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Abstract 
Drawing on a social and cultural analysis of the architecture designed and built 
by the state during the Colombian military dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
(1953-1957), and based on original sources, including historical archives, declassified 
official reports, oral history, and raw blueprints, this PhD research project traces 
relationships between architecture, and the national and international politics of that 
time. In doing so, this research analyses the relation between the built environment 
and power, questioning concepts of representation and identity. It will be argued that 
as well as a materialization of the nationalist discourse, the nationwide consolidation of 
modern architecture should also be seen as a camouflaged instrument of the Cold 
War.  
As part of the contemporary debate about the worldwide impact of the Cold 
War, this research focuses on the architecture of the “National Plan of Public Works” 
developed during Colombian dictatorship of the 1950s. It takes as a case study one of 
the regime’s most emblematic projects: the Naval College Almirante Padilla, using it as 
a methodological instrument through which larger issues can be traced: the 
architecture is taken to be a materialization of the political project of a “new state” in 
Latin America, according to the policies implemented across the hemisphere during the 
Cold War. State architecture was explicitly used as a political device of the aspiring 
“welfare state” amidst a social and governmental controversial context.  
This state architecture co-opted the Modern Movement, simultaneously 
developing modern facilities, and following other national and international agendas. 
But unlike other well-known examples, this was not an attempt to create a unified 
national identity, or to showcase Rojas regime. Conversely, the built environment 
produced by the dictatorship used common strategies of the Cold War; it embodied a 
“double truth” of welfare and warfare. The legacy of this government has been almost 
totally overlooked. By interrogating tactics in use at the time these projects were 
created, what will be articulated here is a critical view of this seemingly neutral 
infrastructure by questioning how this shaped what I will refer to as a conflictual 
identity.  
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Introduction 
In Colombia, at the end of 1954, the military government of General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) organized an exhibition at the Museo Nacional de Colombia 
(National Museum of Colombia), presenting to the community its “National Plan of 
Public Works”. The model of a new Naval College of Colombia Escuela Naval 
Almirante Padilla was the opening feature of the exhibition. Indeed, it was on the front 
page of the catalogue and the image selected to report the exhibition in the media. The 
Naval College was thus portrayed as the representative project of the military 
government’s plan for and policy of infrastructure.  
Tellingly, this architectural complex, located in Cartagena, was the only state 
project of the military government with an special issue of Proa, (Martínez 1955) one of 
the most influential journals of architecture in Latin America during the mid-twentieth 
century. The architectural journal was clearly identified with the postulates of the 
Modern Movement, but also selected and validated projects considered as having 
“exceptional qualities” under these postulates. This architectural complex was the stark 
exception to what can be understood as a “policy of silence” of the journal about the 
regime’s projects.  
 
Figure 1. ENAP general plan: prized state project during the regime, published in 
1955 © Proa 91 
However, two oddities soon arise: first, there is no information about this project 
in the reports of the Ministry of Public Works of those years. Secondly, there is no 
mention of the Naval College in subsequent architectural history in Colombia. Indeed, 
in my studies of architecture, there were minimal allusions to the architecture built in 
the country in the mid-twentieth century, despite the fact that this state infrastructure is 
still in use. The vast number of modern projects developed within this short period of 
time has been totally overlooked as architectural objects of interest. 
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Disregarded legacy 
Looking in detail at the urbanisation process in Colombia, the years of the Rojas 
dictatorship stands out as a time when the adoption of modern architecture was 
accelerated nationwide. Amidst probably the most difficult turmoil in the country’s 
history, the regime concocted a “National Plan of Public Works”. (Piedrahita 1955) This 
Plan was the most visible policy of that government and the centre of its promotional 
image as what was arguably portrayed as a “welfare-state”. However, such idea of a 
welfare-state has important differences with how it is conceived in Europe. As it has 
been discussed by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) the social and economic policies 
that configure the orientation and structure of the state, have a multifaceted character. I 
will follow here Evelyn Huber et al. (1995)’s reference to this practice in Latin American 
countries as it was nominally pursuing a paternalistic action of the state.  
The National Plan of Public Works was an ambitious programme to provide the 
rural and urban areas with infrastructure.([Colombian government] 1951-1957) It was 
an important plan of connectivity, linking the most remote areas, with an extensive plan 
of roads, air routes, and railroads. Most of its visibility was concentrated in civil 
engineering works. Nevertheless, it was also an architectural plan. In terms of 
architectural infrastructure, there was considerable investment in educational, social, 
health, sanitary, civic, transportation, cultural, and even housing projects. Official 
reports mention hundreds of buildings planned, and supposedly funded, by the state in 
different regions of the country. These buildings followed an image of modern 
architecture, had dispersed locations, and represented the country’s progress. For 
Rojas dictatorship, the policy of Public Works acted as a catalyst for the consolidation 
at a national level of the Modern Movement. However, these projects have been left 
out of the history of architecture in Colombia. They are a disregarded legacy. 
Therefore, this research asks: what was the rationale behind the generation of what 
appear at first glance to be arbitrary projects? And how can the historical 
consequences of these projects be understood?  
 
Figure 2. Naval College designed by Obregon & Valenzuela, 1955-1961: 
representative project of modern architecture promoted by the state © ENAP 
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Current architectural history debates provide a source of reference. The 
relationship between architecture and power has been a subject of interest which 
scholars have amply discussed vis-a-vis other regions.1 The particular influence of the 
Cold War period on architecture has rapidly grown as a subject for discussion in the 
last decade.2 However, it is an almost unexplored subject in Latin America.3 In this 
sense, there is an opportunity to bring this subject matter to the region and to relate it 
to one of the less considered periods in Latin American architectural studies. To date, 
these uncomfortable questions have been avoided, generating elisions in the 
architectural history of an important part of the twentieth century. This project 
challenges established views, and aims to contribute to the cultural history of Latin 
American architecture, breaking this silence in three main ways: filling the gap in the 
study of modernity in different Latin American countries; challenging the current canon 
of study of modern architecture in Colombia; and addressing its relation with the 
national and international politics of the 1950s.  
 
Canonical studies of Architectural History in Colombia 
Scholarly literature has noted outstanding developments of modern architecture 
in Brazil and México; the most inclusive studies also consider Cuba and Venezuela. 
Such is the case with Carlos Brillembourg (2004), Valerie Fraser (2000), Damian 
Bayón et al. (1979), Francisco Bullrich (1969), Paul Damaz (1963), and Henry Russell 
Hitchcock (1955). However, little is known about other countries, such as Colombia, 
that developed differently, despite the fact that in 1955, in the opinion of Henry Russell 
Hitchcock, the country had “a promising advance”. When asked about the quality of the 
constructions he answers: “The best quality is the Colombian.” Later he comments 
regarding the countries that play a determinant role for the modern movement: “Brazil 
has still a directing role, both in quantity as in the visual interest of its solutions. 
                                                
1 Relevant works of reference are: (Bleecker 1981); (Lane et al. 1978; Lane 1985); (Weizman 
2008; Holston 1989; Dovey 1999); (Hirst 2005); (Adam 2012) 
2 Influential references are: (Rusi 1991), (Dezalay et al. 1996), (Appy 2000), (Cocroft et al. 2003), 
(Fraser et al. 2007), (Crowley et al. 2008), (Castillo 2010),  
3 Simultaneous with this research, other projects have emerged, filling a considerable gap in the 
regional modern architectural history in its political context. Some references are: (Andreoli et al. 2007), 
(del Real 2012), (del Real et al. 2013) Previous works address a wider spectrum than architecture itself:  
(Andermann et al. 2005), (Giunta 2005). 
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Colombia, and lately Venezuela do also have a lot to offer in these last years.” 
("Entrevista a Henry Russell-Hitchcock sobre arquitectura moderna latinoamericana"  
1955) 
 Notably, in the preparation for his pioneering survey of Latin American 
architecture, Henry-Russell Hitchcock commented in a letter to Paul Rudolph on June 
23, 1954, how difficult the challenge was: 
I am shocked that Harvard library has such a poor coverage. I 
have been through the files of two Argentine magazines and 
one Cuban one with little edification to date, but of course I was 
already aware that Mexico, Brazil, and after them Colombia and 
Venezuela have the best stuff. The Mexican and Brazilian 
magazines are at Yale, and I shall be going through them 
shortly. So far, I have been unable to locate any Colombian or 
Venezuelan magazines. (Hitchcock 1954c) 
Neither modernity, nor Latin America, are monolithic phenomena. The Latin 
Americanist Alan McPherson (2003) reports that during the twentieth century in the 
region there were simultaneous trends, ranging from a radical “developmentalism” that 
followed the new living standards, to “indigenism” – movements that opposed the 
modern image. So far, little is known about what happened in Colombian architecture 
during the Cold War. 
Unfortunately, the literature on architectural history of Colombia does not have 
a long tradition. There are few references before the 1980s, and since that time an 
important generation of national architects has researched and established a canon: 
what is considered worthy in terms of the history of architecture. These books 
constitute the foundation of education in architecture in Colombian universities, and 
have also permeated foreign views about the country’s achievements. The most well-
known authors of architectural histories are Silvia Arango (1989), Alberto Saldarriaga 
Roa (1986), and Germán Téllez Castañeda (1977). 
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Traditionally, architectural history in most Latin American countries, including 
Colombia, has identified historical periods that are “worthy” of study, because they are 
considered to constitute its identity.4 Such is the case of Colonial architecture, which 
was a Spanish legacy, or the case of the eclectic architecture that celebrated the 
young Republican country adopting different influences, including neoclassical 
elements.5 Nevertheless, it is curious that these previous architectures were 
considered part of the national identity regardless of their association with foreign 
influences, while such foreign relations have been taken as an argument for excluding 
modern architecture. 
The history of modern architecture written in Latin America after the 1980s,6 as 
the scholar Felipe Hernandez (2002) has argued, has been articulated according to a 
tradition that focuses on studying the form and function of isolated objects: in particular, 
objects built by a group of selected individuals that by then were identified as canons of 
the “appropriate modernity”. Such denomination in turn builds on Kenneth Frampton’s 
conception of “synthetic regional modernism”. (1980) That is, this so-called peripheral 
development of the original (US or European) modern architecture. Assuming as 
secondary architecture that which was produced elsewhere, case in point, in Latin 
America, where significance was given only to what followed organic forms, or was 
                                                
4 I would suggest that there is a common ground in traditional architectural history of Colombia: 
its authors make few references to Pre-Hispanic architecture. They focus on colonial architecture and 
urbanism imposed by the Spaniards since the sixteenth century to early nineteenth century.  After 
independence in the nineteenth century, they present the changes of the so-called “republican 
architecture”. On the first two decades of the twentieth century, this literature presents what is usually 
known as the “architecture of transition” as a desperate search for new references. Moving then in the 
1930s and 1940s to a sort of “pre-modernity” imported by a group of foreign architects – whether they 
participated as external consultants, or indeed, immigrated to Colombia –, which were common 
phenomena in other countries in South America. 
5 The tradition in Colombia has been to give an architectural language the same name as the 
political period, In this case, Republican corresponds to the period after independence from the Spanish 
Empire, i.e. the nineteenth century, and extending to the beginning of the twentieth century. However, it 
would be more accurate to name it eclecticism, as it corresponds to the confluence of diverse non-Spanish 
European expressions. 
6 Indeed, some of these research works focusing on the 1970s, highlighting the so-called “brick 
architecture”, were initially developed in British schools of architecture during the 1980s. Lorenzo Fonseca, 
Carlos Niño, Alberto Saldarriaga, were educated either at the Bartlett School of Architecture, or at the 
Architectural Association. This scholarly literature expands on the brick architecture of the 1970s, claiming 
this to be what Christian Fernandez Cox called “appropriate modernity”. i.e. the amalgamation of modern 
spaces incorporating traditional materials or features. By placing special emphasis on the work of 
individual architects, such as Rogelio Salmona, Guillermo Bermudez, and Fernando Martínez Sanabria; all 
of them with examples of what was termed in Colombia as “brick architecture”, and which was mainly built 
in Bogotá. 
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built of brick. However, the idea that some periods were more “appropriate” than others 
generates certain questions.  
Such a posture has undervalued this alternative modern architecture, 
questioning its historical validity. Consequently, the issue of what happened in 
architecture from the 1940s to the 1970s has been excluded from the canon, 
presenting a clear gap in the literature of architectural history. This gap becomes more 
surprising when we realize that it was precisely during these decades Latin American 
countries, and particularly Colombia, experienced a sharp and accelerated 
urbanization process. Colombian cities were for the most part built up in these decades 
yet they remain the least examined in terms of architectural scholarship.  
 
· Unquestioned modern architecture 
In Colombia, as in other countries in the region, the move to modernism was a 
long process, the initial developments of which can be traced back to the 1930s, or 
even slightly earlier, and to specific social, economic, and political changes.7 
Modernism implied a transformation in the image of rapidly growing cities, and the 
awareness of a diverse and fragmented country. However, the instability and 
complexities of the transformations that occurred during the twentieth century made 
solving emerging issues a priority rather than understanding what was already there.  
Moreover, the traditional primacy of two elements, Bogotá and housing, has 
long determined what is registered in architectural history. On the one hand, Bogotá as 
a capital city with a major concentration of power, has not only had the most active 
research centres but also the resources and sources to pursue these studies. And, on 
the other hand, the permanent shortage of housing in main cities, that has barely 
responded to a rapidly growing and vulnerable population of mainly rural migrants. My 
aim is to contribute to the knowledge of modernist architecture at the time, type and 
place where there is the largest scholarly gap. That is to say that I will focus on the four 
                                                
7 The political context of the country will be discussed in Chapter 1. Despite the bipartisan 
practice prevalent during the twentieth century, between liberals and conservatives, their politics are 
traditionalist and guided by a close relation with the Catholic church.  
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years of the regime, on state architecture, and on projects others but housing outside 
of Bogotá.  
Regarding studies of the civil architecture developed by the state, there are few 
published references available. An important exception is the architectural historian 
Carlos Niño Murcia (1991). Niño, who personally recovered the archives of the Ministry 
of Public Works (they were being stored in an abattoir), has identified the Ministry as a 
dominant actor in the promotion of modern architecture.8 Niño demonstrates that this 
Ministry was a laboratory of experimentation and research on architecture and 
construction technologies and that, for more than 60 years, this government agency 
was the most active promoter of designs and works nationwide. However, he makes 
few references to the Ministry of Public Works projects during the period of the 
dictatorship. It is the aim of this thesis to illuminate the paradigmatic changes to 
architecture at this time.  
Also of interest is the Master’s dissertation by architect Doris García de 
Moncada (2004) about architecture built in Bogotá during the government of Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla. This study betrays an evident proclivity in favour of the General, and 
even avoids referring to the regime as a dictatorship. The work inventories projects 
built in the capital city, dedicating an important section to housing development during 
a much more extended period than that covered by Rojas government and plans. 
Interestingly, without identifying their specific participation in individual projects, this 
dissertation introduces references to a number of American architectural and 
engineering firms that worked with the military government, such as: Skidmore Owings 
& Merrill (SOM); Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett & McCarthy (later known as TAMS); 
Morrison-Knudsen; Holabird, Root & Burgee, among others. 
 
· Historiography  
                                                
8 Carlos Niño’s research comprises a comprehensive inventory of state architecture from 1905 to 
1960, planned and built up by the Direction of National Buildings, unfortunately with fewer references 
towards the last decades of study.  
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Accurate references about the production of built environment during the 
dictatorship are lacking. A large amount of the political and economic histories of the 
period focuses its attention on corruption. Most references adopt a critical position 
about the excesses of the government.9 Other references defend Rojas on account of 
the popular support he enjoyed.10 Critics usually came from the circles of power, or the 
groups affected by the drastic measures or the excesses of the government, i.e. 
traditional politicians, industrialists, scholars, students, journalists, and the clergy. The 
masses, on the other hand, maintained their support for the General as he claimed to 
embody their concerns, providing them with the social services of the aspiring welfare 
state. In informal conversations about the regime, when talking about this research, it is 
evident that certain buildings remain connected to Rojas, as well as recollections of the 
corruption, and the abuses of power, and the cruelty towards those known for their 
discontent. The accounts that favour the military government rely on its populism11 and 
refer to the extensive number of projects of the National Plan of Public Works. 
The National Plan of Public Works, however, is barely mentioned in 
architectural history12 and even now there is a certain resistance to the topic. When I 
have discussed the period, either with the people involved, or with those who have 
written history of the time, there is a degree of denial, and most memories and 
references turn either into a defence or a denunciation of the acts of the government. 
Although he argues “it is not a denial but a lack of elements to do methodical 
research”, Téllez stresses that after experiencing the Rojas regime: 
This is inevitable; there is no middle ground on this theme. Try 
to understand that buildings of the regime were regarded as 
having a primordially political significance or, on the other hand, 
as useful public tools, the origins of which no one cared or knew 
about. Few remember [now] exactly what hospitals, 
                                                
9 Cf (Rojas de Moreno 2000), (Lasso Vega 2005) Cf (Urán Rojas 1983), (Lasso Vega 2005) 
10 Cf (Urán Rojas 1983), (Valencia et al. 1970) Cf (Valencia et al. 1970), (Rojas de Moreno 2000) 
11 Although acknowledging the populist tendencies, the economic historian Lopez discusses the 
identification of Rojas Pinilla’s government as populist based on economic scholarship. (Lopez Sanchez 
2006)  
12 Case in point, the absence of most works of the decade is recurrent in most of the scholarly 
canon. Cf (Silvia Arango 1989),  Case in point, the absence of most works of the decade is recurrent in 
most of the scholarly canon. Cf (Silvia Arango 1989), (Saldarriaga Roa 1988), (Niño Murcia 1991) 
(Corradine Angulo et al. 2001),  (Corradine Angulo et al. 2001),  
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waterworks, roads, bridges or housing projects were built during 
the dictatorship and do not care whether they were put up by 
other governments. (Téllez Castañeda 2013)  
In an interview about the specific research conducted into the architectural 
projects of the Ministry of Public Works from 1905 to 1960, the scholar Carlos Nino 
Murcia has pointed out that this absence is also related to the scarcity of material 
available in the Ministry archives. (Niño Murcia 2011) Indeed, the Ministry used to 
preserve a detailed record of their activities, but the information from the period of the 
dictatorship is either disorganized or non-existent. Nevertheless, this argument alone 
does not explain the silence, as in Colombia there was no extensive tradition of record-
keeping until the 1990s, and canonical scholars have done extraordinary work in 
recovering an account of the national architecture in other periods based on fragments 
of information. One wonders, therefore, if there may be other reasons for this omission. 
In Colombia the architecture produced between the 1940s and 1970s has not been 
considered of value, despite the fact that it constitutes an important proportion of the 
country’s built environment. Silvia Arango introduces the 1950s as follows: 
In global terms it could be said that the modern movement in 
Colombia, now identified as official architecture of the 
"establishment", followed a similar path to other parts of the 
world: away from the essentialist purism from the 1940s, was 
drifting in a fortuitous formalism that although it sometimes 
produced aesthetically elaborated examples, it already showed 
signs of conceptual depletion. They began to feel then, attacks 
directed at different flanks. (Silvia Arango 1989, 235) 
Samper Martínez (2000) highlights a few state projects in the Época de Oro, 
one of the few accounts of modern architecture in Colombia, but their focus tends more 
to private housing and commercial projects. And there is no major allusion to the 
dictatorship as the promoter of such development. Téllez Castañeda (1977) traces 
relations with the political and economic context of the architectural projects from the 
1930s in Crítica e Imagen; there is general information about how a number of projects 
were framed under the National Plan of Public Works, but little overview of it. 
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The most relevant Latin American architectural journals of the time, such as 
Proa, Casas y Lotes, Arquitecturas, CIA (Construcción, Ingeniería, Arquitectura), 
Ingeniería y Arquitectura, reported mainly on housing projects. International journals 
such as Architectural Record, Architecture d’aujourd’hui, highlight the innovations of 
the young Colombian architects of that time, also stressing on private housing. Only 
Escala13 since the mid-1960s developed a series on different infrastructural projects, 
i.e. hotels, schools, airports, markets, hospitals, and so on, but without any specific 
reference to the Rojas National Plan of Public Works. The literature gap has remained 
for more than 50 years. At the same time, these infrastructural projects have been in 
use as part of the urban life of various cities. The political history keeps its polarity, as 
the political capital built by Rojas Pinilla still constitutes an active legacy for his family; 
indeed the former mayor of Bogotá, (2008-2011) Samuel Moreno Rojas, was his 
grandson.14 
 
· Recent discussions 
During the past decade, a growing interest in modern architecture built during 
the 1950s and 1960s has taken place.15 Scholarship by the new generation of 
researchers addresses from different perspectives architectural objects produced at 
the time. This has coincided with the broader scholarly interest in peripheral 
architectures. Mainly, these research projects have been associated with Universidad 
Torcuato Di Tella, Universitat Polytecnica de Catalunya, Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, University of Texas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, more recently 
with Columbia University, and now with the Bartlett School of Architecture. The 
research of architects such as María Pia Fontana, Luis Fernando Molina, Isabel 
Llanos, and Hugo Mondragón, among others, is establishing a canon of study for 
                                                
13 A Colombian architectural journal 
14 It was not only General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla who built on the political capital achieved during 
his regime, but other members of the family have also had since then active political careers, including his 
daughter María Eugenia Moreno de Rojas, and son-in-law Samuel Moreno Diaz, and grandsons Ivan 
Moreno Rojas, and Samuel Moreno Rojas. This political capital remains as active as polemic. 
15 Recent economic history has identified the 1950s as a period of consolidation of the 
industrialization of the country that had started in previous decades. However, little credit is given to how 
this development was supported. Indeed, there are few references to the new infrastructure and services 
the state was providing. Cf (Sáenz Rovner 2002) 
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modern architecture in Colombia. Most of these scholars concentrate their attention on 
what they call project [formal] analysis: in other words, the study of isolated objects 
focused on its formal and spatial systems, especially using the CIAM grid as its 
methodology. 
In addition, emerging scholars such as Patricio del Real (2012), and Robert 
Gonzalez (2011) have researched overviews and intersections of Latin American 
architecture, in a way continuing the earlier and probably lesser known work outside 
the region, of Roberto Segre (1975), Damian Bayón et al. (1979), Miguel Angel Roca 
(1995), and Francisco Liernur (2002).  
 
Approaching ideas of power in the Cold War context 
The notion of power is a keystone in the study of the social and political 
implications of architecture. This concept has been broadly theorized in the social 
sciences, particularly in anthropology, history and philosophy. Furthermore, the 
interconnection between power and aesthetics has established the grounds for an 
active debate since the second third of the twentieth century. The architectural 
discussion on the subject has been notable in European and American academia over 
the last few decades, and is currently expanding towards new regions of the globe, and 
acquiring a growing body of references.16 However, most of these studies are largely 
focused on traditional and explicit manifestations of power. During the Cold War, and in 
the case under analysis, formal expressions of power and tactics were not at all clear-
cut. 
Thus, scholars have found that strategies in use during the Cold War such as 
“soft power” are helpful in terms of understanding what would otherwise be fragments 
of contradictory and ambiguous data, as this historical material has recently become 
public. In a similar trend, I found a wider understanding about use of “camouflage” 
tactics results essential in the production, mediation, and reception of architecture. 
These concepts were crucial in the post-war context, and here are ascribed to the built 
                                                
16 C.f. (Farrar 2008), (Maran 2006), (Hirst 2005), (Dovey 1999) 
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environment. Though this is not a detailed account of all the contributions made to 
these subjects, my aim is to explore the concept of power, and its strategies in order to 
create the grounds for the proposed analysis of Colombian modern state architecture 
promoted by the dictatorship during the 1950s. 
  
· Architecture as an instrument of power  
Architecture as one of the most important materializations of state power and 
authority has been an often visited topic. Architectural materialization is conventionally 
understood in two different ways: first, it is the result of the “will” of a particular society; 
and, secondly, it is a conditioner of that society, in what has been criticized as a 
deterministic approach. However, the complexity of the duo – architecture and power – 
requires that reductions be avoided and established parameters challenged. 
Sociologist Anthony Giddens (1979) assumes power is a determinant in the 
structuring of society: “spatial practices of power can be modelled as enabling and 
constraining relations between structure and agency”. In his work structure is read as 
rules and resources, and agency as the will or capacity to transform. From Giddens, I 
would trace a relation to the idea of Michel de Certeau about the malleability of society 
through materializations on space as anchors of memory, depending on the structure 
and the agency (Certeau 1984). In other words, society’s milieu, in addition to the 
temporal and spatial situations, is defined by political agency.  
Considering physical and temporal conditions has been a commonplace within 
architectural studies. However, political aspects are no less important, and may alter 
the former in a definitive manner. The temporal and spatial context may be the most 
evident, whereas the influences of the political context on the configuration of space 
may be more difficult to demonstrate. This is the specific challenge posed by my own 
research, since political decisions made by the dictatorship are not open to public 
scrutiny and debate.  
Connections created by the structuring of these spatial relations rely on their 
dialectic and duality. On the one hand, space may be a medium for the power 
implemented, and on the other, it may be an outcome of the politics. In other words, 
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built form operates as both a conditioner and a representation of power. This is how I 
will treat built form throughout my thesis. 
In treating space as both ideological frame and social construction, I have been 
influenced by Henri Lefebvre, particularly in The Production of Space. (Lefebvre, 1991) 
It might be relevant to point out here that, for Lefebvre, space as a conditioner has a 
double connotation: it is a means of production, as an engine of society; and it is 
simultaneously a commodity, a device of social reproduction and control. Concurrently, 
for Lefebvre space constitutes a representation, that is an embodiment of knowledge, 
ideology and “utopia” – namely, an artefact that reflects as a social product the society 
that created it, and that, in a dialectical way, is a conditioner of what is being 
represented. Thus, shaping society is an operational and functional role of space. As 
Lefebvre has remarked: “the space thus produced, also serves as a tool of thought and 
of action; that is in addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of 
control, and hence of domination, of power”. (Lefebvre 1991, 26) This idea of the 
materialization of relations confers an active role on space; it is not an inert locus. The 
production, reproduction and representation of space imply a permanent dynamism, 
conditioning the coexistence and cohesion of society. Space as a social product is a 
result of the permanent construction of diverse relations, from which it can be derived 
that society and space are produced simultaneously and reciprocally. 
Lefebvre warns us that “the practice of power can be hidden within the 
structures and representations of space”; (Lefebvre 1991, 389-91) this gives even 
more significance to the ways in which space is produced, and how it can construct 
illusions of freedom, and forms of control operating under the simulation of innocence 
and transparency, which might be decoded tracing the appropriate relations. Again, 
this is what this research attempts to trace in the case of the infrastructure produced by 
the Rojas regime. 
In a similar vein, Pierre Bourdieu claims that spaces can be “political 
instruments […], of which they are the product, and of which they reproduce the 
structures in a transformed form”. (Bourdieu 1994, 160) He proposes to connect 
motivations with these structures, generating a dialectical relationship. For Bourdieu, 
what motivates social relations, ideologies and practices is what might be conceived as 
a strategy. As we will see, the awareness of the presence of different and intricate 
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tactics is key to understanding the built phenomenon generated during the Rojas 
dictatorship. 
 
· Effacement on Colombian architecture 
Hidden strategies of power were common during the Cold War. In that context, 
my claim is that the production of the built environment during the dictatorship of 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla aimed at a deliberate effacement. –As we will see the 
stratagem did indeed allow the regime to address simultaneously national and 
international agendas. The multiplicity of small and dispersed projects may be 
unexpected for a totalitarian regime such as this. However, it corresponds to a well-
structured and complex strategy of “double-truth”. That is, a double agenda of welfare 
and warfare, through the use of soft power and camouflaging tactics. With foreign 
cooperation the national government received technical advice, materials provision, 
and funding to pursue its ambitions and necessary plans and projects. However, the 
internal agenda of that cooperation and the apparently inoffensive ‘aid’ offered is a 
fertile terrain to explore. 
At this point one can infer that the regime’s withholding of information was also 
intentional, not only through neglecting to report publicly the decisions taken by an 
authoritarian government, but also as part of the strategic operations. A lack of records 
of the discussions – to establish which projects should take priority, or considerations 
about the convenience of those supposedly unrelated buildings that welcomed modern 
life – seem to be an indicator of the dictatorship’s guidelines. Such may be the case 
with the dispersed register of individuals instead of firms in the administrative records, 
or the absence of the participation of the US Corps of Engineers in the Ministry of 
Public Works records.17 By contrast, in the US State Department records in NARA 
there is information about their active involvement in cooperation projects in 
Colombia.18  
                                                
17 Names correspond to architects, engineers, landscape designers, and so on. Ultimately, 
unidentified individuals. 
18 Estimations about the lack of records cannot be fully comprehensive by virtue of their secretive 
nature. 
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What is contradictory, however, is the persistent use of the strategic 
transformation of the built environment undertaken by the dictatorship as propaganda. 
Such visibility ended up being a guarantee of invisibility. As we will see, the policy for 
built environment was fundamental in building the political capital of General Rojas and 
his family, but this was clearly not the only purpose of the whole enterprise, or the 
reason for all the support it received in terms of international cooperation.  
In Colombia, double-truth strategies in the built environment took place on 
different and complementary levels: one was ideological, what is known in military 
strategy as psychological operations; the other was physical, following patterns of what 
was known as industrial camouflage.  
 
Complexity of the historical context of architecture  
Colombia is recognized as one of the most solid democracies in South 
America.19 However, the country experienced four years of a military regime that is still 
a problematic historical subject, as records remain fragmented and polarized. It is also 
a difficult subject to tackle when confronted with our own political ideas; when it raises 
uncomfortable questions about different actors; and, moreover, when what is 
questioned are its internal strategies in a country where security is an unavoidable and 
sensitive issue. Nevertheless, that dictatorship took place, and it is necessary to 
understand both what its architecture and infrastructure embodies and the historical 
consequences. The dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla has so far remained 
an obscure period, on which few historians have produced balanced studies. Part of 
the difficulty in evaluating its legacy is that it continues to influence politics and society 
in quite direct ways.20 Under a telling title, The making of modern Colombia, a nation in 
spite of itself, the scholar David Bushnell (1993) puts it this way: on the one hand, the 
dictatorship significantly reduced the violence in the most turbulent areas of the country 
                                                
19 Other countries in Latin America had had multiple and prolonged dictatorships. Most of these 
were during the 1970s, this period having become known as “the lost decade”. 
20 Based on the political capital created during this regime, there are still members of Rojas’ 
family taking part in the current political scene. For instance, in one of the most recent elections his 
grandson was elected Mayor of Bogotá 2008-2011. Yet, he was suspended before finishing his period in 
office, and is under investigation for corruption. 
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with different forms of repression, censorship and abuses of force; on the other hand, it 
integrated the furthest regions of the country by providing them with an infrastructure 
and social programs. Indeed, this military government of the 1950s was initially backed 
by international cooperation provided by the United States, and others, during the Cold 
War. 
 
Figure 3. Colombia seen by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs: a fragment of 
the country, and dramatic geographical conditions © RAC 
This brings us to two observations that will underpin this thesis. First, Latin 
America – and Colombia with it – has almost disappeared from the Cold War history in 
the last 40 years. Secondly, the conditions of a dictatorship have led to a highly 
polarized political history. In consequence, in the first case, it has been necessary for 
this research to go back to the oldest material – that is, to evidence from publications of 
the 1940s to 1970s; and, in the second case, to incorporate more than the material 
written in those decades that is, to include more recent and balanced political studies. 
Although it does not seem feasible to claim a sort of neutrality, what I will present here 
are the ambivalent, fragmented and contradictory records of a period that deserves a 
better understanding. 
 
· A methodological problem: data access 
A methodological problem arose during this research, concerning documents 
and archives, which involved secrecy, and sensitivity. Because of the dictatorship and 
the Cold War, I found two main obstacles. On the one hand, though a few archives do 
already exist which contain original governmental records about this specific period, 
some institutions do not consider them to be of historical interest. Consequently, most 
of the archival material has not had conventional preservation treatment or been 
catalogued. On the other hand, given the political particularities of Colombia, both then 
and now, a considerable part of the political information and existing material has been 
connected to the country’s security. As a result, I have been granted access to some 
material that still has restricted access, or that has become available through “freedom 
of information” acts, and therefore I have had to sign a confidentiality agreement and 
cannot divulge what can be considered sensitive material for national security. I have 
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remained faithful to this commitment whilst pursuing a cultural analysis of the built 
environment phenomena.  
 
Figure 4. Archival material of the Rojas presidency 1953-1957 without 
preservation © AGN 
Even more complicated is the scenario regarding architectural documents. 
There is a notoriously weak tradition of keeping records and archives in Colombia, so 
that the scarce remaining material available from institutions and architectural studios 
becomes particularly valuable. Given the lack of strict policies and regulations about 
the built environment, Colombia, unlike Portugal or Germany, does not keep written 
accounts of architectural projects in order for them to be approved. Both the records 
and omissions in Colombian architectural, and political history thus constitute a primary 
source.  
After an initial investigation of the National Plan of Public Works, I defined a 
specific case study: the Naval College. Not only was this original and partially built 
architectural complex representative of the regime’s built environment policies, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, I achieved access to the institutional information 
about it, and have stayed on site whilst collecting information. The architectural 
complex itself constitutes a key piece of evidence. 
In Colombia, official information becomes of public interest after 50 years, and 
so I have also taken the opportunity offered by the relatively recent reception of the 
collection of this regime’s presidency at the Archivo General de la Nación (Colombian 
National Archives). However, this information is still dispersed, and uncatalogued. This 
has also been the case with US archives that after a similar period have decreased 
levels of confidentiality. Besides the copious material I have accessed and dealt with 
for this research, admittedly, the evidence is still circumstantial. I never found any 
explicit or specific references that related to the strategies implemented on the built 
environment during the dictatorship. Indeed, the lack of any explicit documents of the 
Plan on the part of the dictatorship ended up being one of the most significant findings 
of this research.  
Therefore, this research will take into consideration not only the original 
blueprints of the Naval College, but also alternative sources such as Rojas historical 
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documents, official reports of the Ministry of Public Works from 1953-1961, recently 
declassified diplomatic communications, oral history,21 media reports, and ephemera, 
covering a necessary period of reference from the 1930s to the 1970s. Wherever 
possible, I have filled gaps of information through different institutional and personal 
archives in Colombia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, I have not 
only relied on written documents. More than twenty personal interviews with architects 
and other relevant actors of the time (former functionaries, and architectural historians), 
have greatly enriched this research. 
Regarding language and orthography: the larger part of my evidence is in 
Spanish, so what is included in the thesis are my translations (unless stated 
otherwise). I also use the Spanish style for names, which in most cases include a 
compound surname; such is the case of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, which is shortened to 
Rojas. And, finally, I am retaining the use of American spelling for official names and 
original quotations. 
 
· Relevance of the research 
It might seem obvious that a Naval College would be representative of a 
dictatorship, but the peculiarities of the Colombian case cast it in a different light. 
Intriguingly, the dictatorship claimed to be building a new nation, and one of its flagship 
projects was the school of the naval armed forces of the country. It is worth mentioning 
that, although Colombia has broad maritime areas in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, 
the public does not recognize the Navy as a war command.22 Institutionally, it is a clear 
presence of the state and a permanent point of reference for the inhabitants of 
Cartagena, one of the most important ports on the Caribbean coast since colonial 
times, even if they cannot access it physically. Indeed the Navy, as an institution, is 
                                                
21 Although oral history has been a valuable and orientating source of information – given the 
distant period of study, and its sensitivity – I have tried to cross check information gathered in different 
interviews with alternative evidence. 
22 Colombian military forces include the Army, the Navy and the Air force. Within the country, the 
Army is the largest force, which has a vast presence in the territory being identified as the core of the 
defence system. By contrast, the Navy is less visible in daily life and a common citizen would identify the 
Navy with high profile officials in white uniform who appear as aides de camp either at official ceremonies 
of the presidency, or at the national beauty contest. 
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part of the identity of the city. However, in spite of the complex’s strategic importance, it 
is widely regarded as an academic centre, rather than a military base. 
 
Figure 5. Naval College Location in Cartagena © IGAC (modified) 
Through the analysis of the National Plan of Public Works and the Naval 
College, my contention is that the regime’s developments in the built environment were 
part of a complex strategy that was premised on misrepresentation in order to achieve 
very specific aims. It was a “double truth” game, where welfare and warfare concerns 
of the time were entangled. This thesis maintains that it was this intertwining of welfare 
and warfare that has driven the conflictive relation to these projects. 
This research contributes to the growing scholarship about Latin American 
modernist architecture, but it is also a starting point for further studies. The information 
analysed has already opened a Pandora’s box of questions and issues and it does not 
by any means pretend to be a comprehensive history of the period. However, it does 
seek to focus new light on these works, a significant number of which are currently 
under threat from demolition, and to open up a debate about what they represent in 
Colombian history and society. 
 
· Overview of the structure  
The structure of the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part provides 
some necessary context for a more specific discussion of Colombian architecture. The 
opening chapter about the historical context starts from a familiar terrain of 
international history, in which I will situate Latin America, before focusing on the 
internal particularities of Colombia. The Cold War not only embodied tension between 
East and West; it expanded and made visible the North-South relation. It conditioned 
social and cultural development during the twentieth century. After the Second World 
War, foreign countries identified Latin America as a fertile terrain with valuable natural 
and mineral resources. Like most countries of the region during the mid-twentieth 
century, Colombia began a transition from rural to urban society. Social and political 
conditions shaped the urbanization process, which was highly influenced by the 
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international involvement. On the one hand, the mass media permanently promoted 
new living standards. On the other, the military government developed assertive 
campaigns about the creation of the new state. 
From this context, the specific discourses and strategies that shaped the spatial 
production of the time, will be addressed in the second chapter. Consequently, this 
chapter considers international policies and practices that will help to understand the 
Colombian case in relation to the complex post-war dynamics. The Cold War was a 
latent conflict; its tactics, means, and extent were often distorted. This historical 
research sets out to expand to the Latin American periphery the study of the intrinsic 
relation between socio-politics and the built environment that exists in European and 
American scholarly literature. This cultural approach to the study of architecture 
constitutes pioneering work in the field in this South American country. 
The second part of this thesis addresses the specific case of the built 
environment in Colombia during the dictatorship, and constitutes the core of this 
research. The relation between architecture and politics during the Rojas regime was 
manifested through the National Plan of Public Works. Therefore the third chapter 
presents an account of the Plan as the government portrayed it, mainly based on 
records of the official reports and media, and discusses how it articulated the national, 
regional, and urban development. The government constantly mentioned the Plan, yet 
what it actually consisted of was never known in detail by the public. Indeed, this Plan 
is still unknown as we will see.  
The fourth chapter discusses the national project undertaken during the 1950s. 
The National Plan of Public Works did not directly encompass the guidelines of 
international experts who had had a professional presence in recent years such as Le 
Corbusier, and Wiener and Sert. It was portrayed as an inclusive plan that sought the 
incorporation of more distant regions through a group of isolated and dispersed 
buildings, and works of infrastructure. It establishes an interpretation of the policy of 
spatial production following the national and international agendas at the urban level. 
The fifth and sixth chapters analyse the case study: the Naval College 
Almirante Padilla. The fifth chapter presents the architectural complex of the Naval 
College in Cartagena. The original project of the complex will be explained. Even 
though the urban and architectural project was never built in its entirety, it was 
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designed at a very detailed level. On the urban level, it works as a satellite area of the 
main city. The college was conceived as a self-contained unit on an island of 163 
acres. It amply fulfils the architectural requirements of the military institution, which 
anticipated a population of 1,500 cadets. ([ENAP] 1946-1976)  
The following chapter traces the connections of the architectural project in order 
to shed light on the strategies in use by the regime. It characterizes its participants, the 
interpretation given by the institution, and its inhabitants, and relates the project to 
wider operations. It should however be stressed that the evidence gathered from the 
field, archives and oral history is as contradictory as it is illustrative. 
The mediation and instrumentalization of architecture will be discussed in the 
third part of this thesis. In the seventh chapter I discuss the implementation of 
ambivalent strategies on architectural projects of the 1950s. They were not an 
exceptional process, nor a solitary one. The proposed utopia confronted deep-rooted 
social problems and vast territories, making it yet more difficult to fulfil some of the 
expectations of the society. In this sense, the cultural and historical consequences of 
this process will be addressed: it was a modernity without modernization.  
Drawing on the idea that architecture is a material representation, this research 
project takes the Naval College of Cartagena as a lens of interpretation through which 
to analyse the cultural and political implications and significance of the National Plan of 
Public Works. Through a prominent development in Colombia, architecture illustrates 
larger principles of the complex dynamics involved in the national and international 
context of the mid-twentieth century. As part of the contemporary debate about the 
Cold War’s impacts, this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of these 
relations of architecture and power in a peripheral region such as Latin America. From 
an academic perspective, it is as fascinating, as it is challenging, to trace these 
relations that are manifested in the built environment, but that have fallen into oblivion.  
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Part I 
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1. Setting the context: 1930-1970 
Understanding the complex and particular context of Colombian architecture in 
the 1950s requires a wider panorama. The historical window between the 1930s and 
1970s will allow us to trace not only the architectural particulars, but also political, 
economic and social aspects that have shaped the built environment created during 
Rojas dictatorship between 1953 and 1957. Once the national conditions are inserted 
within the international frame, new interpretations of the development of modern 
architecture in the country are possible. The well-known international circumstances of 
the Cold War, thus, will be linked to the internal situation of this Latin American nation. 
Therefore, I focus this research on four years of dictatorship in the context of the 
historical period of four decades. 
 
Figure 6. Common images of the mid-twentieth century: inauguration Luis Angel 
Arango Library, 1958 © BLAA 
Contemporary interest in the Cold War is continuously growing as historical analysis 
becomes more informed, due to the lessening of restrictions on official documents of 
that time. So far, scholarly literature has focused mainly on the political, cultural and 
military tensions between Eastern Bloc and Western Hemisphere. The North-South 
inter-connection, however, is still a lesser known terrain to explore. How did this 
phenomenon affect the relation between the traditional centres of power (such as the 
United States, European countries, and the USSR) and developing countries in the 
“Global South”?23 In the case of architectural history, the insertion of Latin America into 
the context of the Cold War is the subject of on-going research projects;24 thus, in this 
                                                
23 Growing research in the Cold War is taking place mainly in different institutes of Latin American 
studies, as is the case of the LSE, ILAS - SLAS, and LASA. It usually focuses on economics, politics, and 
social aspects.  
24 Such is the case of the on-going research projects at MoMA, Columbia University, and 
Syracuse University about which there is not much information available at the moment. Some advances 
have been presented at academic events such as the SAH 2012 and SAH 2013. Perhaps the most 
relevant is the research coordinated by Professor Barry Bergdoll (2011): MoMA is preparing an exhibition 
for 2014-2015 about the role of the museum with the interconnections of cultural politics and modern 
architecture in Latin America in the early years of the Cold War, revisiting the exhibition and publication 
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thesis I will focus on the relationships and influences between US foreign policy and 
modern architecture in Colombia in the 1950s.  
The wider scenario extends over decades and multiple actors; for the purposes 
of this research, however, I emphasize the relationship of the United States and Latin 
America, and more specifically Colombia, as it was highly influential, most publicized, 
and has reachable data access. Other foreign influences were present, but their impact 
is perhaps less concrete, more dispersed, and individual. As an area of study, these 
foreign interactions have yet to receive further attention. This research, then, highlights 
aspects of the relationship that had a more tangible impact on the development of the 
Latin American built environment. 
In order to demonstrate how Colombia was not an isolated case during the Cold 
War, I will introduce in this Chapter post-war global conditions, common discourses, 
the strategy implemented, and alliances established, while also expanding on the 
particular situation of the country. This context, thus, brings into visibility the dichotomy 
between reality and representation of this Latin American country. 
 
 
1.1. Colombia in a wider picture 
Despite the fact that Colombia on its own did not have an outstanding historical 
status during the Cold War, it was part of a region that proved highly relevant in the 
international scenario. The reference to Latin America is, therefore, necessary in order 
to understand political, social and economic conditions that differ from the ones of 
other regions during the post-war period. Although the region was indirectly part of the 
international latent conflict, American countries became more visible in the international 
realm during early years of the Cold War, without assuming a leading role. Although 
Cuba was a prominent reference, it is just the tip of the iceberg of what was happening 
                                                                                                                                          
organized in 1955 by Arthur Drexler and Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Latin American architecture since 
1945”.  
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in the continent. It was a camp of operation and experimentation from other 
governments, as we will see. 
 
Figure 7. Prominent figures who took part on Pan-American cultural exchanges 
organized by the ICA © RAC 
In order to situate Latin America, I use published material of the period, and 
official government documents of both Colombia and the United States, and contrast 
these with the well-established political literature. During the Cold War period, there 
were numerous publications addressing different aims. Particularly during the early 
stages on the political confrontation, leading governments of both sides in tension, i.e. 
Western Allies and Eastern Block, as well as scholars, produced relevant material as 
part of their interest in keeping their communities informed.25 Primarily, there is material 
produced by the US governmental agencies, for whom within the “Western 
Hemisphere”, Latin America had a vital role. Thus it is possible to find a relevant trace 
of debates in the US Congress, and the creation of specific dependencies to address 
the relation the region had with the United States.26 After the 1970s, however, the 
region becomes less prominent, as the focus of interest moved to other regions such 
as Africa, and Asia.  
 
 
1.2. “Grand strategy” 
After the Second World War, tensions between the super-powers that 
represented different ideologies were predominant, conditioning the political scenario. 
The antagonism between democracy and communism determined international 
relations for more than 40 years. New forms of conflict and diplomacy took place, and 
                                                
25 For an in-depth examination see: (Daniels 1952), (Berle Jr 1961), (Carnoy 1962), (Parkinson 
1974), (David 1976), (Tusk 1977), (Tillapaugh 1973) 
26 The Inter American Affairs office, Organization of American States, and the Pan American 
Union channelled foreign relations of the US government with Latin American countries. 
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shaped not only the reconstruction of areas affected after the total war, but the 
development in other regions.27  
The ideological rivalry created three defined groups: the Western Allies, Eastern 
Bloc and the Non-Aligned. The strategy proposed by the US diplomat George Kennan 
labelled as the “Grand Strategy” illustrates the latent situation. Kennan reported on the 
political conditions, and suggested a secure US strategy in an internal communication 
with the State department, known historically as “Kennan’s long telegram”, stating: 
"[the strategy] must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies.” (Kennan 1946) It was neither peace, nor war.  
 
Figure 8. Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"], 
February 22, 1946 © NARA  
 
· Post-War panorama 
Political historians, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1995), have identified the post-war 
period as marked by a latent conflict between two antagonist ideologies embodied in 
the principal super-powers: the Soviet Union and the United States. There was a 
permanent risk of escalation into active war. This prompted each super-power to 
expand its influence into allied countries and to develop new forms of warfare. Other 
territories were therefore, by extension, spaces of operation.  
The Cold War was an economic as well as political competition. 
Both superpowers built huge stocks of arms and gave lavish aid 
to their allies, while also seeking to compete in domestic growth 
and welfare. In so doing, both strained their systems. Ideology 
drove them to compete and drove them to aid their friends. The 
Western economies were better able to provide guns and 
economic assistance, as their system was more adaptable to 
technological and economic changes and they thus came to be 
                                                
27 See (Kramer 1999), (Hixson 1997), (Kuznick et al. 2001), (Donohue 2012)  
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perceived as more successful than the Soviet alternative. 
(Sewell 2002)  
Although the two super-powers in the global realm, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, never confronted each other directly in their own territories, there were 
skirmishes in other regions that helped to escalate the tension. The Korean War (1950-
1953) in particular demonstrated the lack of preparedness of the Western Allies to 
respond to the Soviet Union’s attempt to expand into new territories. (Eisenhower 
2007, 8) Even if this was publicized differently, internal fears in the US government 
were roused, and there was the highest perception of latent danger during Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-1961).  
 
· Cold War in Latin America 
The former US diplomat, Nathan L Whetten,28 acting as Chairman of the Brian 
McMahon Lectures in the University of Connecticut, introduced the annual series 
devoted to Latin America in 1961 as follows:  
It [i.e. this lecture series] is concerned with Latin America, an 
area about which most North Americans know far too little 
despite the fact that it includes twenty [sic] different countries 
and contains a rapidly expanding population that is now larger 
than that of the United States. The geographical position of the 
Latin American countries and their increasing importance in 
world affairs would seem to require that they receive increasing 
attention in American foreign policy. (Berle Jr 1961, 3)  
Continental affairs have indeed been essential for the US government. The 
Latin American historian Hubert Herring (1955) explained the relevance of the region 
by highlighting the common ground of the almost 40 countries of the American 
continent, sharing similar roots to colonies in the oppression of the indigenous 
                                                
28 Nathan Lasalle Whetten, diplomat and scholar of the University of Connecticut in rural 
sociology, was an expert Latin Americanist during the Cold War; he published Rural México in 1948 
(published in Spanish in 1953) and Guatemala: the land and the people in 1961. 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 49(
 
 
population, and slavery. Herring, however, also pointed out how, with industrialisation, 
the differences between North and South deepened. Since independence at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States has attempted through its 
foreign policy to expand its domain into other territories of the continent. Herring 
argued that “Latin America” – integrating within that denomination the Caribbean, 
Central and South America – not only comprised double the US population by the mid-
twentieth century, but also contained a vast diversity and richness of natural and 
mineral resources.  
 
Figure 9. Latin America as a backyard: “Civilization, the last chance” by Herblock, 
originally published in 1939 ©LOC/Herblock Foundation 
Despite the historical reference of the Western Hemisphere representing all the 
Allied countries, I have found that in documents of the US State Department, the 
American Continent alone is referred to as the Western Hemisphere. The United 
States came to see Latin America as its “backyard”, as it has informally been named. 
Thinking about Latin America has therefore been for the United States part of a 
strategy to protect its own interests.  
Historically, various instruments have been used at different periods by the US 
government to intervene in Latin American affairs, and consolidate its commercial and 
political domination there. To illustrate this, I have identified the most influential 
precedents: the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Organization of American States 
founded in 1890, and the Platt Amendment of 1904. The Monroe Doctrine declared the 
American continent to be out of bounds of European colonialism, while the 
Organization of American States (OAS) represented an attempt to integrate the 
interests of the continent. Finally, the Platt Amendment claimed: “the United States 
assumed the power to supervise the internal affairs of states in the Caribbean and 
Latin America”. (Blouet et al. 2010, 106) After the First World War, the Good Neighbour 
policy formulated by the United States in 1933 was presented as a call for solidarity in 
the hemisphere, facilitating influences in different aspects of Latin American countries 
in the name of common progress and wellbeing. I will expand on this policy later on. 
During the twentieth century, US interventions in Latin America have covered a 
wide spectrum: military operations, purchases of land, occupations of territory, supplies 
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of arms (either to insurgent groups, or to governments in power), plots concerning 
coups d’état, trade embargos, protectorates, and economic and technical cooperation. 
Even if it is not the focus of their study, scholars such as Brian W. Blouet and Olwyn M. 
Blouet have presented detailed accounts of different intervention events. (2010)  
Perhaps the most prominent instances of the involvement of Latin America in 
the Cold War are related to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the new government’s 
declaration of its intention to expand revolution in the continent. Concerns about the 
empowerment of the left in the region grew, and the radicalisation of propaganda and 
politics reached its height. Events such as the Bay of Pigs, the Trade Embargo, and 
finally the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 were crucial in this conflict. It is, however, 
necessary to point out that these were not isolated events.  
Since the late 1950s the US government had assumed that communist 
governments supported the populist authorities of the region, promoting leftist ideas. 
Such was the case of Perón in Argentina, Perez Jiménez in Venezuela, Odria in Peru, 
and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, though only at the end of his period in power. In 
response, the US missions labelled them as targets: relations were tightened, uneasy 
conditions predominated, and subsequently the flow of funds was substantially 
reduced. Public information through the media available – particularly distributed 
through the Voice of America – stressed the impossibility of the United States 
cooperating with regimes that “seek American help but in their own countries publicly 
insult or oppose the US”. (Berle Jr 1961, 18) 
The US diplomat Adolf A. Berle Jr clarified the situation: “Pleasant or not, the 
need of defense is a reality. Without which, no program designed to increase human 
welfare in this area is likely to succeed.” (1961) Indeed, Latin America was openly 
declared a “specific front” by the Communist Party Conference in Moscow in 1959. 
Berle, considered an expert in Inter-American affairs, contended that the United States 
had credible information that the Soviet takeover of Latin America was set for 1963. 
(Tucker 2007, 121)  
Towards the end of the 1960s, there was another period of increasing strain. 
The tension between leftist and communist factions, and right-wing conservative 
groups mirrored what was taking place on a bigger scale between the Eastern bloc and 
the Western allies. In turn, each group received the considerable support of actors of 
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the international conflict. Various insurgent groups and socialist parties developed in 
the region with the open support of Soviet or Chinese communist regimes. The Cuban 
revolution was still a reference of the triumph of the popular movement. In some cases, 
they took power by peaceful means, as was the case in 1970 of Salvador Allende in 
Chile. Amidst the radicalization of the period, there was little space allowed to 
consolidate any socialist idea, which was rapidly labelled as communist, and therefore 
attacked. 
 
· Inter-continental relations  
For the purpose of contextualizing Colombia, I highlight here some of the 
historical characteristics of the region that conditioned its foreign relationships. Latin 
American countries have had a degree of instability, shifting between authoritarianism 
and democracy. For instance, the scholar Paul Lewis (2006) introduces a more 
extended list of authoritarian governments in the region during the period from the 
1930s to the 1970s; one can count, however, 11 governments openly recognized as 
dictatorships in different countries. Eight out of 12 South American countries were 
under military rule during what has been known as “the lost decade” of the 1970s.  
 
Figure 10. Dictatorships in Latin America during the Cold War. © MPSB based on 
Bethell  
The Colombian dictatorship took place at the beginning of the Cold War, in 
other words in a different period from the vast majority of the regimes in the 1970s. It 
was also one of the shortest regimes, in comparison with the average of others lasting 
in power for 14.4 years each.  
Another phenomenon distinctive to Colombia is represented by still unresolved 
boundary disputes, despite stability in the formation of countries since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century; such is the case of the borders of Colombia with Peru, 
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Venezuela, and more recently with Nicaragua, which would reconfigure the domain of 
an important part of the Caribbean Sea.29  
There are three additional aspects that are more or less strong in each country, 
as the Latin American historian James Dunkeley observed. First, social inequality in 
the region persists, preserving similar social structures to those of colonial times. 
Second, there has been a consistent lack of social services. And third, the region has 
been a massive producer of raw materials exported mainly to the United States and 
Europe. (Domínguez 1999)  
Perhaps the latest act of strong and overt US intervention in the region, the 
invasion of Panamá in 1989, coincides with the beginning of the end of the Cold War. 
However, the United States maintains a permanent presence in and influence on the 
politics of the continent. 
 
· Colombia in the Cold War  
During the first half of the twentieth century, whilst most countries were 
struggling with the consequences of the First World War, Colombia enjoyed a degree 
of prosperity. The first substantial revenue came in the late 1920s and comprised the 
compensation paid by the United States to support Panamá’s independence – usually 
known as the “purchase of Panamá”.30 Historically, this transaction generated in 
Colombia what the scholar Vernon Lee Fluharty31 documented as “Dance of the 
Millions”, as it generated a bonanza in the national economy, despite the loss of 
                                                
29 Since 2007 the territorial and maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua has 
escalated to the International Court of Justice, whose latest judgement was released on November 19th, 
2012 (still in appellation), which changed borders between the two countries.  
30 Aware of the relevance of the Caribbean and its possible inter-oceanic connection, mentioned 
by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in The Influence of Seapower upon History in 1890, the United States 
government encouraged and supported the growing independence of a part of the population, and as a 
compensation paid to Colombia an economic indemnification. After Colombia rejected in 1903 the Hay-
Herran treaty, which proposed “to lease in perpetuity” the area of the Panamá canal that was built by the 
United States Corps of Engineers – in operation in 1914 –, the government of Theodore Roosevelt paid 25 
million dollars to Colombia under the Thomson-Urrutia treaty, signed in 1921, under the condition of the 
recognition of Panamá’s independence. An additional transaction with the new country of Panamá – that 
understood it owed its independence to the United States – assured their lease of the territory to build, and 
control the canal for a century.  
31 The scholar Vernon Lee Fuharty situates this period of economic prosperity between 1930 and 
1956.  
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territory and the implicit consequences. Almost simultaneously, on account of the 
favourable production and price of grain, the coffee trade bred an economic bonanza 
documented by the historian Marco Palacios (1980).32 The coffee market maintained 
an upwards financial flow. During the Second War World important reserves of oil had 
been identified and, with foreign investment, these began to be exploited by the state. 
As a consequence, Colombia enjoyed a degree of economic stability. (Fluharty 1957) 
In addition to its solid economy, I identify two further factors that defined the 
position in which Colombia found itself at the beginning of the Cold War: its foreign 
alliances, and its strategic location in the American continent. 
 
· Post-War alliances 
The United States government regarded Colombia very favourably, as is shown 
in the 1954 annual country report of the Department of State. (USOM 1948-1961)  
The recent change of leadership in Colombia has had no 
immediate impact upon activities of Point IV […] the regular 
programes of technical assistance were continued, but no 
efforts were made to effect negotiations through the official 
channels of the Colombian Government. […] Despite the 
favourable reception given to the point IV under the prior 
government, it would appear that the new government is 
creating conditions more favourable both to the people of 
Colombia and Point IV for technical assistance. (USOM 1948-
1961) 
The country proved to be a devoted US ally during the Second War World, 
being the first Latin American country to break off relations with Japan. Later, Colombia 
was the only other American country to participate in the Korean War (1950-1953), in 
an attempt to show the commitment of the nation to the defence of democracy 
                                                
32 Cf Marco Palacio’s, newly edited book (2009),  reports that in the 1950s the Colombian peso 
was a strong currency almost equivalent to the US dollar. The official change kept on 2.51 COP per USD 
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elsewhere. This participation in the United Nations Command helped to invigorate 
relations. Both governments regularly mentioned it. ([US Department of State] 1983) 
The internal conflict in Colombia that escalated after the assassination of the 
popular presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 was another aspect of 
concern from the US perspective. As Soviet influence was gaining ground in Latin 
America, this event roused consternation as the possible instability represented an 
opportunity for communism. Amid the internal instability, the Colombian government 
decided to cease diplomatic relations with the USSR, and later with Cuba, creating a 
closer proximity to the United States. (Safford et al. 2002b)  
 
· Strategic location  
Colombia was vitally important to the security of the continent, not least 
because its strategic location supported the Panamá Canal and allowed control of the 
Caribbean Sea, which was to some extent the Achilles' heel of the Americas. The 
Panamá Canal had a vital value, not only in economic, but also in military terms. The 
transit between oceans, and the access to the fragmented Caribbean, brought 
elements of defence that were highly valued by the United States.  
 
Figure 11. Colombian territory in the world © World Geographic Maps (modified) 
Colombia represents two other main factors to be considered in terms of its 
location: first, it is the Latin American country with the most extensive continental 
shelves in both oceans, and the closest proximity to the most vulnerable areas of the 
Caribbean. Secondly, Colombia’s vast territory is located at an equidistant north-south 
point of the continent.  
In consequence, to strengthen defence capabilities in Colombia became an 
important aim in the international realm. (Tucker 2007) What is more, Solmirano 
asserts that Colombia became one of the main actors in the definition of priority 
projects and presence of US military assistance. (2007) This alliance helped in 
developing security plans for the region, and simultaneously backed the internal 
policies of development, aspects that I will develop further on. 
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1.3. Colombia’s particularities 
The internal processes of each country have an impact on its international 
relations. One could say that Colombia's predominant characteristics are complexity 
and singularity. Notably, what is peculiar in this country is the combination of key 
factors that have remained unsolved throughout its history: a “social gap”, latent 
violence, regional diversity, the uncompromising role of the state, the richness of 
resources and political indolence. The political transitions that occurred during the 
period between 1930 and 1970 may be an accurate framework for the study of the 
social and political events of the twentieth century in Colombia, as they are particularly 
representative of this complicated situation. This generates in turn, a particular 
scenario for the development of the country’s urban centres. 
 
· Geographical complexity 
In addition to the significance of its location, the fact that Colombia covers an 
area of 1,141,748 square kilometres33 adds other factors of consideration in the interior 
of the country. In this respect Stephen Gudeman (1990) states that culturally, in 
Colombia, control of the land has a greater significance to the people than its material 
value as a resource; it represents their “strength”, the base of production and a 
leitmotif. This may be explained by two basic factors: on the one hand, the richness of 
the soil itself, which offers diverse means of subsistence and, on the other, the struggle 
for the land’s possession, implying the control of possibilities and security. Land control 
represents a key factor of conflict and development of the nation, and simultaneously 
defines an important condition of social inequality.  
The quest for land has created internal migrations, along with other powerful 
economic and social factors. Consequently, new areas of the country were colonized 
                                                
33 440,831 square miles 
56( Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán(
 
 
during the second third of the twentieth century, which led to a substantial expansion of 
the productive and habitable territory of Colombia. Historical studies about internal 
migration by Andres Etter (2000) have pointed out how this phenomenon was 
accelerated by higher rates of demographic growth of around 3.5% per annum that 
were a particular manifestation of the poverty and violence in rural areas. The Eastern 
plains, North Amazonia, and the Caribbean coast began during this time a slow 
recognition into the national context. Hitherto, the state presence in rural areas was 
limited, if it existed at all.  
It is necessary at this point to bear in mind that major welfare services, as well 
as 85% of the capital, were concentrated in the principal cities: namely Bogotá, 
Medellín, and Cali. Other cities such as Barranquilla, Cartagena and Cúcuta, acting as 
heads of regional, agricultural or political frontiers, increased their population by around 
11% per annum. (Asociacion Colombiana para el estudio de la poblacion -ACEP 1974) 
Most of these cities are concentrated in the Andean mountains, which represent less 
than 40% of the national territory. 
 
Figure 12. Traditional urban areas, cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants by 
1930s © Mapsof.net (modified)  
However, without reducing its levels of poverty, on account of rural political 
violence and high demographic growth, the country engaged in a dramatic urbanization 
process in the mid-twentieth century, lessening the primacy of Bogotá as the urban 
centre – although the capital has remained as the biggest city – and generating a 
better balance between different regions. During the Cold War period, Colombia 
embarked on a modernization process following international trends. 
 
· Social fragmentation 
Similarly to other countries of the region, during the first half of the twentieth 
century Colombia was predominantly rural, with vast unexplored areas. Population was 
rapidly increasing, most of it with low living standards, and a considerable 
concentration of resources in few hands, preserving the colonial tradition. Associated 
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with urban-rural tension, there was a wealth-peasant disparity in the country. The 
extreme inequity and lack of social mobility has been termed the “social gap”.  
This social gap reflects the dissimilarity between the facilities and services 
available to different sectors of the population. This is noticeable from the difference in 
attention accorded to each region, which had indeed diverse needs and resources. 
Scholars such as Safford et al. (2002a) have claimed that the pyramidal social 
structure tends to aggravate social hierarchy through the increasing concentration of 
resources in a few hands as a result of the incipient process of industrialization, which 
was widely sponsored by the economic policies.  
Though in the early years of the Cold War, Colombia did not itself have a strong 
communist party, there was a latent preoccupation with Marxist-Leninist influence that 
later emerged in the Cuban revolution. Initially this influence came either from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the Chinese Communist Party, addressing 
distant regions, and either, struggled sectors of the population or intellectuals. (Miller 
1989) State presence in these rural areas became therefore, a concern and a priority 
for both the national and foreign governments. Later this social and political influence 
became more consolidated, in particular with the regional engagement of the 
Communist Party of Cuba to export its revolution to other regions of the American 
continent. Concerns were focused on the growing labour force, and guerrilla groups 
began to form in the rural areas, encouraging armed insurrection (c.1964) amongst 
peasants.  
 
· Political turmoil  
I will focus on three different political periods that occurred between the 1930s 
and 1970s: starting with the Liberal Republic, followed by La Violencia (the violence) 
during which the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla took place, and concluding with a period 
known as the “National Front”.  
 
· The Liberal Republic 
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Historically, the political scholar José Fernando Ocampo (2008) identifies that 
Colombia has had a bi-partisan democratic system, composed of Liberals and 
Conservatives, with timid expressions in the 1960s of a third, the Communist party. 
The government has been under the control of these parties since its creation in the 
early nineteenth century. These have grown in constant opposition, creating a political 
tension that reached such a level of hostility during the early twentieth century that it 
developed into violence. The first decades of the twentieth century saw Conservative 
rule with the active participation of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the Liberals won 
the elections in 1930, starting a period known as the Liberal Republic. The political 
transition of power was peaceful. These Liberal governments were characterized by 
the beginning of what was conceived as “radical” social changes, which in turn caused 
a greater political polarization among the population. For instance, there was profound 
antagonism at that time, and in some sectors, to the recognition of women's rights to 
own property and to have access to education, as well as by agrarian reform, which 
entitled dispossessed people to own land.  
Behind the apparent calmness of public order in the cities, there was violence in 
the rural areas. Various armed actors directly related to official parties or state forces – 
and in some cases, even incited by representatives of the church hierarchy – 
participated in the conflict. Such was the case during the 1940s of Liberal guerrillas 
and Conservative paramilitaries who fought not only against each other, but also, 
separately, against the state forces. Even though widely spread in different regions, 
this conflict was largely ignored in certain sectors of society and territory, essentially 
because its main impact was in rural areas. In those remote areas common people 
found themselves in the middle of the conflict and, in order to survive, ended up joining 
one group or another –either because of the emerging circumstances, or through 
coercion.  
 
· La Violencia 
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The critical and tense internal situation experienced in Colombia, which was at 
its worst between 1946 and 1964, was labelled La Violencia.34 In political 
historiography, La Violencia is registered as a dramatic conflict emerging from the rural 
isolation of a vulnerable peasant population that lived amidst extreme conditions, 
polarization, and illiteracy. This period witnessed macabre expressions of bloodshed, 
which led to migration towards new colonized areas and, primarily, to the outskirts of 
principal urban centres. (Uribe 2004) 
During this time of social unrest, one popular figure, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán from 
the Liberal party, led a movement against those whom he called the “oligarchy”, that is 
"the small, wealthy, educated elite that supposedly ran the government, the church, the 
army, businesses, everything, including the two traditional parties". (Bushnell 1993, 
198) Due to the confrontation between parties Gaitán was assassinated on April 9th, 
1948, while Bogotá was hosting the Ninth Inter-American Conference. As a result, 
there was a sharp increase in mayhem, which reached its height in 1950, when more 
than 50,000 political murders occurred. (Palacios et al. 2007, 159) This havoc took 
place not only in the rural areas, but also made the violence more tangible in urban 
areas. 
The instability brought about by the assassination of Gaitán was assumed to be 
a determining factor in the coup d’état of 1953. During a crisis of a highly polemic 
Conservative government, on June 13th General Lieutenant Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
assumed power by means of a military coup. The US embassy reported the incident 
as: 
In a surprise move on June 13th, the presidency of the national 
government of Colombia was assumed by General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla, who with the support of the military forces and 
factions of the conservative party, ousted President Laureano 
Gomez. […] The change of administration was effected with 
neither bloodshed not violence.(USOM 1948-1961) 
                                                
34 The turn to a Conservative rule 1946-1953 coincides with the beginning of the social unrest. 
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Military rule was presented as an alternative political force, named “the third 
force”, in order to restore political equilibrium and pacify the rural areas. The discourse 
of the regime will be the subject of analysis later on in this thesis. Surprisingly, it was a 
calm transition and received popular support; in fact, during the first year of the regime 
violent deaths fell significantly. (Safford et al. 2002a) Immediately after, the Asamblea 
Nacional Constituyente (Constitutional National Assembly) confirmed Rojas as head of 
state in 1953. 
 
Figure 13. Rojas’ speech on taking power speech June 13th, 1953 © El Tiempo 
The political agenda of this military dictatorship will be presented in more detail 
later, but it is worth noting at this point that the regime supported its agenda by 
implementing economic measures that claimed to maintain financial stability from the 
coffee bonanza, whilst also balancing the budget through taxes and opposition to 
monopolies. This was strategically presented as “economic planning and big projects” 
and as receiving the support of the masses. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1953a) This government was indeed to some extent regarded as populist,35 and 
it would later face opposition from the church, banking and industrial leaders, university 
students, the press, the international financial agencies, and even a faction of the 
military forces. Certainly, this growing opposition to the regime was due to some of the 
economic measures that attempt to benefit popular sectors of society, but especially 
because of its abuses of force, indoctrination, massive censorship, repression, and 
corruption. 
Tellingly about the contradictory perception of the regime, the historian Marco 
Palacios, despite being a former student and later rector of the Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia, where the core of the opposition to the regime was concentrated, points 
out: 
Rojas regime was not a military regime in the conventional 
sense. He did govern in the name of the armed forces, and with 
the support of the three services, despite his opponents’ efforts 
                                                
35 See further information in (Lopez Sanchez 2006)  
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towards the end to label him as ‘usurper’ of the military’s 
authority. (Palacios et al. 2007, 151) 
In the beginning, to engineer its positive image, the military regime invested 
considerable amounts of the national budget and foreign loans in different regions 
through the “National Plan of Public Works”, which is of central concern in this 
research. The largest sums were assigned to the construction of infrastructure: primary 
public education – giving access to this resource to more than 60% of children –, low-
cost housing, health centres, road construction, and communication infrastructure; 
lands were also provided for the displaced population and victims of the recent 
violence. Most of these programmes and projects were supported by international 
organizations. In social terms, this government was responsible for consolidating the 
rights of women as democratic individuals, authorizing their active participation in 
suffrage and seeking a gender balance in public service appointments.  
 
Figure 14. Image of public manifestations of support for the regime alongside with 
undergoing “works of progress”, 1953 © DIPE 
Conversely, even if these populist policies were a major factor in consolidating 
Rojas power, there was an increasing repression caused by the application of military 
force. Political historiography registered this opposite side. One of the most 
documented references is Wiarda et al. (2001) who argue that, during Rojas 
dictatorship, there was an active and increasing press censorship, as well as abuses 
against freedom of assembly, mobilization and expression – especially of students and 
communists, who were explicitly banned as a political party. The dictatorship controlled 
all the flows of information through its Dirección de Información y Propaganda del 
Estado (Directorate of Information and State Propaganda). This entity maintained 
surveillance over what was in the public domain. People were compelled to attend 
public events and “show support” for the government. As is usual in totalitarian 
regimes, a significant number of intellectuals were forced into exile. There is no clear 
information about the number of people who disappeared or were killed by state forces. 
Nevertheless, these anomalies were also present in previous, and later governments, 
while most of the public criticism of the regime was focused on corruption. Balanced 
political historical literature identifies: 
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The fall of Rojas marked the end of the chapter that had begun 
in 1930: while [the regime] had promised an expansion in 
citizens’ rights, its ending demonstrated that the real 
beneficiaries were those members of the oligarchy who had 
been able to modernize. (Palacios et al. 2007, 134) 
The self-enrichment of General Rojas’ circle, and the mismanagement of 
resources, gave credence to the allegations by the International Monetary Fund and 
Central Bank of Colombia against the regime. In 1956, those institutions forced the 
devaluation of the national currency, increased import control, and reduced public 
spending and bank credits. (Safford et al. 2002a; Bethell 1991) The tension between 
the government and important social groups, such as the church hierarchy, traditional 
parties, industrial leaders, the media, factions of the military, and university students, 
finally led to Rojas’ peaceful resignation on May 10th, 1957.  
A new agreement signed in Spain by the two traditional parties, known as the 
“Sitges declaration” (1957), was definitive in the resignation of Rojas and the fall of his 
regime. This agreement proposed that the transition of government would be handled 
by a “Military Board” for one year, and created a “National Investigative Commission” to 
look into the crimes committed during Rojas dictatorship. On December 1st of the same 
year, a plebiscite confirmed some of the regime’s policies, including full political 
equality for women and a minimum of 10% of the national budget to be allocated for 
education. However, the plebiscite was particularly focused on the equal and 
alternating representation of both parties in the government. 
 
· The National Front 
The bi-partisan agreement signed in Sitges to alternate the two parties in power 
was known as “The National Front”, and it lasted from 1958 to 1978. In essence it was 
a pact among the elite to hold a monopoly on power within the two traditional parties. It 
facilitated a return to an apparent calmness, the consolidation of economic disparities 
and legitimization of the acquired rights achieved for each group. However, the pact 
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denied any possibility of alternative manifestations. Indeed, as the scholar Robert 
Wesson36 claimed, “most analysts recognized that the bi-partisan arrangement 
incorporated a series of artificial, anti-majoritarian and anti-democratic elements”. 
(1984, 125) These years of negotiated calm featured a low rate of democratic 
participation, strikes by workers, and an increasing political discontent that was 
manifested, once more, through rural peasant violence, which in turn forced and 
accelerated internal migration. 
The political situation in Colombia between 1930 and 1970 showed some 
superficial social changes, but it was built on a fragile structure. At the end of the 
1960s, the National Congress and the Supreme Court dismissed all the charges 
against Rojas Pinilla. Afterwards, with the support of the party he promoted, Alianza 
Nacional Popular [ANAPO], and the labour movement, Rojas put his name forward for 
democratic election; how truly democratic these elections were has been historically 
questioned, but he lost by a narrow margin of 3%. Oddly enough, as a consequence of 
the restlessness of the popular groups supporting the former dictator a socialist 
guerrilla group emerged. The Movimiento 19 de abril, M-19 [Guerrilla Movement April 
19th] was created “recalling the date in 1970 on which Rojas Pinilla narrowly lost the 
presidency”. (Bushnell 1993, 245)  
  
 
1.4. Common discourses 
In the post-war era, foreign contacts encouraged an awareness of international 
discourses of modernization. This led to the commitment, among other things, to the 
ideas of higher living standards and national-state consolidation in Latin America, 
where most countries, including Colombia, were beginning a transition from rural to 
urban society, under the instable conditions already referred to above. 
                                                
36 Robert Wesson was a distinguished scholar on political sciences, expert on Latin American 
affairs, who served in the US Foreign Service in Brazil and Colombia. 
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Here I will present a short account of the principal discourses that had an 
impact in Colombia at the time. The two confronted ideologies provided different 
interpretations and approaches to them. These discourses were widely disseminated 
as part of the active propaganda the super-powers promoted in the region. The 
sources created little adaptation to address local audiences’, hence, they will coincide 
with currents of thought that can be found elsewhere. What might differ is the 
interpretation and interest that each of them had within the region, matching the 
internal politics of each country. The Colombian government, as much as other Latin 
American ones, and social movements of intellectuals, conveniently merged and 
adapted these discourses shaping the political and social context, whilst their 
aspirations were paradoxical. On the one hand, concurrent with the incursion into an 
international world, nationalist discourses gained ground. On the other, an incipient 
interest in pre-Columbian roots competed with a modern developmentalist trend. How 
these discourses were specifically interpreted in the Colombian built environment will 
be a matter of study in the following Chapters. 
 
· The Nationalist discourse 
In Colombia as in the rest of Latin America, the “national project” was not 
related to any independence process; rather, it was associated with the idea of unity as 
a centralized policy driven by modern progress.  
Even if in other territories nationalist discourses respond to recent 
independence processes, and are based on ethnic or cultural roots, Latin America 
observes a different phenomenon, as originally noted by Benedict Anderson.37 Latin 
Americanists have drawn on his idea of “imagined communities”, as a social and 
political construct. (Anderson 1983) My intention at this stage is to point out how the 
nationalist discourse was instigated in the international realm. The interpretation of 
these nationalist ideas during the Rojas regime will be analysed later on. 
                                                
37 The initial works of this scholar are related to Sudan, Indonesia, and other regions. His 
contributions to the idea of nationalism have widely supported studies outside the traditional ethnographic 
definition of collectiveness. Imagined communities was first published in 1983, and reedited in 1991 and 
2006. 
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In the introduction to the special issue of Nations and Nationalism about Latin 
America, Monserrat Guibernau (2006) noted how: “sufficient commonalities can be 
found across Latin America to justify talk of patterns of nation-building, nationalism and 
political identification which distinguish this region from others”. This echoes 
Anderson’s argument “that nationalism in the Americas, far from being derivative of 
European patterns, was in itself a model for developments both in Europe and other 
parts of the world”. (Miller 2006)  
Within the region the first involvement with international affairs parallels the 
period between the world wars. The preoccupation with the expansion of these 
conflicts into the American continent was simultaneous with the rise of indigenism. 
Modern ambitions were, thus, in conflict with the interest of putting forward the 
uniqueness of the pre-Columbian and indigenous traditions, neglected until then.  
Contradictory discourses of Pan-Americanism were also in vogue. In the letter 
of José Vasconcelos to the Colombian youth, the intellectual and diplomat remarked:  
A modern Latin Americanism is different from that of Bolivar, 
because that was political dream, whereas this one is ethnic. 
Bolivar wanted a League of American Nations that did not 
exclude the Northern United States. We want the union of 
Hispanic people, without excluding Spain, and explicitly 
encompassing Brazil; and thus, we have to exclude the United 
States, not due to hatred, but because they represent a 
different expression of human history. (Vasconcelos 1950) 38 
Understandably, the United States persisted in the promotion of the discourse 
derived from Simon Bolivar. Either way, the consolidation of the region was a priority.39  
And perhaps one of the US strategies to pursue its inclusion was to support 
what was presented at the Ninth International Conference of American States. In the 
                                                
38 Historically, the key and visible role played by Simon Bolivar (1783-1830) in the independence 
of the Great Colombia (now Colombia, Panamá, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia) from the Spanish 
Empire, and creation of new nations in the ninetieth century, meant his name and ideas remain as a 
common reference of democracy in the region.  
39 How this discourse shaped the cultural exchange within the American continent has been a 
recent subject of study by Robert Alexander Gonzalez (2011). 
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plenary session of speakers on April 6th, 1948, by Parra Velasco, Ecuadorian Foreign 
Minister, “within the hemisphere both Federation of Latin American countries and 
subregional groups such as Gran Colombia should be promoted” [My emphasis].40 This 
motion was amply seconded, and reaffirmed by delegates of most Latin American 
countries, during the following days. (US Department of State 1972) In other words, 
there was a simultaneous encouragement of the cohesion of the whole American 
continent, and subregional associations, that had an historical precedent in Bolivar.  
The flourishing of nationalist sentiment in Latin American countries in the late 
1950s, in addition to the ground gained in the 1960s by socialist ideas, reinforced by 
foreign communist parties, helped to create a greater resistance to the hegemony of 
the United States in the region, as has been argued by the scholar Nicola Miller. (1989) 
In the 1970s the democratic spirit of the region experienced a degree of instability as a 
considerable number of Latin American nations were ruled by dictatorships and internal 
conflicts, as has been mentioned. Historians such as Robert Wesson have claimed that 
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed some of these military coups as leftist 
governments represented a threat to the security of the region. The opening of the 
agency archives of the time, as part of the Historical Review Program, has recently 
ratified this assertion.41 
 
· Progress and Development  
Perhaps a more internationally appealing discourse was about modernity. 
Modern ideas had strong social concerns such as universal access to services, 
implying social and political commitments for a more cohesive society. It was Latin 
America’s opportunity to converse with developed countries. 
                                                
40 The Gran Colombia at the beginning of the nineteenth century – i.e. immediately after 
independence – comprised Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, and part of Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Nicaragua, 
and Costa Rica. 
41 The Historical Review Program of the US Central Intelligence Agency has released restricted 
material of its operations abroad originally created as secret communications or reports. Some of them 
have been “sanitized” which means that part of the information, such as specific names, dates or locations, 
are still blocked. Cf. (CIA 1958; Cullather 1994)  
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Nicola Miller, as a Latin Americanist, argues that the modern paradigm was 
conveniently shaped to adjust to different political discourses in the region. The 
adoption of modernist ideas was not monolithic. Singular elements depended on the 
internal conditions of each country. 
As elsewhere, in the modern utopia, development and progress were, thus, 
almost synonyms of modernity. New living standards were defined not only by 
improving sanitation, but also alternative social relations. They were materialized 
through an aesthetic based on abstraction, and efficient technologies in the use of 
standardized resources.  
What emerges is the political interpretation of such development in the context 
of the Cold War: “security equals development”. (Carothers et al. 1990) This US policy 
encouraged intervention and cooperation of the military apparatus in other areas, such 
as the construction of modern facilities, as noted by Felipe Agüero: [T]he military as 
performing developmental roles: [that were called] civic action programs […] in which a 
foreign military must gain the support of civilians. (Schoultz et al. 1994) 
This condition adds more elements to consider in what is traditionally 
considered as development, amidst a regional context of a weak presence of the state. 
Progress encompassed along with new living standards the idea of stability and 
control, which was provided in the built environment in urban centres; becoming 
modern was therefore identified with the idea of becoming “urban”. At the time, 
Colombia engaged in an accelerated process of urbanization that will be explored later 
on in this Chapter. 
 
· Political discourse of Rojas Pinilla 
In order to analyse the architecture developed under the Rojas dictatorship, the 
use of alternative sources such as political history material has been valuable. Some of 
this material has either only become available recently, or is now recovering relevance 
as there is a growing interest in the history of the mid-twentieth century. 
The public appearances of Rojas Pinilla were quite prolific; his speeches 
conveyed the political discourse of the regime. But political discourse can be 
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communicated in other ways too, including through debates, policies and projects. 
Sometimes that discourse involved the presentation of plans; at other times, it 
embodied a justification and validation of the regime’s intentions.  
I trace Rojas Pinilla’s discourse through his speeches published by the 
Directorate of Information and State Propaganda (DIPE). This office produced a 
number of publications, including compilations of speeches and annual reports. In 
some cases these publications repeat material among them with some edits. There are 
four publications concerning speeches, corresponding to the years 1953, 1954, 1955 
and 1956.42 Notably, the book relating to his final year in power, 1957, was not 
published originally by DIPE, but compiled years after. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1957) Some of these speeches were recorded for radio or 
television, but the quality of the recordings sometimes makes it difficult to follow the 
content. Therefore this project concentrates primarily on the published material, and 
has also made use of the material recently published online.43 
Examining the speeches in sequence, it is possible to identify elements of both 
change and consistency. On the one hand, one can see transformations in the content 
and the language over the four years. The initial presentations placed greater 
emphasis on the denomination of the government as the “Christian and Nationalist 
movement of June 13th”, (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 14-
111) recalling the date of the military coup. After the ratification of power by the 
National Assembly, this denomination becomes gradually absent, and only the first two 
anniversaries of the date were celebrated. The date is a constant factor, however, in 
the denomination of various buildings, projects and policies, as we will see in more 
detail. 
 
Figure 15. National broadcasting of presidential speeches ensuring wider 
audiences with the use of modern media © BLAA 
                                                
42 The number of speeches and the delivery also changed during the four years in power. In the 
final years of Rojas Pinilla's regime, there were fewer prepared speeches and more improvised ones – that 
is, without a formal reading of a set text. 
43 The website El libro total during the last years has included an important collection of material 
from Rojas Pinilla. Although valuable, these transcriptions are not a direct source, nor they cite the original 
documents. See www.ellibrototal.com 
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Despite the more secular international discourse, the regime internally 
acknowledged the “Catholic Church and God as moral guides for the order and dignity 
of the country”, (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 17) and this 
emphasis was particularly strong during the first year of government. Even though the 
religious reference is permanent, a certain distance from the church hierarchy 
becomes visible later, with more of a focus on popular devotion, as is seen in the 
denomination of Colombia as the “country of the Sacred Heart”. (Archivo Presidencia 
(1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1955, 220; 1956) 
These initial speeches placed Simon Bolivar as a main ideological reference, in 
particular as regards the unity of the continent under the “Society of Nations of the 
Americas” as the aim for each state to pursue, generating simultaneously “the 
intellectual and moral unity of the continent”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1953b, 56) Rojas related this ideal of unity to the international policies that 
were, as we have seen, in fashion in the region: focusing on the American continent as 
the priority, and stimulating hemispheric relations under the label of Pan- Americanism 
supported by the United States.  
It is also possible to see how the regime was presented in different ways: 
initially it is presented as the “government of the military forces”;(Archivo Presidencia 
(1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953d, 17) later it is given a personal reference as being 
Rojas Pinilla’s government; then towards the end, the speeches make reference to the 
“People's government”.(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1955, 137) 
During the second stage an important number of projects were inaugurated, and in 
consequence some of them were named after the dictator. I would suggest that the 
final denomination of the government to some extent reflected the socialist trend that 
was gaining ground in the American continent, and which was a matter of great 
concern to the US government. 
Over the course of the time in power, internal tensions gained more importance 
in the content of the speeches, particularly in three aspects: the acknowledgement of 
the press as a powerful force and the need for its censorship; the communist risk in the 
continent; and the relationships between students and the military government.  
Turning now to the elements of consistency, various topics can be seen to have 
been a permanent feature of the dictator’s speeches. During the time Rojas was in 
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power, there were continual mentions of mass support – regardless of the fact that this 
was visibly decreasing. The discourse also made visible the role of women in society, 
and their rights. It stated an antagonistic position towards the traditional parties and the 
oligarchy, in order to maintain popular support. There was a constant invitation to 
national unity and the re-invention of the state. (Rojas Pinilla 1954, 17) This last point is 
perhaps the most relevant for the formulation of the National Plan of Public Works, as it 
was permanently related to it. I will expand on this point in Chapter 3.  
As the participation of its only frigate, and more than 4,000 Colombian men in 
the Korean War (from 1951)44 were taken as proof of the state’s international 
commitment,45 it was continually mentioned by the regime.(Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 5) Of particular relevance is the case of the first 
anniversary of the naval force during the regime when, based on the commitment of 
the naval force as the international representatives in the Korean War, the dictator 
stressed how the involvement of that force should be internationally recognized, 
particularly in a country such as Colombia with 3,208 kilometres (1,993 miles) of 
coastline: 1,760 kilometres (1,100 miles) bordering the Caribbean Sea, and 1,448 
kilometres (905 miles) bordering the Pacific Ocean. Rojas emphasized the strategic 
location of the country:  
As the Mediterranean people once [did in history], the 
Caribbean people have a common destiny in which our 
geographical position points us as a reference of balance in the 
progress and harmony in America (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953d, 45) 
Most Latin American countries did not publicly acknowledge the influence of the 
Cold War. Significantly, however, shortly after taking power in 1953,46 Rojas did state 
that the Cold War was an international phenomenon with an impact in the region. 
                                                
44 Reported in the research of the US Marine Corps, Gordon (Rottman 2002) 
45 That commitment was ratified years later by joining in peacekeeping missions of the United 
Nations. Since 1956 Colombia has participated in different missions in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, 
and Central America. 
46 Interview with Camilo José Cela, June 27th 1953. New State discourse, August 13th 1953 (237). 
American [continent] fraternity, October 25th 1953 (481-2). Solidarity against communism, October 25th 
1953 (486). 
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There was, he said, the risk of “impiety and international communism” in the continent. 
On May 13th, 1954, Rojas stated: 
In a world always concerned with the spectre of the war, 
America shows that is the continent of pacific solutions, and 
hope. The American solidarity, expressed today in the 
Colombo- Peruvian agreement, is today more needed than ever 
with regards to the immense dangers that threaten the Christian 
civilization with the tumultuous advance of Communism. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 173) 
Rojas claimed that, as a response, cooperation agreements between the United 
States and developing countries, such as Colombia, were necessary in order for those 
developing countries to receive technical and financial support to enforce democracy 
and modern development.47 According to the information publicly displayed, the priority 
areas of these international agreements were: health and sanitation, education, 
industry, and infrastructure and housing. (USOM 1948-1961) Rare references were 
made to foreign cooperation in terms of state security. Despite acknowledging the 
growing influence of communism in the region, this was only addressed as an 
ideological concern, and not as a security issue. 
Along with the motto of the regime – “Peace, justice and freedom” – Rojas calls 
for a “political binomial: military forces and people”, reinforcing the idea that the military 
forces offered tranquillity and equality. The regime adopted the image of a protectionist 
state providing “progress for all”, claiming to close the social gap. It was planned to 
close this gap through the provision of the services and opportunities of the “modern 
world” through “an ambitious project of works for progress” which would be made 
possible thanks to international cooperation.48 (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1953c, 57) Rojas related this progress within a wider scenario: 
                                                
47 Some of them reported in Jorge E. Hardoy, ‘Cooperación internacional para los asentamientos 
humanos’, / Comercio Exterior / Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (México), Vol. 32, No. 2 (February 
1982), pp. 131-142.  
48 The National Plan of Public Works and the international cooperation frame will be analysed in 
the Chapter 4. 
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These preoccupations of my government for a sincere union 
and cooperation amongst Colombians [working] towards the 
progress of the country are framed in the international realm in 
a firm and honest harmony with all countries, in particular with 
the ones in this continent, with which we have more immediate 
obligations for geographic, political, economic, and historic 
reasons, that will allow us to work together towards the 
exaltation, and progress of all our people. (Archivo Presidencia 
(1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953d, 190)  
In summary, Rojas took into account the resistance that a totalitarian regime is 
bound to experience in a traditionally democratic country. Thus the dictator’s speeches 
consistently characterize the government as both transitory and legitimate, portraying 
the military government as necessary to rebuild the “nation” in order to generate a 
transformation and reconstruction on three different levels: intellectual, moral, and 
material.  
The regime presents a balance that people appreciate. The will 
of organizing life in Colombia, leading policies, political 
orientation, and material works of this Bolivarian, Nationalist 
and Catholic government. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: 
Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 5) 
Consequently, in order to create a “new state”, Rojas presented the Plan of 
Public Works as the instrument to answer the social problems Colombia had at that 
time. Despite the traditional interpretation that the political discourse represents an 
ideology and proposes a vision, it is difficult to identify Rojas’ discourse with a 
particular ideology. It shifts and changes shape according to the expected rationale of 
the public.  
 
· Facts and figures 
 
Figure 16. Synthesis of Colombian census data 1930s – 1970s (Average Annual 
Growth Rate). Based on DANE 
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Some of the figures of the period are illustrative of the transformation of the 
country, thus I create this table49 based on the censuses published by the 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DANE (Department of National 
Statistics) between 1928 and 1974, and the information about Colombia in the final 
report "Population and Urban Change in Latin America, 1850-1989". (Hardoy et al. 
1991) The information about the variations in growth of the urban areas related to the 
inhabitants of capital cities of departments (i.e. administrative regions), which 
correspond to the political-administrative division of the country during the period of the 
regime.50 This information frames the demographic change in which the Rojas regime 
operated.  
It is noticeable in the information that greater changes occurred during the 
1950s; not only did the total population of the country grow at a higher rate (51%), but 
the urbanizing trend of the previous decade was reinforced, concentrating a bigger 
population in urban centres, that were more dispersed in the territory. I will identify the 
phenomenon by identifying cities with higher than 5 as Annual Average Growth Rate 
(AAGR), which reflects cities that duplicate in ten years their population. In the 1940s, 
i.e. 1938 and 1951, appeared traditional urban centres as such as Cali (7.0), Medellín 
(6.84), Bucaramanga (5.84), Bogotá (5.52), closely followed by Barranquilla (5.25). 
Between 1951 and 1964, almost half of the cities more than doubled their inhabitants: 
Cali (7.62), Bogotá (7.48), Tunja (7.35), Santa Marta (6.28), Cartagena (6.16), 
Bucaramanga (6.03), Pereira (5.47), and Medellín (5.24). In the latest period shown, 
1964 and 1973, there is a return to lower growth rates, with only Cúcuta (5.27) keeping 
a higher pace.  
 
Figure 17. Urban extension Cali 1961: almost duplicated area in a decade © OSSO 
These numbers could lend credence to what the Rojas’ discourse proposed: a 
more equal development in different regions. As the dictator insisted on this claim: “The 
                                                
49 Find on the Appendix the complete table of censuses of Colombian population including data 
about inhabitants and growth. 
50 Colombia adopted the French denomination for the political division of its territory. It is worth 
noting that this division changed before, during, and after the dictatorship, but for the purposes of this 
research the information presented here will provide a general understanding about the growing 
phenomena. 
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country cannot gravitate exclusively around only one of its regions, its progress should 
be uniform, balanced and methodical.” (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1956, 46) 
The number of projects developed in different regions is also relevant. 
Remarkably, the higher rates of construction correspond with what was identified by 
the historian Javier Ocampo (2008).  
The political violence worsened between 1948 and 1953, and 
continued during the 1950s. Guerrillas were organized in the 
Eastern Plains, and numerous resistance groups emerged in 
Tolima, Caldas, Valle, Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Santanderes 
and other regions. 
On the map, I have located the number of infrastructural projects reported by 
the Ministry of Public Works 1954 specifically, to benefit the population of one part of 
this disaffected region, the coffee-growing area that initially corresponded to the 
department of Caldas, and during the regime was divided into Caldas, Risaralda, and 
Quindío.  
 
Figure 18. Map of distribution of projects in coffee-growing area © UNC (modified) 
During the four decades the distribution of the rural and urban population 
changed, but so did the distribution of population in the national territory. In general, 
urban growth remained, with the increasing concentration of a higher number of 
inhabitants in the principal cities – namely, Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla – 
which jointly moved from 54% to 85% of the urban total. Notably, Bogotá, from 
containing less than 25% of the national urban population in the 1930s, reached a 
significant 41% by the 1970s. In terms of regions, the south west of the country had in 
1964 a negative rate of migration (-11.5), which means that the population moved to 
other regions, in particular the western mountains, where new urban centres emerged, 
adding to the number of urban centres dispersed on the territory. (Asociacion 
Colombiana para el estudio de la poblacion -ACEP 1974)  
In other words, the trend that the country had experienced at the beginning of 
the twentieth century of a homogeneous growth in different cities and different regions 
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was disrupted in the 1940s, generating a larger difference between these four cities 
and the others – though one should include on a second level an incipient development 
in the 1950s of other cities as Cartagena, Bucaramanga and Manizales, that was finally 
equalled in the 1960s by Cúcuta, Pereira, and Ibagué. In terms of the national territory 
this means that, given the concentration of urban population in the centre and the 
preservation of traditional cities in the northwest, southwest, and north, efforts at 
maintaining a balance between the rates of progress of different regions failed. 
However, this account only considers the hard figures of urban growth, and not the 
social, economic, or political factors that might impact on these numbers. 
Given the political, and social conditions of the country, and the international 
concern with the spread of communism in Latin America, the interest in developing 
infrastructural projects all around the country is understandable. The transformation of 
the built environment was heavily politically motivated, rather than just urban 
expansion. As is clear from the figures, there was a related change in the urbanization 
process, and the direction of the National Plan of Public Works constitutes a core of 
this phenomenon of accelerated modernization, at least in the political discourse.  
 
 
1.5. International interest 
According to the political history scholar Howard J. Wiarda, an important 
precedent to define foreign politics during the Cold War was set during the First World 
War, when there was evidence that more than 50% of foreign investment in Latin 
America was British, around 15% was North American, and 10% French. German 
investment was also rapidly increasing. (Wiarda et al. 2011) These investments were 
accompanied by trade preferences towards Europe, placing at risk not only the domain 
of the territory, but also the provision of commodities for the United States.51  
                                                
51 The Great Depression, and later The Second War World, modified both the trade of 
manufactured goods towards Latin America, and the exportation of industrial raw materials and agricultural 
products to Europe and the United States. These changes have defined the reliance, almost dependency, 
of Latin American markets, technology, and financial services on the United States and Europe. 
(Henderson 2001) 
76( Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán(
 
 
Shortly after the Second War World, the expansion of communism in the most 
deprived areas of the world created alarm in the US government, and marked a turning 
point in its relations with what was already considered the “Third World” – that is, the 
peripheral economies, including Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. As a 
consequence, US President Harry Truman proposed the Point Four Program (1949) to 
provide international assistance in order to accelerate development with infrastructure 
projects, demonstrating through them the advantages of a democratic and capitalist 
system, and thereby reducing the risk of a communist takeover of the territory. (Tucker 
2007, 121) And it is relevant to emphasize that in a wider scenario several agreements 
of mutual security were ratified, comprising not only military aid but also pacts about 
the provision of resources. 
 
Figure 19. List by region (Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America) of capital 
cities of countries taking part in the program, ICA telegram, 1961 © NARA 
These increasing fears were not related solely to acts of external aggression in 
the American continent. Deliberations in the US Senate showed that even internal 
revolutions in Latin America were considered highly threatening for US security. 
Therefore, some of the debates concerned the inclusion in foreign agreements of the 
right to intervene, even via armed attack, in those countries benefiting from US 
cooperation. (US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1951) 
These foreign agreements were essentially a double-edged sword. National 
and international interests were entangled. State boundaries and autonomy became 
compromised in the commitment to modern development. The extent of the influence 
of this puzzle remains to be fully identified. This research constitutes a first approach to 
the topic in the Colombian case.  
 
· Technical cooperation 
After the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), the US National Security Council Report – 
known as NSR 68 – shaped US foreign policy not only in prioritizing military aspects, 
but also in redirecting US involvement in the consolidation of support and democracy 
within the Western Hemisphere, i.e. Allies and developing countries. In consequence 
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alternative means were devised to gain access to and provide support for other 
countries. One of these forms of international exchange was technical cooperation. 
During the early stages of the post-war era, there were milestones in foreign 
policy that were relevant to developments in technical cooperation. I would mention 
four of them. First, the Truman doctrine (1947) represents a remarkable initial point, 
turning the awareness of the United States towards foreign countries in order to secure 
its own concerns, as a global power. The Mutual Security Act of 1947 recognizes the 
importance of financial and technical support of foreign governments, backing the 
strategy laid out in George Kennan’s long telegram. This was in turn reinforced by the 
Marshall Plan (1947) to rebuild Europe through what was then conceived as the 
beginning of foreign aid programmes, later to be applied to Latin America as part of the 
Good Neighbour Policy (1933) already mentioned. This did not initially imply technical 
cooperation itself.52 The reinvigorated Inter-American system acquired greater visibility, 
assuring the hegemony of the United States. (US Mutual Security Program 1951) 
In 1961 John F. Kennedy proposed the “Alliance for Progress” as a multilateral 
agreement to grant assistance, and to stimulate, primarily, social and industrial projects 
in the Western Hemisphere, in order to consolidate the resistance to the advance of 
communism in the region. According to Blouet, the ten-year plan, entirely “funded by 
the United States sought to promote democracy, accelerate development, sponsor 
agrarian reform, and improve housing, working conditions, education, public health and 
taxation policies”, while encouraging private enterprise and economic preferences. 
Issues of internal security in the region were toned down despite featuring in the 
debates in the Congress to approve the agreement. (Blouet et al. 2010, 111) 
These international exchanges covered political, economic, and military 
agreements. Cultural exchanges of around 1950 played an important role in this 
agenda: cooperation on education, exhibitions, publications, technical advisors, and 
media information shaped the purposes of mutual security, more specifically 
exchanges of the inter-American security system. A prominent example of this would 
be the creation of institutions of architectural research, and construction, such as 
                                                
52 Cf traditional studies of the time about the policy (Wood 1961), (Wood 1985), (Green 1971), 
(Steward 1975), (Steward 1980) 
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Centro Interamericano de Vivienda CINVA (Inter-American Centre of Housing) in 
Bogotá. 
Though most visible, diverse, and relevant, the USA was not alone in its 
enterprise of cooperation. Notably Germany and France commissioned a number of 
experts, such as Joseph Louis Lebret about whom we will hear more in Chapter 3.  
 
· Foreign relations in the region 
Wesson asserts that the 45 years of the Cold War represented the period of 
greatest influence of the US government in Latin America. (Wesson 1984) However, as 
also happened in other regions, the name of the latent conflict was hardly ever 
mentioned publicly. Nevertheless, the threat of communist influence in the region was 
fundamental for the Rio Pact of 1947, also known as “the Inter-American conference 
for the maintenance of continental peace and security”.53 Endorsing this multilateral 
agreement to prevent the presence of communism in the American continent became 
the main role of the Organization of American States (OAS) and later other institutions 
such as the Inter-American Development Bank. The US government was suspicious of 
every leftist idea, programme or policy. The third article of the Rio Pact reads: 
The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any 
state against an American State shall be considered as an 
attack against all the American States and consequently each 
one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in 
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence. (OAS Department of 
International Law 1947)  
In March 22th, 1948, the US Secretary of State disseminated among its officers 
the paper no. 26, entitled: "To establish US policy regarding anti-Communist measures 
which could be planned and carried out within the Inter-American System." Perhaps 
the most complete account of the Inter-American policy in terms of the latent tension of 
                                                
53 A detailed information about internal documents of the US relations in Latin America can be 
found in (Tusk 1977)  
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the Cold War can be found in the Resolution XXXII adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States held in Bogotá (also in 1948) about the Preservation 
and Defence of Democracy in the American continent. (USOM 1961) It is worth noting 
that this was the conference held during the mayhem of violence after the 
assassination of the popular candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. I include here relevant 
parts of the document, which starts with the considerations: 
In order to safeguard peace and maintain mutual respect 
among states, the present situation of the world demands that 
urgent measures be taken to proscribe tactics of totalitarian 
domination that are inconsistent with the tradition of the 
countries of America, and prevent agents at the service of 
international communism or of any totalitarian doctrine from 
seeking to distort the true and the free will of the peoples of this 
continent; 
The declaration goes on to identify international communism as anti-
democratic, and against individual freedom and the sovereignty of nations. Portraying 
democracy as universal access to modernity, as the declaration asserted, through it: 
[T]hey shall achieve social justice, by offering to all increasingly 
broader opportunities to enjoy the spiritual and material benefits 
that are the guarantee of civilization and the heritage of 
humanity. 
The resolution presumes complete Pan-American unity, whilst establishing a 
distance with external countries to the region, condemning “[the] interference by any 
foreign power, or by any political organization serving the interests of a foreign power”. 
Concluding with four resolutions that defined the Inter-American system of 
mutual support, that as we will see have a direct relationship with the development 
policies embraced in Latin America: 
1. To reaffirm their decision to maintain and further an effective 
social and economic policy for the purpose of raising the 
standard of living of their peoples; [as] a guarantee of the 
essential freedoms and rights of the individual […] 
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2. To condemn the methods of every system tending to 
suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular 
the action of international communism or any totalitarian 
doctrine. 
3. To adopt […] the measures necessary to eradicate and 
prevent activities directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign 
governments, organizations, or individuals […] 
4. To proceed with a full exchange of information […] American 
libraries and cooperative cultural institutes should not become 
involved in internal political affairs in the other American 
Republics. Their influence will be anti-Communist if they carry 
out their normal functions efficiently. Radio, press, and motion 
picture-programs should be reviewed to determine their 
effectiveness as measures to combat Communism. [My 
emphasis] 
Inter-American relations were central in the early years of the Cold War. During 
the 1960s and 1970s political relations of Latin America were the focus of concern, and 
intense debates were held in order to define the US action towards this region. It is 
notable that political literature relating to the Cold War and Latin America or Colombia 
was extensively published in the United States at that time,54 but it has since become 
virtually non-existent. As mentioned earlier, there has been recent interest about this 
connection concentrated either in Latin American institutes or in Cold War centres of 
study, but this is focused on economic aspects, their connection with the production of 
the built environment is a fertile terrain of exploration.55 
 
· US foreign policy: mutual security 
                                                
54 Some studies received great acceptance in diplomatic circles: (Wagner 1970), (Green 1970). 
55 Scholarly works in the area show a rapid increase. See (Bethell et al. 1997), (Franco 2002), 
(Westad 2005), (Joseph et al. 2008), (Crandall 2008), (Harmer 2011)  
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In order to support the US foreign policy, different administrative structures and 
resources were crafted. New dependencies were created in order to facilitate the flow 
of information and make more operative the system of technical aid. Although a more 
complete study is necessary, this is an attempt to map the dependencies and 
programs I found related to the US cooperation with Colombia:  
 
Figure 20. Scheme of the US cooperation system intertwined with security 
concerns © MPSB 
In addition to the US official budget assigned for cooperation, it is now a matter 
of record that foreign policies also received the financial support of what were known 
as “reptile funds”, i.e. a flow of resources for covert operations. (Westad 2005) 
However, no information has been obtained, so far, regarding the use of these funds in 
the Colombian case. 
Colombian governments cooperated extensively with the United States. 
Solmirano notes how “Under the Mutual Security Act 1951 the country became one of 
the main recipients of United States military assistance.” (2007, 457) This alliance 
helped to develop some of the most crucial plans for the region, and simultaneously 
backed the internal policies of development such as the National Plan of Public Works. 
However, this aid was clearly related to concerns about the security of the region, 
though it was portrayed differently at the national level. (Carnoy 1962) 
 
Agreements of mutual protection were not confined to Latin America, but 
related to the entire Western Hemisphere. The US Congress approved the first one in 
1951, in order to grant resources to pair military assistance with technical cooperation. 
(US Department of State 1952)  
Framed in cooperation agreements for mutual security, projects of warfare 
equated with welfare ones. Cooperation projects were conveniently presented under a 
principle that the US ambassador Beaulac portrayed as: “the welfare of one country is 
dependent upon and derived from the welfare of other countries”. (USOM 1961) More 
than preventative and strategic measures, economic cooperation was widely presented 
as generous US diplomacy. This simultaneity between warfare and welfare brings new 
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light to the understanding of cooperation projects. The complexity of this intertwining 
requires an exploration into how policymaking and power relationships operated during 
the Cold War, as we will see in Chapter 2.  
 
· Colombian foreign contacts  
From the late 1920s Colombia gained international visibility on account of the 
issues surrounding the Panamá Canal and the coffee trade. And from the late 1940s, 
this Latin American country received further attention as findings of mineral and natural 
resources in different regions provided evidence of rich reserves in its territory. Unlike 
other Latin American countries, Colombia did not pursue a national management of the 
exploration and exploitation of national resources. Countries including Germany, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union showed an interest and 
participated in cooperative exploration projects, and offered technical assistance for the 
exploitation of these highly valued resources. (Bushnell 1993) It is also relevant to point 
out that Colombia was prompt in keeping strategic materials flowing exclusively to 
Allied governments, and particularly to the United States. Indeed, during this period, 
the nation signed agreements relating to the exploitation and export of relevant natural 
resources that are still in force. (Westad 2005) 
The United States have been the major recipient of a wide variety of Colombian 
raw materials, partly on account of commitments contained in bilateral agreements. 
Strategic minerals in the post-war era, such as coal, oil, uranium, gold, iron and 
nonferrous ores, were subject to US exploration and exploitation. (USOM 1961) In 
terms of agricultural and food security, there is also a relevant commitment to maintain 
the provision of rubber, coffee, palm, and sugar cane. The country was the scenario for 
several pilot projects that aimed to increase production. (Coleman 2008) The 
dependency on the United States as the primary market conditioned the relation even 
further, and, at the time, allowed the direct involvement of US companies in developing 
projects and infrastructure to facilitate such exploitation.56 
                                                
56 Factories and housing projects were undertaken in distant regions. Such is the case of Tropical 
oil company. 
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As Rojas states in the speech to welcome Henry F. Holland, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, October 8th, 1954, the aim was: “to 
coordinate the collective efforts of the hemisphere in order to avoid the risk of 
communism with its tremendous spiritual and material threats.” (Archivo Presidencia 
(1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 67) 
Rojas regime closely cooperated with the United States during his first year in 
power. However, tensions arose towards the end of his second year in power on 
account of his social policies, and these defined a distance, as they were regarded as 
close to socialist politics. At the point that the internal communications of the USOM in 
Colombia considered “whether the vast wheels of ICA can be stopped”. (USOM 1948-
1961) 
At the end of the 1950s, in terms of foreign policy, Colombia had re-established 
all its international relations,57 and participated actively in the Organization of American 
States (OAS). The Colombian demand for multilateral negotiations in hemispheric 
affairs, rather than direct imposition of US policy, was persistent, and not well received 
by that government.58  
The significant pre-eminence of the northern neighbour was becoming a source 
of resentment, particularly amongst what Nicola Miller (1999)calls the illustrated 
community – that is, certain isolated groups of intellectuals and scholars. This created 
some tension in the relationship, as the US government had historically expected 
unconditional support regardless of the local impact, as noted early on by the US 
political historian Walter M. Daniels:  
North Americans have, not surprisingly, shown little restraint 
against the temptation to exploit their Latin neighbours in 
business dealings. Transportation and public services and 
extractive industries, financed with United States capital, have 
                                                
57 During the 1970s Colombia ceased relations with Cuba and Nicaragua as a response to 
alleged support for the guerrillas. 
58 After the initiative of Colombia and Peru, Cuba was excluded from OAS and the Inter-American 
system at the conference of Punta del Este in 1962. 
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too often been conducted primarily for the enrichment of the 
investors (Daniels 1952, 4).  
As Alan Gilbert has mentioned, Latin American countries – and in particular 
Colombia, I would add – have been extremely tolerant and almost passive towards the 
situation. This Latin Americanist claims, “perhaps the explanation is that survival has 
been so difficult for the poor, that they have been too busy to protest. [...] Busy lives 
leave little time for political protest which only occurs when significant events trigger a 
popular reaction.” (Blouet et al. 2010, 192) This reference still captures the inertia of 
Latin American countries in face of a dominant neighbour.  
On the one hand, the political stability achieved with the National Front 
agreement nominally facilitated the internal political situation, but did not develop a 
clear position of the country in terms of foreign policy. And on the other, the escalating 
internal conflict with guerrilla groups was predominant in vast rural areas containing 
natural and mineral resources. Colombia became increasingly concerned with its social 
struggle without showing relevant evolution in the situation. These conditions made the 
country both irrelevant and unreliable, for international policies and foreign 
agreements. Therefore it basically disappeared from the Latin American political scene 
from the 1970s, when other countries were under strong dictatorships that attracted all 
the attention.59 
 
· Architectural exchanges 
The technical cooperation projects influenced on the development of the built 
environment. Nevertheless, their impact was much more complex than a direct 
involvement in mere constructions. A memorandum from R. R. Rubottom Jr., the 
Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Colombia, to the Secretary of State is 
illustrative on this regard: 
[T]he Department is requested to inform the Embassy whether 
the peso funds might be used, in part, for such a cultural 
                                                
59 During the 1980s international concerns were focused on the production of marijuana and 
cocaine, which are perhaps the most common and reductive references of the country in the mainstream.  
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program, or whether the entire amount would have to be 
allotted to the foreign buildings program. (US Department of 
State 1972) 
Official forms of cultural exchanges “envisaging the new” took place through the 
mobilization of different resources including consultants, exhibitions, visiting 
professors, publications, radio and animated picture programs. The US Operations 
Mission (USOM) was pivotal in coordinating these interactions, which were mainly 
unidirectional from the United States towards Latin America. The office in Colombia 
undertook prominent activity in the region. However, it was not the only channel. In 
terms of architectural exchanges the scenario has more elements in play, as we will 
see in Chapter 5. 
As in the rest of the world, the adoption of modern architecture in Latin America 
was a long process during the twentieth century. Scholarly literature has highlighted 
some well-known precedents of governmental policies in the construction of 
outstanding modern projects in the case of Latin American architecture, particularly in 
Brazil with the creation of the new capital in Brasilia, and in México with the design of 
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México UNAM (Mexican National University). 
Remarkably these state projects followed a different policy from the one adopted in 
other regions including Colombia: “Brazilians built Brazil.” That is, the modern image 
pursued by the Brazilian government prioritized the participation of Brazilians. Tellingly, 
the motto of Juscelino Kubitschek (in power 1956-1961) exposes a different 
understanding of this process of building modernity.60 
The majority of Latin American cities have been built in modern times; modern 
architecture has thus been taken as the natural manifestation of the process of 
urbanization. Despite the fact that vast areas of these cities have a modern built 
environment, this is hardly ever regarded as of any worth. The modern utopia has been 
confronted with deep-rooted social problems and vast extents of land. In this sense, 
the cultural historian Jorge Larrain (1996) has claimed that Latin America has 
experienced modernity without modernization.  
                                                
60 It is worth mentioning here the work of Fernando Luiz Lara about what he denotes as the 
popularity of modernity in Brazil. See (Lara 2008) 
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· Cultural diffusionism 
Human creations such as artefacts have conveyed different purposes. After the 
Second World War, Cyril Connolly coined in a newspaper article what was considered 
“cultural diffusionism”, identifying, along with other intellectuals, such as T.S. Eliot, Ezra 
Pound and George Orwell, the phenomenon of the political use of cultural 
manifestations. (Goodden 2007) 
During the Cold War, governments heavily invested in and supported cultural 
activity, including architecture, as these were relevant parts of the war of ideas. This 
generated what Patrick Deer calls “a war culture boom”.  
It reached into state-sponsored cinema, documentaries, and 
radio comedy; promoted official poetry and reportage, art, 
music, drama; and drew on the futuristic tropes of air power, 
mechanized warfare, and the wizard war of technocratic boffins 
that produce radars… code breaking… on the terrain of culture, 
it seemed, every available resource could be looted and 
pillaged by the wartime state. (Deer 2009, 3) 
According with what we have seen as part of the international discourses, 
Western states were promoting a nationalist discourse of stability, reconstruction and 
development.61 Consequently, Deer affirms that in the post-war period, governments 
invested in identifying and defining what was appropriate as social and cultural 
manifestations. Such cultural diffusionism of the state, promoting an image of calm 
stability, could be understood at its more superficial level as an effort to manipulate 
language, artefacts and expressions but, in the end, the final goal is a manipulation of 
memory and identity. And it is here that camouflage tactics acquire particular value. 
 
                                                
61 During the last decade a number of researches, exhibitions and publications have addressed 
these issues of the Cold War and its impact in modern architecture and design. Emerging mainly in a 
European context, and focusing their attention on its immediate and more noticeable aspects, they have 
traced relevant connections with schools, trends, and social transformations. See (Fraser et al. 2007), 
(Castillo 2010), and (Crowley et al. 2008) 
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Figure 21. Workshop at Inter-American Housing Centre, part of the cultural and 
technical exchanges © RAC 
Expressions of international affairs were recorded not only in the local media 
but also in international newspapers, acknowledging the use of foreign policies towards 
other countries of the Americas. During the Cold War, the use of the official 
representation and interpretation of “white, and black” propaganda,62 speeches, 
censorship, films, press, radio, manuals, sponsored artists, control of resources, and 
so on, was particularly notorious amongst contending paradigms. Different states 
aimed to manipulate language and expression; this implied a huge importance and 
intervention in cultural activities. There was a widely disseminated official version, and 
this reduced the possibilities of developing dissident voices and expressions though 
these too were often camouflaged.63 Resistance, if it occurred, took diverse forms that 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
 
1.6. Modernity without modernization 
The experience of modernity in Latin America is a recent subject of academic 
interest, especially in social and cultural studies. In 2005 at the Institute for the Study of 
the Americas in London, an interdisciplinary event co-ordinated by Stephen Hart and 
Nicola Miller questioned when, if ever, Latin America had become modern; this in turn 
led to more questions due to the complexity and diversity of the countries under 
discussion. “Scholars [Latin Americanists] from different disciplines (and, indeed, within 
each discipline) have taken widely varying positions on fundamental issues such as the 
                                                
62 In this respect I have found two different interpretations of the denomination as white, grey and 
black propaganda. The first one depends on how explicit is the origin of the information; (US Department 
of the Army. Headquarters 1979) and the second, on how favourable or unfavourable the information it 
disseminates. (US Department of the Army. Psychological Operations Group 7th. et al. 1969) 
63 Alternative means of resistance towards the manipulation of information occurred at the time. 
For instance, in literature, writers “in the shadow”, or even in exile, challenged dominant narratives and 
mental landscapes projected in the mass media. One relevant example of this is what has been called in 
Latin America ‘Novela de dictador’ (Dictator’s novel) referring to writing under siege, where people with a 
background, or practice, in traditional journalism turned to literature in search of narratives that would allow 
them to present their point of view. Other artists had to find ways to subvert, and resist, the imposed order 
through humour, lyrics, personal diaries, and ephemera. Even in the most traditional media it was possible 
to find humour as an alternative critique, which was usually less censored. Strategies were no longer 
merely military; camouflage was at the core of everyday life. 
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chronology of modernity, its character, and its agents.” Miller et al. (2007) In addition to 
this initial point, other enquiries informed the debate – in particular, the question of 
what modernity meant in Latin America, as well as the conditions of place and context 
in which these nations achieved some sort of modernity.64  
As this event demonstrated, the modernity in Latin America represents 
fragmentation and difficulty of consensus, which may reflect not only divergence about 
the acceptance of the purpose and implications of modernity, but also the 
inconsistency of its project, its discourse, and its experience elsewhere – what Garcia 
Canclini identifies as “the contradiction between, on the one hand, an exuberant 
cultural modernism and, on the other, a deficient modernization”. (Miller et al. 2007, 
177) 
In fact, Octavio Paz has interpreted the dichotomy between the modern project 
and the expected agency of the modernization as a “pseudo-modernity”. According to 
him, such pseudo-modernity was just an apparent image failing to achieve the modern 
ideals of an egalitarian, secular, universal, and rational progress. In addition to this 
central dichotomy between discourse and experience, the question about modernity in 
Latin America addressed points common to different disciplines about the convenience 
of thinking in terms not only of temporality but also of spatiality, where there is still 
some debate about whether there is a process of adoption, imposition, or 
interpretation, and the role of particular agents, such as governments and intellectuals 
– among them, built environment professionals. 
Drawing from views presented in different collaborations, from diverse 
countries, I suggest that in Colombia, as well as others in the region, it is possible to 
identify three different referents in the modernization process: the European 
enlightenment, the Soviet construction of the nation-state, and the global 
modernization firmly led by the United States. Nestor Garcia Canclini has drawn 
attention to the displacement of Europe by the United States as the paradigm of 
modernity,65 which may explain the blurred boundaries of what is conceived as modern 
in Latin America – what he has coined “cultural hybridization”. An emancipatory ideal 
                                                
64 Further discussions on modernism, modernity, and modernization can be found in (Schnaiberg 
1970), (Berman 1982), (Friedman 2001), (García Canclini et al. 2005) 
65 Constantly alluding to the political implication of this asymmetrical relation of power 
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underlying the diverse, uneven and hybrid modernities found in Latin America informed 
processes of identity construction during the twentieth century. This ideal in turn 
requires new perspectives of analysis, especially considering that, paradoxically, “Latin 
America displays an overall bias toward modernity”, as has been pointed out by 
Lawrence Whitehead. (Miller et al. 2007, 198) This topic will be further explored in 
Chapter 7. 
 
· Incipient modernity 
In the specific case of Colombia the process of global awareness and 
modernization has relevant precedents that existed well before the Rojas dictatorship. 
Perhaps as a reaction to the repressive years of conservative governments at the 
beginning of twentieth century, during the Liberal Republic (1930-1946), the country 
embraced ideas of progress and development. These ideas were in vogue in the 
international context as a consequence of the devastation engendered by the World 
Wars. Even though they had different motivations, the principle was the same: the 
generation of a new society where new paradigms and references were necessary. As 
a result, what was considered as traditional was degraded and discouraged. Similarly 
to other regions, Colombia was then caught between a lethargic past and a promising 
progressive future. The early encounter with modern ideas was plagued by hesitation 
and polemic.66 The country was in contact with and well aware of global phenomena, 
but it was dealing with its own complexities. 
The international economic crisis of the post-war era affected local 
communities, creating a fertile terrain in traditionally rural countries for the introduction 
of political change. Social changes were initially promoted by Latin America’s liberal 
governments, and later adopted by the military government. Nevertheless, these social 
concerns were categorized by opposition sectors as “communist and atheist”. (Archivo 
Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953c, 27) In a predominantly Catholic country, 
where the church held considerable social and political power, embracing new 
paradigms was challenging. 
                                                
66 Conservative groups discouraged most modern ideas. Nevertheless, during the conservative 
regime 1946-1953 the modernization process continued. 
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The ideal society aimed at transforming the social structure. Literary and artistic 
work incorporated new subjects, techniques and references of everyday life and ethnic 
roots, creating a distance from traditional academicism, and increasingly achieving the 
abstraction of its contents to the extent of social utopia. (Saldarriaga Roa 1986) The 
permanent interaction with foreign influences facilitated the change of paradigms, 
where the United States and Western Europe were the most solid references of 
innovation and evolution.  
It is possible to identify that such incipient manifestations of modernity were 
concentrated in Bogotá, and elite groups of other middle-size cities. Modernity began 
as a central-periphery or top-down venture. The modern crusade was highly 
encouraged by the media, and in reduced power circles. Becoming modern was paired 
with becoming urban and international. 
 
Figure 22. Press article encouraging modernization to resemble the United States 
© Cromos 
New living standards were promptly promoted as elements of progress and 
status, and facilitated the massive demand of urbanization, which was accompanied by 
rationalization and standardization. However, the modern projects remained as an elite 
ambition and eventually as a space of experimentation. 
 
· Reaching modernity in architecture 
In terms of the built environment, although there are manifestations of early 
modernism,67 1936 has traditionally been identified as the determinant year for the 
adoption of the modern movement in Colombia.68 Traditional architectural historians in 
Colombia, as Alberto Saldarriaga Roa (1986) mentioned that this year encompasses 
the confluence of three important events: the opening of the School of Architecture of 
                                                
67 The beginning of the twentieth century and modernizing ideas that aimed to break with the 
Spanish colonial tradition are denoted in architecture by the incorporation of new languages such as art 
nouveau and deco, that is commonly known as the transition period. Further information is well 
documented in (Corradine Angulo et al. 2001), (Silvia Arango 1996), (Saldarriaga Roa 2006),  
68 Further information can be found in: (Téllez Castañeda 1998), (Saldarriaga Roa 1984), 
(Corradine Angulo et al. 2001), (Silvia Arango 1989).  
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the Universidad Nacional, the creation of the Colombian Society of Architects, and the 
beginning of the publication of the Proa journal. Actors, places and instruments 
complete the context of the change of paradigms.  
The Universidad Nacional de Colombia recognized the importance of the 
discipline and as a result created an independent programme of bachelor studies in 
architecture, being the first at national level and a pioneer in Latin America. The space 
opened a training – still linked with civil engineering – under the discourse of the new 
rationalized tendencies incorporated by Colombians who had studied in the United 
States and Europe, and foreign architects, some of whom had come into the country69 
to work with the Ministry of Public Works. For almost 20 years the National University 
represented the only possibility of education in architecture in the country. During the 
1950s other programmes were created in private universities, most of which received 
international support: Bolivariana, Los Andes, Javeriana, Gran Colombia and America. 
The larger number of educational centres led to a considerable increase in the number 
of professionals in the country. 
The newly developed society was enthusiastically promoted as ideal by 
academia, placing special relevance on comfort, hygiene, and economy of resources. 
However, every change requires time. One can see that projects developed by 
architects and engineers in the 1930s and 1940s answered to diverse languages, in 
which eclecticism, inconsistency and slow incorporation of new techniques were the 
predominant note.  
It was the Proa journal, led by Carlos Martínez Jiménez, an architect trained in 
France,70 which not only played a crucial role disseminating the postulates of the 
modern movement, but also validating projects that followed these postulates, and 
therefore were worth of appreciation. Later on, the Colombian Society of Architects, in 
an attempt to enhance the profession through awards and public contests, honoured 
projects that maintained the principles of the modern movement. Whereas Proa is an 
invaluable source of information still accessible today in main libraries, the Society of 
                                                
69 An incipient research has start tracing back precedents of the migration. Showing that some of 
the immigrants came after either, being members of the Schutzstaffel, or fleeing Nazi persecution. Cf 
(Oyuela-Caycedo 2012) 
70 Detailed information about Martínez and Proa journal can be found in Hugo Mondragón (2003)  
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Architects does not keep records for more than ten years, constituting an important 
loss of memory for the country. 
Despite the instability of national policies and financial struggles, an important 
supporter of the modern movement was the Ministry of Public Works. For more than 60 
years this governmental entity was the most active constructor nationwide as well as 
an active promoter of the state architecture:  
It is within this perspective that public buildings are understood, 
not only as ideological elements and functional placement of 
the administration, but also as educative factors, and 
transmitters of ethical and cultural values, which are part of the 
historical project and the formation of a nation. (Niño Murcia 
1991, 15)  
The consolidation of the practice of architecture was conducive to the 
establishment of firms and studios, some of which are still active. Among these are: 
Cuellar Serrano Gomez; Pizano Pradilla Caro; Lago Saenz; Obregón & Valenzuela; 
Samuel Vieco; Guillermo Bermudez; Fernando Martínez Sanabria; Alvaro Ortega; 
Gabriel Solano; Borrero Zamorano Giovanelli; Leopoldo Rother; Bruno Violi; Jorge 
Gaitán Cortes; Hernando Vargas Rubiano; Guillermo Herrera Carrizosa; Vicente Nasi; 
Juvenal Moya; Esguerra Sáenz Urdaneta y Samper. 
These professionals were primarily active in the main cities of the country. The 
considerable and rapid rise of population in the cities challenged the incipient 
significance of urban planning in Colombia. As a consequence, following the CIAM 
postulates, the Ministry of Public Works led programmes with some of these firms to 
promote the development of middle-size cities in different regions taking as reference 
the proposals of international experts, such as Le Corbusier, who was invited for the 
formulation of the Pilot Plan for Bogotá (1947-50), and later on, and Wiener & Sert the 
Bogotá Master Plan (1950-53), and other middle-sized cities.71  
 
                                                
71 Detailed information about the Master and Regulatory plan of Bogotá has been recently 
published by the research group architecture and city of Los Andes university (O'Byrne et al. 2010)  
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Figure 23. Le Corbusier pilot plan for Bogota: mainly focused on the traditional 
centre, preservation of rivers, and road network © FLC-ADAGP 
From the 1950s, and 1960s the country changed focus towards urbanization, 
with the major concentration of population in cities such as Cali, Barranquilla and 
Medellín, which have an industrial character, followed by Bucaramanga, Cartagena, 
Manizales, Cúcuta and Pereira that have historical and regional relevance as post of 
trading centres. 
 
Figure 24. Colombian main cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants) in 1973 © 
Mapsof.net (modified)  
As usual, the advent of a new social paradigm is a result of different concepts 
or ideals that should be promoted by active actors of the national life with the possibility 
of affecting the conditions of the collective. In Colombia the role of the state was a key 
factor in the incorporation of modern architecture. The elite sector was more receptive 
to the changes resulting from progress and development, which were associated with 
an urban status. With the 1950s, simultaneously with the construction of public 
buildings, massive dwelling programmes were promoted to satisfy the increased 
demand in the cities for a new urban/rural distribution of the population.  
 
 
1.7. Dichotomy: reality and representation 
Even though Colombia’s image is commonly related to the pre-Hispanic and 
colonial, or to violence and drugs, the mid-twentieth century is crucial in its fragmented 
history. Nevertheless, its complexity brings elements of discussion, where the absence 
of clear and explicit ideologies is a latent condition. Short-term perspectives, around 
the particular objectives of each region or group, have driven its historical development 
with an endemic absence of the state, and a permanent social exclusion. As the 
historian Bushnell (1993) states: “Colombia is a nation in spite of itself.” Discussing the 
complexity of this country in the mid-twentieth century represents a huge challenge, 
particularly on account of the inherent polarization that has spanned a considerable 
part of its history. 
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It is possible to say that during the Cold War US interventions not only in 
regional but also in the internal politics of Latin American countries were at their 
highest point. Distance, or even attempts to act independently in the region, were 
considered a high risk, and raised fears of communist dominance. The US government 
defined the level of “friendliness” of each government – or, in other words, the level of 
support or hostility each country could expect. In response to these unequal and some 
say imperial relations, (Wiarda et al. 2011) it is not unusual to find anti-US sentiments 
in Latin America,72 that might well interfere in the interpretation of the consequences of 
its relationships and exchanges with the United States. 
The complex national context, as well as the tense international one, brings us 
a frame of reference to locate confluences that were materialized in the built 
environment.  
Looking in detail at how this process played out in Colombia, we will see that 
the adoption of modern architecture nationwide accelerated in the 1950s. Amidst 
probably the most difficult turmoil in the country’s history, Rojas insisted in his 
speeches that the aim of his government was to create “progress for all”. (Archivo 
Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953a, 57) The regime adopted a paternalistic 
state image by presenting itself as providing the services necessary for modernizing 
the country through infrastructural projects, which were collectively described by the 
Minister of Public Works, Admiral Ruben Piedrahita Arango, as “an ambitious project of 
works for progress”. (Piedrahita 1955) This was the National Plan of Public Works and 
it was a crucial part of the government’s efforts to maintain the image of the welfare 
state. However, awareness of how it also implied considerations of warfare makes the 
understanding of the transformation of the built environment more challenging. 
 
                                                
72 Detailed information can be found in (McPherson 2003), (McPherson 2006),  
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2. Misrepresentation of the political agenda 
The representation of a political period in terms of architecture demands an 
understanding not only of the historical context of the country and the region, but also 
of the different constructs of power, and strategies that were in use at that time. The 
historical context of the Cold War gives us certain specific conditions that must be 
taken into consideration, as they shaped the resulting built environment. Through 
research into the socio-political conditions of Colombia, but particularly through the 
archival material available concerning the architectural projects of the dictatorship and 
its interpretation in historiography, the information turns out not only to be fragmented 
and polarized, but usually contradictory. In an effort to understand a more 
comprehensive picture of what is confusing at first sight, it has been necessary to 
explore different approaches to the notion of power; that is, to understand its operation 
in the politics of the time, and its impact in the transformation of the built environment. 
In order to question the rationale of the numerous infrastructural projects 
undertaken by the Rojas regime, the information made available by the government 
needs to be re-visited and interpreted on different levels. That information is neither 
consistent nor coherent: it seems to have less content than one might expect from a 
dictatorship that claimed to enjoy public support. As drawn from the regime’s 
discourse, the agenda of the military government was unclear, and archival material 
refers more frequently to immediate, internal concerns than to a wider picture. 
Moreover, the architectural representation of these state projects follows no apparent 
logic. To help make sense of this shifting ground, I have explored different forms of 
power, and strategies in use during the Cold War in order to contextualize the 
development of infrastructural projects in Colombia.  
 
Figure 25. Accelerated construction of architectural and engineering projects: 
Chapel Gimnasio Moderno School © Orduz 
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2.1. Architectural apparatus 
Within architectural studies, Jonathan Hill (1990) questioned the autonomy of 
architecture and its role in the formulation of ideologies. Hill argued that within the 
discipline of architecture it has traditionally been “inconvenient” to place in evidence, or 
even to inquire about, the political implication of the built environment.  
Architecture’s status as an ideological apparatus is discussed 
outside the discipline in subject areas closely related to 
architecture. It is not usual for the criticism of the ideological 
relations of a cultural discipline to be absent from the discipline 
itself. (Hill 1990, 74)  
Indeed, developments regarding this relation between space and power in the 
field of architecture are more recent in comparison to those from other social sciences. 
Fortunately this has been changing in recent decades, the relation between 
architecture and power becoming a subject of concern and debate within the 
discipline.73 Nevertheless, in Latin America preoccupations are still raised about its 
“inconvenience”.74 This research not only aims to contradict that assumption by 
opening up new territories, but also attempts to challenge existing understanding about 
how this power is materialized.  
The interpretation of space in other recent studies is mediated by the recreation 
of different relations and traces, which it is worth mentioning once more are not all 
visible; given the dynamic connotation of the production of space adds more 
complexity. Interestingly, Kim Dovey argues that the relative invisibility makes the built 
form even more powerful, “the more that structures and representations of power can 
                                                
73 The rapidly growing interest in the subject would not allow for a comprehensive account of the 
scholarly production, but perhaps some of the most recurrent references are Barbara Miller Lane (1985), 
who in 1968 coined the contradictions on the critique and later adoption of the modern movement in Nazi 
Germany (and the manipulation of its core social postulates). Thomas Markus (1993) whose main 
assertion is that “In space, relations of power are ever-present.” Paul Jaskot (2001) traces relations of 
architecture with social and economic facts, generating a direct connection with two concepts already 
mentioned: power and representation. Kim Dovey (1999), who claims that the built environment acts as a 
stabilizer for its own characteristics, making it invisible and, therefore, more powerful. 
74 Although with a very limited dissemination, recent studies have addressed the relation between 
power and architecture in Latin America, mainly in Argentina: Ballent (2005), (Giunta 2005), (Andermann 
et al. 2005), and more indirectly (Liernur 2004) y (Gorelik 2012). 
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be embedded in the framework of everyday life, the less questionable they become, 
and the more effectively they can work.” (Dovey 1999, 2) It draws on Bourdieu, who 
terms this phenomenon a “complicitous silence” where habitus legitimizes the 
ideological discourse when it remains hidden in the space. (1977, 188) 
Dovey elaborates another aspect, which could also be connected with 
Bourdieu;75 he claims that there is a “complex dialectic whereby overt expressions of 
power in space tend towards an inverse relation to the security of that power”. In other 
words, in the rush to legitimize certain agents of power, they urge the materialization of 
projects in direct proportion with the vulnerability of that power. Agents of power appear 
to have identified the “capacity of buildings to symbolize a 'grounding' of authority in 
landscape and nature [which] means that architecture is regularly called on to 
legitimize power in crisis”. (Dovey 1999, 14) This well might be the case with the 
Colombian dictatorship. 
 
· Different constructs of power 
Bearing in mind that every interpretation of the concept of power may be partial, 
and not necessarily applicable to every case and subject, I have followed previous 
studies regarding the relation of architecture and power to find the references that most 
commonly inform them. This has given me the opportunity to explore other areas and 
disciplines, which create – either directly or indirectly – connections with my subject of 
research. Most of these studies are built on French philosophy, and largely focus on 
the traditional and explicit manifestations of power. 
When talking about power, perhaps the most common reference among them is 
the French philosopher Michael Foucault (1995), particularly in Discipline and Punish: 
the birth of the prison, published originally in 1975, and referring to Bentham’s 
panopticon, as the quintessential materialization of his notion of power. This French 
philosopher conceives power as a means of domination, which fundamentally implies 
                                                
75 To analyse how places materialize and reflect interests Dovey combines parts of what 
he calls three intellectual paradigms: space syntax (social logic), discourse analysis (representation) and 
phenomenology (experience). 
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the coercion caused by the idea of surveillance: forcing individuals into discipline.76 
There is an explicit idea of control over the other. Foucault admits at a certain point, 
however, “power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. 
Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” (Foucault et al. 
1980, 86) 
Trying to find other references on this balance with non-explicit control, I 
considered other contemporary perspectives, less diffused in the architectural realm; 
some of them are complementary and some contradictory to Foucault’s work. Perhaps 
one of the most relevant is Michel de Certeau’s (1984) contribution is the idea of “silent 
histories”, that is, tactical ruses to make more bearable and effective the power 
exerted. 
On the one hand, in the conception of power, this philosopher considers either 
the direct or indirect impact of the strategies applied over society due to the 
vulnerability of memory, that is an impermanent construction. Certeau affirms that 
memory can be modified depending on the intentions of agents, and it should be 
assured in materializations that act as anchors. One potent materialization of power is 
the modification of space; hence places are warehouses of memory.  
On the other hand, Certeau opens a new front for discussion: he “celebrates” 
the resistance to the disciplinary regime one society might create. This French scholar 
asserts that the more totalitarian a power source becomes, the more prone it is to 
subversion. Such subversion is indeed another power in tension with the idea of control 
where the agent of domination is contested.77  
If it is true that the grid of “discipline” is everywhere becoming 
clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover 
how an entire society resist being reduced to it, what popular 
                                                
76 Such discipline helps the individual to internalize what should be considered normal (right) or 
deviant (wrong) behaviour. 
77 This idea of a tension amongst actors implies different forms of relationship involved in the 
notion of power. Well before, in 1951, that is in the early years of the Cold War, Hannah Arendt (1951) 
contributed to the conceptualization of power, by claiming that not only is there a relationship, but that such 
a relationship implies asymmetry. The relationship can be the result of the exertion of force, seduction, 
coercion, manipulation, legitimation, or authority. Thus the power tension may be conceived further than as 
an imposition, or a reaction. 
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procedures (also “minuscule” and quotidian) manipulate the 
mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to 
evade them, and finally, what “ways of operating” form the 
counterpart, on the consumer’s (or “dominee’s”?) side, of the 
mute process that organize the establishment of socioeconomic 
order. (Certeau 1984, xiv) 
Despite the fact that the idea of power interpreted as control has been widely 
accepted, it implies the active domination of one agent “over” the passive malleability 
of other actors.78 Nevertheless, the conception of power as a process may be closer to 
other different and complementary approaches; for instance, the one drawing on the 
etymology of the word. “Power” comes from the Latin word potere, meaning, “to be 
able” which implies the capacity to act, to think, to do. (Dovey 2008) Conversely, both 
“power over” and “power to” may have a duplicitous character: oppression and 
emancipation – that is to say, control and freedom, but not necessarily autonomy. 79 
 
Figure 26. UNESCO mobile public library, gaining public support through 
developing social programmes during the construction of the local library ©RAC 
The concern about how such power is received leads us to more 
considerations, where I would recall Foucault's claim regarding the convenient 
exposition of power. (Foucault et al. 1988) In this sense, one could elaborate by saying 
that in a political discourse, as representation of power, there is a dual condition: one 
overt and visible; and another masked – or perhaps reserved to some of the actors 
involved. From these different constructs of power, I will focus on the masked control, 
in other words, the indirect control that both Foucault and Arendt have identified. Such 
intangible, but intentional, power can also be derived from de Certeau’s construction; it 
seems difficult to grasp, but perhaps more related to the potential of the built 
environment. This more subtle manifestation of what represents power may tend to 
                                                
78 In turn, this implies a conception of power as relationship, from which I deduce a connotation of 
process and dynamism. The tension this power relationship generates between actors implies the 
interaction of different forces and manifestations. Some of them might be planned, but not necessarily all. 
The idea of a dynamic issue implies that involved forces or agents may create and re-create the process. 
79 Whereas “power over” has had negative connotations, “power to” has a more positive 
association as it opens possibilities for a more “balanced” condition of the entities involved; in other words, 
it does not imply superiority of one agent over the other. 
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normalize the asymmetrical relation, minimizing the possible dissent of different actors. 
It is here where the multiplicity of what is exposed, and what is silent, becomes more 
intriguing. Perhaps these nuances can explain the difficulty in pinning down the political 
discourse of Rojas, and the weight put on the transformation of the infrastructure in the 
country. 
  
 
2.2. Soft power  
In the context of the Cold War, this notion of an “invisible hand” has been 
inherent to power. Although referencing it before, the US intelligence expert Joseph S. 
Nye Jr80 finally coined the term “soft power” in Bound to lead in 1990. Keohane et al. 
(2001) build on the idea that a balance between explicit control – mainly military and 
economic – and covert strategies was fundamental to the “US triumph” in the Cold War 
– in other words, the interplay between hard and soft power. 
Nye acknowledges that diverse tactics are necessary to achieve expected 
results depending on the context: “All power depends on context – who relates to 
whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power 
upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.” (Nye 2004) Therefore it gives 
a preeminent role to both the representational tactics and means, and the interpretation 
by the receivers of the power exerted.  
Nye (2004) argues that “co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want 
– can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate 
the agenda of political choices.” It should basically reinforce rather than undercut the 
asymmetrical relationship between different actors. In terms of international politics, 
however, the United States was not a pioneer in what the historian Edward Hallet Carr 
in 1939 referred to as “power over opinion”. (Carr 1939) Seduction of public opinion, 
                                                
80 Joseph Nye was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
in the United States, and Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has 
published about international politics since 1965. 
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and its subscription to ideologies, has been part of the political game, and in particular 
of diplomacy.  
Although inherent to public diplomacy in transnational relations, this soft power 
also proves its effectiveness in a national context, where immediate threats may lead 
to a greater resistance. In this case persuasion facilitates the inducement. Manipulation 
of public perception had used different means throughout history in order to gain 
acquiescence. (Wilson III 2008) Yet, Nye warns, “soft power resources are slower, 
more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources.” 
Some of the identifiable resources of this type of public diplomacy are political 
values, foreign policies, and cultural expressions. The final aim is to embed these 
values, policies and expressions in everyday life, in a long-term relationship creating an 
enabling environment. To do so, soft power tactics build on three main factors: regular 
communication, dissemination of strategic information, and key individuals who act as 
multipliers.  
Despite the contradictory caveat that Nye presents, “in a liberal society, 
government cannot and should not control culture”, cultural expressions have been 
widely used as political devices. I will develop the debate that derives from outcomes of 
such instrumentation in Chapter 7.  
 
· Psychological operations 
Political strategies of soft power are related to what in military sciences is 
known as psychological operations, or psychological warfare – that is PSYOP or 
PSYWAR. According to the manual of PSYOP of the US Department of the Army: 
“Psychological operations used for the purpose of creating a favourable image, gaining 
adherents, and undermining opponents have become a major weapon of the 20th 
century warfare”. (US Department of the Army 1962) After the First World War the 
importance of controlling flows of information to the public was identified. Since the 
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Second World War, it became operative,81 and part of military training not only in the 
USA, but amongst the Allies, and it was vastly disseminated within defence circles 
during the Cold War; in particular the Manual of 1979 noted: “after the Korean conflict, 
organizations, and techniques for tactical PSYOP improved”. (US Department of the 
Army. Headquarters 1979)  
 
Figure 27. Front page: manual of psychological operations © University of Illinois 
Perhaps the most complete compilation about PSYOP can be found in War on 
the Mind by Peter Watson (1978). According to the review by psychology professor 
Perry London (1979), most of its content was unfamiliar – and shocking – to the 
general public, even to psychologists, as it had remained until then “limited distribution 
material”. Watson’s compilation covers aspects of internal training in combat, stress, 
and loyalty, but it also addresses the external practice of it – in other words, the one 
directed towards civilians, which is the case in point.  
Psychological operations, therefore, encompass political, economic, social, 
ideological, and also military actions. This unconventional warfare practice has been 
highly influential in the formulation of international and national politics. On this sort of 
operation, information equates to power: the ability to manipulate information, 
therefore, gives an advantage point in terms of control, that validates and operates: 
“[v]ia traditional media and non-conventional means”. (Armistead 2004) 
According with the PSYOP manuals,82 the general objectives of operations are 
usually: to deter hostility, foster acceptance, build confidence, secure support, and 
finally to indoctrinate civilians. Such operations commonly take advantage of perceived 
needs, turning them in favour of the plot and presenting the idea, as stated in the 
                                                
81 According to Curtis Boyd (2007), “Appreciation for the utility of PSYWAR in peace began to 
take shape in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina. To improve operational effectiveness, the name PSYWAR was then changed (1962) to 
PSYOP to establish a term that was more inclusive of full spectrum operations–activities before, during, 
and after combat operations–which created greater opportunity for military non lethal foreign influence 
outside of combat operations.” 
82 The current PYSOP manual of the Army in Colombia, which seems to draw from the US 
version.  
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manual, that “government programs serve the interest of the people”. (US Department 
of the Army. Headquarters 1979)  
This sort of operation, as the politics scholar Janos Radványi (1990) pointed 
out, is either strategic if it is long term, or tactical, if it has a shorter span. Tasks can be 
inscribed in four aims: defensive, offensive, retrograde (i.e. delaying), or relief. And 
they depend on propagation, receptivity, and coverage. For instance, according to the 
US Army, “the major PSYOP effort of the United States has been by the Department of 
State (STATE); subsequently, the US Information Agency (USIA) which included the 
Voice of America (VOA)”.83 (US Department of the Army. Headquarters 1979)  
In the 1940s most countries had created a governmental section called the 
Ministry of Information and Propaganda.84 In the case of Colombia such a role was 
filled by the Dirección de Información y Propaganda del Estado (State Directorate of 
Information and Propaganda – DIPE), which was created during the Rojas dictatorship. 
(Henderson 2001) The role of the Ministries of Information was to deal with sensitive 
information, propaganda by the state, surveillance of all information flows, and 
censorship of inconvenient data.  
Governments invest considerable effort in the delivery of information suiting the 
interests of the state and the needs of the citizens. However, during the latent tension 
of the Cold War, the management of information required creative strategies of 
concealment: on the one hand, representing images of stability and progress; on the 
other, interpreting potential threats. Consequently, the DIPE played an important role in 
the national and international image of the Rojas regime. 
Soft power and psychological operations ran parallel in order to contain the 
influence of socialist ideas in Latin America, as well as in other more or less developed 
                                                
83 USIA was created since 1953, with the aim of centralizing state information. And Voice of 
America was a well-known radio system for information and misinformation. An account of its evolution 
can be found in Nye (2004). Kenneth Osgood (2006) has recently researched the parallel case of the 
European system of state information, Radio Freedom Europe, which advances were presented at 
seminar in Crassh (2011) about Public Relations in the Cold War.  
84 In most countries this Ministry has changed its name to Ministry of Communications, or Culture, 
or has been divided into small and less visible units such as Departments of Information.  
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countries.85 In this respect, the internal reports of the US Central Intelligence Agency 
that have become public – some of them through Freedom of Information Acts – about 
psychological operations in South America are telling. Unfortunately, the ones that 
have become available, so far, do not directly address Colombia during the Rojas 
dictatorship. They either correspond to operations in other countries at the time – i.e. 
PBSUCCESS in Guatemala in the early 1950s86 – or they refer to Colombia in the 
context of a general survey of the region, thus being less specific. However, they do 
provide evidence that US psychological warfare was implemented in the region and in 
the country. And at the time, the increasing involvement of US entities in the region 
was operational to the strategy. 
Cultural exchanges, the manual stresses, had the objective of creating “clear 
lines of responsibility for enhancing, on the one hand, foreign access to American 
experiences and, on the other hand, American access to foreign experiences and 
culture”. (US Department of the Army 1962) It emphasizes that the success of an 
operation relies on the creation of a “credible truth”.  
 
· Offensive Charm 
The charming seduction87 of international diplomacy had involved strategies 
with multiple purposes, not all visible at first sight. Tactical operations to influence 
public opinion have included the creation of cultural institutions to promote national 
interests elsewhere. Such is the case of the US Committee on Public Information in 
1917; the BBC in 1922; and so on.88 The same resources and strategies will not 
necessarily produce similar outcomes; to our particular reference, due to the concern 
of German propaganda in Latin America, in 1938, the US State Department 
                                                
85 The US government undertook systematic surveys of the “influence of socialist ideas” through 
locating not only socialist parties and unions, but other questionable allies. Cf (CIA 1958)  
86 A detailed account of the tasks can be found in (Cullather 1994).  
87 “Charm offensive” has been used by Joshua Kurlantzick (2007) to describe the Chinese soft 
power strategy of the last 30 years. 
88 It can be argued that organizations such as the British Council in 1934 (formerly the British 
Committee for Relations with Other Countries) were created with similar purposes. 
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established the Division of Cultural Relations, and later the Office of Inter-American 
Affairs directed by Nelson Rockefeller. (Nye 2008)89  
Since the 1950s, other institutions have also played a crucial role in the 
dissemination of political values, under different modalities. Some of the most visible 
ones in Latin America are: MoMA,90 the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Soros Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment, the Fulbright Commission, the 
Council of Learning Societies, and the Social Science Research Council. Additional 
acknowledgement should be given to US corporations and companies operating in the 
developing world with the convenient presentation of technical cooperation 
agreements.91  
The involvement was not limited to the obvious aid cooperation. Arguably, US 
industries such as the Tropical Oil Company or the United Fruit Company were 
involved in these operations, as well as cultural agencies such as the MoMA, or 
CINTAS, which have been questioned about their deployment in US psychological 
operations. 92 
George Kennan, who was a key figure in the definition of the US political 
strategy of containment during the Cold War, strongly favoured cultural exchanges, as 
“political propaganda for results that could be achieved by such means alone”. 
(Richmond 2004) Cultural exchanges addressed mainly elites expecting them to create 
a replication effect to high cultural contacts, academic, technical and scientific 
exchanges. Its expected outcomes were gradual and structural in the society.  
During the Cold War, governments and other actors conveyed messages and 
images according to their particular agenda. Multilateral institutions and cooperation 
agreements were crucial. However, Nye notes that the definition of international 
                                                
89 This has been one of the agencies identified in Chapter 1 in the network of institutions devoted 
to bilateral or multilateral relations. 
90 A detailed and well documented account of this interaction of the MoMA and its political 
involvement in Latin America can be found in Patricio del Real (2012). 
91 Further information can be found in (Cody 2003). 
92 Originally with the exhibition ‘Britain at War’ in 1941, and later with an impressive campaign 
that was initially extended nationwide in the United States, and then towards Latin America, clearly played 
a key role as a materialization of US foreign policy. Cf (del Real 2012) 
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policies and tactics was controversial, mainly because what he identifies as a period of 
crisis in the international image of the United States: 
As the Cold War developed, there was a division between those 
who favoured the slow media of cultural diplomacy – arts, 
books, exchanges – that had trickle-down effect, and those who 
favoured the fast information media of radio, movies, and 
newsreels, which promised more immediate and visible ‘bang 
for the buck’. (Nye 2004, 102-3) 
In particular, taking into account that some of these cooperation agreements 
implied the assignation of resources, this may not always generate tangible and timely 
outcomes: “one way for a government to retain control while presenting the illusion of 
not doing so is by covert funding through intelligence agencies.” (Nye 2004) For 
instance, a recurrent reference was the case of the newly created Central Intelligence 
Agency covertly assigning funds to cultural organizations, and artists, until it was made 
public in the 1970s.  
Within the political contest of the communist bloc and the western democracies, 
civilian co-option rather than coercion defined the ability to reduce confrontation and 
resistance, and to shape the preferences of countries that were consolidating their own 
political systems. Whilst modern development was highly persuasive in engendering 
cooperation from national governments and civilians, it also facilitated the containment 
agenda. As the Soviet politician Georgii Shaknazarov stated in an interview in 1990, 
“all of us were Double-thinkers. We had to balance truth and propaganda.” [My 
emphasis] (Montgomery 2001) 
Seeking for acquiescence, the combination of different strategies of power took 
place. The political agenda of Rojas government was greatly permeated by tactical 
operations. Most of these had the clear aim of assuring public support but, due to their 
own nature, such tactics were not entirely controllable, as Nye argued: “in the case of 
soft power the question is what messages are sent and received by whom under which 
circumstances, and how that affects our ability to obtain the outcomes we want”. (Nye 
2004) This political historian mentions that a suitable simile to illustrate these elaborate 
tactics is the Trojan horse. In other words, not necessarily the apparent image conveys 
the whole. My contention is that the ambiguity and incoherence of the historical 
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information available about policies of the built environment is related to this soft 
power. Identifying what was the agenda framed by the Colombian regime, and the 
tactics used, provides some light on understanding infrastructural projects of this 
regime, and its consequences for the development of modern architecture.  
 
 
2.3. Double-thinking practices  
At the end of the First World War, this joint operation on the cultural 
manifestations of double-thinking practices took place in two instances. Historians have 
recently and publicly identified the participation of Cubists, such as Jacques Villon, and 
the Vorticists, such as Solomon J Solomon,93 amongst others, in cooperating with 
military camouflage units. So did American designers and artists, such as George 
Sakier and Jackson Pollock. This was part of an open and direct participation of 
different disciplines in the service of concealment initiated during wartime, and 
sustained to protect against future attacks. Amongst them is a report to the public 
relations office of the British Ministry of Home Security presented by Sir Robert Vere 
(Robin) Darwin, Secretary of the Directorate of Camouflage, about the role of artists 
cooperating along with engineers, architects, scientists, and officials in creating 
successful camouflage operations.94 Most of these documents show this relationship 
between professionals of different fields with war issues. 
In the case of the built environment, perhaps the most visible cooperation was 
the involvement of universities and practices of architecture and engineering in 
incorporating their knowledge in the disguise of spaces. This was a fruitful relationship, 
as reportedly camouflage was incorporated as a subject of study in the 1940s primarily 
in the United States of America, Germany, and the United Kingdom.95 Cooperative 
                                                
93 Solomon has a detailed description of strategies and methods used by Germany in order to 
conceal even towns at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
94 In the case of British military strategy, the research work of Henrietta Goodden (2007) traces 
relations on the subject with the Royal College of Arts, and recovers important archival material about the 
cooperation with the British forces.  
95 See Jean Louis Cohen (2011), who has a complete account on how this academic and 
professional connection took place in the United States.  
108( Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán(
 
 
workshops, and a published series of manuals developing best practice on camouflage 
were set. These camouflage manuals did not differ greatly from one another, and 
shared accepted practices that were disseminated in the Western Hemisphere. I will 
expand later on the specific content of these manuals.  
 
Figure 28. Front page: the Art of Camouflage © BL 
In 1941 The Art of Camouflage was published in Britain, in which Lieutenant-
Colonel Clement Hope Rawdon Chesney put into words this expansion of the field into 
different realms: “Nature invented the art of camouflage, and man has developed it as 
a science of modern war.” (Chesney 1941) Drawing on from Chesney, one can 
conceive camouflage as art, as it is a creative process which implies a representation 
of some reality and allows different interpretations. 
Camouflage, therefore, appears a suitable conceptual device given the 
available confusing information about the relationship of politics and architecture in 
Colombia in the 1950s, which I interpret as a materialization of the “double-truth” game. 
Camouflage has an extensive literature in biology, and in security sciences. However, 
references to it are scarce in the social sciences, and even fewer in the arts. I 
approach however, this concept with a certain scepticism, noting how problematic it is 
to enter into a scholarly trend that can be already heavily loaded.  
 
· Tactics in use 
Whilst the notion of camouflage is commonly understood, through unpacking 
the concept its intrinsic connectivity emerges. To be camouflaged is necessarily to be 
“in relation to”. Usually this refers to a connection between either a subject, or an 
object, and its surroundings. Traditionally this relationship is about those subjects or 
objects, disguised in their context.96  
  
                                                
96 Further references can be found. (Behrens 1987);(Friedland et al. 1994; Blechman et al. 2004; 
Leach 2006; Osgood 2006; Goodden 2007; Deer 2009) 
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Figure 29. Camouflage, Basic Principles: cover © NARA 
Drawing on biological and military practice, it is possible to identify traditional 
tactics used to camouflage; most of these were initially visual, but later evolved to 
include other senses. Amongst camouflage tactics it is possible to find repetitions, and 
combinations to create disguises.97 There is not necessarily a unique agreement about 
categories of different tactics, but given their dispersion, I have found it useful to 
simplify them into six representative groups, that will later be related to the historical 
material about Colombian architecture. Thus, my proposal is to group them into the 
following tactics: mimicry with the environment; counter-shading; disrupting and 
distracting; encrypting or fractioning information; masking or obstructing accessibility; 
and denaturing ordinary appearances. In general terms, here I will present how each of 
those categories works, and give basic examples to illustrate them.  
! Mimicry is perhaps the most popular tactic. As it is an imitation of the environment 
in order to blend in, it usually takes place by colouration or shape. The salient 
example of this mimicry is that of the chameleon, with its ability to imitate the 
immediate surface on which it is placed.  
! With counter-shading,98 the purpose is to make it difficult to identify the object by 
blurring boundaries, or shading the object of it by the effect of highlighting the 
context; this relates to the effect generated, for instance, by exposure that makes a 
silhouette against a bright background.  
! The creation of distractions that look for disruption by attracting to a decoy element, 
or guiding the attention away from the object, where it is even possible for the 
object to disappear; such is the case with smoke screens.  
! Encrypting or fractioning information is one of the most recurrent practices in 
camouflaging communications, but is not limited to them; the aim here is to 
disguise the meaning by presenting the object using a system of codes, or merely 
fragments of information, in order to make it difficult to identify the whole.  
                                                
97 H. Blechman and A. Newman (2004) have compiled an inventory of different camouflage 
patterns drawing on biology and mainly military sources. It traces some influences on different cultural 
manifestations, highlighting what they claim is its anti-war contemporary association. 
98 This counter-shading technique was perhaps one of the first insights from art on camouflage. 
Abbot H. Thayer, based on animal observation, proposed a technique playing with darkness and light in 
order to modify the perception of a volume, in his book Concealing colouration in the animal kingdom, 
1909. This strategy was widely used on the First World War. 
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! Masking is one of the most resourceful practices of camouflage, and it occurs when 
an element embodies a different one, something familiar, or when is possible to 
perceive just a fragment of an element, limiting access to the original; perhaps the 
simplest case would be the “wolf in sheep’s clothing”.  
! And lastly, one of the most complex tactics of camouflage, a denatured object 
which refers to the change of external features usually making them appear as 
something different, but contrasting with the environment, distorting and creating 
confusion in its interpretation; this is the case with the use of Vorticist patterns to 
dazzle on camouflaged ships.99  
These relations of an individual, or object, with its environment are crucial to the 
discussion about camouflage: they reveal the procedures and tactics that can be 
adopted in order to conceal the object. Nevertheless, these tactics consider only a 
fraction of what is implicit. The reason or purpose of the camouflage is missing. Such 
classification might be a limitation. Camouflage implies an agency that is devoted to 
deceiving. This generates more questions than what is the nature of camouflage. In 
other words, more than tactics, camouflage is wilful – conscious. Therefore, these 
tactics are only one instrumental step in order to understand different implications 
involved, and the consequences of the deception, in particular the implication for the 
receiver of the trick. Understanding these different tactics will help to make sense of 
fractionate and contradictory information about the built environment produced during 
Rojas regime. See Chapters 4, and 6. 
 
· Exteriority of the practice, the observer 
Traditionally the discussion about camouflage has been focused on the relation 
of an object in a context, which I consider insufficient for the understanding of both the 
rationale and the interpretation of the double–truth strategy. However, peripheral 
information in the manuals of camouflage leads towards other aspects that could give a 
better account of what the original strategy implied. Two aspects to reflect on are 
relevant to point out here. The first one is the necessary differentiation between the 
                                                
99 An interesting account of the polemical participation of modern artists in the military strategies 
used by the British army can be found in (Deer 2009, 44-7) 
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subject and the object in the context. And secondly, as the purpose of camouflage is to 
conceal, the question is from whom?; this brings out the participation of what I will call 
here an observer, that is, the receiver. These elements will provide a better 
understanding of my proposal about two categories of camouflage, identified here as 
internal and external. 
In order to develop these ideas it is necessary to recall Roger Caillois’ original 
discussion about camouflage. (Caillois 1964; Caillois et al. 1984) Based on biological 
studies, Caillois considers the capacity of modification for imitation not only between 
the subject and the environment, but also amongst subjects – in other words, the 
subject as an organism that adapts through mimicry of its surroundings and of its pairs. 
Caillois also introduces possible reasons for such adaptation, mentioning the search of 
defence amongst other needs – such as a sense of belonging, attack strategy, and 
ageing. Hence, the focus here is the relation between the subject and its surroundings, 
which has been extensively discussed by Neil Leach (2006).100 
Extrapolating this assimilation of the subject and its surroundings, it could be 
seen in terms of architecture, as operating simultaneously on two different levels: on 
the one hand, the relation between the individual who experiments with the space, and 
on the other the architectural object and urban projects as artefacts in the context.101 
Putting it differently, more than the camouflage’s traditional binomials – subject-
context, or object-context –; there are now three different elements in the relationship 
of camouflage: individual, artefact and environment. Tensions and adaptations in order 
to conceal between subject, object, or context will be understood as internal 
camouflage. 
                                                
100 Neil Leach appears to be a permanent reference when mentioning camouflage in the 
architectural realm. This architect claims that in the experience of the space there is a primitive instinct to 
blend in with the environment, arguing that such a desire is related to the sense of protection, and the 
need to belong, proper to psychoanalytic theory. Leach considers camouflage as multiple possible 
adaptations; however, I will argue that this first level of mutual transformation does not necessarily result in 
camouflage as has been identified, unless in these adaptations to an environment there is a specific 
intention to conceal from an observer. This is the rationale of the adaptation. This claim thus defines a 
distance from Leach’s proposal.  
101 In material culture theory, architecture as human creation is an artefact – an artistic object that 
is a product of the human mind, and in this sense such an object is a reflex of the human mind. Further 
references in: (Attfield 2000), (Rapoport 2005), (Prown 2002). 
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However, my proposal is to look at camouflage taking into account also a fourth 
element: what we would call the observer, or receiver for whom the concealment is 
created. This relation between subject, artefact, and context is directed at the receiver 
who, as an external reader of the connection, acquires a prominent role. Yet, so far this 
receiver has been overlooked when addressing studies of camouflage.  
As a matter of fact, it can be assumed that this connectivity of disguise amongst 
an individual, artefact, context, and external observer could reach diverse levels of 
complexity. This brings us to the second category of camouflage I propose: the exterior 
one, based on the position of the receiver as an outsider, who may modify and 
particularly bring more dynamism to the relation, even providing it with temporality. The 
extent to which the receiver remains as external observer will be addressed in Chapter 
7. 
This seems to be a complex game where four elements play a specific role, but 
each of them is not necessarily aware of the extent of the camouflage. Traditionally this 
has been conceived as a unidirectional process – in other words, the process where 
organisms assuming the active role adjust themselves in relation to the passive 
environment.102 Nevertheless, I would argue that this first level of mutual transformation 
does not necessarily result in camouflage as has been claimed, unless in these 
adaptations to an environment there is a specific intention to conceal from an observer. 
That fourth component, the observer, as an external agent, is essential to the 
definition of how the relationship between individual, artefact, and the environment 
takes place. The aim is to create for the observer a false interpretation of the relation 
between the artefact and its surroundings. It is noticeable that the external agent is the 
one who receives the information, which could affect perception.103 What is relevant is 
that the information that appears at first glance misleads the receiver’s understanding 
                                                
102 Most references focus on how there is a unidirectional change of the subject, modifying its 
presence to suit better into a given scenario. They seldom contemplate the possibility of adaptations on 
the environment, as it is usually more stable. However, the dynamic of mutual transformation occurs once 
they enter into relation, which implies there is an intrinsic change. Such mutual change is even generated 
with the presence of an object in a context. The interpretation of the object changes according to its 
context. Similarly, the environment changes with the existence of objects in it. 
103 Camouflage studies have prioritized visibility, but camouflage practices in the animal kingdom, 
in the military, and particularly in the arts have evolved to cover other levels of perception as previously 
mentioned.  
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of the relation between the artefact, or the individual, and the environment. Such 
misleading is the goal of the camouflage.  
 
· The (in) visibility game 
Roger Caillois, referring to the way in which a camouflaged object can convey 
multiple realities – or even how it can be interpreted as the embodiment of something 
different, and accomplish that while it also has other connotations – coined the term 
“double-truth”. (Caillois et al. 1984) As mentioned above, misleading the understanding 
of the observer of an artefact, in a context, is the agency of camouflage.  
In the psychological battlefield, this misdirection is reinforced by information 
presented to the observer – what I identify as an external camouflage. In the 
camouflaging of information there is not only the suppression and hindering of public 
information, but also the creation of false fronts, and glossed-over data. In terms of the 
proposed categories, frequent tactics in state information management included 
counter-shading, fractioning, and the creation of smoke-screens.(Shlaifer 2011) This 
obscuring of information aims to make it difficult to identify possible relations, or 
rationale. Most of the time, Rojas governmental decisions appear random and 
improvised.  
These “double-truths” took different forms in media reports, propaganda, 
awards, and exhibitions, usually composed of photographs, photomontages, models 
and posters. The Western Hemisphere was very efficient at publicizing their material 
achievements.104 So was Colombia’s regime at promoting a modern image and its own 
accomplishments. This constitutes nowadays the bulk of the available material about 
the Rojas dictatorship; therefore an important part of the primary material of this 
research comes from material issued by DIPE.  
                                                
104 A detailed account of this trend in the Western Hemisphere can be found in (Kallmann 1943). 
According to Kallmann’s compilation in different editions of The Architectural Review, the British 
government was quite prolific in this sense as he maintains “the exhibitions are never isolated: they 
provide the climax, or the opening bars of a campaign which is staged by radio, press, film, and posters”. 
Veronica Davies (2008) also traces in her paper “Steering a Progressive Course”. Kallmann also reports 
about different exhibitions of the British Government, see http://www.henry-moore.org//hmi-
journal/homepage/view-by-conference/sculpture-in-the-home/steering-a-progressive-course accessed on 
September 13th, 2011.  
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Figure 30. The government showcased the achievements on infrastructure through 
the media, exhibitions, official reports © DIPE 
As we have seen, in the Western Hemisphere, as in the Colombian case, there 
was a permanent presence and almost saturation of information from the state. This 
created an impact with the use of new technologies, but also with rapidity, providing 
permanent information in what I will assume was a soft power strategy to avoid any 
fixity in the collective memory.  
This was a double game of visibility and invisibility. Drawn on Orwell idea of 
“double-think”, (Orwell 1954) Kim Dovey argues that in order to legitimize the ruling 
power one of the strategies is a self-deceit “capacity to hold contradictory beliefs, to 
deliberately service one agenda while justifying it with another” which usually seem to 
serve public interest. It ensures its relative invisibility and acceptance. (Dovey 2008) 
On the same line, according to Jean-Louis Cohen’s recent publication, “camouflage 
started at the most basic level, at the very sources of information, with the organization 
of ignorance. It started with pure and simple censorship of city plans and aerial 
photographs.” (2011, 208) To illustrate this, Cohen cites a famous case of censorship 
in L’architecture d’aujourd’hui in 1940, where two white squares appeared, instead of 
plans of the port of Marseilles.  
Nevertheless, it is correspondingly important to mention that data was creatively 
used also, simulating realities. For instance, 1:1 models were created for training 
purposes, or even as part of the defence strategy to avoid aerial attacks on vulnerable 
areas, such as was the case of the fake urban sites of Paris, Moscow, Leningrad, 
Hamburg, Berlin, or Munich. (Cohen 2011, 190) There was a representation of a sort of 
reality, that requires it to be looked at again, either because it was incomprehensible, 
or because it seemed to be something different. In Latin America there are no 
precedents known about these practices of creation of aerial urban concealment within 
consolidated areas; one can say that the continent was under an urbanization process. 
However, my opinion is that they followed the same strategic principles in the definition 
or extension of urban areas, as we will see in Chapter 4. 
Drawing on different strategies in the double-truth game, one can synthesize 
that information was used to accomplish different purposes: most ordinarily to endorse, 
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or focus particular attention on, certain facts that acted as decoys. It was also 
implemented to orientate a convenient interpretation of the phenomena. It mediated in 
conflictive or sensitive issues. And, lastly, information helped the public to catalyse 
social dynamics.  
In sum, the manipulation of information – also that concerning the built 
environment, as we will see – aimed to shape processes of remembering, or forgetting. 
In other words, it was an instrument to mobilize public opinion, to promote, persuade, 
or prevent cultural possibilities. The proliferation of information, and its control, seeks to 
orientate, internalize, and familiarize the state image – that is, I would argue, to 
manipulate identity processes. 
 
 
2.4. Equivocal Representation 
Different Cold War strategies of manipulation of information imply compatible 
and complementary purposes. Alternative forms of power were necessary to assure 
success in a complex historical and social context as the Colombian one. The 
confluence of tactics of soft power, PSYOP, and camouflage allow the consideration of 
different relations of an object to its environment. (Barnett et al. 1988) Considering the 
possibility of finding elements that may be noticeable, but not explicit, what I propose, 
is that through the lens of camouflage, it may be possible to understand different 
rationales of architectural projects that act as instruments of power. By doing so, I 
introduce questions about the effects that multiple representations have on the 
capacity of the exterior observer to relate to the built environment. 
It is possible to identify processes of representation by which nation-building 
discourses were portrayed by the state in the official media, or in state projects and 
policies. At the same time, it is relevant to discover how the few critical voices or 
silences found their way to represent dissident opinions. Both state and dissidents 
used different types of concealment of their message and purpose. It is open to the 
receiver to interpret the message on different levels, despite the bombardment of 
information that validated the ideal nation. 
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Such awareness of the role of the observer might suggest an elaborated 
camouflage. People were instructed not only on how to represent, but also on how to 
interpret, the official and the dissident voices. Camouflaging strategies in the built 
environment took place on different and complementary levels. One was more 
ideological, identifiable with PSYOPs; (Daugherty et al. 1958) the other was more 
physical, following patterns of what was known as industrial camouflage. Until the 
present this official creation has remained either unquestioned or silenced. 
In order to understand what the operation in the built environment enabled, and 
define it as a suitable tool, I have researched the history of camouflage and a set of 
ideas and tactics that are associated with the practice of disguise in the post-war 
period. As Davide Deriu (2004) notes in his research, most of the tactics in use in 
camouflage were initially designed to avoid aerial visual recognition. Wittmann’s 
manual points out: 
The task of camouflage is to deceive the bombardier. 
Confusion, concealment, deception, and diversion are the 
means to fulfil this task. If complete subterfuge in evading 
recognition cannot be accomplished, disturbance of accuracy of 
observation is the next goal. (Wittmann et al. 1942)  
However, the evolution of the practice after initial failures led to a more integral 
development; where different operations defined a complex system since the initial 
definition of the project, to the configuration of the space, and the experience of it. 
 
· Camouflage and architecture 
The use of camouflage in architecture is not new or unfamiliar. Indeed, it is 
possible to discover how, during times of war, governments promoted and issued 
several guides on how to disguise key spaces, military and civil, from the enemy. One 
such case is a study by Robert Breckenridge (1942), a member of the US Engineering 
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Board at Fort Belvoir.105 This official illustrates how it was relevant to protect houses 
and industries, as the territory to be defended was vast. This protection took the form 
of concealing “location, strength, and purpose”, in order to disguise what was most 
prominent or vulnerable according to military tactics and, I would add, to political 
interests.  
Notably, historical documents highlight the relevance of incorporating different 
arts and sciences in the practice of disguise. However, my interest is about different 
levels and tactics of concealment, particularly as architects and engineers of that time 
in Colombia have so far denied the possibility of such connections, without providing 
alternative answers. Archival material merely mentions information about contracts for 
parts of projects, but does not suggest a clear picture.  
These creative processes and practices were regulated and standardised, 
producing manuals that were widely disseminated in the Western Hemisphere. Even 
though there is no evidence about a direct relation with my study case, they do provide 
elements to unravel strategies that were prevalent amongst the Allies. Therefore, 
based on some traces of information found in the available material, I extrapolate 
information of strategies in use at that time, in order to elaborate on connections that 
allow an understanding of the development of modern architecture during Rojas 
regime. 
 
Figure 31. Front page: Camouflage manual of Pratt Institute © TATE 
Also in 1942 Konrad F. Wittmann, in collaboration with the staff, prepared 
another manual for the Industrial Camouflage Program at Pratt Institute. This was one 
of a series of manuals produced during the Second World War106 and took a more 
practical approach, illustrating case studies of civil buildings. The compilation of best 
practice achieved by the military camouflage units was documented and disseminated 
in architectural schools in the United States and Europe. Some of these schools, such 
                                                
105 The author compiles an account of the bases, practices and materials used by the 
Camouflage Section of the US Corps of Engineers. It takes some references from a previous study 
published in England: The art of Camouflage by C.H.R. Chesney (1941) 
106 This manual identifies Colonel Homer Saint-Gaudens as a pioneer in camouflage science. 
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as Pratt, in 1940, had a camouflage laboratory integrated into the art department.107 
One can assume that students of US universities and professionals of architecture and 
engineers working on state projects were well aware of them. However, there are 
insufficient records about the dissemination of these manuals. It is unclear if they were 
commercially distributed and available to the average civilian. 
 
Figure 32. Diagram synthesizing key aspects for existing buildings and new 
structures: health and aesthetics along with security © Industrial Camouflage 
Manual  
In these manuals there are specific guides on how to disguise a construction, 
which can be identified with the camouflage categorization mentioned above. The most 
common methods include: underground construction for complete concealment, – 
more prevalent in the European realm; reduction of visibility, known as “toning down”; 
decoy installations to distract or attract to a different target; disperse and “intelligent 
siting”; deception, such as a change of the apparent identity to make it appear “more 
innocent in nature”. (Breckenridge 1942, 86) The two latter are the most effective 
methods according to the concept of the Engineering board. “A combination of several 
factors (orientation, design of roofs, relief of terrain, contoural features on ground, 
shadow pattern of plants) may be most effective.” (Wittmann et al. 1942)  
 
Figure 33. Architectural students were trained through camouflage design 
problems © Industrial Camouflage Manual 
Breckenridge (1942, 40-67) also presents a detailed account of different 
techniques in concealment use for civilian camouflage, explained by the logic of 
military operations and weapons. Some of the tactics implemented were related to the 
change of perception of form and bulk, avoiding straight lines of extensive elements, or 
                                                
107 The first one is ‘Concealment of new buildings’, published by the Camouflage Committee. (UK 
Ministry of Home Security [1942]) And the second one was the series of publications of Industrial 
Camouflage Manual of Pratt Institute, particularly the one edited in 1942 by Konrad F. Wittmann. Other 
publications as architectural journals were also relevant the edition of special issues on Julian Trevelyan, 
“The Technique of Camouflage,” in Architectural Review, vol. 96, no. 573 (September 1944), 68–70; “Fort 
Belvoir: Camouflage and Headquarters” in Architectural Forum, vol. 77 (November 1942), 3; and perhaps 
the pioneer article Embury II, A. "Architects and the Camouflage Service" in Architectural Forum 27 
(November 1917), pp. 137-138. 
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regular layouts. “Our watch-word must be interconnection and standardization”.108 The 
recommendation in this sense was creating dispersed units and irregular borders, 
modifying surfaces in order to appear as smaller units.  
 
Figure 34. Management of shadows in order to conceal existing or new buildings © 
Industrial Camouflage Manual  
Another important element was the consideration of shadows, as they are more 
visible form the air than some volumes: “we may, by clever contrasts, deceive the close 
observer into believing he sees a relief. This illusion does not hold true for 5,000 ft., 
however. Real shadow is, at great distance, much more effective than any painted 
shadow.” (Wittmann et al. 1942) 
 
Providing the recommendations for disguising a factory, (Wittmann et al. 1942) 
introduces the advantages of the subdivision on smaller buildings: 
The chance of internal explosions, which could destroy the 
entire factory, is reduced. Explosions and damage are more 
localized. 
Access to buildings from all sides is better. [flexible circulation] 
Fire doesn't [sic] spread as quickly and is easily restricted to 
one unit. 
Camouflage and blending with the natural pattern of the 
surroundings is easier.  
Additions in the form of separate buildings look more natural 
and do not make the target bigger. 
The grouping of buildings very often reveals better architectural 
values.  
                                                
108 Emphasis in original text 
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Figure 35. Fragmentation of the built space, different material and form to reduce 
visibility © Industrial Camouflage Manual  
Civilian camouflage has a complete account of different techniques to disguise. 
Materials, texture and colour were also controlled and manipulated in order to reduce 
the visibility and identification of a specific installation depending on its nature and 
importance. However, location of the site was fundamental, taking into consideration 
not only terrain itself and elements of vegetation, but the relation with built 
surroundings. 
 
· Following industrial camouflage manuals on modern 
development 
Military units of engineers in different countries109 created special units to deal 
with “civil camouflage”. In the case of the US Corps of Engineers, they even developed 
a division that dealt with civilian projects, providing wide technical assistance, and 
cooperation with studios for urban and architectural “key projects”.110 In some cases 
civilians were hired and enrolled in the service.111 In other cases, they were just 
registered and cleared to participate in projects nationwide and abroad. I found that 
such is the case of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill - SOM, one of the architectural firms 
that held for several years “an interim security clearance” to participate in projects with 
the US Department of Defense classified as “secret”, either in the United States, or in 
foreign territories, as is ratified in a communication dated June 29th, 1955. This internal 
communication between the San Francisco and Chicago offices of SOM mentions the 
clearance issued by the Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago and the active clearance 
on level “Q” by the Atomic Energy Commission to Nathaniel Owings (1903-1984) – 
                                                
109 In each country it adopts a different name. To illustrate this, see the following references: in 
the United Kingdom it was the Battalion of Royal Engineers, in the United States the Corps of Engineers, 
and in Colombia the Cuerpo de Ingenieros Militares.  
110 They developed studios, workshops, and manuals of modelling, as it was understood that it 
was necessary to create a figurative scenario to test alternatives of protection, and simulate conditions. 
111 A detailed account of British artists can be found in (Goodden 2007). The focus of this book is 
on artists, but it also mentions architects such as Erno Goldfinger, whose office at 2/7 Bedford Street was 
set up as a camouflage studio. Only individual names of some artists have been related in the Americas. 
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who, it is worth mentioning, was the partner in charge of projects in Colombia and 
Venezuela. (Owings 1955) 
 
Figure 36. “Interim Secret” clearance to SOM for projects of Defense department 
and the Atomic commission ©LOC  
Louis Skidmore (1897-1962) confirms this involvement with US defence 
projects abroad, amongst other documents with a letter to George Howe, chairman of 
the Department of Architecture at Yale University, on February 8th, 1952, apologizing 
for his inability to attend a talk at the University: “I really wish I could talk with your 
boys, but with ninety per cent of our work defense, you will understand that I am 
always on call by the army on some distant job.” (Skidmore 1952)  
 
Figure 37. Letter: Skidmore’s apology for absence from Princeton University 
meeting in 1952 for being in the South and “Ninety percent of our work now is 
defense work” © LOC 
In fact, with the introduction of techniques such as aerial photographs – that is, 
information easily transferable to maps – concerns were raised about urban areas in 
Europe, while in the Americas such techniques made evident vast territories that then 
became vulnerable. Consequently, military units such as the Corp of Engineers used to 
incorporate “camouflage planners” who were in charge of either the creation of 
strategies to obscure spaces primarily from aerial views, or the design of urban areas 
following the same principles.  
The specific term “industrial camouflage” was used in relation to civilian spaces. 
Apart from the direct connection with factories, plants and industrial sites, this also 
covered utilities, transport facilities, major civic installations, and housing. Regardless 
of propriety or control, it was understood that the normal operation and security of 
urban areas did not draw exclusively on the defence of military spaces. Thus 
camouflage was considered over a vast proportion of the built environment. Some of 
the registered planners related to the US Corps of Engineers were working as 
consultants in Colombia, and other Latin American countries. Such is the case of the 
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firm Town Planning Associates – Joseph Lluis Sert, and Paul Lester Wiener – who 
actively participated in planning projects for Bogotá, Medellín, Tumaco and Cali.112 
Admittedly, military strategy warns about the impossibility of exposing all the 
possible methods and tactics in use, as different threats require a modification in the 
ploys implemented to protect and disguise constructions and open areas. During times 
of war, public awareness was advised, and public campaigns to train professionals 
were recommended and pursued; some strategies in use were explained to the public. 
Conversely, as the Cold War was a period of tension but not of open war: techniques 
and tactics were no longer revealed to civilians, and the public strategy changed to 
projecting an image of calmness. 
 
· Uncovering modernity 
I would argue that the relevance of this information was primarily because 
camouflage was an inherent part of the built environment practice, not only in the 
development of the project, but also in the early stages of its definition – from the 
conception of the project, its design, and even the actual process of building. 
Considerations regarding camouflage were present, though not necessarily explicit, as 
part of defence. Significantly, Breckenridge proposed – in the first manual edited at 
Pratt in 1942 – guidelines for military installations, which may well have influenced 
modern urbanization in the developing world: 
In selecting the site for an industrial plan, the considerations in 
peacetime are generally the cost of the land, transportation and 
communication facilities, labour supply, and nearness to 
markets and source of materials. When protective concealment 
is a factor, the following additional factors should be kept well in 
mind: strategic location, dispersion, avoidance of prominent 
landmarks in the vicinity, type of terrain or background, layout of 
                                                
112 Patricia Schnitter Castellanos has finished a thesis at the Universitat Politecnica Catalunya 
about the plans and projects of Sert and Wiener in Colombia (Schnitter Castellanos et al. 2002). 
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roads, and railroads in the area, and size of the area. 
(Breckenridge 1942, 59) 
Tracing these invisible connections is part of the necessary work to unveil 
different tactics of camouflage used in the built environment. The complexities of the 
tactics used in “peaceful” times were much more elaborate, as they needed to convey 
the image of anything but a military strategy. Which I argue is the case of the built 
environment produced during Rojas dictatorship. Therefore, in the following Chapters I 
will trace these relations through policies, agreements, manuals, contracts, plans and 
projects that define the Naval College in the frame of the National Plan of Public 
Works. 
 
Figure 38. CIAM Strategic bombing © ETH Courtesy: Stephen Graham 
 
Strategies that were ordinary in Europe and the United States were translated 
to the urbanization process of the developing world. Logics of camouflage coincide with 
similar modern postulates. In the manual Wittmann pointed out that most of the CIAM 
postulates could correspond with guidelines drawn on security rationale, such as: 
City planners have advocated, for a long time, decentralization 
for the sake of safety, health, and beauty. Their aims receive 
unexpected support from air-protective design. Decentralization 
brings new problems for transportation and supply of utilities. 
As a whole, the factory needs more space and longer lines of 
communication. This brings additional building costs, but the 
advantages are advantages not only under aerial 
bombardment. Hygiene and a more pleasant architectural 
aspect of industrial areas are also advantageous. (Wittmann et 
al. 1942) 
Modern development on infrastructure is appropriate to respond to political and 
military agenda; thus state architecture is instrumental for this purpose. Nonetheless, I 
should make an explicit caveat that the fact that modern architecture coincides in some 
of the principles of camouflage does not mean that it equates with camouflage. Similar 
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principles can be associated with other architecture. The case in point here is that a 
better understanding of the creation of an enigmatic built environment should provide 
clues to its interpretation. As Murray Fraser (2005) has argued, a critical architecture 
implies “the desire to be openly critical of the society in which it finds itself, and the 
need to criticize its own methods of practice and production”.  
 
 
2.5. Spatial production as political strategy 
Spatial production became a powerful resource. Simultaneously, the public 
discourse was oriented to nation-building and incorporation into the universal modern 
world. Silent strategies were necessary in order to assure the political agenda. The 
complexity implied in the notions of soft power, PSYOP, and camouflage has the goal 
of distorting the observer’s interpretation of the artefact, the context, or even the 
subject in play. Such concealment of any of the elements is the agency that allows 
multiple, and various, tactics to achieve its purpose.  
Such warfare operations remain historically, simply by creating an effect of 
overlooking of particular facts. Perhaps by acknowledging that architectural experience 
is a dynamic process, which is constantly recreated, it is possible to assimilate 
camouflage to a creative operation of revealing and concealing the relation between 
individuals, artefacts and surroundings. The strategy is not reduced to the material 
application of military tactics; even if that is important as materialization of the agency, 
concealment manoeuvres and framing practices covered a wider spectrum. 
However, it should be acknowledged that the debate about agency sometimes 
tends to succumb to a discussion on determinism.113 Conversely, the question of 
awareness about agency inverts the value to the practical autonomy of an individual in 
the society. Yet there is here a basic principle of dynamism and inherent duality where 
                                                
113 An extended account of different positions about agency can be found in (Rubinstein 
2000), (Findley 2005), (Kossak 2010) 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 125(
 
 
different actors of the relationship between power and architecture can define and 
contest the will, or deep rules, that drive the construction of the built environment.  
This obscurity of the meaning and comprehension of the artefact may influence 
the appropriation of it. In other words, the capacity of the space to produce social and 
cultural significance and value. Amidst a conflictive political period with the threat of 
Fascism in Europe, Caillois has pointed out that this breakage in the connection with 
the artefact makes it problematic to generate an identity, particularly because of the 
difficulty of both assimilation and distinction of what is a masquerade. “People belong 
to history and civilization once they give up the mask, when they reject it as a vehicle of 
personal or collective panic and strip it of its political function.” (Caillois 1964) 
Given that the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla played a crucial role in the 
dissemination of modern state architecture in Colombia, and drawing on the complexity 
of these relations between architecture and power, one can perhaps elaborate further 
questions about space as a materialization of discourses that affirm or subvert the 
asymmetries without reducing any of the actors involved to an absolute dominance, or 
docility.  
This raises questions on the implication of such ‘mis-representation’. A case in 
point is: to what extent is it possible to generate an appropriation of architectural 
objects that were created to be blurred? Is it possible to relate the lack of appropriation 
of this modern architecture in Colombia with the initial agency of these projects? 
Perhaps it is time to think twice about the “double-truth” that political strategies might 
imply. By doing so, there may be more opportunities to understand this architectural 
legacy that has been largely ignored, and is in increasing risk of disappearing.  
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Part II 
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3. The National Plan of Public Works 
During the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, all the interventions and 
projects in terms of architecture and engineering were framed as being part of the 
National Plan of Public Works. The government claimed that all the projects were part 
of a wider strategy, and its concern was to make the projects relevant to the 
community. Most of the projects were necessary works of development, and they had a 
significant impact on the process of urbanization. The National Plan of Public Works 
was widely commented upon by the media and social and political circles. However, 
these projects were often unexpected – i.e. executed projects were either not seen as 
an obvious priority, or they were built in isolated areas, or suddenly – and undertaken 
without consulting of local built environment professionals. As the architectural 
historian Germán Téllez affirms: 
Planning disorder was total throughout the country. Local 
political convenience and even personal requests from Rojas, 
his family and military or civil friends were fulfilled with buildings 
financed with state resources. (Téllez Castañeda 2013)  
In contrast to Téllez, my contention is that such a National Plan of Public Works 
was part of a complex political strategy of the military regime, which conditioned the 
state architecture produced as part of it, and its reception. The Plan was public 
knowledge thanks to the media where it was regularly portrayed as a core policy of the 
government. The National Plan was a regular feature of speeches by Rojas and his 
ministers. The annual reports of 1953, 1954 and 1955 presented to the Colombian 
Congress by Rojas government were focused on this Plan. ([Colombian government] 
1951-1957) It was undertaken as a response to social inequality and a desire to 
materialize the new state. It was made widely visible, and often invoked.  
Despite this visibility, the Plan was always mentioned in a deceptive manner; 
the government had multiple agendas at the national and international level. On the 
one hand, the Plan was presented as a general idea. And on the other, most projects 
that were supposedly part of the Plan were presented individually. There was not a 
unified document that clearly explained the aim, or scope, of the National Plan of 
Public Works. What is more interesting is that, despite the importance of this plan, 
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there have been no previous studies about it. It has fallen into oblivion. In this Chapter I 
present the historical information to support my claim. 
 
 
3.1. Core policy of the regime 
The National Plan of Public Works was, indeed, an ambitious programme. It is 
nevertheless quite difficult to pin down exactly how many projects were undertaken, 
and whether every project was the initiative of the Plan. For instance, in the official 
records of the Ministry of Public Works, 1954 is the year with the most detailed 
information, department by department, listing more than 1,000 state-projects – i.e. 
architectural and engineering – under construction, (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: 
Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, 5) although some of these projects began before the regime 
commenced and most of them were entirely functional after the dictatorship fell, as will 
be explained later on. Certainly, infrastructure did not begin with Rojas regime, but it 
was boosted. 
 
Figure 39. Infrastructural projects equated development, international airport in Cali 
© Proa  
According to the government discourse, the main aim of the Plan was to 
provide the rural and urban areas with infrastructure. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: 
Rojas Pinilla) 1953a, 21) It was a plan that sought to connect even the most distant 
rural areas with a substantial extension of the rail and road networks; this was the 
priority. Additionally, it included other public works in terms of engineering and 
architecture. The provision of sanitation, clean water, bridges, and abattoirs 
accompanied the construction of facilities such as educational, transportation, health, 
civic, social, cultural and military buildings, and housing projects. As such, its most 
visible trace was civil engineering works. 
In reported figures, the scale of the National Plan of Public Works overall was 
impressive. There were hundreds of buildings planned and supposedly funded by the 
state in different regions of the country. As we might expect, almost all these buildings 
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were in the modernist style of architecture, which seems to suit the discourse of 
progress and development.  
The importance of the built environment for the regime not only justified its 
recurrent presence in the political discourse, but also the considerable efforts and 
resources assigned to it. A sizeable portion of the national budget was assigned to the 
Plan, as mentioned by the Minister of Public Works, Admiral Ruben Piedrahita Arango, 
at the end of 1954. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) The Plan took more than 
60% of the national investment budget during the first three years (1953-1955) of the 
government, the amount assigned for public works was 340.000.000COP (which at the 
time corresponded to 140.000.000USD) which represents a sharp increase in the 
expenditure on infrastructure.114 ([Colombian government] 1951-1957)  
 
· A positive image  
The National Plan of Public Works was strategically presented as a material 
achievement of the government. General Rojas Pinilla and his Minister of Public 
Works, Admiral Piedrahita Arango, were fully aware as civil engineers of the 
importance of the built environment. Interestingly, there is an explicit recognition in the 
regime’s discourse of engineering and architecture as “powerful tools of progress” and 
social change. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 67) The 
provision of modern facilities helped in the construction of an important political capital, 
and popular support, which become essential in Rojas’ legitimization in power, and in 
his political aspirations. (Rojas Pinilla 1964, 1971) 
As stated earlier, state architecture in the country did not begin with this regime: 
the Ministry of Public Works had been part of the main structure of the government 
since 1905.115 Nevertheless, the regime defined a change in the pattern of state 
architecture. In particular, it made more visible the importance of the built environment 
in support of the social development of the country. Up to Rojas dictatorship, there was 
                                                
114 Which was not sustainable given the coffee crisis, amongst other factors. Further information 
can be found in (Palacios 2009) 
115 The law 44, on the 29th April, 1905, created the Ministry of Public Works. As the scholar 
Carlos Nino mentioned, its ambit initially included “national buildings, railways, roads, bridges, and 
wastelands”. (Niño Murcia 1991) 
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a trend for public works projects to be concentrated in traditional centres of social 
power and their surrounding areas. The poorest regions had no representation in 
central government. Under such conditions, it was common for the traditional centres 
of power to claim, and obtain, more attention and benefits from the state projects 
deemed necessary. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) Until then, most works 
reported by the government as state presence were concentrated in cities, and 
benefited only part of the population. The complex geography of the country, and its 
extent, were seen as insurmountable problems. Such conditions were consolidating a 
deeper fragmentation between the urban areas, and the vast rural ones. The social 
gap was increasing. Consequently, violence and illegality predominated in extensive 
areas of the country. Already explained in Chapter 1. 
 
Figure 40. Map of location of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1950s, 
growing number of urban centres in Andean and Caribbean regions © 
Mapsoft.net (modified) 
The commission of the World Bank, 116 and Economie et humanisme mission, 
were two different foreign missions which had begun at the end of the 1940s and early 
1950s respectively and were fundamental for the definition of the regime’s policies. So 
far, there is no clear information as to how they initially came into contact with previous 
Colombian governments. Yet they were reported as being close to the military 
government in the first years, but their final reports were not published until after the 
regime fell.117 However, highlights of their reports can be extrapolated to the discourse 
associated with the Plan; they were highly influential in the definition of the policy.  
On the one hand, the French economist and priest Louis-Joseph Lebret’s118 
report, Estudio sobre las condiciones del desarrollo de Colombia. Misión economía y 
humanismo, [Study about the developing conditions of Colombia, by the Economy and 
                                                
116 Tellingly about the importance of Latin America, and Colombia in particular, according to the 
report published in 1961, the mission that was initiated in 1949 was the first ever mission abroad of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – i.e. World Bank – to a developing country. The 
head of the mission was Lauchlin Currie, who in 1939 was the personal economic advisor of the US 
president Roosevelt, and had also worked closely with Truman. 
117 There are two initial publications related to the mission (Currie 1951), and (Currie 1950) 
118 Lebret developed the concept of human economy as a key factor for social and economic 
development. As a Dominican priest he created the mission ‘Economy and Humanism’ and worked in 
several developing countries of Latin America and Africa. 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 131(
 
 
humanism mission] (Misión “Economía y Humanismo” et al. 1958) argues that the 
social gap was the country’s most serious problem. On the other, the World Bank 
expert Lauchlin Currie (1961) presented the Operación Colombia: Un programa 
nacional de desarrollo económico y social report, in which he argues for the 
importance of creating geographical awareness, and of encouraging processes of 
urbanization in order to achieve greater industrialization and security.  
 
Figure 41. Members of the Currie Mission in Colombia 1949-1953 © The Political 
Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years 
The connectivity of the country and a fairer distribution of state resources, 
identified by both missions, were apparently decisive to the definition of the Plan. In 
one of the reports, Minister Piedrahita claimed that, even if the regional requests were 
extremely demanding in terms of attention and benefits from the state, resources were 
traditionally distributed in a different way – i.e. concentrated in the main city, Bogotá – 
so the regime claimed that the priority during his time in office was the national 
concern. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) 
The military government pretended to demonstrate, through these results 
nationwide, how “independently from the political tension, all our time, resources and 
efforts are bent on improving the living standards of Colombians, and helping them 
take advantage of what the country can offer”. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) 
The National Plan of Public Works constituted a core element of the regime’s 
desire to project an image of itself as welfare state. It addressed the vulnerable 
population, without interfering with the benefits of the wealthy. It was broadly presented 
as a government priority. The policy justified the interventions of the military 
government and works all around the country, minimizing possible resistance. These 
works were necessary in order to achieve modern development for all the population. 
The Plan provided modern services while claiming to help close the social gap. This 
clearly contributed to the popular acceptance and support the regime enjoyed even 
after its collapse. 
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3.2. How was it presented? 
Warfare has demonstrated the importance of information management. Even 
more during the Cold War period, information was highly valuable as part of the 
exerted power. As mentioned in Chapter 2, DIPE administered the information of the 
regime and was the interlocutor with the media, filtering what the military government 
decided to make either internal or public. This directorate was in charge of presenting 
and publishing all the information made public not only by the presidency, but by all 
ministries and other state dependencies. DIPE produced most of the preserved 
information of the Rojas regime that can be found dispersed in different libraries and 
archives. Unfortunately there is no unified collection, of these materials, not even in the 
Colombian National Archives, where material of this presidency does not have the 
usual preservation treatments, and it is not fully catalogued, as mentioned previously.  
This historical source has therefore turned out to be highly valuable. It gathers 
together what was presented as the National Plan of Public Works. However, one 
should make it clear that this is the version as portrayed by the regime. In other words, 
it is likely that the filter and control exerted by this dependency shaped the information 
found in other sources, such as the national and local media.  
The presence of the regime in the newly developed media aimed to reach not 
only different regions, but also different social groups. The government prescribed a 
constant flow of information through this department, using regular public outlets, such 
as speeches, governmental reports, television broadcasts, and news. 
 
· Speeches  
As a core policy of the military government, the National Plan of Public Works 
was constantly alluded to as the determining factor in the transformation of the country, 
and as a direct expression of the people’s wishes, ensuring popular support. The Plan 
brought together a considerable number of state activities, as it was created to catalyse 
the stability of the economic, social, and security sectors. The infrastructure proposed 
in the Plan was to be the engine for the advancement and industrialization of the 
country. Piedrahita was prompt to frame publicly the Regime’s discourse in welfare 
considerations: 
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Even the most sceptical of Colombians would be insincere if he 
did not acknowledge that in 1955 the country was experiencing 
the most favourable signs for a long time: peace, a solid 
economy, business stability, incentives for new business, a 
considerable increase in all kinds of production, wide-ranging 
and favourable foreign loans and, furthermore, a definite and 
enduring trust in our own effort and the potential of the country. 
(Piedrahita 1955, 17) 
The Plan was indeed a strong impulse to the development of the necessary 
infrastructure and, in this period, there was significant growth. The Plan was fully 
controlled from central government, which claimed that it was an agent of integration at 
the national level, and made explicit that “national needs and concerns are the priority”, 
thereby avoiding the claims of regional interest groups. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 279) This shows how the discourse was shaped towards 
constructing a modern nation. 
The extension of roads, railways and airports was the most popular and 
recurrent item in the Plan. It covered distant areas, facilitating the mobilization of 
consumer products. Connectivity was essential to deal with the geographical conditions 
of the country. It was portrayed as the most efficient path to achieve the expected 
economic growth, and social inclusion. For communities, this was an identified 
urgency, as the dictator affirmed: 
Air transport is one of the most important needs for trade and 
better bonding and understanding between the people of two 
different departments. With a vast territory and diverse 
topography as the Colombian, requiring huge sums of the 
budget for conservation, expansion and construction of 
terrestrial routes, the most economic and effective means to 
solve the transcendental problem of transport, is an ambitious 
plan of airports. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1953c, 440-1) 
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Figure 42. Railways and road network map seeking connectivity across the 
country, but still concentrated in the Andean region © MOP 
The part of the Plan that addressed the development of the built environment 
was less systematic and apparently lacked strategic planning and implementation. 
Whilst each project was portrayed as the most important at its time, all were part of the 
National Plan of Public Works. It is nevertheless interesting to find that very little 
information exists in the records of the Ministry of Public Works about the most 
publicized projects of the Plan.  
 
· Reports 
During the first two years of government (1953-1955), the regime was keen to 
inform the community about its achievements. Traditionally, at the end of the legislative 
year, ministers presented to the Congress a report of their activities, the fulfilment of 
the proposed policies, and use of the assigned budget. By doing so, their relative 
popularity was maintained at a fairly high level. However, these reports lost weight and 
credibility over the time the military government was in power. By the third year (1956), 
these reports were more generic, as they focused on responding to issues of 
repression, corruption, non-conformity, and censorship. In 1957 and 1958, the 
transition to the Military Board did not allow much information or reports of what was 
happening. The restoration of democracy was the central theme of the debates in 
these years. 
 
Figure 43. Image of voluminous reports of Ministry of Public Works 1953-1958, 
focused on technical innovations on road and railroad networks  © MOP 
Nevertheless, I have used the information available from the reports of the first 
years of the government, as most of the projects of the National Plan of Public Works 
originated at that time. Fortunately, the Ministry of Public Works has preserved some of 
these reports. This information was supposedly presented to the Congress and 
Presidency; however, it has either disappeared within their archives or is inaccessible. 
In the official records of the Ministry of Public Works for 1954 there is a report of 
1,422 state-architecture and engineering projects under construction during that year 
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alone, including schools, universities, power stations, aqueducts, abattoirs, libraries, 
hospitals, cemeteries, parks, sports fields, social clubs, theatres, airports, markets, and 
state housing, amongst others. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, 
332) It is remarkable that almost one third of the projects were related to education. But 
there are other figures of interest hospitals and municipal houses are also numerous, 
the former in the rapidly growing regions (i.e. Cundinamarca, Antioquia) and the latter 
in the most violent areas (i.e. Santander, Boyacá, Tolima).  
 
Figure 44. Table: figures by type of projects reported as inaugurated in 1954 
©MPSB based on data MOP 
Nevertheless, as Jorge Ramirez (2011) argues, “it is difficult to clarify if all these 
projects [reported as part of the Plan], were their initiative”, particularly at the beginning 
of the government, taking into account that the so-called “strike of opinion” was a 
smooth transition. i.e. that there was no dramatic rupture or suspension of the previous 
government’s activities. It is also noticeable that the core professional team of the 
Ministry of Public Works did not change, (Niño Murcia 1991) it is therefore possible to 
assume that some projects were under way already. 
The regime took advantage of this. A number of projects that had been 
conceived before, or were even already under construction, were conveniently 
incorporated into the regime’s accounts. In some cases the project was built as 
expected, but with an expedient change of name to “June the 13th” to commemorate 
the beginning of the military government (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1954a, 18) – in other words, to the date of the coup d’état. 
In general terms these projects were distributed all around the country; there is 
no clear information about how they were defined, commissioned or built. However, 
some images were included in the reports, and various lists of facilities provide data 
about their materialization.  
There is no map of the Plan’s projects at the national level. Nevertheless, based 
on the reports of the Ministry of Public Works, I have prepared this map indicating the 
national location of projects, according to the administrative division of the territory 
during the dictatorship. It shows how, despite claiming a priority in a more dispersed 
distribution, it ends by reinforcing the concentration of projects in the traditional urban 
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centres in the Andean region. It does enough to ensure, however, the incorporation of 
distant areas and the drawing of state attention to the national borders. 
 
Figure 45. Map of distribution of projects by department in 1954 ©MPSB based on 
MOP data 
 
· Media coverage 
The important role played by the media in modern times was clear to the Rojas 
Pinilla government; the dictator publicly admitted, “Newspapers and media are a 
source of [popular] knowledge”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953a, 
171) Although some of the traditional newspapers stopped publishing before and under 
the military regime,119 this understanding may explain the constant presence of the 
dictatorship’s achievements and, at the same time, the dictatorship’s control of the 
media.  
The National Plan of Public Works is referred to several times in the media 
during the time Rojas was in power. Even after the fall of the regime (1957), in the 
following years the provision of facilities all around the country was attributed to the 
Plan. The source of information, as already mentioned, was the Directorate of 
Information and State Propaganda, created by the regime. And the media received 
from it up-to-date access reports on the activities and the official position in debates 
that became increasingly relevant towards the last two years of the Rojas regime. 
One can read from the media of that time how, apart from the information that 
came directly from the government, there were some attempts to understand more 
clearly what those projects implied. It was common to find a weekly section about 
construction in most of the daily press. El Espectador, El Tiempo, El Siglo, and El 
Colombiano were perhaps the most regular. There are various questions about the 
validity of some projects, the urgency of others or, more frequently, the rationale for 
their location. 
                                                
119 Some of the press was suspended since the previous government, which also has records of 
repression and limitation of guarantees. 
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Figure 46. Press clippings emphasizing technical innovations in projects under 
construction © El Espectador 
There were specific cases where the media concentrated on a particular 
project. At this point it is difficult to determine whether the interest in a specific topic 
was dictated by central government, or whether it was of genuine public concern. Such 
is the case with the Centro Administrativo Oficial – CAO [Official Administrative 
Centre]. The proposal to concentrate most of the governmental offices in a complex on 
the outskirts of the capital city incited several critics, and proved to be the most 
controversial project of the regime. 
 
Figure 47. SOM’s drawing and model for CAO project: these images were widely 
used to report the project © MOP 
One of the major reasons for this controversy was that it made visible that the 
military government was developing different projects from those that had been 
expected. Years before, Bogotá had received the Pilot Plan proposal from Le 
Corbusier,120 later complemented by a Master Plan by Paul Lester Wiener & Josep 
Lluis Sert i Lopez.121 The Pilot Plan report illustrates how the city was read at that time 
and, in its description of the city, it includes dynamics that are not visible in the Master 
Plan.122  
 
Figure 48. Sert and Wiener plan for Bogota, 1952, concentrating the urban 
operation on the historic centre of the city and its immediate surroundings © LCB  
                                                
120 The project originally proposed by Le Corbusier has been the subject of study by the research 
group at Los Andes University.(Vargas Caicedo 1987) Recently some of the material has been recovered 
in an exhibition and a publication with the coordination of María Cecilia O'Byrne et al. (2010). 
121 Paul Wiener and Josep Lluis Sert’s projects in Colombia are part of an extensive body of 
research by Doris Tarchópulos Sierra et al. (2012) On regards to Sert see Schnitter Castellanos et al. 
(2002) 
122 Some information about these two plans has been recently documented, however little, if 
existent, reference to what happened during the regime is done. Here, I am including accounts of the 
Ministry of Public Works regarding these plans. (O'Byrne et al. 2010) 
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The regime used the information that was convenient to them to support the 
project they were proposing, but without following the whole plan as recommended. 
Piedrahita argued: 
In the context of South American cities, Bogotá is a 
disorganized, uncomfortable, and ugly city, and there is no 
sense in keeping it to traditional situations, that are not valid as 
traditions. In the city it is necessary to select, preserve and 
dignify whatever has a historical, sentimental, or architectonic 
value, in order to allow the rest of the city to be open to 
progress and the evolution of time. ([Colombian government] 
1951-1957, 37) 
Even though the government insisted on the validity of the CAO supporting the 
proposal on the CIAM modernist principles that were fully accepted in the architecture 
schools, and that were explicitly the fundamental argument of the Pilot plan, dissident 
voices were raised. Architects at the time rejected this and expressed anger at the 
“betrayal” of Le Corbusier’s proposal. An active participant in the polemic was the 
architect Germán Samper,123 – whom I interviewed in 2011. Samper still insisted: “for 
the majority it was ‘inconceivable’ to dismiss Le Corbusier’s proposal”.124 Indeed, the 
regime apparently ignored its content. But despite there being no direct citation of the 
report, some of the arguments of the military government explaining their projects 
followed similar concepts and modern principles.  
The military government claimed that the extraordinary number of conditions, 
and the limited information provided, made it impossible for a reputed professional 
team, such as Le Corbusier’s, to create a more appropriate outcome. Such limitations 
were related to the resistance towards creating different solutions outside of traditional 
forms, and to the lack of official registers and cartography. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 44) Piedrahita stated: 
                                                
123 Samper had a bitter legal process associated with it, as another architect, Enrique Uribe White 
sued him and the SCA for slander in the course of this debate. 
124 In 2011, I had a personal interview in Bogotá with Germán Samper about his experience as an 
architect during the regime (Samper Gnecco 2011) 
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Architects of great fame, to whom I bring my tribute and 
admiration, came to Bogotá to propose the Pilot Plan, but they 
were not told about the importance of redefining vital areas, and 
solving urban problems. From the beginning, their possible 
outcomes were guided, and restricted, circumscribed to the 
small and congested area around the Bolivar plaza. 
The CAO was presented under the logic of a city with multiple centres, 
identified by the MOP as: historical, religious, commercial, industrial, financial, 
residential, educational, administrative, and civic (the latter being a conglomeration of 
some of the previous ones). Nevertheless, the polemic about this administrative 
complex defined a breaking point with a fraction of members of the Colombian Society 
of Architects, and the Colombian Society of Engineers. Taking advantage of the 
location in the Salitre neighbourhood, the complex was identified in the media as 
‘CAOS’, which in English will be translated as chaos. As a consequence, the official 
name changed to Centro Administrativo Nacional – CAN [National Administrative 
Centre]. 
 
Figure 49. Press clipping about CAOS (i.e. chaos), discussions in favour of and 
against the project © El Tiempo 
The controversy was ferociously aired in the media. Promoters and detractors 
of the project sustained for several weeks an intense debate and exchanges of 
criticism. The regime kept a distant position:  
The National Administrative Centre is not the product of a 
sudden desire, or an improvised decision, it is the result of 
wide-ranging and well thought-out studies of the needs of the 
capital city, now and in the future, based on estimates of the 
impact of this project, once it is built, on the extensive and rapid 
growth of the city in all its activities. (Diario Oficial de Colombia 
1954) 
On December 10th, 1954 Rojas signed the Decree 3.571 ordering the 
construction of the National Administrative Centre next to the campus of the 
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia. (Diario Oficial de Colombia 1954) After all, it was a 
dictatorship. 
 
· Exhibitions 
The dissemination of the information about the Plan took different forms. During 
the last months of 1955, the regime exhibited some of the projects that were included 
in the National Plan of Public Works in the Museo Nacional [National Museum]. This 
was part of the campaign to make the Plan visible, to instruct the public about the use 
of new facilities, and to stimulate the appreciation of the importance of “works of 
progress” in the community. Based on correspondence of the director of the National 
Museum, Teresa Cuervo Borda, it is possible to complement the information from the 
Ministry of Public Works.(Cuervo Borda 1955d, 1955a, 1955c, 1955b; Teresa  Cuervo 
Borda 1956; Teresa Cuervo Borda 1956) According to records, the exhibition was 
Piedrahita’s initiative. The curator was the architect Luis Borrero,125 who moved in 
political circles, and who had the cooperation of Alfredo Castañeda (Piedrahita’s aide 
de camp) and Diego Tovar Borda who was the director of state-buildings office in the 
Ministry of Public Works. 
 
Figure 50. Ministry of Public Works staff members: notably an important number of 
members were military officials © MOP 
Through images of the opening it is possible to identify that the exhibition 
brought together drawings, blueprints and, especially, models of the projects. 
Apparently, there was not a particular narrative, and the existence of a catalogue of the 
exhibition is questioned.126 The exhibition was widely reported in the media, mentioning 
                                                
125 Not clear if it refers to Luis Borero Mercado, a former mayor of Bogotá, or Luis Borrero 
Caicedo, young architect from Cali. Both prominent architects in power circles. 
126 In the archives of the National Museum there is a complete and rigorous collection of 
exhibition catalogues. Unfortunately there is not any visual information about this exhibition in this archive. 
The catalogue of this exhibition either never existed, or was excluded from the collection. I have not found 
any proof of its existence. However, on interviewing visitors to the exhibition, such as Germán Téllez, they 
had memories of such ephemera. (Téllez Castañeda 2009, 2010) Téllez remembers “a sort of folding or 
pliable light cardboard or very heavy paper with texts and photos of models, but no drawings or plan. It 
might have had six or eight pages altogether [...]. Every one of us remarked that the photo on its cover was 
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without giving specific data that the high attendance caused the display to be extended 
for a longer period than originally expected. There are three letters from the director of 
the Museum complaining about the extension over a holiday time. It is possible also 
that the controversy about some of the projects motivated the extension of the 
exhibition in order to influence public opinion in support of the Plan.  
 
Figure 51. Inauguration ceremony of the National Plan of Public Works exhibition 
at the National Museum ©DIPE 
In the media, and in the report of the Ministry of Public Works, it is mentioned 
that the exhibition comprised 150 images from Leo Matiz and Cano studios, a 40-
minute documentary of Gran Colombia pictures, and representative models. 
([Colombian government] 1951-1957) Pictures of the opening focus attention on the 
National Administrative Centre, the Bogotá international airport, and the Naval College, 
which was the primary image of the exhibition. The model of the Naval College was the 
first object a visitor would see at the entrance hall of the National Museum. 
The exhibition was initially at the National Museum in Bogotá, and after, it was 
planned to tour to other cities for short periods, although there is not information 
confirmed apart from the case of Cali – the biggest city in the south west of the country 
– Later, there are some references in the MOP report that the exhibition travelled to a 
city in the Caribbean without being fully identified. ([Colombian government] 1951-
1957)  
 
 
3.3. How was it interpreted? 
The National Plan of Public Works was a recurrent theme of government 
propaganda. But, how was it received in the professional realm of engineering and 
architecture? Whereas the information about the Plan was constant from the official 
                                                                                                                                          
the same that had appeared in PROA magazine. That photo was taken by Paul Beer.” (Téllez Castañeda 
2013, ) 
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sources, the response from the community was not so strong or regular. This can be 
understood in the context of a repressive government, which controlled the media. 
(Vasquez Botero 1956) But it can also be interpreted as support for what was 
happening. This ambiguous silence has continued years after the dictatorship ended. 
Indeed, the scarce evidence of how the Plan was received by professionals opens 
relevant questions about its repercussions. 
 
· Architecture and engineering realm 
Piedrahita, as the Minister of Public Works, mentions in a speech in homage to 
the Society of Civil Engineers, that “civil engineering will be included as an official 
activity”, (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 18) though there is no 
clarification on what implication this might have. One could assume that this 
acknowledges the importance of the profession for the core policy of the government. It 
might also be related to two important aspects: on the one hand, the relevance of the 
consolidation of such a professional field to the intellectual capital of the country; and 
on the other, an act of reconciliation by the government, after the controversy 
surrounding some of the Plan’s projects. 
There are references to how the Society of Engineers apparently took some 
distance from activities engaged in by the government as part of the National Plan of 
Public Works. According to Hernando Vargas’ (2011) memories of the construction 
industry, a representative of the Society claimed that the exclusion of national 
engineers from the plan was “due to disproportionate personal ambition and local 
interest”. Vargas alludes to the report of the engineering journal Anales de Ingeniería 
that mentions how the road plan and railway network were developed by foreign 
companies with the financial support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development;127 these were presented as particular and experimental projects of 
international cooperation. This claims contradicts the argument in the public press, 
presumably with information provided by the government, which maintained that 
                                                
127 The World Bank initially supported activities of reconstruction in the post-war period, and 
expanded its activity supporting infrastructure projects in developing countries. 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 143(
 
 
Colombian engineers were integrally involved in the Plan’s realization without 
mentioning any particular involvement of foreign firms or professionals. 
In the case of the Society of Architects, the situation was similar. Architects did 
not have such a robust instrument as the Anales de Ingeniería, but I found from both 
the journal El Arquitecto and some of the Society minutes that open competitions were 
run for particular projects. Articles also regularly complain about the direct assignation 
of others, without mentioning corruption but favouritism.  
As we have seen, the only project to provoke significant debate, i.e. the Centro 
Administrativo Oficial –CAO (1954), ended in legal processes amongst the architects, 
without any effect on the government decision about the project itself. From that point 
on, apart from rare criticism, there is no relevant account about the reception of the 
Plan. 
 
 
3.4. It does not exist! 
Rojas and his regime continuously referenced the National Plan of Public 
Works as a state priority. Nevertheless, apart from recurrent references to it in official 
talks, records in the media, and annual reports of the Ministry of Public Works, there 
was never any overt explication of it. I have found no document compiling anything that 
might constitute an actual Plan. The closest I have come is to a document entitled a 
“Policy of Public Works”, prepared by the minister Piedrahita (1955). Its actual 
contents, however, refer to a building contracts guide of the Plan. The document does 
not explain what the Plan consists of, or, more significantly, why exactly it became the 
focus of Rojas policy. What is more, there is nothing to explain why the language of 
Modernism was adopted for the programme. The Plan remains a shadowy and elusive 
subject: as we will see, the information provided by the government about architectural 
projects was only ever partial, with some projects being showcased, and others 
downplayed to the public, even though they were clearly important to the regime.  
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Figure 52. Rojas regime publication entitled: “Policy of Public Works”, 1955 © MOP 
 
· Misleading Document  
Addressing the National Congress of Engineers, Piedrahita announced that he 
was going to present the National Plan of Public Works in six points. However, the 
document focuses on the relation of the engineering professionals to the regime, rather 
than on the actual Plan. (Piedrahita 1955) Here are some of the main points from the 
document: 
! The government, he claimed, depended on the capacity of national engineers to 
solve national problems of public works. As proof Piedrahita mentioned that 150 
Colombian engineers were participating in projects of the Ministry of Public Works 
for more than 25 million Colombian pesos. 128 
! The government expected groups of professionals to create professionally and 
economically stable companies to receive contracts from the State. Some of them 
would link with financial institutions to allow strategies of funding, such as 
concessions of works, to reach funds not included in the national budget. 
! As the National Plan of Public Works had exceeded the assigned budget, there 
was to be a system of tolls and charges to support the maintenance and 
development of new projects.  
! It also announced the creation of betterment taxes on rural properties to allow for 
the construction of connecting roads in remote areas. 
! It stipulated that all the contracts for public works will be issued under a system of 
Unitary Costs of Construction.  
! It gave information about the disposition of the Ministry of Public Works to provide 
building machinery in order to accelerate construction and reduce costs.  
This is a clear example of how the government’s information was misleading. 
The document does actually refer to the Plan, but does not explain what the Plan 
consists of. The document delineates the generalities of the policy, but the agency, 
                                                
128 Equivalent to 10.373,000 US dollars at the time.  
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 145(
 
 
scope, schedule, funds, and guidelines of the core plan of the government were never 
made explicit. 
 
· Fragmentation of information  
Another strategy of the dictatorship was to present information about the 
National Plan of Public Works as individual projects with reference to the general Plan. 
In other words, most projects were explicitly related to the Plan, but rarely connected to 
similar projects.  
In the annual reports of the Ministry of Public Works, only roads and railways 
were presented on a national scale. There was an important investment in the opening 
of new routes, and the maintenance of existing ones. There was an appeal to increase 
accessibility to the most distant areas, related to the possibility of development for 
those areas. Yet geographical and environmental conditions were constantly 
introduced to explain delays in the execution of these projects. ([Colombian 
government] 1951-1957))  
 
Figure 53. Extensive construction of railroads or roads in order to connect different 
regions © Colombia en Marcha 
In the case of architectural projects, the regime only showcased a small number 
of the projects to the public. In the budget and financial records of the Ministry of Public 
Works, other projects are included, which indeed received important sums and priority 
in execution. Such is the case with the military installations. They were never 
mentioned in the annual reports, nor in the press releases of the Directorate of 
Information and State Propaganda.  
Each individual building played a key role in the local realm, but was portrayed 
as independent of any similar building. It was a state building, but was not part of a 
national or regional system. Rojas was assured of having the “inauguration” of projects 
all around the country for the first anniversary of the government. (Archivo Presidencia 
(1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, ) In almost every town of the country there was an 
opening or a “foundation stone” of a public work. It included a wide variety of projects: 
schools, universities, libraries, hospitals, telephone exchanges, civic centres, hospices, 
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nursing homes, stadiums, gyms, abattoirs, markets, warehouses, churches, jails, 
cemeteries, squares and monuments. The regime’s figures emphasize the allocation of 
state projects for each town. They do not mention a systematic approach to the 
provision of welfare services. It is difficult to trace them as a group where they might 
support each other to satisfy national needs. 
 
Figure 54. People attended exhibition of National Plan of Public Works: didactic 
explanation through models and perspectives ©DIPE 
 
 
3.5. Making of the National Plan of Public Works  
The established literature has criticized the rapid development of the time as an 
entirely improvised and reactive process. Given the figures, and cultural practices of 
the country, this claim has long been accepted. However, after identifying the absence 
of concrete information about the National Plan of Public Works of the dictatorship, the 
scholar Julio Dávila contests this interpretation, arguing that in order to assign 
resources, from both the national budget and the cooperating agencies, it was 
necessary to have an actual plan.129 Considering that it was a dictatorship it may well 
be the case that national institutions just followed the order given, but the question 
about the international agencies still persists.  
Even if there is not a single document of the so-called National Plan of Public 
Works, this does not mean that the regime did not have an agenda in terms of the built 
environment, which clearly occupied a pre-eminent role in the urban emergence of the 
country. Therefore, I explore in the first instance the most visible sources of this 
agenda: Rojas himself, the personnel directly involved, and the discourse associated 
with it. 
 
                                                
129 The urban historian Juan Carlos del Castillo mentions the existence of previous plans of public 
works, as a network of roads, railroads, and harbours. (del Castillo Daza 2002) 
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· Rojas as engineer  
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla proudly mentioned on a couple of occasions how he had 
“earned the necessary money to finish his studies as a Civil Engineer in the United 
States, working as a labourer, like any other worker, at the Ford factory”. (Archivo 
Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953a, 43) As his graduation project in 1927 at 
Tri-state College in Angola, Indiana,130 Rojas proposed a new airport for Bogotá, one 
he managed to build during his regime. 
 
Figure 55. “Rojas designed the international airport” press clipping, 1953 © El 
Tiempo 
Addressing unionists, the dictator claimed: “my will is constantly to calm the 
anguish of the labourer, and the farmworker, and respond with works to the desires for 
peace, effective protection and social justice”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1953d, 403) 
Rojas presented himself as middle working class. His biographers have 
conceded this, as he was a member of a non-prominent family, from a minor provincial 
capital: Tunja, in Boyacá. Few of them have mentioned how his first education at 
university was in pedagogy, which provided the foundations for a later career that 
fluctuated between engineering and the military. Rojas began his engineering studies 
in Bogotá in 1918, but after the death of his father, he embarked on a military career. 
After renouncing the military to continue his studies in the United States, he returned to 
Colombia as a practitioner on “roads, airports, and other ‘civilizing’ projects” which 
provided him with contact with further regions. Due to the border war with Peru in 1933, 
president Enrique Olaya Herrera called reserves to duty, which not only meant Rojas’ 
return to the military, but a boost to his visibility within the army, and a better 
appreciation of the conditions of the national borders.131 Later, Rojas was sent on 
strategic missions that allowed him to interact with high-ranking officials in Germany in 
1936, and the United States in 1944 and 1949. In 1940, Rojas undertook a “High Rank” 
course. He occupied the head of the Civil Aviation Department in 1945, and in 1949 
                                                
130 The institution was renamed in 2008 as Trine University. 
131 For further information about his biography see (Rojas de Moreno 2000) (Lasso Vega 2005) 
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was designated Minister of Post and Telegraphs – i.e. Communications. Between 1950 
and 1953 Rojas occupied the highest posts in the Army, and the Inter-American board, 
including being commissioned to the battalion participating in the Korean War.132  
 
Figure 56. Rojas Pinilla in a speech with prominent social and political figures of 
the country, 1953 © Discursos del General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1953 
Considering the minimal social mobility Colombia has historically had, and the 
level Rojas reached, it is understandable that he is still a byword amongst army 
officials for being a brilliant strategist. Conversely, as noted by Téllez, within higher 
social and economic classes Rojas and his followers were regarded as “parvenus and 
upstarts, without any importance for history”. (Téllez Castañeda 2013)   
 
· Other members of the government 
Strategically, there was a remarkable continuity of personnel in individual 
departments despite the changes in the government. When he took power, Rojas tried 
to facilitate a transition from the previous government; the incorporation of new 
members of the government was therefore gradual. In addition, after the dictatorship 
fell, high-ranking officials who had been part of the regime formed the military board 
that replaced it.133 In the Ministry of Public Works, the minister in office changed twice: 
the architect Santiago Trujillo Gomez,134 the former Minister, remained in office more 
than one year. After him, the most visible Minister of the regime, the admiral and 
engineer Ruben Piedrahita Arango, moved to the post from the Instituto de Crédito 
                                                
132 After his time in power, Rojas was initially in exile, and only returned for a trial in the Congress, 
as discussed in Chapter 1.  
133 Most of the stable names in the ministries were: Government, Lucio Pabón Núñez. Foreign 
Relations, Evaristo Sourdis. Justice, General Gabriel Paris Gordillo. War, General Gustavo Berrio M. 
Economy, Carlos Villaveces. Agriculture, General Arturo Chary. Health, Bernardo Henao Mejia. Mines and 
Petroleums, Pedro Nel Rueda Uribe. Education, Daniel Henao Henao. Comunications, Coronel Manuel 
Agudelo. Foment [commerce], Alfredo Rivera Valderrama. Work, Aurelio Caicedo Ayerbe. Public Works 
Admiral, Ruben Piedrahita Arango. cf Andres González Díaz, compiled a complete list of ‘Ministros Del 
Siglo XX’. The military board was a provisional government to call for democratic elections within the 
bipartisan agreement. Its members were officials that in the Rojas regime acted as: the Police director, 
General Deogracias Fonseca Espinosa. Army Commander, General Rafael Navas Pardo, and the former 
director of the Colombian Intelligence Service, General Luis Ernesto Ordóñez Castillo, who were joined by 
Admiral Rubén Piedrahita Arango and General Gabriel París Gordillo.  
134 Assigned on June 13,1953 by decree 1469 
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Territorial – i.e. the national dependency supporting housing developments.135 Later, 
Tulio Ospina Perez was assigned to the role shortly before the regime ended, and 
continued under the military board. 
Carlos Niño Murcia (1991) reports that the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 
remained similar throughout the period. Diego Tovar Borda was the director of National 
Buildings for 12 years (1950-1962). Other architects of the Ministry – about whose 
specific role there is no clear information – were: Antonio M. Alba, Guillermo Castro, 
and Leopoldo Rother, who had previously been external advisors or hired architects; 
and Jaime Bayona who had begun as a draughtsman and continued after the military 
board. (Niño Murcia 1991) In the compilation of projects, however, new names begin to 
appear. 
In a sense, these permanencies in personnel crafted the continuity at the 
interior of the Ministry of Public Works, and made difficult to assign the credit for them 
to one or other government as mentioned earlier.  
 
Figure 57. Projects in different regions were under construction for extended 
periods: Universidad Tecnológica Pereira © Carlos Drews 
In the interview I had with Carlos Niño Murcia (2011), he critically reports a 
relevant change: the Ministry of Public Works had traditionally controlled all state 
projects, while during the dictatorship some projects were decentralized to other 
ministries, that ended up also developing constructions – for instance, the Health 
Ministry was in charge of constructions for hospitals and sanitary locations. Maybe this 
allowed for more efficient delivery on multiple operational fronts. Feasibly this can 
explain the difficulty in consulting the remaining data of the regime. Or possibly it 
contributed to the mismanagement and corruption for which the regime was criticized. 
But, wondering about the rationale of the Plan, it is also conceivable that the multiplicity 
and simultaneity were related to the intention of making projects respond to diverse 
agendas.  
                                                
135 Assigned on August 7th, 1954 by decree 2392 
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Considering the stability of the conditions of the Ministry of Public Works in 
terms of advisors, staff, and resources, questions arise about the sharp increase in the 
activity of the state architecture and engineering. For instance, how was it possible to 
fund and manage such a significant number of simultaneous projects in different 
regions? What was the difference with previous and subsequent governments, and 
plans? With each piece of information found there are more questions to address. 
 
 
3.6. Unveiling the Plan  
The importance of the National Plan of Public Works is that for the government 
of Rojas Pinilla it constituted the core policy. Most of the political, social and economic 
decisions were related to the so-called Plan. Of the few documents available in the 
Colombian national archives, it is clear that the Plan was portrayed as necessary and 
beneficial for national unity. At a critical time for the regime, Rojas argued: 
I had to think of peace, [that is] national unity, this national unity 
that all the countries of the world look for, because the security 
of sovereignty and the freedom of the people lay on it. (Archivo 
Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1956, 346) 
In a traditionally democratic country such as Colombia, Rojas made strenuous 
efforts to present his government as transitional and legitimate. Acknowledging the 
history of social fragmentation and inequality, Rojas claimed his transitional 
government was the beginning of a “new state” (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: 
Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 213) – one that aimed to be more inclusive, egalitarian and safe. 
Initially, the government was widely supported by the public, institutions, and even 
foreign governments. Indeed, Rojas’ coup d’état has been described in most 
historiographies as a “coup of opinion”.136 An indicative fact of the populist orientation 
of this regime was its motto “Peace, justice and freedom”. However, the excesses and 
                                                
136 Although different references of Dario Echandía or Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, as the one who 
coined this label to describe the military seizure of power, the term is generally accepted and registered in 
historiographies. Cf (Safford et al. 2002b; Palacios 2006) 
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repression of the regime stand in contradiction to that motto. The nationalist discourse 
that this military government adopted was not related to a recent independence, but to 
the idea of progress and modernization. Rojas constantly insisted in his speeches that 
the aim was to create “progress for all” and thereby close the existing social gap. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 1954a, 1953a, 1953b, 1954b, 
1953c, 1954c)  
The dictator promulgated a “political binomial: military forces and people” as the 
motor to enter the modern world. The regime adopted a protectionist state image 
providing necessary services through “an ambitious project of works for progress”. 
("Llamamiento a la nación del Presidente Rojas Pinilla"  1954, 4) Such works 
constituted the National Plan of Public Works. These projects were crucial to 
maintaining the façade of a welfare state. Yet we have seen that they are not 
unambiguous.  
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4. A national project 
It was convenient for the National Plan of Public Works to be portrayed as the 
core element of the modernization of the country. As an underdeveloped and 
fragmented country undergoing a profound social and political crisis, Colombia was a 
fertile terrain to recreate the trends of the post-war years.  
Latin America was not destroyed or directly affected by the Second World War, 
but I will contend that, as its references – namely Europe and the United States – were 
in crisis after the wars, countries of the American continent joined in the impulse to 
recreate themselves. Colombia’s social and political situation represented a historic 
opportunity that was seized by Rojas regime. After the war, a nationalist discourse was 
essential both in the international realm and internally in each country. As the 
geographer Sara A. Radcliffe has observed: “the nation-state in the region has often 
been understood as the agent and symbol of modernity”. (Radcliffe et al. 1996) 
Similarly to Radcliffe, other Latin Americanists have followed Benedict 
Anderson’s137 argument about the substantial difference between the Latin American 
and European notions of nationalism. Anderson conceived it as a dynamic social and 
political construction that emerges from within the community. This approach can be 
criticized as simplistic and commonplace, but it corresponds with the standardizing and 
unifying rationale of Rojas’ attempt to create a new state: the General imagined a 
nation, and set the conditions to shape it, as he declared on the first anniversary of his 
regime.  
The new state, the state we want to construct, is one of 
happiness, strength, work, and security for Colombians; a state 
without family or class differences, but with firm support to 
                                                
137 More than an ethnic interest as elsewhere, Anderson (2004) points out that alternative forms 
of cohesion took place in peripheral regions such as Latin America in order to define its nationalisms. Also 
argued by (Guibernau 2006).  
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those of reduced means. The new Colombian state will be 
nationalist, free, fair, and positive. God’s will is a Colombia as 
nation of workers and an emporium of historic projections. [My 
emphasis] (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1953b, 237) 
It is worth to make at this point a note about the interchangeable use on the 
Rojas’ discourse of “nation” and “fatherland”. Following the remaining documents from 
the presidency archive of this period, there seems to be a preference for the idea of the 
nation, as a renovated image – that is, the modern image – over the direct relationship 
of the fatherland with tradition and the inherited past. The military government was 
proposing to recreate cohesion according to modernist principles that opposed the 
colonial social legacy. 
Rojas embarked on a colossal enterprise. With continuous references to 
contemporary leaders, he assumed the posture as the personal promoter of egalitarian 
modernity. The modernization of the country however, was not his own initiative as 
former governors and intellectuals had begun the process in the 1930s. (Romero Isaza 
1994) Maybe the most visible difference relates to the explicit allusion to the creation of 
a new state. The projected nationhood was directly interconnected to nation-building 
and social inclusion.  
Contextualizing the privilege of access to knowledge in the midst of an illiterate 
majority, the scholar Nicola Miller (1999) identifies how intellectuals have contributed to 
Latin America’s modernization process – either in direct political positions, or acting in 
the manner of custodians of “the national consciousness” or, finally, as mediators 
between the masses and the state. Nevertheless, the role of intellectuals has been 
paradoxical in any of the debates around the subject of nation-building. On the one 
hand, they claimed to embody the popular will, assuming responsibility as public 
figures, but, on the other, their practical agency was limited, downplayed and 
conditioned by the leaders of the state. 
The utopian nation sought by the military government addressed the social 
base. Material wellbeing and physical progress were necessary to tackle the popular 
concerns of an egalitarian community. The regime embraced its own idea of the new 
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state. The National Plan of Public Works was an instrument to call for the unity of the 
country around the concept of an ideal nation. 
 
4.1. State unity  
While the country was still unstable, the Rojas government uttered calls for 
national unity – both in order to preserve the integrity of the territory and to attain peace 
as a nation. The official discourse maintained that development and inclusion in the 
modern world were appropriate ways of reducing the social gap. The territory 
reinforced social fragmentation. Thus, the National Plan of Public Works claimed to 
address the deepest needs of the most deprived communities, located in the 
hinterlands. The Plan also assured a state presence along the borders, and other 
distant regions where the communist influence was gaining terrain. 
Historically, for diverse reasons Colombia has repeatedly “lost territory”.138 The 
territory of the country has been dispersed and diverse. Whilst state resources were 
concentrated in the urban centres, the central government had little control over the 
vast territory, where there were upsurges of violence as well as raw materials to be 
exploited.  
Throughout these rural areas the population was more exposed to the threat of 
communism. Nicola Miller (1989) has pointed out how the Soviet Bloc addressed two 
main actors: intellectuals and peasants. Rojas in a popular manifestation in Cartagena, 
also acknowledged the inequalities between rural and urban areas, claiming that:  
From the strengthening of a social policy that improves the 
living conditions of our urban and rural workers, and avoids the 
danger of the class struggle, to the multiplication of housing as 
an effective formula of strengthening the family, giving the most 
                                                
138 As commented in the first Part of the thesis, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
Latin American countries adjusted their territories. Since the 1930s Colombia has not been disposed to 
cede any more, which has been the historical rationale of the war with Peru (1933-1934), and a more 
recent tension with Nicaragua, regarding the archipelago formed by San Andres, Catalina, and 
Providencia in the Caribbean sea. Thanks to Juan Carlos Rojas for calling my attention to this fact, acting 
as respondent to my paper in a seminar of Architecture & Anthropology at UCL, 2010.  
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disadvantaged groups a clear sense of the dignity of men and 
citizens; From the adoption of rational plans in public works, to 
the defense of our agricultural products, without forgetting 
fundamental reforms that refine the justice, combat impunity 
and ensure the scrupulous management of funds of the State. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 531) 
By doing so, the government acknowledged that the rural violence had its 
origins in the non-conformity of the population, and took this issue of social inequality 
as an opportunity to build on it. Integrating the hinterlands would provide a desired 
equality. Through the Plan the government acknowledged communities and places 
which had traditionally been relegated. This implies an innovation noted by Radcliffe in 
the parallel case of Ecuador: 
Geographers have considered the power relation of the modern 
nation-state as fundamental to the nature of modernity’s 
projects. [...] As the locus of power in modernity, the nation-
state has played a central role in the disposition of subjects, 
landscapes, and resources in a “rational” self-evident 
topography. (Miller et al. 2007, 26) 
In the political discourse of the Regime, state projects, providing modern 
services for needed communities were associated with a sort of ‘transitional’ landscape 
– that is to say, dispersed locations in the country and in the outskirts of urban areas. 
The specific aspects of the location, and its rationale, will be explained later on.  
 
Figure 58. Political capital built by Rojas, 1953 © El Tiempo 
The state’s presence was necessary to ensure the idea of a nation and the 
control of its territory. But at a time of internal tension, and in the difficult conditions of 
civil society, the presentation of the National Plan of Public Works as the provider of 
modern services to the most deprived and vulnerable groups facilitated the definition of 
projects and normalizing practices, minimizing possible resistance to them. 
Nicola Miller (1989) has further pointed out that, in South America, modern 
development was an integral part of the political discourses of both democratic and 
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totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, it was not a unified process in the region or in any 
particular country. There were a number of simultaneous modernities. State-led nation-
building was indeed one of the modern ideals in the region.139 
Notably, Rojas addressed this importance of the materialization of the imagined 
community as he reported on achievements during his second year in power:  
The Nation is not only a fragment of land within borders defined 
through centuries, but is essentially the human collective, 
connected by the invisible ties of beliefs, idiosyncrasies, 
traditions, and creations; this is exteriorized in its ornamental 
and architectural works, where its emotions and trends are 
portrayed. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1954a, 115) 
 
· Ambition of progress 
The discourse imposed about modern development was, as I have mentioned, 
neither an innovation nor exclusive to the regime, but Rojas embraced it and made it 
core to the military government. Modernity suited not only the internal social difficulties, 
but also the international discussion.  
Scholarly production from different disciplines140 identifies the modern 
movement as aimed at securing universal access to hygiene, education, 
communication and social integration, by means of an efficient use of resources, the 
incorporation of new technologies and of course, even if it was not mentioned very 
regularly, security. The National Plan of Public Works addressed in principle these 
aspects.  
Contributing to the history of engineering in Colombia, Vargas Caicedo (2011), 
asserts that the mid-twentieth century encompassed a transformation of the mentality 
and means of urban centres in Colombia; thus, according with him, urban history 
                                                
139 Cf (Bethell 2010; Miller 1999; Miller et al. 2007; Miller 1989) 
140 See (Miller 2008)  
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provides “a bigger picture about the modernization of the nation based on the 
infrastructure as indicator of organization, and collective results”. 
In the interview I had with Dora Clement de Piedrahita (2011) the widow of the 
Minister of Public Works, Ruben Piedrahita Arango, there is a certain defensiveness, 
but at the same time a clear pride in the relevant projects developed during the 
Admiral’s time in the Ministry. Along with family memories, Clement makes random 
references to some of these projects. What seems most vivid in her memories is the 
controversy about the projects, and the need to establish that they were driven by a 
concern for the development of the country.  
Clement ratifies what was reiterated in Piedrahita’s discourse: “With all the 
strength of our heart, we appreciate and respect the past, but we cannot live as in the 
past.” (Piedrahita 1955, 37) The ambition of transferring the advances of the modern 
world to Colombia played a crucial part in the definition of priorities in the National Plan 
of Public Works. 
To be modern was interpreted as being different from the past, and thus 
associated with a new order and with progress. The New State was associated with a 
more globally aware, healthier, and better educated society. The Plan sought to 
improve living standards by the introduction of modern facilities. These facilities 
comprised three general categories: sanitation (water provision, sewage disposal, 
hospitals, abattoirs); communication (roads, railways, airports, harbours, private and 
rural telephones, media); and education (civic centres, university campuses, schools, 
museums).  
The urge for progress and development to improve the living conditions of the 
population all around the country may have created some optimism within the 
population. Indeed, the Plan providing for diverse modern facilities followed a 
consistent logic. However, the reality was less utopian. The internal situation of the 
country meant that insufficient measures were taken to ensure such modern standards, 
and progress was lethargic. The discrepancy between discourse and practice is 
noticeable as uninstructed users could not understand some of these modern facilities 
imposed on them, as we will see. 
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· Implications of the new developments 
 The modernization of the country through the National Plan of Public Works 
had political, social and economic implications. The provision of engineering and 
architectural infrastructure was by no means improvised.  
The State presence in distant regions and in the hinterlands made it possible to 
rationalize the territory in diverse ways – namely, mapping, making inventories, 
characterizing territories, creating homogeneities, integrating regions, and ratifying 
boundaries. Common to these activities, and of particular relevance for Latin America’s 
modernity, is the double sense of “place” as both location and social rank. There is 
then, a correlation in the construction of spaces and of communities.  
 
Figure 59. Featuring and expansion of the construction industry: inauguration 
exhibitions centre in Bogotá, Corferias. © BLAA 
Noticeably, the Plan also gave in different regions a massive impulse to the 
construction industry, and to urbanization, which was a key factor in consolidating 
modernism in Colombia. It required accelerated and practical use of available 
resources. 
Connectivity played a part in the acceleration of industrialization. Networks of 
roads, railroads, airports, and harbours facilitated and in some cases made possible 
the exploitation of resources from the hinterlands. The Minister reported that the 
creation of a road network in what were still rural areas reduced both costs and time of 
operation. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) International investment was attracted 
and contributed to an incipient industry. Even if the silent role of this infrastructure has 
not been acknowledged in historiography, it coincided in terms of time and space in 
serving the development of industries in the 1950s, as noted by Sáenz Rovner (2002).  
A renewed cohesion of civil society, that felt included through both these 
facilities and new social practices, boosted political capital with the masses. Despite 
the constant allusion to the “government of the military forces”, it was Rojas himself 
who personally capitalized on this political capital, and as materialization it in turn 
reinforce the US fear about the communist tendency of the regime.  
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· Support for the Plan 
How was it possible to carry out such an ambitious number of projects? As 
mentioned in the historical context, in the post-war period Colombia still had financial 
resources from the coffee bonanza, as well as from Panamá’s compensation. It has 
also been claimed that the raw materials in high demand in the post-war period created 
a new affluence in the country. It should also be acknowledged that the National Plan 
of Public Works received important support in terms of international co-operation. The 
historical information about this is vague and disconnected, but I am tracing relations 
from the available sources of evidence. 
Though the internal situation of Colombia was complex, as we saw in Chapter 
1, it was not isolated as a country. Both the richness of its natural and mineral 
resources were greatly in demand during the post-war years but, more importantly, it 
had a strategic location in the north-western corner of South America just at the 
Caribbean – in other words the US Achilles' heel – brought a particular international 
attention. 
Foreign policies were relevant to developments in architecture during the early 
stages of the Cold War. The international diplomacy not only ensured the technical 
cooperation but the mutual security. Acknowledging the influence of the Soviet Union in 
the US “backyard”, (Berle Jr 1961) Latin America proved greater importance under the 
revived label of “Pan-Americanism”. One of the most prominent policies in this sense – 
and most relevant to this history – was the “Point Four Program” of US President Harry 
Truman (1949), under which most of the technical cooperation in Colombia was 
provided.  
Despite its assessment of the risk of “impiety and international communism” in 
Latin America, (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954b, 228) Rojas’ 
speech, to the accredited diplomatic corps, is apparently the only public one which, 
calling for solidarity against communism, contains an explicit reference to the Cold 
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War.141 From the minutes of government meetings it is clear that the subject was 
discussed, but never aired in the media directly. The US cooperation agreements142 
detail how technical and financial support was provided in priority areas of 
infrastructure. In compensation for the technical cooperation, the most strategic natural 
and mineral resources were committed not only at that moment, but also in the future. 
(US Mutual Security Program 1951) 
However relevant this international cooperation, such an ambitious Plan also 
made use of, and sought, other available funds. Based on the dynamics of the 
international market, Colombia speculated on the continuity of coffee value, and other 
exports, creating estimations of “future budgets” but also having the first international 
mission of the IBRD (i.e. the World Bank), certainly facilitated the acquisition of 
international loans. During the 1950s the national debt of Colombia reached one of the 
highest levels in the continent. (Sáenz Rovner 2002) 
At the same time, the local financial system also modified its target clients, 
integrating the State. (Bateman 1969) Ruben Piedrahita addressing a meeting of the 
Society of Civil Engineers claims that the Instituto de Crédito Territorial [Housing State 
Fund] had been focused on housing: more specifically, social housing, built with credits 
with the lowest interest rate possible for local banks. Piedrahita declared it to be state 
policy that “the financial system and public funds should provide [also] communal 
facilities”.143 (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1955, 15)  
However, as there was much ambition about the scope and number of projects 
of the National Plan of Public Works, funds were insufficient to cover all the associated 
demands. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) Therefore, some projects of the Plan 
suffered delays, postponements, and cancellations.  
 
                                                
141 The scholar Dr Tanya Harmer, a specialist on the Cold War in Latin America, mentioned that 
in her years of research on the subject in the region this was the first discourse openly addressing the Cold 
War. 
142 The US government has a complete record of the agreements by country. Some of them are 
reported in (Hardoy 1982),  
143 Piedrahita was honoured at the end of 1954 in Tequendama hotel as one of the first signs of 
reconciliation with the Society of Civil Engineers p. 16 
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· Location of works 
Due to the violence in the hinterlands, and incipient industrialization, there was 
a significant rise in the figures of rural migration to cities creating an urban escalation. 
At the interior of the cities an initial process of densification of consolidated urban areas 
took place, but then informal settlements on the outskirts rapidly became shanty-towns, 
replicating the risks of rural areas in proximity to the centres of power. The incipient 
town planning undertaken by local governments was insufficient, as the growing figures 
surpassed all the forecasts.144 
In consequence, the government responded in two ways: providing a state 
presence through services in middle-sized cities, and strategic towns, in order to 
diversify the migratory phenomena; and tackling the expansion of the urban areas of 
the main cities. In other words, the confluence of the political interest, and the capacity 
of the territory, defined the location of the facilities. This phenomenon responds to what 
Radcliffe remarks as a spatial disposition of Modernity’s landscape of power: “[it is] a 
story about the location of objects, boundaries, and subjects and their interrelationships 
across the space”. (Miller et al. 2007) 
One of the most striking elements was the location of the Plan’s projects not 
only at the national level, but also within the existent urban areas. 
With the exception of the capital city, Bogotá, the regime claimed the Plan was 
responding to a state void, i.e. the lack of a visible state presence. Thus, architectural 
and engineering projects might be explained simply as the provision of modern 
services to a vulnerable population. Yet the rationale to locate facilities, such as water 
treatment plants, sanitation systems, hospitals and schools, in major towns and middle-
sized cities might not be sufficient in all cases – for instance, when to a minor town is 
assigned a school with similar characteristics to one for an middle-size city. 
([Colombian government] 1951-1957) Moreover, different questions emerge when 
other infrastructure projects are assigned to urban centres, such as university 
campuses, airports, military installations, harbours and warehouses, amongst others. 
                                                
144 Corbusier’s plan foresee a population of 1.653.242 in an area (central area) of 6577 hectares 
for the next 50 years, that figure was reached in 1964, that is 17 years. (Saldarriaga Roa 2010);(Vargas 
Caicedo 2010) 
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The deceptively arbitrary distribution of projects conveniently facilitated territorial 
control, whilst providing modern services to reduce social inequality. Rojas claimed: 
“The government aims an ambitious work of progress […] filling every empty space”. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 57) 
In order to illustrate this point, I have located infrastructural projects reported in 
the annual report of 1954. The distribution in different regions confirms in this case 
what was openly claimed by the regime. At first sight, apart from departments where 
the main cities are located, others such as Boyacá – Rojas’ birthplace – gained state 
attention. Given the number of projects, the regional social and economic effect of 
these projects could be a subject for further studies.  
 
Figure 60. Regional location of facilities in Boyacá, 1954: ensured state presence 
in most of the area © Ochoa Planning Map (modified) 
And then, once the allocation of these projects in specific cities is accepted, the 
next question is where to locate them in the urban pattern? In addition to the social 
aspects already mentioned, there are physical and economic considerations I will 
propose. 
Most urban centres, even if they began during the post-colonial period, were 
consolidated colonial patterns – dense reticules formed by low-rise and continuous 
buildings around a central plaza. Traditional construction systems in tapia pisada, i.e., 
a Spanish legacy of rammed earth walls,145 adobe and masonry did not permit the 
elevation of high-rise buildings. Therefore the rapidly growing population arrived to the 
outskirts areas of cities, carrying along its rural difficulties, and breeding problems in 
the provision of suitable modern infrastructure; thus shanty-towns became an 
emergent hazard.  
Interestingly, the regime adopted a position that at the time diverged from the 
prevalent ideas of architects and urban planners. The regime adopted the preservation 
of these consolidated areas as representative of the fatherland’s legacy. Rojas 
                                                
145 The traditional construction technique of thick walls made of encased mud. Tapia pisada 
consists in compacting moistened earth and some stabilizer, between formwork panels that are removed 
once the wall has dried. The wall is also called tapia pisada. 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 163(
 
 
remarked on an interpretation of the value of the pre-existent that might explain his 
interest in preserving it.  
From prehistoric relics until current times, Colombia presents to 
informed eyes a rich variety of features of all kinds that 
successive generations have left as a legacy of their existence, 
and as a prolongation of their beliefs, lives, and human 
concerns. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1954a, 115) 
Economic reasons can also be adduced, as demolition and construction in 
areas already occupied would have required greater resources, as well as more 
displacement and, consequently, time. Therefore, it appears to have been more 
convenient in terms of efficiency to expand into new areas that, if left as shanty-towns, 
had the potential to become problematic; this in turn matches the modern ideal of the 
clear space.  
 
· The process of urbanization 
This phenomenon of intervention in the outskirts not only solved problems; it 
also created an opportunity to define urban patterns of growth that shaped the current 
urban form in most cities.  
As Piedrahita explained, the proposal of state buildings on the outskirts defines 
the tendencies of city development that attempts to solve inadequacies of spontaneous 
development. Such is the case with the axis generated in Bogotá to connect the new 
international airport, and the National Administrative Centre, with the Tequendama 
hotel, i.e. defined by then as the first international business centre, on the border of the 
city centre.  
 
Figure 61. Axis from Bogota's centre to El Dorado airport: expedit movilization © 
MB 
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As we have seen, the CAN project generated a controversy, as did the 
international airport of Bogotá. But each project was presented independently, and was 
usually addressed at different moments.  
Piedrahita’s reports on the project in the media, and additional details in the 
annual report to the Congress, suggested that the proposal to generate satellite cities 
which would act as poles of attraction on the west was originally taken from studies by 
the Universidad Nacional de Colombia under the rectorship of Gerardo Molina (1944-
1948). By claiming that the proposal originated from within the institution where its 
most energetic opposition was concentrated, the government aimed to reduce 
resistance to it.  
From the 1930s Bogotá had experienced linear growth, parallel to its eastern 
mountains. The terrains on the west made construction in these areas difficult and 
more expensive, being subject to periodic flooding and river overflows. But linearity 
was causing struggles and inefficiencies: the purpose was to balance towards the west 
“the linear condition of a city of 16 kilometres length and 2.5 wide”. ("Centro 
Administrativo Oficial, Piedrahita interviewed"  1954) This was already considered by 
Le Corbusier’s Pilot Plan as an “an abnormal extension”. However, Le Corbusier’s plan 
focuses on the downtown area, timidly indicating, without development, the possibility 
of satellite cities to the west, and without proposing alternative solutions to the 
unbalanced growth.146 
 Although the idea of creating a more regular form sounds appealing, one can 
suggest other reasons for the regime’s strategy. Some of the arguments presented to 
justify the development outside the centre were related to institutional security. Since 
the beginning of the city, the downtown area had congregated all the power forces not 
only of the city, but also of the country. Indeed, Bogotá until then had retained the 
political, governmental, religious, military, and financial headquarters in an area 
measuring less than four square kilometres. It was therefore deemed highly vulnerable 
after the experience of the Second World War, once aerial attacks acquired a 
prominent role in warfare, and at the local level, after the destruction caused by the 
                                                
146 Cf (Arias Lemos et al. 2005; Vargas Caicedo 1987; O'Byrne et al. 2010) 
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sprawl of violence after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, referred to in 
Chapter 1.  
El Dorado International Airport was a proposal made by Rojas after he had 
been director of the Civil Aviation Department. Dora Clement de Piedrahita (2011), 
amongst others, asserts Bogotá’s airport was initially designed by Rojas as his final 
work at Indiana University. There is, however, no clear information about the 
acquisition of the terrains, or to what extent such sketches, if they exist, influenced the 
final project that was publically presented as designed by a Colombian practice, 
Cuellar Serrano Gomez.147 What is more intriguing at this point is to consider its 
location in the city. 
The western areas of the urban centre were at the time mostly agricultural land, 
only connected with the route to Mosquera. The Airport of 57,000m2 was located in 
Fontibón, i.e., a different town. Next to it were built two additional facilities: cargo and 
military air terminals. In the eyes of critics such as Alberto Lleras, who became 
Colombia’s president in 1958, it was “one of the Pharaonic works of the dictatorship”, 
meaning El Dorado airport was an unreasonable distance away from Bogotá, and the 
whole project of an unnecessary magnitude. In other words: colossal. I contend that 
the decision about the airport represented one of the most important measures the 
regime took in relation to urban administration. It was to promote an aspiration that had 
been proposed for economic reasons since the 1930s: the integration of the annex 
towns to Bogotá, in what was named as the ‘Special District’. This was formed by 
Fontibón, Soacha, Engativa, Bosa, Usaquén, and Suba. This approach gives additional 
elements of consideration to the ones recently addressed in the research of Marco 
Cortes Diaz (2006).148 
 The tension generated between the downtown area and the new international 
airport of the city created in turn an axis of development that has provoked recent 
scholarly interest.149 This axis brings together three of the most visible state projects in 
the city during the 1950s: the International Financial Centre in the immediate outskirts 
                                                
147 In the monograph about this practice, Germán Téllez denies Rojas involvement in the airport 
project. See (Téllez Castañeda 1988) 
148 Cortes Diaz’ research compiles the information about this integration from the rationale of the 
city administration, and relates it to the master plans of the city.  
149 One of the most influential documents is Juan Carlos del Castillo Daza (2002)  
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of the downtown area (1950-1982), the CAN conglomerate (1953), and the 
International Airport El Dorado (1955).150 In other words, the axis brought together: the 
financial centre, the political centre, and the civic and military airport. Such an avenue 
appears to correspond to a rapid evacuation strategy for the city. 
 
 
4.2. Modern aspiration  
Even if an incipient modernism was gaining ground from the 1930s through 
private and elite housing projects, it is interesting to see how there was a turning point 
in the 1950s in favour of a consolidation of modernist architecture. My contention is 
that the quantity and variety of projects of the National Plan of Public Works were 
fundamental in fostering the consolidation of a modernist image in different regions and 
for broader purposes. 
The regime’s discourse of a more egalitarian, cohesive, and secure society 
found a synergy with postulates of the modern movement. Indeed, the political 
argument was conveniently reinforced by the enthusiastic architectural realm, the 
prominent historian Jorge Arango claimed: “architecture in Colombia is neither in the 
hands of a group of snobs, nor supported by the state, contemporary architecture in 
Colombia is a popular movement”. (Jorge Arango et al. 1953, 33) Nevertheless, 
considering the initial modernist projects, claims for popularity seem debatable.  
For the government, the modern image conveniently responded to the 
demands of various groups of society. On one hand, it was presented to elites as part 
of the euphoria about infrastructural development on equal terms with more advanced 
countries. On the other, as Valerie Fraser (2004) has pointed out, it was portrayed for 
                                                
150 Recently, these projects have been subject of monographic researches. Cf the doctoral 
research by María Pia Fontana at Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya analyses modern forms in Bogotá 
in the mid-twentieth century through the financial centre.(Fontana et al. 2012) Final work of architectural 
studies by Natalia Londoño and Edwin Alejandro Soto Villada (2008) about the urban impact generated by 
the Bogotá’s airport, which was awarded as outstanding final works for undergraduate students 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia 
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the masses as “cultural experimentation that challenged traditional Eurocentrism”, 
commonly associated with the elites.  
 
· Modern image  
Latin America was keen to explore modernity in architecture. South American 
countries engaged politically with social change. What has not necessarily been 
evident though, is how “governments of quite different persuasions sponsored 
networks of public schools and hospitals, extensive housing schemes and university 
cities, and dared to do so in an uncompromisingly modern language”. (Fraser 2004) 
The Colombian government was eager to integrate the most advanced 
techniques, images and discourses. The nation-building plan aimed to materialize 
progress, and relate to international dynamics. The case under discussion is 
nevertheless very different from that of Brasilia which was also designed and 
constructed during this period (1953-1960) and which remains the region’s best-known 
example of nation-building through the language of modernism. The scholar Jorge 
Ramírez Nieto (2011), in the interview we had, has pointed out that Juscelino 
Kubitschek’s modern projects were an explicit call to build the Brazilian identity; they 
aimed at taking control of a vast inhabited territory.151 The ‘Anthropophagite 
Manifesto’152 summarized the Brazilian strategy towards the unavoidable European 
influence, recreating it with local traditions.  
A different case was represented by Juan Domingo Perón’s regime in 
Argentina, which assumed a more conservative posture in terms of state image. The 
country indeed underwent modernization, but the language was moderate – an 
aspiring neoclassic style – assuming in the late 1940s an explicit state position against 
abstraction in art.153  
                                                
151 Complementary information can be found in (Ramírez Nieto 1995)  
152 In 1928, Oswaldo Andrade promoted cultural cannibalism as a method to recreate foreign 
influence into an appropriate product. Extended studies have addressed this subject. Cf (Ramírez Nieto 
2000) (Tauxe 1996) 
153 See (Giunta 1997), (Andermann et al. 2005).  
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In addition to the influences from Europe, there was a simultaneous – and more 
aggressive – influence from the United States, as noted by Valerie Fraser (2004): 
During the 1940s and 1950s contemporary US art was 
promoted in Latin America via the touring shows organized by 
the MoMA as part of the Cold War propaganda offensive. 
These exhibitions sought to promote US art and to make a strict 
division between figurative and abstract art, or as the US 
authorities saw it, between politically motivated social realism 
and political neutral abstraction, which was in turn presented as 
a choice between the old-fashioned and the modern. 
The cultural exchange in the continent shaped different strategies to resist such 
polarization, and even with the opposition of alternative trends, for instance, what was 
denoted as ‘indigenismo’.154 Consequently this Latin Americanist also highlights how 
“Art and architecture in Latin America are interesting in their selective appropriations 
and manipulations, for their originality rather than their dependence.” (Fraser 2004) In 
brief, there was not a passive reception of modernism. 
Despite the large number, diversity, and impact of these infrastructural projects 
which both Colombian and foreign architects developed throughout the country, the 
adoption of accepted modernist forms did not follow, or attempt to develop, an 
identifiable national style. In other words, modern architecture was not used to embody 
a new national identity in Colombia. The projects were presented to the community 
merely as facilities rather than salient monuments of the “new state”. Paradoxically, the 
military government had little interest in promoting, or permitting, the identification of 
these projects as constituents of the national identity. Certainly, neither communities 
nor scholars have considered these projects as a valid national representation. 
If anything, in the case of Colombia, these state projects were to some extent 
invisible or at least self-effacing. They served as tools of power for an increasingly 
unpopular military government, not only providing necessary services, but also being 
camouflaged posts of control. Their invisibility eased the insertion of these projects into 
                                                
154 Indigenismo was an artistic and literary movement that began in México, aiming to call 
attention to the indigenous legacy and participation in society in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
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the growing cities. It also defined the way the community related to them. There was no 
appreciation of them as landmarks of progress. Functionally, these projects provided 
much needed infrastructure, and people used them. What is more, most of these 
buildings are still in use. However, tellingly, communities have not developed any 
sense of reference or belonging with them. We will return to this point in Chapter 7. 
 
· Definition of parameters 
The archives of the Direction of National Buildings of the Ministry of Public 
Works contain no specific guidelines for the projects of the National Plan of Public 
Works. Nevertheless, presenting the advances achieved on the first anniversary of the 
regime, Rojas made clear the image that was being pursued: 
Rather than challenging skyscrapers and opulent works, this 
government prefers the multiplicity of small and medium-sized 
projects, basic public infrastructure being brought to the nine 
hundred towns and villages of the country, and the benefits of 
social assistance to the most deprived countryside areas and 
cities. 155 (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 
1953d, 38) 
More explicitly: public buildings were meant to be accessible as facilities to 
provide modern services to the community, but they should not be remarkable as 
landmarks. Considering the examples of other authoritarian regimes, this remains 
perhaps one of the most surprising particularities of the Colombian case. 
In order to understand the practice of the time, I have interviewed some of the 
most prominent practitioners who were junior architects of the 1950s.156 Their 
testimony provided relevant observations about how the corporate practice within the 
                                                
155 Also found in Colombia en Marcha, one of the regime’s reports of achievements. It is common 
to find fragments of speeches that are included repeatedly in different editions of the DIPE. 
156 I am indebted to the generosity of architects who gave me their time and efforts to enrich this 
research with their insights. They were significant junior architects in the 1950s: Hernando Tapia (1937-
2011), Edgar Bueno Tafur (n.d.), Germán Téllez Castañeda (b.1933), Germán Samper Gnecco (b.1924), 
Hernán Vieco (1925-2012), Dicken Castro (b. 1923). 
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small studios of engineers and architects began. Understandably, there are some 
inaccuracies and contradictions in their efforts to recall memories from more than 50 
years ago. I have therefore cross-checked the information obtained in this way both 
with material from other interviewees and with other sources. 
According to the interview we had with Carlos Niño Murcia (2011), the regime 
usually defined the function of a project, without providing a specific programme. 
Officially, state projects aimed to reach the majority of the population with hygienic, 
economic, modern buildings, but these were centrally designed by young architects. 
Most of these practices were located in Bogotá and operated from there in other 
regions of the country, which might imply that in some cases their knowledge of a 
particular site was limited; as Dicken Castro (2011) mentioned, “More often than not, 
the demands designers were addressing were speculative, rather than based on actual 
needs.” In this respect, Hernán Vieco (2011) added, “As these practices did not have 
wide experience of some of the functions, this allowed a relevant practice of that time: 
experimentation and exploration based on the avid reading of international journals.”  
In addition to the location of infrastructural projects in the outskirts of the urban 
areas, which I have already mentioned, Vieco, Samper, and Téllez made reference in 
the interviews to how dispersed the projects were. The government assigned for these 
projects specific sites that, according to the architects of the time, were never 
discussed or consulted on with the designers. While the regime’s discourse was aimed 
simultaneously at the construction of a new nation and at modern progress, in the 
practice of architecture it was engaged in as an opportunity for innovation according to 
international standards. Perhaps without presenting the opportunity to ask many 
questions, the National Plan of Public Works was tackled as a technical and aesthetic 
concern. 
 
· Who built them 
Given the number of projects of the National Plan of Public Works, the question 
about the people involved is almost unanswerable. Historical data that provides explicit 
information about professionals, companies, and labour is inconsistent and incomplete. 
I have therefore taken information from some of the regime’s reports, payrolls, reports 
of cooperation, correspondence of foreign agencies, lists of authorized companies, and 
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registers in the media. This has allowed me to present an image of people involved in 
the design and construction of the most well-known projects; the account does not, 
however, pretend to be complete or detailed. 
As far as I can establish, architectural practice changed from individual 
established professionals to small collectives of young architects and engineers. It is 
well known that, during the mid-twentieth century, there was a change in the most 
frequent names in charge of these projects. There was a move away from prominent 
names from the previous decades, such as Alberto Manrique Martín, Martínez 
Cárdenas, Herrera Carrizosa, among others. From the late 1940s one can identify new 
smaller firms gaining prominence. Cases in point are: Obregón & Valenzuela; Pizano 
Pradilla Caro; Herrera Nieto Cano; Domus (Pizano, Bermudez, Vieco); Ortega, Solano 
& Gaitán; Esguerra, Sáenz, Urdaneta & Suarez (joined by Samper in the 1950s); 
Samper & Castro; Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez; Ritter & Mejia; Violi & Lanzetta; Borrero, 
Zamorano y Giovanelli; Ricaurte, Carrizosa, Prieto; HM Rodriguez e Hijos; Arango & 
Murtra, and others.157 Remarkably, most projects of the Plan were in the hands of 
these small practices, despite their lack of experience in similar projects. Jorge Arango 
(1953) affirmed: “young architects design young architecture”. One could rephrase this 
as “new architects design new architecture”. Rojas ratified this, emphatically 
announcing: “Our National movement ought to support a young generation which is 
solid and ambitious of great destinies, able to engage in an historic endeavour.” 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, 175) 
In identifying these actors, there are other aspects to consider. The majority of 
these practices included Colombian professionals who had studied abroad. The first 
school of architecture in Colombia had been founded in 1936, but even in the 1950s 
most head designers of these practices had studied in universities in France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and 
Chile.158 Tellingly, there was a continuous exchange with the new developments in 
                                                
157 Along with these practices were engineers that closely interacted and participated in projects 
at that time. Unfortunately this activity has not been acknowledged or widely registered. Some of the 
related professionals were: Guillermo Gonzales Zuleta, Doménico Parma; and some were engineer 
architects such as Juvenal Moya. 
158 Arango and Martínez, as well as later historians, have pointed out this information. However, 
specific data about which universities they attended, or the particular influence this brought is still a 
pending matter of study. Cf (Silvia Arango 1996), (Saldarriaga Roa 1986) 
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architecture in a period marked by changing discourses and the after-effects of 
wartime. 
This flow of information was reinforced through the immigration to Colombia of 
foreign, mainly European, architects during both World Wars. They actively participated 
in the local academia and, more interestingly, in the government. Indeed, the main 
consultant of the Ministry of Public Works was the German architect Leopoldo 
Rother.159 In 1984, Hans Rother published a compilation of works of his father, in which 
the foreword by Carlos Martínez described him as:  
Professor of all the cohorts of architects of faculties in Bogotá, 
active researcher, reader, […] energetic worker, either 
collaborator or author of the majority of the Ministry of Public 
Works’ projects in the last two decades. [My emphasis] (Rother 
1984) 
Nevertheless, the information about this period in the archive of the Ministry of 
Public Works does not clarify the precise way in which professionals were linked to the 
Ministry and what their specific responsibilities were. There is, however, the evidence 
of payments to professionals hired from other disciplines and thus integrated in the 
design and construction of the plan’s projects, including landscape designers, artists, 
and, interior designers.  
 
Figure 62. Payments to individuals in administrative files of Ministry of Public 
Works ©AGN 
Through debates about the participation of national and foreign firms in these 
projects which appeared in the media, it is clear that foreign companies were also 
taking part in the development of some of the Plan’s projects. Such participation was 
justified as an aspect of technical cooperation, either because of the direct funding, or 
on account of the implementation of new technologies. 
                                                
159 Most studies about Leopoldo Rother were undertaken by his son Hans Rother (1984)  
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The historical information presented here demonstrates that, at the time of the 
increase in architectural infrastructure projects, the government was keen to promote 
new ideas about the built environment. The relevant projects were entrusted to a new 
generation of professionals who introduced an architecture that corresponded to 
international practices. Questions then arose about how these projects were 
commissioned, or what kind of information they received. 
 
· How they were commissioned 
Information about the direct commission or public contest to assign projects of 
the National Plan of Public Works is unclear, as one might expect at this point. Some 
debates were recorded in the media, and in the minutes of both the Societies of 
Architects and of Engineers. In recent studies, these controversies have been repeated 
and differences in interpretation are noticeable. In the history of the Colombian 
Chamber of Construction – Camacol – which was compiled by Oscar Alfonso Roa 
(2007), it is argued that the most difficult point on the relationships with the government 
was reached during the Rojas regime; while the scholar Hernando Vargas (2011) 
acknowledges that in August 1953, two months after the beginning of the regime: 
[T]he second national convention of engineers took place, and 
Archila Briceño, president of the association, spoke against the 
procedures of the former government on [assigning] roads 
commissions. Firstly, he claimed that plans and projects of 
public works were solely done by foreign engineers, and for 
organisms in which Colombian engineers were not represented. 
In the report of the Dictatorship’s first six months in power, Rojas pledged 
support for Colombian professionals and enterprises: 
Deserving all support and encouragement by the state will be 
the capital that prospects, creates, and executes productive 
enterprises, […] that offers the technique of experts, as well as 
the ability and devotion of workers, to produce essential assets. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953d, 19)  
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Considering the creation and active presence of new companies, not only 
during the period of the regime, but afterwards, (Roa 2007) one could assume that the 
following government effectively encouraged circles of Colombian professionals to 
become involved with projects of the National Plan of Public Works. 
 
· Participation of foreign architectural and engineering firms 
It is clear, however, that along with foreign aid came the involvement of foreign 
experts and companies. In some cases this information was widely publicized. This 
was not always the case, however, as inconsistencies regarding both the projects 
themselves and who was involved in them were common. 
 
Figure 63. Advertisement of US firms and innovative materials used in Colombia, 
Military hospital Bogotá ©Architectural Forum 
During the Cold War, US companies that were acting abroad were registered 
annually; they required a security clearance to cooperate on projects in various 
countries, and with US funding. In relation to the built environment, I found that during 
the 1950s more engineering firms than architectural practices were authorized to work 
in Colombia. Amongst others, in the directories of US firms operating abroad the 
following companies were involved in the country’s projects: Armco Steel Co, Morrison-
Knudson Corp, Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton Engineering Co, Raymond Concrete 
Pile Co, Thompson & Merritt, Frederick Snare Corp, R J Tipton Associates, Utah 
Construction Co. 160 (Angel et al. [1955] -1960) 
 
Figure 64. Experts visit, reported in the media: Paul Lester, Le Corbusier, Josep-
Lluis Sert © El Tiempo,  
The foreign presence in Colombia was not only represented by companies 
working there temporarily; there was also a common phenomenon of immigration to 
                                                
160 Others firms are reported to work in previous years: Town Planning Ass., Skidmore Owings & 
Merrill, Cia Constructora Groves-Drake Inc, Bethlehem Steel Co, Merritt Chapman & Scott. 
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Latin America both during and after the World Wars. In the census of 1951, the number 
and distribution of foreigners is not insignificant and their contribution would be worth 
investigating further. The census data reports that, after Germany, countries such as 
the United States, Spain, Italy, Venezuela, and Ecuador had more than 7,094 
immigrants to Colombia between 1952 and 1974. (Asociacion Colombiana para el 
estudio de la poblacion -ACEP 1974) The higher proportion was located in areas of 
industrial and urban growth: Bogotá, Valle, Atlántico, Caldas, and the Eastern plains. 
Correspondingly, one can trace foreign engineers and architects not only connected to 
local schools, but undertaking some of the projects of the National Plan of Public 
Works. Perhaps the most prominent cases, to name but a few, were: the Spaniards 
Fernando Martínez Sanabria and José de Recasens, the Italians Vicente Nasi and 
Bruno Violi, and the German Leopoldo Rother. Their imprint in academia, and in 
particular in the Universidad Nacional and the Ministry of Public Works, has been 
acknowledged individually. Recent scholarly work has taken a new interest in their 
legacy. 161 
 
· Role of foreigners in the Ministry of Public Works and 
university  
It is not then surprising that both foreign and national professionals in Colombia 
were informed, or even educated, in relevant international practices. In terms of the 
built environment, the permanent flow of information and people ensured a connection 
with contemporary trends elsewhere. 162 There were two crucial settings for this 
connection: on the one hand, schools of architecture, in particular la Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, along with other more recent and private universities located in 
Bogotá and Cali;163 and on the other, the Ministry of Public Works.  
                                                
161 Within the Master program in Architecture at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, a 
renewed interest about these architects has recently produced a number of works. Cf (Castellanos Garzón 
et al. 2010), (Rodríguez Botero 2007), (Parra Escobar 2010), (Rojas Farias 2007) 
162 I will address in Chapter 6 the media used in the exchange of information. 
163 During the 1950s, universities such as Javeriana, Andes, and Valle aimed to reach a similar 
level to the Nacional, including the international state of art of the discipline. 
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Results of the extensive research undertaken by the scholar Carlos Niño 
Murcia, based on the archives of the Ministry of Public Works, have shown how the 
Ministry was a laboratory for the exploration of new languages and techniques. 
Interestingly, Niño has pointed out that there were changes even in the work of the 
most traditional architects; for instance: 
Even [Angiolo] Mazzoni, in 1954, designed a rationalist project 
marking a change in his position about which it is difficult to 
establish if this change was produced by his own conviction, or 
due to [governmental] pressure – which might be strong – 
prevailing on the realm. (Niño Murcia 1991) 
Academia and Ministry played complementary roles. The former was the place 
of introduction, learning, and diffusion of the most recent trends within professional 
circles and in the main cities; and the latter, as the largest constructor in the country, 
was the laboratory for testing these ideas, and for applying them in different contexts 
and regions. According to the scholar William Vasquez Rodriguez (2013) at least half 
of the staff members of the school of architecture in Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, were foreigners during the first decades of the programme in architecture, 
i.e. 1930s-1950s. New ideas and practices were widely introduced over a short period 
of time, and heavily supported by Germany, including not only the provision of 
academic material, but supplies for models. 
 
· New materials and techniques  
One can identify as a common ground in the regime’s discourse and the 
professionals’ approach an interest in improving living standards. Within the restrictions 
appropriate to the time, technical aspects were key to the actual implementation of the 
Plan.  
In this sense, the architect Hernando Tapia (2010) mentioned in his last 
interview how part of the local adaptations involved the need to find alternative ways to 
deal with two main concerns: “ventilation and sun protection, especially given the 
tropical conditions of the country”. He claimed that a common solution involved a 
combination of traditional features with a modern image, through brise-soleils, 
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airbricks, patios, and orientation. Because of the wide variety of climates in the country, 
a different range of adaptive resources is required, and in some cases is just 
introduced as formalist fashion. 
In relation to building materials, Adrian Forty (2012b) focuses his latest 
research on how concrete was an international resource. In order to achieve a modern 
image, other “new materials” – namely iron, marble, and glass – were in high demand. 
I will associate this also with data found about how the government awarded special 
subsidies to constructions which used concrete and other new materials. ([Colombian 
government] 1951-1957) Differently perhaps from other governments in the post-war 
years, rather than controlling and restricting the provision of cement, the regime 
endorsed national cement industries, and the use of this material in public and private 
projects. Either exposed concrete, or white or light-coloured walls, were frequent in 
state buildings, generating ambivalent reactions from users such as the one reported in 
the media by the Brazilian architect and footballer Otavio de Moraes (1952) about a 
recently opened project: “the Campín [the Bogotá stadium] seems an unfinished work”. 
Although concrete structures were the most common, Arango notes: 
In a few cases there is a [complete] metallic structure. Colombia 
does not [massively] produce steel. But there are factories 
producing minor structures, window frames, and other non-
mechanical pieces of construction. (Jorge Arango et al. 1953)  
But this was set to change. At the time the Colombian government was 
undertaking a cooperation initiative with the French government, to build the largest 
steel factory in Latin America: Paz del Rio in Boyacá, “opening the path to total 
economic and political independence”. (Andermann et al. 2005) The company and plan 
were set in 1948, but were only operative from 1954, when the regime urged its 
production.  
Another interesting peculiarity to consider here is that the work force arrived 
with rural migration. Labour was plentiful and knowledgeable about such traditional 
techniques as tapia pisada, and about brick production and masonry. Further studies 
should be developed, but notably, USOM (1948-1961) reports on housing, highlighted 
that this traditional knowledge informed the research undertaken by the CINVA (1951-
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1972) concerning their interest in modulating and industrializing construction 
processes. Experimental techniques such as the cinvaram164 are evidence of this. 
Considering the incipient industry of the country to mass-produce materials, cinvaram 
technique allowed rapid and economical construction in remote areas. However, it was 
not entirely popular as it was seen as earth, an undervalued traditional resource, 
instead of “being made of material”, that is: concrete, a modern resource. 
In terms of the technical aspects of the modern architecture, therefore, one can 
consider that there was a degree of cultural and material distinctiveness. However, this 
was never explicitly addressed, but rather led by resources.  
 
 
4.3. Reading the National Plan of Public Works 
What was confusingly presented as a National Plan of Public Works does 
indeed correspond with modern postulates of well-being, progress and social inclusion. 
However, the social and historical context at the time also called for control. This 
control was directed not only towards “dangerous ideas” that were gaining ground in 
the region, but was particularly concerned with control over the territory. The 
improvement of living standards and the construction of a “new nation” were vehicles to 
exert such control while minimizing resistance to the regime. In this way, the non-
existent Plan was a soft power strategy that tinted down hard decisions of the 
dictatorship.  
Thinking about infrastructure, the strategy becomes evident, as the scholar 
Montserrat Guibernau i Berdún (2006) discusses about the modernizing enterprise in 
Latin America: 
It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of transport 
and communications, not just for social mobility and interaction, 
                                                
164 A compressed-earth brick. The block adopted the name from the manual machine used to 
produce it. 
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but as a multiplier of the military power of the state and the 
facilitator of a national press.  
The provision of modern facilities, I would argue, aimed to work in parallel in 
different directions. Firstly, it aimed at an improvement in living standards and the 
provision of suitable infrastructure for industrial development, as was widely publicized. 
Simultaneously and no less importantly, it was an instrument to camouflage posts of 
control in peri-urban areas, while conveniently gaining some popular acceptance of the 
increasingly repressive regime.  
Having clarified that the so-called National Plan of Public Works was more a 
strategy than an actual plan, it is then relevant to explore more possible explanations 
for “these random projects”. So the proposal here is to examine official reports, media 
and internal information of the entities involved in order to identify possible connections 
– and perhaps a general system that might make sense at different scales. 
 
· What were the Plan’s priorities? 
In a way, the National Plan of Public Works not only focused on, but also 
represented, the fragmentation of the country, and its contradictions. It promised 
material improvement through the implementation of modern facilities such as 
hospitals, schools, university campuses, banks, markets, national buildings, SENA 
(polytechnic centres), SENDAS buildings (social assistance programme for rural areas 
and marginal communities), military bases, airports, ports, clubs, libraries and hotels, 
but these were under construction both before and after the dictatorship. The point is 
that during the regime their priorities and rationale were not apparent to the architects, 
nor to the community, and yet the transformation of the built environment, and the 
construction industry, were both greater and faster.  
 
Figure 65. Pablo Tobón Uribe Hospital under construction on the outskirts of 
Medellin © Gabriel Carvajal 
Oddly enough, projects highlighted in the Ministry of Public Works’ reports of 
1956-1957 were: the Heroes’ monument in Bogotá, the extension of a “tourism” hotel in 
Popayan, university campuses in Popayan, Bucaramanga, and Pamplona, Colegio 
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Salesiano Zapatoca, National Buildings in Riohacha, Monteria, and Barranquilla, and 
the Palace of Justice in Tunja, Banco Republica’s libraries and Caja Agraria. 
([Colombian government] 1951-1957) 
A wider picture is necessary in order to understand these projects and to 
identify their priorities. With this in mind, we need to go back to one of the reported 
influences on the plan, namely the “Basis of a Development Program for Colombia”, 
also known as the Currie Mission.165 In a recent history of the World Bank, the scholar 
Michele Alacevich (2009) highlights the importance of the Currie Mission began in 
1949, as the “first comprehensive economic survey mission [abroad]” ever undertaken 
by the bank. The historian identifies the 14 advisors who were commissioned to advise 
Colombia on development projects concerning agriculture, industry, transportation 
(railroads, highways and waterways), public facilities, energy, health and welfare.166  
Among these advisors, Alacevich identifies some controversial connections.167 
Haywood (Woody) R. Faison, head of the economy section, simultaneously 
participated as a member of the board of aviation of the US Defense Department. Carl 
W. Fletcher, appearing as an expert on industry and energy, was the former director of 
the US Maritime Commission. David Livingstone Gordon, who acted as the expert on 
public facilities, authored in 1947 “The hidden weapon: the story of economic warfare”. 
Joseph L. White was a former member of the transport office at the US Defense 
Department. Espionage questions about the director of the Mission, Lauchlin Currie 
himself, who was not only linked to prominent circles in Washington but to the Soviet 
intelligence, have already been extensively documented. 168 Obviously, during the Cold 
War the concern about security was part of the agenda of multilateral organizations, 
but it was not openly included. One can see how the improvement of living standards 
                                                
165 I chose to focus on the Currie mission rather than Lebret, as it had more prominence at the 
time within the country, and there is a growing literature about it.  
166 Lauchlin Currie, Gordon Grayson, Haywood R. Faison, David L. Gordon, Richard A. 
Musgrave, Jacques Torfs, Frederick C. Gill, Joseph White, Carl W. Fleisher, Juan de Dios Ceballos, Jaime 
F. Cordoba, Roger V. Anderson, Juan Antonio Montoya, Wilford E. Johns, Joseph W. Mountin.  
167 One should note that some of the roles of the members within the mission are reported 
differently by sources. cf (Tijerina 2011), (Ibanez Najar 1990), (Meisel Roca 1990)  
168 Studies about Currie’s participation in Latin American politics have possible links as a source 
of Soviet intelligence, during his time in charge of the prolonged World Bank Mission in Colombia, after 
acting as White House Advisor. See more details in (Sandilands 2009), and (Andrew et al. 1999)  
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served diverse interests: some were national ambitions, and others were international 
anxieties.  
 
· Network of Airports 
Airport terminals were presented in official reports and the media as essential 
modern infrastructure that would service the country’s aviation industry. Arguably, 
Colombia developed the first commercial airline of the continent in the 1910s and, what 
is more, since 1945 Colombia had direct flights to the United States, France and 
Spain.169 Air transport constituted a rapid and economical alternative in a country with 
challenging geographical conditions. Additionally, there are two relevant facts: Rojas 
not only had a previous education himself as a civil engineer, but had also acted in 
1945 as head of the Aviation Department, which might also explain his particular desire 
to develop a nationwide network of airports. Once more, in the case of airports, as in 
other state projects developed by the dictatorship, the national media described these 
projects as necessary works of progress, while raising questions about their apparently 
random location.  
Indeed, the question of where to locate more than 20 air terminals was not 
clear-cut. In the mid-twentieth century Colombia was predominantly rural. Apart from 
Bogotá, the three major cities of Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla had less than 500,000 
inhabitants.170 These urban centres were encompassed along with middle-size cities, 
as well as an ambitious number of towns in more distant regions, including in the most 
violent areas and on the international borders, as is the case of the San Andres Islands 
in front of Nicaragua. (Piedrahita 1955)  
Internally there was only one public report by the Ministry of Public Works 
showing the network of airports at the national level. ([Colombian government] 1951-
1957) Documents from the Aviation Department itself have disappeared, so it is not 
known if there was ever a detailed aeronautical plan within the institution. What can be 
                                                
169 Flights of DC-6 and Constellations had to stopover either at Bahamas, or Azores islands to 
reach Europe. 
170 DANE census of 1951 reported in ACEP, La población de Colombia, Committee for 
International Coordination of National Research in Demography, 1974 
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done, given the extant documents, is to relate the report of the Ministry of Public Works 
to the cooperation documents from the US Civil Aviation Mission.  
Rojas introduced the network as part of the record of achievements in 1954, 
with a sudden and apparently illogical remark: “the multiple air terminals will 
conveniently develop tourism, which is the fundamental basis of national defence”. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, 90)  
The construction of Colombian air terminals received significant support from 
international cooperation through the US Civil Aviation Mission (Institute of Inter-
American Affaris. Administrative Office 1953), which was part of the Point Four 
Program. Interestingly, the locations of airports belonging to the national network 
coincide with the terminals of the Plan defined by the US War Department in 1945. (US 
Mutual Security Program 1951) For instance, in a recently declassified item of 
information, I have found data of the budget drawn up for the airport of Barranquilla, 
one of the priority locations to secure the Caribbean within the Continental defence 
plan.  
 
Figure 66. Civil airports development was a War department programme, and this 
map shows the priorities in the Caribbean zone © NARA 
Most information about how these projects were defined or commissioned is 
unclear. Registers in the media claimed Colombian architectural practices developed 
these projects. This is contradicted, however, by the official bodies representing 
architects and engineers in Colombia, who complained to the government about being 
excluded from these projects and requesting more participation. (Ramírez Nieto 2011) 
The annual reports of the Ministry of Public Works confirm that foreign firms were 
involved in the development of some terminals and runways ([Colombian government] 
1951-1957). Nevertheless, specific links between many projects and firms are difficult 
to trace because most of the contracts were in the names of individuals, rather than 
companies.  
Some Colombian professionals worked on designing runways and terminals, 
although not in the principal cities. This was the case of engineer-architect Hernando 
Velasco who had studied in France in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but Velasco 
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noted that most of the archives of his and others’ work on airports was burned in the 
fire of the Avianca building in Bogotá in 1972. (Téllez Castañeda 2013) 
Similarly, it is unclear how decisions were made about the location and design 
of projects; the beginning of their construction was sudden. Only a small percentage of 
these terminals were fully built and functioning by 1957, when the military government 
fell. As was reported in a special issue of Escala about the air terminals in Colombia 
("Aeropuertos"  1971), some of them were concluded years later according to the initial 
plans. The language and techniques on these projects contained constant references 
to similar terminals elsewhere.  
 
Figure 67. Blueprint of a Colombian airport: the journal compared it with 
contemporary international developments © ESCALA 
These built projects were rapidly incorporated into urban dynamics. The 
communities received them with satisfaction; one airport, the one in San Andres 
Islands, even still today bears the name of the dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. 
Functionally, they satisfied much needed transportation connections and, at the urban 
level, they defined areas of extension and development in the cities. Nevertheless, at 
this point, I will consider the national level only for the purposes of understanding the 
overall network. 
 Indeed, the network of airports ended up playing a key role at the national 
level, as it integrated more distant areas, thus assuring state presence and territorial 
control in isolated zones, even in small towns, where air traffic was practically non-
existent. Additionally, the network also aimed at a reconfiguration of air connections of 
the South of the continent. As is possible to see in this map from 1955, all the 
transatlantic flights began to be directed through US territory. In this sense, it might be 
important to pursue similar studies in other countries of the continent, tracing other air 
terminals, now that the information has been declassified.  
 
Figure 68. Image of Latin America routes reconfigured: Colombia as a hub, and 
intercontinental flights via the United States © DIPE 
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· Construction of cities 
However, the dictatorship – under the image of a “welfare state” – developed 
different projects from the ones expected also on an urban scale; for instance, they did 
not follow the Pilot Plan for the capital city, Bogotá, designed by Le Corbusier and 
complemented by Paul Lester Wiener and Joseph Louis Sert. The Pilot Plan proposed 
to raise urban density and redevelop the centre of the city. 
José Salazar Ferro (2007), perhaps one of the most prominent urban planners, 
a practitioner and a scholar, emphatically claims in a recent article, talking about the 
development of Bogotá at that time:  
[Urban and architectural] works of the so-called dictatorships of 
the mid-1950s in the city could be considered as a return to 
projects without a plan. Not “capricious” projects [...], but 
conceived individually in the city, however framed in the 
“National Plan of Public Works”. [Quotation marks in the original 
text] 
Following the method of Paul Jaskot (2001), who argues that there are 
connections between the image, materials and location of architectural projects of 
National Socialism in Germany, I located the highest budget projects built by this 
regime in Bogotá. Within these projects it is possible to identify a certain consistency, 
from which I would contend that they do not appear arbitrarily. 
 
Figure 69. Bogota military projects under construction in 1950s, shaped urban 
extension © LCB 
The buildings located in Bogotá correspond to the already mentioned National 
Administrative Centre, International financial centre, Military Hospital, Military 
Engineers’ Barracks, Cavalry Barracks, Artillery Barracks, and the Military social club. 
Despite being allocated higher budgets, these buildings were barely mentioned by the 
government; indeed, military facilities were not listed among the projects of the 
Data restriction
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National Plan of Public Works. Some of them are more often cited within professional 
circles because of the companies involved.171  
The lively controversy surrounding the National Administrative Centre in 
Bogotá, for example, concentrated all the attention on one particular project, but 
perhaps also distracted from the construction throughout the city of eight military 
installations in the same period.  
Even though these buildings were located in the suburbs of the city at that time, 
there is a regular placement creating a net of about 50 blocks, or approximately 5,000 
metres, from the centre towards the north and west - the city has mountains as natural 
borders, in the east and south. These projects were connected afterwards, and helped 
to define hierarchies in the road system of the city, reinforcing the integration of 
surrounding towns, and expanding the urban border of the city. As a consequence and 
in opposition to Le Corbusier's Pilot Plan, these projects helped to define the expansion 
of the city. 
 
 
4.4. Agency of the Plan 
The strategy of the National Plan of Public Works was quite complex, and 
operated for a long time. We have seen how, in the bigger picture, there were more 
continuities than disruptions. Perhaps the Plan was only a small piece in a larger 
machine. Despite the corruption and manipulation, by no means all of what it attempted 
was pernicious: equality, progress, autonomy, education, security, and legitimacy. 
Given the challenging conditions of Colombia, one can appreciate the enterprise 
undertaken. 
Through infrastructural projects, Piedrahita interprets the regime as the 
promoter of a national resurgence towards a better future under “wider criteria, more 
                                                
171 A clear example of projects that began before the regime, but which received a boost during 
that period is the Military hospital in Bogota. 
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logical, more technical, and more modern”. (Piedrahita 1955, 25) And the so-called 
National Plan of Public Works represented a suitable opportunity to reach 
“development possibilities and [a] national exaltation”, as the minister claimed. The 
issue here is that, despite the “not-deplorable” agency of the Plan, it neglected 
potential complications because of strategies implemented to avoid explicitly 
addressing the security concerns. 
 
· Charming civil buildings  
Making use of soft power strategies, the regime multiplied its efforts to build 
different projects, avoiding justifying or explaining the rationale for them. One example 
of this can be drawn from the CAN controversy.  
In its only public intervention into the controversy, the government put out a 
press release ("Centro Administrativo Oficial, Piedrahita interviewed"  1954) in which, 
instead of explaining the project of the CAN in terms of the security network created for 
the city, it adopted two tactics: on the one hand, presenting the logic of the location 
following on from former studies, i.e. Le Corbusier’s pilot plan, without giving much 
detail about it, and making reference to its “modern principles”; and on the other, 
alleging an almost natural social resistance to change. This press release, Piedrahita 
documented how some of the most advanced works in the city had attracted the 
opposition and resistance of the community by pointing to other relevant examples: the 
national park, and the campus of the Universidad Nacional, which were projects built 
by opposition parties in recent decades. He highlighted, however, how these projects 
had substantially changed the urban development and had benefited the city, noting at 
the end that the regime was prepared to accept criticism in the name of “resistance to 
change”. ("Centro Administrativo Oficial, Piedrahita interviewed"  1954) One can read 
this thus, as a “charm offensive” to minimize resistance while showcasing this project 
as a crucial one for the development not only of the city, but also of the country. 
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· Warfare as welfare operation 
In order to implement the military regime’s Plan, political strategies closely 
intertwined both soft power and psychological operations.172 Both General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla and Admiral Ruben Piedrahita Arango were well trained in such 
operations. Presumably, so were other high-ranking officials in the immediate circle as 
it is a prominent subject on their education. Therefore, to infer that the dictatorship was 
prone to use such tactics on the national level and to relate them to the core policy of 
the government seems reasonable. Entangled policies of welfare and warfare were 
materialized through the National Plan of Public Works. In other words, national and 
international concerns were simultaneously addressed. 
Nevertheless, concerns and priorities did not necessarily match. The military 
strategy of the “credible truth” of the National Plan of Public Works, that for the 
Colombian regime heavily focused on consolidating progress and reinforcing 
nationhood, equated warfare with welfare. Yet, as might be expected, for the United 
States, i.e. the main foreign guide and actor in the country, internal concerns about the 
processes of nationalism could be dismissed, as can be seen in the internal records: 
“Nationalism in Latin America is a demagogic, highly emotional pressure which is now 
being exploited by all political elements, including both extremes.” (CIA 1958) 
 
Figure 70. The CIA internal report on Socialism in Latin America illustrates how 
nationalism was seen by the US agency. ©CIA/FOIA 
The systematic reference Rojas and his regime made of their nation-building 
programme to the National Plan of Public Works made these state projects the engine 
of nationalism. In the document presented as the report of the first year in power, the 
DIPE claimed:  
[These state projects] originated from the deep will of the 
people, not as a political imposition or pressure. Otherwise, how 
many works could be inaugurated that would be worthless?  
                                                
172 As a military practice it is still in use. Recent references can be found in (Shlaifer 2011), (June 
2011), (Boyd 2007), (Kodosky 2007), (Osgood 2006) 
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They would be nothing but concrete, asphalt, or stone 
skeletons. (Piedrahita 1955) 
Nicola Miller (2008) identifies how the consolidation of modern national 
identities in the twentieth century in Latin America follows a complex process, in which 
popular concerns and anti-imperialist feeling become intertwined. This partially 
coincides with the US report already mentioned. Admittedly, as the scholar Anthony D. 
Smith (1998) warns, the US involvement in the region has generated some resistance, 
unevenness, or alienation. Thus, given the indisputable, but not always explicit, US 
involvement in some projects of the Plan, questions arise about how this might have 
conditioned its effectiveness. 
 
· Catalytic purpose of built environment 
Basing my argument on archival findings, I therefore contend that the National 
Plan of Public Works concretized a complex strategy: a “double truth”. The regime 
used different tactics of industrial camouflage (as will be discussed more explicitly in 
Chapter 6), psychological operations, and soft power. In other words, the National Plan 
of Public Works not only followed the principles of civil defence, but also created false 
fronts, and fragmented data. This obscurity of information about the Plan was intended 
to make it difficult to identify possible connections, or reasons for particular projects 
related to welfare as much as to warfare. As we will see, most of the time, objects 
appeared random and improvised. This was a double game of visibility and invisibility. 
In Colombia, camouflaging strategies in the built environment took place on different 
and complementary levels. Such is the case of the Naval College.  
Disseminating the ignorance about what the state agenda conveyed was part of 
the strategy. Drawn from tactics in use, one can synthesize that the National Plan of 
Public Works was used to accomplish different purposes. Most commonly, it was 
implemented to orientate a convenient interpretation of the phenomena. It also 
endorsed, or focused particular attention on, certain facts acting as decoys. It mediated 
in conflictive or sensitive issues. And lastly, information made public helped to catalyse 
social dynamics. In short, the manipulation of information was aimed at shaping 
processes of remembering, or forgetting, architectural and engineering projects. 
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Whilst the National Plan of Public Works did not explicitly exist, it was 
nevertheless a potent instrument of power. Indeed, it ensured that the four years of the 
Rojas dictatorship left a permanent imprint on Colombia’s built environment, but the 
overall significance of such a massive number of buildings has been downplayed. It is 
an overlooked and unloved legacy. We cannot reconstruct exactly the discussions and 
decisions that led to the construction of particular projects; however, it is clear that the 
programme broadly served Rojas’ and, by extension, American interests, both in terms 
of securing the regime’s power and improving the continent’s defensive capabilities.  
It brings to mind Bourdieu’s discussion of architecture’s often “complicitous 
silence” in the political legitimisation of agendas. Drawing on which, Dovey (2008) 
summarizes: “[T]he more structures and representations of power can be embedded 
in the framework of everyday life; the less questionable they become, and the more 
effectively they can work.”  
Undeniably, one cannot expect to have an exposed military strategy. Even 
more during the Cold War, this being a latent conflict rather than an explicit war, high 
levels of secrecy were required, not only in relation to what was perceived as opponent 
governments, but also in relation to its own civilians. Therefore, the public strategy 
changed as it was projected as an image of progressiveness. Camouflaging became a 
powerful resource for the Rojas regime. At the same time, the public discourse was 
oriented to nation-building and incorporation into the universal modern world. Silent 
strategies were necessary to assure the national and international agenda. 
In this sense, assuming that the “double truth” of an artefact aims to create a 
“mis-representation”, obscuring its understanding and making it conflictive to develop 
some identity with it, this raises questions as to the implications of such “mis-
representation”.  
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5. The Naval College  
The National Plan of Public Works covered infrastructural projects nationwide, by 
focusing on one prominent project in a middle-sized city the purpose is to test the 
national character of the Plan. Thus, in order to reach an architectural scale in this 
research, I have selected the Naval College “Almirante Padilla” in Cartagena de Indias 
as a case study. This architectural complex is a representative project of the National 
Plan of Public Works. Tellingly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, its model was the image on 
the catalogue cover of the exhibition of the regime’s plan, and it also occupies a 
prominent place at the show itself.  
Based on the historical information found, my claim is that this project represents 
the sum of different interests for the government, namely: the provision of modern 
facilities such as academic spaces; the configuration of the expansion zones of 
growing cities; and the strengthening of the territory’s security. My contention is that the 
rationale and conditions for developing such a complex are representative of both the 
dictatorship’s strategy and the reception of these projects in the architectural realm, for 
reasons that will become clearer through my analysis. 
 
5.1. Why build it? 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Colombia participated in the Korean War as a US 
ally (1950-1953). It was the first involvement of Colombia in an external international 
conflict. i.e. not related directly with the country. According to the naval historian 
Enrique Roman Bazurto (2005), after such involvement there was a sharp increase to 
the number of naval recruits in Colombia. In consequence the Naval Base “ARC 
Bolivar” became insufficient. Moreover, at the urban level, the location of this Naval 
Base on the outskirts of Cartagena’s colonial centre was considered inappropriate on 
account of the extension of new residential areas in Cartagena.173 Therefore, 
                                                
173 Although further studies of the urban development of Cartagena are a pending matter, there is 
a preliminary study about the immediate extension of the historic centre. See (Samudio Trallero 1999)  
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developing a new Naval College was in the interests of both the national174 and local 
governments. 
Cartagena is a middle-sized city, but is of remarkable historical relevance. The 
location of the city has been crucial to the control of the Caribbean Sea since the 
sixteenth century. Thus, the regime’s need to build a new Naval College proved an 
opportunity to produce an architectural object with outstanding characteristics, which in 
turn materializes the multiple and complicated politics of that time. 
 
· What is a Naval College?  
The institutional character of the project has relevant considerations. The Naval 
College Almirante Padilla is the academic institution of the Colombian Navy. The Navy 
was created in 1907175 (Grau Araujo 1968) and is highly regarded by the local 
community, i.e. of Cartagena. It is commonly associated with social and cultural 
events, rather than with security issues. Despite the Navy being the only force that 
actively participated in two international wars, it is either the Army or the Police that 
covers security at the national level, and who are thus associated with military control. 
The presence of the Navy, by contrast, gives rise to little resistance from the general 
public as its main role is outward-facing. 
 
Figure 71. Modern architectural complex © ENAP 
Initially the institution carried out training on board vessels, but from the 
beginning of the twentieth century a constant growth in the number of recruits176 made 
it necessary to have suitable installations. Historically, the actual demands of 
enrolment have exceeded institutional estimations, creating a permanent shortage of 
capacity. The first site was the Naval Base built, in the outskirts of the downtown, with 
                                                
174 The institutional history of the Colombian Navy has been the subject of study by former 
officials, such as (Roman Bazurto 1997), (Grau Araujo 1968).  
175 The Naval College was initially created by decree 783 July 6th, 1907. It was closed on 
December 28th, 1909, and opened again after the War with Peru in 1935 
176 There were two events that impacted the institution, making it more visible and attractive to 
enrol in: first, the Colombian war with Peru (1932-1933), and then the Colombian participation in the 
Korean War. 
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the support of the British Royal Navy in 1935.177 (Roman Bazurto 1997) Due to 
restrictions of space, this was more a military base than an academic centre. Yet most 
of the training was carried out there. Soon after the construction of that site, it became 
insufficient to cover the population and programme, and moreover it defined a sharp 
border between the downtown and new residential areas.  
 
Figure 72. Saturated space at the old naval college (1935) in the outskirts of the 
historic centre, which image resembles colonial features © Corredera magazine 
The Navy’s academic curriculum ([ENAP] [1953]) states that it aims to achieve 
a balance between technical, physical, and tactical instruction in a confined site. 
Discipline and hierarchy are crucial elements. At the time there were two career paths: 
maritime administration, and naval sciences.178 Thus the College is both a military site, 
and an academic centre, which each require suitable spaces. This dual character 
makes the Naval College even more significant for the purposes of this research. 
The perception of the institution informs the interpretation of the architectural 
complex, which is also telling about the relevance of the project for the regime. The 
Rojas dictatorship invested efforts in a prominent architectural project for a war 
command with a high level of social acceptance. Indeed, the Navy, as an institution, 
has been part of Cartagena’s identity; contrary to its previous site, the new architectural 
complex is – still today – widely regarded as an academic centre, rather than as a 
military base. 
 
· What information is available? 
The architectural project of the Naval College is a significant piece of 
architecture, probably one of the most outstanding examples of modern Colombian 
architecture. At the same time, it is one of the least known. This is paradoxical, as it is 
                                                
177 Since its beginning and until 1950s, the Navy received strong support to define the formation 
and all the parameters of a military career from the British Royal Navy. The structure and academic 
programme of studies follows the British model. 
178 Later on other academic programmes were added such as naval engineering and 
oceanography. 
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definitely a clear presence of the state, and a permanent point of reference for the 
inhabitants of Cartagena. At this point a set of elements for consideration will be 
introduced and subsequently developed. 
The architectural complex of the Naval College was the only state project of the 
military government reported on in Proa. (Martínez 1955) Not only the outstanding 
qualities of the architectural project might explain this inclusion. The friendship between 
the editor and Rafael Obregón, the chief designer of the project, may have been 
decisive in the case of that publication.  
 
Figure 73. Along with pointing out the critical condition of urban growth, this issue 
highlights the architectural qualities of the ENAP project in Cartagena © Proa 
Despite its selection in Proa, and its powerful presence in Cartagena, the Naval 
College has been barely mentioned in the later historiography of architecture in 
Colombia or Latin America. Exceptionally there are comments acknowledging the 
existence of the project, but no study or analysis of it.179 For instance, though the 
architectural historian Carlos Nino’s study about the Ministry of Public Works mentions 
the exhibition of the National Plan of Public Works, it does not mention the Naval 
College. (Niño Murcia 1991) It analyses other state projects, but even when listing 
academic or military works, the Naval College is omitted. This is also the case with 
other architectural histories.180 There is, however, one short reference in the publication 
by Eduardo Samper,181 which is an effort to revalidate the “golden era”.  
Rafael and José Maria Obregón design (sic) the Naval Base 
(sic) in Cartagena, an enormous urban complex closed to the 
public. The layout is organized through covered corridors 
intertwining geometrically building volumes, in order to have a 
correct orientation and separation among them, aiming to have 
optimal ventilation and visibility. (Samper Martínez 2000, 99) 
                                                
179 cf (Téllez Castañeda 1998), (Silvia Arango 1989) 
180 cf (Saldarriaga Roa 1986), (Corradine Angulo et al. 2001) 
181 Eduardo Samper Martínez is a son of Germán Samper Gnecco, architect at the time, and one 
of the possible participants in the project. 
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Despite the short reference to the existence of the Naval College, Samper 
includes one photograph of the College by the experienced architectural photographer 
Paul Beer. The inclusion of Beer’s picture opens a lead to some information. Between 
the 1940s and 1970s, this German photographer182 was regularly commissioned both 
by architectural practices and by the government, to record its most outstanding 
projects.183 
At this point it is clear that the Naval College is a compelling object of study. 
The absence of data about it in the architectural history, and the traces found in the 
scarce references, makes it both challenging and valuable as a case study. In addition, 
I have found alternative sources for this research.  
Information from the Ministry of Public Works collects some of the reports 
presented to the Congress annually, and the material of the ministry in the National 
Archives mentions only administrative and financial aspects that cannot be related to 
the project, which may explain its absence from Nino’s study.184 However, I have 
interviewed people who were linked with the Ministry of Public Works (or their 
relatives), and officials who were active the Navy at that time; scholars concerned in 
related subjects; senior architects including one of the College’s designers, and other 
members of the architectural practice that designed it. Moreover, with the authorization 
of the General Command of the Navy, I have been on five occasions on site,185 and 
consulted the internal archives of the Naval College related to its architecture. Through 
the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, this research obtained access to the original 
blueprints of the project that are in Bogotá’s historical archive. Information that was 
complemented with data from the city archives, and from former users of the Naval 
College. i.e. pictures of families living there in the 1960s.  
                                                
182 Paul Beer (1904-1976) was born in Regensburg (Germany) and migrated to Colombia in 
1923, where he became in the mid-twentieth century one of the most prominent photographers of ethnic 
groups and modern architecture. 
183 Without specific dates Germán Téllez mentioned a previous visit to the Naval College of the 
photographer Ezra Stoller, who might have been commissioned by the Rockefeller foundation or the 
Museum of Modern Art. However, these images have not been published so far. And in the case of Stoller, 
there is no reference to the existence of those images, but there are Stoller photos in O&V archives of 
other projects designed by the same practice . 
184 It is possible that the General Command of the Navy had also some material. However, the 
Academia de Historia Naval [Naval History Academy] holds its historical information, and I was not granted 
access to this material. 
185 I have done field work at the Naval College on 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013, and in one 
of them I stayed living on site for 15 days  
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Figure 74. ENAP classrooms: the complex’s educational role seems prominent, 
2008 © MPSB 
 
 
5.2. Significance of the project 
In the context of what we now know about the National Plan of Public Works, 
the Naval College has also a particular relevance. Its duality as both academic campus 
and military base presents an opportunity to analyse how its construction and design 
process took place, to consider the project itself as architectural and urban object, and 
its historical interpretation. The idea, then, is to think about the scale of the city and the 
College as part of a wider strategy in the context of the Cold War.  
For reasons that will be detailed in this Chapter, in my opinion, the Naval 
College was one of the most relevant and ambitious projects undertaken by the 
regime. It is a modern architectural complex located in Cartagena de Indias, the 
paramount colonial city of Colombia. It was developed in a terrain of 163 hectares 
(1,63km2) and its initial project had more than 100,000m2 designed, which establishes 
the magnitude of the enterprise. The project was designed by the architectural practice 
Obregón & Valenzuela – identified here as O&V – a rather young and inexperienced 
firm at that time. Let us then explore the city as a first approach in moving towards its 
buildings.  
 
· Cartagena in the Caribbean 
The project was a priority for the military government. Admittedly the fact that 
the Minister of Public Works was a Navy official may have influenced the significance 
of this project, but I will consider other aspects. Whilst discussions about urban 
development at the national level were relevant, other historical aspects are significant 
for this research: namely, the location of Colombia in the Caribbean Sea. Although 
there is no data that directly addresses this issue, from information already discussed 
about the concerns of the Western Hemisphere over the security of the Caribbean, 
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along with the extended military cooperation Colombia was receiving, one can assume 
its strategic location was considered.  
The Caribbean coast represents a particular feature both to Colombia and to 
the continent. Historically, Cartagena de Indias has been a major port in the area since 
the sixteenth century.(Lemaitre et al. 1983) In addition, geographically, and due to the 
maritime currents, Cartagena has advantages over other cities on the coast in terms of 
navigability and proximity. As can be seen from the map its location is an accessible 
point within the Caribbean area. Therefore, the strategic location of Cartagena allows 
complementary control of the core of the Caribbean. For instance, there is a distance 
of 450km to the Panamá Canal, less than 1,000km to Nicaragua, and 1,000km to 
Cuba.  
 
Figure 75. Location of ENAP in Caribbean Sea © World Geographic (modified) 
The city has a prominent and extended colonial architecture in particular the 
complex formed by fortresses and 12km of defence walls, that continue underwater in 
the entrances to the internal bay. A masterpiece of Spanish fortification, not only the 
largest but also the most secure in the area, it successfully repelled the attacks to 
which the city was subject as the collection point for treasures sent to the crown. This 
colonial defence system has become the identifying feature of Cartagena, which is 
commonly understood as the old walled city; it has been protected as National Heritage 
since 1959, and was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1984. 
 
Figure 76. Cartagena’s representative images: Colonial fortress and historic centre 
2008 © Juan Marulanda/ MPSB 
The Naval College is a key referent of the city for its inhabitants. Officials 
wearing pristine uniforms are part of the city’s daily life, and their associated locations 
are distributed over the urban area. However, none of these installations defines a 
landmark. They became practically invisible in the daily life and to the not informed 
ones. These sites have been integrated into the urban pattern, leaving predominance 
to colonial structures.  
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· Urbanizing extension areas 
The urban context denotes some particularities for this project. The Naval 
College Almirante Padilla was built on an island that closes the internal bay of 
Cartagena from the south and where there remained traces of an ancient colonial 
fortress from the eighteenth century called San Juan de Manzanillo.186 The surrounding 
area was an incipient urban extension towards what was then the new petrochemical 
industrial area in the southeast; the Naval College is also near to the commercial 
harbour of the city that was increasing its activity, and its surroundings were rapidly 
becoming dilapidated sectors. In the internal bay, there is also direct access to the 
coast through this island. 
After the excitement generated by Charles A. Lindberg’s landing in Cartagena 
in 1930, the “Colombo-German Society of Air Transport - SCADTA” inaugurated an 
alternative airport on Manzanillo’s island which, despite its strategic location, had 
remained empty; this airport basically assured the occupation of the land. 
In addition to the overcrowding in the Base ARC Bolivar, (Roman Bazurto 2005; 
Samudio Trallero 1999) as we have seen the 1940s and 1950s were active decades of 
urbanization in Colombia, and as a consequence there was a desire to develop 
planning regulations. Since the Master Urban Plan of Cartagena of 1948, the location 
of this Naval Base was considered inappropriate due to its proximity to the colonial 
centre and residential areas. However, it characterized the city as “a principal harbour, 
rail network terminal, commercial and tourism centre, city of the Navy base, and 
Olympics [games] city”. [My emphasis] (Gonzales Concha 1948) 
After several years of lethargic development, Cartagena began receiving 
private investment from petrochemical companies,187 which allowed the development 
of a new industrial area called Mamonal, and the activation of its commercial harbour. 
The process of internal migration that was common all around the country at that time 
found then an attraction pole in this south-eastern area of the city. The road that 
                                                
186 The remaining parts of this fortress were restored and integrated into the “Casa de Huespedes 
Ilustres”, i.e. the official residence given to guests of state by invitation of the president of Colombia. 
Designed in 1978-1982 by the architect Rogelio Salmona with the cooperation of the architectural historian 
Germán Téllez. 
187 See detailed information in (Sáenz Rovner 2002) 
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connected both sectors provided an opportunity for the growth and consolidation of 
linear informal settlements, thereby creating a deteriorated urban area. (Giaimo 1999) 
As the urban development plan of Cartagena of 1948 shows, there were 
discussions relating to the need for relocating the Naval College. In this case, the local 
and national government considered two options: the first was to move the institution to 
Tierra Bomba Island, the second to move it to Manzanillo Island.  
 
Figure 77. Aerial picture before urban development, 1954 © IGAC 
Considerations concerning both options were discussed to the point where 
there seemed to be no agreement. The main argument in favour of the first alternative 
of relocating to Tierra Bomba Island was its tactical location closing up the external bay 
of Cartagena; it also had a bigger terrain that would allow for the full relocation of the 
institution. (Gonzales Concha 1948) However, the principal concern about this location 
was its lack of connection with the city, and the inconvenience of the total isolation of 
its community, as it would take more than 40 minutes by boat to reach the mainland; in 
other words, it had weak transport links and poor provision. In the case of Manzanillo 
Island in the internal bay, the arguments were less polemical. The land was 
independent, but provided access in fewer than 15 minutes to any point of the urban 
centre and extension urban areas. However, the size of the terrain was regarded as 
limiting.  
Endless discussions in the local administration led to suggestions to relocate 
the Navy to Barranquilla,188 which generated a negative reaction from the community 
supporting the permanence of the institution as an emblem of Cartagena. (Lemaitre et 
al. 1983) 
 
Figure 78. Mass support for the ENAP to remain in Cartagena ©FHC 
These preceding discussions are fundamental to understanding the location of 
the new Naval College on Manzanillo Island. Yet there is no clear information about the 
                                                
188 The Navy opened simultaneously other training centre for low rank marines in Barranquilla. 
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institutional, or governmental, considerations by Rojas regime for the final decision on 
c.1955 of the Naval College being built on Manzanillo Island – an abandoned coralline 
formation, visible from most urban areas of the city.  
 
· Geographic location  
As a consequence of the decision in favour of Manzanillo Island, the Navy 
redefined its strategy to assure its presence at different points of the bay – as shown in 
the aerial view. The location of remaining parts of colonial fortresses seems to be 
retaken; presumably the Navy drew on a strategy that had proved to be successful in 
protecting the city in earlier centuries.189  
 
Figure 79. Location of sixteenth century fortresses in Cartagena’s bay © IGAC 
(modified)  
In line with such a strategy, the military base ARC Bolivar remains in the same 
location in the external area of the wall of the colonial city. Tierra Bomba Island holds a 
post of control. The terrain in Castillo Grande was designated for the Naval social club. 
And the Naval College was relocated to Manzanillo Island, the first of these three 
projects to be developed.  
 
Figure 80. Navy sites in Cartagena in 1974: keeping the same locations of the 
colonial fortresses  © IGAC (modified) 
The island is separated from the continental land by the Caño de Gracia, which 
physically allows total independence and strategic control of the area. There is only 
one link point, a bridge to the mainland, which is in turn immediately connected to one 
main road to the central areas of the city. By sea, the distance to other lands reinforces 
its isolation and control over them. The director of the Naval College in 2009, Admiral 
Luis Alberto Ordoñez Rubio (2009), asserted in an interview we held during one of my 
                                                
189 Further information about Cartagena’s colonial fortress, walls and the complex of monuments 
can be found in (Lemaitre et al. 1983), (Lemaitre 1993) 
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site visits, that Manzanillo represents a strategic location, due to the possibility of 
physical displacement by water to other land in the bay in 15 minutes. Moreover, due 
to the visual monitor over movements in the bay, the military institution is allowed 20 
additional minutes of preparation time; in addition to the support provided by the Naval 
Club just in the front peninsula.  
 
 
5.3. The original drawings and plans from the 
1950s.  
I first had contact with the original blueprints after they were donated by the 
architectural practice O&V to the Archivo de Bogotá (Bogotá’s archives) c. 2007.190 
Though the Naval College was not set in the capital city, the firm had been based there 
since its creation, and most projects of this architectural practice were built in Bogotá. 
Consequently, the capital’s archives were keen to take on the material that included 
some projects built in different regions of the country, and in Venezuela. The archives 
hold what is probably the most complete set of blueprints for this project, including 
different phases of the design from 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1958.  
 
Figure 81. O&V label of Naval College blueprints showing different years, and 
people involved © AB 
The range of blueprints covers the urban plan, and architectural plans, façades, 
sections, technical details, sketches, and perspectives. The plans drawn in pencil 
follow all the standards of the time. The quality of the drawings is remarkable, as it 
emphasizes different intensities and gradations. Perspectives are drawn in pencil, and 
additionally with ink, and markers. The representation of this project is similar to any 
other of the firm at that time. 
                                                
190 Rafael Obregón Herrera – the son of Rafael Obregón and General Manager of the building 
company that continued the legacy of the O&V – donated some of the material of the projects designed by 
them.  
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The architect Edgar Bueno (2009), whose sketches are among the most 
successful from that time, mentions how the perspectives and drawings of this project 
follow the usual patterns of O&V. Thus there were no special requirements in terms of 
communication regarding the project. The graphic representation of the complex was 
produced under similar conditions to that of any other private project of this practice. 
This is of particular significance as these images of an academic campus and military 
site have been in the public domain since its construction. 
A particular element of interest is the image of the model of the complex. The 
model was essential to communicate a new spatiality to people who were familiar with 
other forms of habitat. Perspectives provide additional readability for new projects, and 
therefore they were preferred over plans or other technical documentation. As the 
regime made an effort to present its achievements to the community, it was common to 
present architectural projects through models and perspectives. In the case of the 
ENAP, this model became a sort of official image of the project. It appears in at least 
three different publications, all of them with very different audiences. In addition to Proa 
journal, the project was presented by the model in: the Corredera, the internal journal 
of the Naval College; Cromos, a weekly national magazine addressed to the upper 
middle classes; and in the local newspaper of Cartagena, El Universal. 
 
Figure 82. Different covers using the same image© ENAP / Corredera Magazine / 
Proa  
The model itself was a central element in the exhibition of the National Plan of 
Public Works in 1954. Due to its size, it is highly unlikely that it travelled with the 
exhibition. On the contrary, Captain Ramírez García (2009), a retired official, reports: 
“the model remained since the beginning, and for several years, in the Naval College, 
usually at the entrance of the administrative building”. Over time, the model served to 
show to the internal community transformations and additions to the original plan. 
Unfortunately, it was removed from the administrative hall in c.2004, and cannot now 
be located. 
 
Figure 83. Picture of the original model featuring the proposal of later additions (the 
initial project in white) c. 1970 © ENAP 
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In addition, the Naval College has recently found a design brochure for the 
project, (O&V [1955]) and a set of construction blueprints dating from 1956. The former 
have explanatory drawings of the architectural complex. The latter are heliographic 
copies, some of them with site notes that seem to have different dates, and they show 
some of the adaptations that were necessary during the construction of the first phase.  
 
Figure 84. Image O&V Brochure for ENAP project: perspectives without reference 
to the military character of the complex ©ENAP 
It is possible to see from them how some decisions were taken on site, 
maintaining the general plan. It is very probable that these changes were made by the 
Navy, and not by O&V. These have also been the basic plans for transformations 
made directly by the Navy in the following decades on some buildings. None of the 
interviewees has referenced any consultation with the original designers about these 
changes. (Tapia 2010);(Lemaitre 2009);(Ceballos 2009a) It can therefore be assumed 
that, after the initial design, the architectural practice O&V had little if any input into the 
evolution of the architectural complex. 
 
Figure 85. Construction blueprints of the cadets’ dining room © ENAP 
Remarkably, in the unit logbook for October 30th, 1964 there is an annotation 
about the denomination of the buildings within the project. ([ENAP] 1964) Instead of the 
function assigned to each building, they were identified by the name of a representative 
official relevant to the history of the Colombian Navy, and became official after that 
date. This means that buildings are no longer identified by their functions; these names 
have been incorporated and are still in use today.  
 
Figure 86. Annotation in the ENAP logbook about denomination of buildings © 
ENAP 
Comparing the original sets of drawings with the latest ones reveal changes 
that may have initially been related to adjustments to accomplish diverse activities that 
were considered after the first proposal. Perhaps the most visible of these is the area 
allocated to create a residential zone, namely Manzanillo neighbourhood, in the 
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general plan. Other changes are related to the definition of phases of execution. 
Although these changes were relevant to the conditions of the complex, they did not 
alter the architectural parti of the project. 
On the following sets of plans it is visible how the main area of education and 
accommodation for “one thousand five hundred cadets”, officials, and inferior warrant 
officers was prioritized. Indeed, in 1955 the Navy defined the construction of the project 
in two reported phases.191 Proa mentions the allocated budget “for the first phase is 
four million pesos”. (Martínez 1955) That is, the initial allocation of resources did not 
correspond with the budget: it was insufficient. In this respect, Rafael Bueno (2009), 
one of the architects who participated as a junior, remarks, “the project exceeded the 
expectations, and the budget, of the Navy”; it was therefore necessary to reduce the 
construction area, by introducing new functions into buildings that originally had only a 
single function. As a matter of fact, the construction was initiated with the area 
identified as the heart of the complex with the buildings originally defined as: technical 
classrooms, dining room, “cameras”,192 and cadets’ accommodation. (Ceballos 2009b)  
 
Figure 87. Spread sheet of the programme, areas, phases, and values © AB 
According to Proa, the total cost of the complex was estimated as “twenty 
million pesos”193 and it was foreseen that the construction would be finished in five 
years. Martínez enthusiastically comments: “if in fifteen years or so, due to the growth 
of the country, there is higher demand for war or merchant officials, then the 
extensions anticipated in these blueprints will be developed”. (Martínez 1955) 
The construction of these buildings at the core of the complex ensures the 
general plan is preserved. The decision about phases is strategic in a project of such 
magnitude. None of the interviewees participated in the decisions made, but they were 
part of the following steps. However, it is possible to identify that the priority was to 
                                                
191 Reported in La Corredera, ("[Editorial] Nuestra portada"  1955) but in the discrimination of 
cost, O&V identifies three or even four phases. (Obregon & Valenzuela - O&V 1954-1961) 
192 “Camera” denotes the social space for officials or cadets. i.e. entertainment, and socializing. 
193 O&V documented the amount in building budget $17.124.875 with an additional cost of the 
project cost $481.307 
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maintain the overall layout of the project. In that sense, the selection of the central 
area, identified as the academic zone, is understandable.  
 
Figure 88. Aerial view of first ENAP buildings proves the difficulty of identifying the 
conformation of buildings © ENAP 
After the start of the construction there were technical difficulties that had not 
been contemplated in this project’s fast track.194 Rafael Bueno, a junior architect of the 
firm, reports “the project was severely delayed”. (Bueno 2009) This signifies that the 
plan was affected in terms of budget and time. It also explains some alterations to the 
designs. Although, the construction of the first phase had initially been foreseen as 
taking one year, took more than two years. At the time the dictatorship fell, this initial 
phase was suspended. This meant that the already limited resources were frozen, as 
happened with all the works in progress at the time.  
A Captain at the time, Admiral Orlando Lemaitre (2009), who was assigned as 
Director of the Naval College in 1959, observes in one of the interviews held, “at that 
time, Manzanillo construction work was abandoned, buildings were just on the cladding 
process”. The Navy under the command of Admiral Jaime Eraso Annexi195 (1916-2010) 
agreed to resume work on the new college, but resources were limited. 
Therefore, with the aim of continuing the construction, and making use of the 
available installations, in 1959 Lemaitre contacted Rafael Obregón to adjust the 
proposal to the current requirements. 196 As a consequence, interior transformations 
were carried out on those buildings that had been constructed, in order to allocate to 
them the necessary functions for moving the Naval College to this site. This changed 
the configuration of functions and the clarity of the programme but, as most of the 
interiors had been conceived as free plans, it was relatively simple to adapt the 
interiors for new uses. In order to assure a rapid finalization, Lemaitre hired architect 
                                                
194 These technical aspects of the construction will be explained later on. 
195 Also spelled Eraso-Annexy once moved permanently to the United States  
196 It would be worth to note that 1958 is the year registered in an additional set of blueprints, with 
some changes, mainly, in the use of the same spaces. 
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William Ceballos, a former cadet, as field architect,197 who stresses, “changes were just 
in the interior”. In our interviews, he has insisted the idea of the navy was to be as 
faithful as possible to the original project, but some changes were necessary to make 
the project functional according to changes and new demands of the institution. 
(Ceballos 2009b, 2009a) Despite this persistence on the affirmation that buildings were 
not modified, I have found minor discrepancies between blueprints and pictures of that 
time. Manzanillo Island was occupied from March 27th, 1961, when the director of the 
college Admiral Lemaitre ordered the move.  
 
· New language 
The Naval College layout seems relatively familiar to any person who has had 
some contact with modern architectural complexes. The College was organized 
following elements in common with other similar projects built elsewhere during the 
same period.198 The campus creates an orthogonal composition that follows a systemic 
organisation of regular elements. It is a neat geometrical composition based on 
modulation and assemblage of components of the programme.  
 
Figure 89. Naval College work sketches looking for solutions of the programme, 
O&V © AB 
The self-contained complex of the Naval College was intended to fulfil its own 
needs, reducing the dependency on other sectors of the city. The logbook of the 
military unit quotes “the project will be allocated 1,500 cadets”. ([ENAP] 1946-1976) 
Although the note stresses an estimated number of cadets, it is worth mentioning that 
references to the institutional hierarchy of naval officer ranks are omitted in the 
description of the project. Yet, implicitly, it was highly influential to the design, and in 
the definition of the development of the construction. 
                                                
197 After his years as a cadet at the ENAP. Ceballos was trained as an architect at the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia. This architect worked as facilities manager of the Naval College for 
more than 20 years. 
198 At the time the Naval Colleges of other Latin American countries were built, as well as other 
military schools, such as Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. However a comparative study is yet to be done. 
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Figure 90. Naval College, first version of the urban plan: note the change on the 
morphology of the terrain, and a completely different layout, O&V, 1955-1961 © 
AB 
For the purposes of this construction a modification of the terrain was 
implemented. Though, one of the initial drafts of the project explored that, on the aerial 
pictures it is possible to see that its morphology or extension did not change. (IGAC 
1942, 1954, 1968, 1977) Nevertheless, architects involved with the project, Tapia and 
Ceballos, both agree, mentioning in their interviews: “it [the terrain] was elevated 1.10 
metres”. (Tapia 2010; Ceballos 2009b) In their view, this elevation was one of the 
technical achievements of the complex. Due to the integration of traditional and 
contemporary techniques, this elevation was prepared with the use of pilotis embedded 
in the terrain made of a local wood called mangrove,199 and conformed by fitting 
together and tamping down seashells. This elevation over the high-tide sea level 
creates a flat terrain, and protects the island from inundations.  
However successful, the elevation of the terrain generated some problems in 
the structure of the new constructions. Ceballos (2009b) claims “the terrain was not 
stable enough to resist the weight of the new structures”. This therefore caused delays 
in the construction, and it was necessary to provide reinforcements to the structure, 
which are still visible.  
 
Figure 91. Naval College, approved general plan O&V, 1955-1961 © AB 
At first sight it is readable from the general plan that the Naval College is a 
complex programme. Buildings are distributed in different sectors engaging the totality 
of the island. Some expansions were contemplated from the beginning as part of the 
repetitive elements, or as objects playing within the lines of the composition. There is 
no space left for later developments beyond the ones already included in the 
programme. From the project it is possible to conclude that the island has just enough 
space to contain the Navy’s anticipated needs. 
                                                
199 A hydro plant that grows on the Caribbean coastal areas.  
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On the urban level, the Naval College works as a satellite area of the main city. 
Within the island it responds to the architectural programme required for the military 
institution at that moment, in a built area of 104,938m2. From the blueprints of the 
original project it is possible to read that there is a rigorous composition based on 
straight lines and right angles, on what one of the architects who participated in the 
design, Hernando Tapia, calls a “green base”, i.e. a predominance of the void terrain. 
(Tapia 2010) Since the original layout in the set of blueprints of 1955, (Obregon & 
Valenzuela - O&V 1954-1961) the order of the complex is defined from two axes.200  
The complex gives particular prominence to the parade camp, conceived as a 
central square, a rigid surface of massive proportions without elements of shadow or 
landmarks. There is a clear zoning of the compound by five different areas of 
assembled buildings. This zoning is reported in Proa as four areas with similar 
proportions: administration; instruction and dormitories; sports; services and support 
personnel. Each area, in turn, follows the institutional hierarchy, divided into spaces for 
officials, cadets, and recruits.  
However, there is a change in the proportion and disposition of areas, mainly 
due to the introduction in the north sector of housing for officials. Along with these 
minor changes, I found constant the increasing priority given to areas for instruction 
and officials. Areas related to military requirements are not apparent. 
Within the general organization of the Naval College layout, and the division 
into zones, there are groups of buildings that respond to the complex programme, each 
group composed by pure volumes. Here I will introduce the original plan of 1955: the 
administration zone (19,143m2) is integrated in the north, it is an area of administrative 
offices and dormitories in two pavilions raised off the ground on pilotis, linked through 
social areas called “cameras” for flag rank and commissioned officials, the prominent 
image of this volume being the sequence of concrete vaults. It also includes an 
additional subgroup with such services as theatre, library, and chapel, which are pure 
geometric solids integrated through organic-shaped gardens. Finally there is the clinic 
                                                
200 One of which was the former runway of the pre-existing airport, but it has not been possible to 
establish which. 
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as an independent building compound formed by two introverted201 volumes linked by a 
passageway.  
 
Figure 92. Buildings interconnected: transition on interior and exterior spaces 
©MPSB 
In the central area (52,401m2), there is another group of buildings that follows a 
similar organization to that of the first subgroup mentioned, and also reinforces the 
horizontality of all the objects. This is the zone for dormitories for cadets and recruits, 
and comprises two prism pavilions, one for cadets, and the other for recruits, of four 
levels elevated on pilotis with a free ground floor. Despite these being the largest 
volumes, the proportion and disposition of the freestanding objects generate an 
impression of transparency and lightness. These two buildings are connected through 
one volume of cameras for cadets that once more is the only element on the ground, 
with a sequence of vaults.  
 
Figure 93. Volume of the dormitories in the 1960s, and 2010: preserving main 
features but the free ground floor © Corredera magazine / MPSB 
This area also has two additional subgroups: a series of four pavilions for 
classrooms and laboratories, with workshops and an armoury at the back, which 
volumes again appear elevated as the closed areas on the ground floor are only the 
services for the upper levels. In addition, the prominent element on the façade is an 
elevated passageway that serves as an atrium providing shade for the parades. This 
liminal space is a prominent feature of this set of buildings.  
 
Figure 94. Officials’ assembly in front of the class rooms © ENAP  
And finally there is a set of what appears as a double volume for dining rooms 
for cadets and recruits, and its service areas. These again are two introverted buildings 
with perhaps the most rhythmic facades of the complex. 
                                                
201 Their exteriors are close walls, but their spaces are open and connected to an interior garden. 
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Figure 95. Dining room elevations © Proa 91 
The area of physical training (5.150m2) occupies the south of Manzanillo. This 
area provides: a gym, pool, shooting range, and volleyball, basketball, football, and 
baseball fields. Interestingly it also includes a Naval museum; as an element of 
transition with the centre, this building exemplifies the dissolution of boundaries 
generated by a glass wall that integrates the interior and exterior space. 
 
Figure 96. Gym perspective © Proa 91 
On the east, in addition to three buildings for access control, there is the sector 
associated with support personnel, i.e. warrant and petty officers (28,244m2). This area 
is self-contained as it has dormitories, camera, gym, theatre, laundry for the use of 
lower ranks, or service members of the institution. However, this sector had the most 
reduced spaces, and is least developed in the design.  
Despite the oral testimony presented here, I have found no information about 
the residential area proposed on the north. Admiral Lemaitre argues that “[he] thought 
the College was far away from the [residential areas of the] city, [therefore] it was 
better to provide some basic houses for officials and their families”. (Lemaitre 2010) 
William Ceballos, as field architect of the Naval College, claims that he designed the 
house type that was later used in the creation of Manzanillo neighbourhood. He also 
mentions how this design was approved by Obregón, and impacted on Ceballo’s later 
projects. (Ceballos 2009a) 
There are common elements in the organization of the volumes according to a 
rigorous geometry. Areas of circulation and shade are essential in every part of the 
complex. Most buildings, being prism volumes elevated on pilotis, have a free ground 
floor generating continuities in circulation, and shade. This was one of the first areas 
where changes were pursued, as it was unusual to have this excess of free areas in 
buildings without an evident use.  
 Within these buildings, the formal language identifies internal functions through 
different roof solutions, use of diverse wall types, transition spaces, and structural 
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elements. In each case, composition lines, and equilibrium of the masses, are evident 
in the volume. In other words, from the general plan to brise-soleils there is a rigorous 
geometric disposition that gives formal unity to the complex.  
The project had additional difficulties during the construction. As a consequence 
the Navy ended up defining different phases from the ones originally proposed by 
O&V. Those changes required numerous modifications in the function assigned to the 
interiors. Most of these changes were seen as temporary, therefore a minimal 
intervention was expected. Negotiation and a continuous exchange between officials 
and designers that were necessary to set the premises of the project not longer 
occurred. As a consequence, the layout of the general plan was a priority in the 
construction, and during the dictatorship the works for the five (out of seven) main 
groups of buildings were initiated. 
 
Figure 97.  Aerial view of the first group of buildings. © Corredera 38 
As mentioned previously, the construction of the first phase had several delays 
due to technical issues. With the dictatorship's fall, construction was suspended for 
about two years. The next government resumed work in order to complete the 
buildings that had been initiated.  
 
Figure 98. ENAP in 1959, during the period construction works were suspended © 
SAMPER/BEER 
There is no massive building. Indeed, even though Manzanillo Island is visible 
from almost the whole of the urban areas of Cartagena, the landscape has no 
prominent features. The general perception of the built environment of the island is the 
predominance of emptiness and openness. There are clear and smooth transitions in 
the components of volumes, generating harmony among the elements of the complex, 
bringing scale and protection.  
Another notable aspect is the management of roofs, which complement the 
identity of each function in the complex, facilitating the social reference. These utilize 
the possibilities of concrete as flat terraces, structural tiled beams, or curved 
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membranes. In each case, they are evident in the volume as lines in the composition, 
bringing equilibrium with the masses of different textures. 
 
· Technical innovation and tradition 
The technical considerations of the project fulfil two main aspects: the 
adaptation to the climatic conditions in which it is located, and the incorporation of new 
materials and techniques. On the one hand, the Caribbean island, with its humidity, 
high temperatures all year around and constant winds, defines another particularity of 
the project. Therefore the disposition of volumes accords with the solar exposure, 
reducing surfaces with direct exposure to the sun’s rays, the openings and voids of 
façades dissolve their boundaries allowing cross-flows in the interiors, and reducing 
temperatures inside. On the other hand, all the constructions presented an opportunity 
to experiment with technologies: they were planned in reinforced concrete, using both 
the most advanced techniques of the time and contemporary adaptations of traditional 
ones. The structure of the porticos permits not only the adaptation to a coralline soil, 
but the conception of free areas modified by simple plans, setting suitable conditions 
for the suspension on pilotis of the main buildings, and a continuous passageway with 
light structural elements, which may be one of the most characteristic aspects of the 
Naval College. 
 
Figure 99. Geometric composition: detail of celosias bricks to enclose spaces 
allowing illumination and ventilation © ENAP 
According to the interview I had with Captain Ramírez García (2009) who was 
among the first contingent to move to Manzanillo, petty officials at the time were 
“helping to make the space adequate, providing furniture already in use from other 
buildings and vessels”. But perhaps the strongest memory of this official was how the 
“whole island was resplendent” – that is to say that, during the first years, it was difficult 
to see outside due to the refraction of the white seashell soil and the environmental 
conditions of Cartagena. This clear soil reinforced the bright light of the Caribbean. And 
at the same time it reflected the heat; as there was no vegetation, “we planted palms 
and trees to create some shade”.  
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5.4. Fast track project 
The interest surrounding the Naval College project and how it was appraised 
can be inferred from its selection as the front feature in an exhibition that aimed to 
show how the regime was responding to the social needs of the country. One can 
hardly believe that the community considered the Naval College a priority. As we have 
seen, facilities to improve living conditions and increase production were deemed as 
urgent. Nevertheless, the project illustrates how the dictatorship conceived the 
construction of the new state.  
 
Figure 100. Logbook of the ENAP, rare notes about construction ©ENAP 
The unit’s logbook records on September 10th, ([ENAP] 1955b) that by the 
decree 2435 the presidency: 
[O]rders the construction of the new Naval College and, to do 
so, assigns the terrains in Manzanillo Island in the bay of 
Cartagena. Captain Jaime Eraso Annexi, vice-president of the 
board of the Dique canal, and the engineer Alfonso Mejia, from 
Obregón & Valenzuela, the practice hired for the works, visited 
the terrains […], and immediately began the filling works in the 
zone where the new Colombian Academy of Naval War will be 
built. It will cost twenty million pesos, and will have an initial 
capacity for 1,500 cadets.  
The following relevant annotation is on October 8th, ([ENAP] 1955a) when the 
minister of Public Works, Ruben Piedrahita, with other ministers, and high-ranking 
officials visited the construction works in progress.  
Admiral Jaime Eraso Annexi reported in one of his latest interviews, recorded in 
Pañol de historia – a naval journal – that the construction of the Naval College was part 
of a plan he had proposed as commander “to modernize the Colombian Navy”. (Eraso 
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Annexi et al. [2011]) This essentially comprised facilities and vessels. According to 
Eraso’s testimony, after a long process to determine the ownership of the terrain in 
Manzanillo Island, the government gave the property to the Navy in 1956 [sic].202 This 
was one or two years after the project was actually designed at the end of 1954. (Eraso 
Annexi et al. [2011]) Eraso, who at the time was the commander of the Navy, stated in 
the interview that, after the architectural practice had received the commission abroad: 
The studio, blueprints and all the details [of the architectural 
project] were developed in the space of two months, with an 
excellent outcome that accelerated the legal, administrative, 
and financial aspects needed to begin the construction. 
This testimony, which concurs with Tapia’s interview, confirms that the Naval 
College project was one of the “fast track” projects. It is abnormal for an architectural 
project of such complexity and scale to have been advanced in such a short time, 
particularly considering the manual labour: design, drawing and modelling, in the 
context of a small practice with no experience in similar projects. Therefore questions 
must persist about possible cooperation with other firms, the information received, or 
even whether the design of O&V began from scratch.  
 
 
                                                
202 Note the mistaken year, as it differs from the information recorded in the unit logbook. 
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6. Tracing connections 
As with other projects of the dictatorship, it is necessary to trace connections 
with the available information, in order to achieve a better sense of what at first sight 
might seem arbitrary. For this purpose, most of the information presented here has 
been obtained through contacting and interviewing architects who in different ways – 
externally or internally – were related to the firm that developed the project, Obregón & 
Valenzuela.  
Given that we are referring to oral history spanning more than 50 years, most of 
the interviews were conducted over two sessions, and in some cases there has been 
follow-up via email. In order to learn about the context and specific information, I tried 
to follow a similar script in the interviews, but most of them took the form of an open 
dialogue as this seemed to be more productive in allowing memories to flow more 
freely. Most of them were either voice-recorded, or notes were taken at the time. 
 
 
6.1. How was it commissioned? 
The Naval College project was commissioned by the national government. 
Information about how O&V was appointed is contradictory. There are no documents in 
the Ministry of Public Works archive about how the process was managed. During the 
first interview we had, the architect Tapia (2009) recalled: “It was an international 
contest. Architectural practices from Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and others presented 
proposals. And Obregón won it.” However, when trying to go into the specifics on how 
the project was presented, Tapia could only comment: “Rafael [Obregón] had good 
relations, at the highest level, and he was the one in direct contact with the Army [sic].” 
Conversely, Germán Samper Gnecco (2011) argues, “The problem was that 
none of these projects were clear. I think they [Obregón & Valenzuela] received a 
direct commission, that was the way with the Military.” This concurs with Admiral 
Orlando Lemaitre’s reasoning: “It was a dictatorship, there was no need to ask anyone. 
It would have been directly commissioned.” (Lemaitre 2010) It is possible that the Navy 
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organized an invited private competition, involving small practices. Considering the lack 
of supporting evidence about any international contest remaining in the archives of the 
Society of Colombian Architects, it is more likely that it was indeed a direct commission 
to Obregón & Valenzuela, who were themselves keen sailors and had previous 
personal relations with key members of the Ministry of Public Works, and later on, 
designed several houses for Navy officials.  
Information about possible guidelines to develop the project is also relevant to 
this research. In this respect, Tapia (2010) recalls, “we had absolute freedom to 
develop the project as we wanted”. However, on entering into some of the general 
aspects of the project, he did not have a great deal of information. Admittedly, after 
more than 50 years some memory lapses are to be expected. Yet despite the project 
being immediately identified, no information was recalled about the design parti203 or 
the general layout. Thus questions about the wider involvement of other professionals 
or firms arise despite the information found through blueprints and interviews, as we 
will see. 
 
 
6.2. Who developed the project?  
As was common during the regime, the Naval College was designed by a fairly 
small and new architectural practice, Obregón & Valenzuela.204 Their partners were 
young but prominent architects who were at the time building their reputation through 
innovative projects. Their language was eminently modern, and they were part of the 
first generation of Colombian architects to have studied abroad. On their return to the 
country, they created an architectural practice that despite several changes is still 
relatively active.205 
                                                
203 Commonly in use for other projects and architects of the time, this refers to the organizing idea 
of the project. 
204 Indeed, there were no large corporations in Colombia at that time. This topic about foreigners 
is expanded in Chapter 3.  
205 The website of the firm includes a time line: Obregón & Valenzuela Co. apparently came into 
being on its partners’ return to Colombia in July 1944, but it was not officially registered with the Bogotá 
Chamber of Commerce until November 18th, 1952 (under the register 26111 and 4827 public deed at 
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Until the 1940s foreigners invited to the country, either as firms or individual 
practitioners, developed most relevant projects. The practice of architecture was held 
in few hands, and mainly concentrated in the main cities, namely: Bogotá, Medellín, 
and Cali. After 1942 the first group of students of architecture from the Universidad 
Nacional started to feed the increasing demand for designing the built environment. 
These offices were small, and their arena of action very limited, usually being 
concentrated in their own city. 
 
· Obregón & Valenzuela O&V  
At the time of the commissioning of the Naval College, Obregón & Valenzuela 
was a partnership founded by Rafael Obregón Gonzalez, José María Obregón Rocha, 
and Pablo Valenzuela y Vega. Members of prominent immigrant Spanish families, all 
three had studied architecture during the Second World War at the Catholic University 
of America in Washington DC. 
Both the political situation and the education they had received from the 
American university informed the projects designed by the practice, and in turn they 
engaged in the dissemination of modernist ideas through their participation in 
Colombian universities. I will return to this point later on.  
Rafael Obregón Gonzalez (1919-1976), who qualified as an architect at the 
Catholic University of America in 1943, was a talented practitioner.206 When in 2011 I 
interviewed the senior architect Hernán Vieco,207 he recalled: “Obregón was one of the 
most skilful designers of that time”.(Vieco 2011) He was the principal designer of the 
firm, and also the most outgoing of the partnership. One can find that on several 
                                                                                                                                          
Seventh Notary). It is worth noting that this was one year before the regime took office. It was a fairly new 
practice. Later, due to partnership changes, it was registered as Obregón & Valenzuela Co. Ltd from 1969 
to 1976. After the death of the main designer partner, the firm moved towards becoming the Construction 
Company Obregón & Valenzuela Ltd Inc from 1976 to 1982 (by creating a partnership of O&V with 
Ospinas Co). From 1982 to the present day, it has carried on its activity as Construction Company Obreval 
Inc. 
 
206 Obregón received an honours degree. 
207 Hernán Vieco (1925-2012) is one of the Colombian architects who worked with Le Corbusier 
after his first visit to the country. Among other projects he participated as junior architect on Marcel 
Breuer/Bernard Zehrfuss’ team for the UNESCO headquarters. 
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occasions the firm was identified solely with him. Obregón undertook the public 
relations of the architectural practice. His connections as an active member of affluent 
circles, and his involvement in various hobbies, made him someone able to access 
different levels of society and to win clients. 
José María Obregón Rocha ([1921-1982]), also awarded a degree as an 
architect of the Catholic University of America in 1944, was a member of technical 
commissions of institutions related with construction, such as Camacol, the Banco de 
Crédito, and of the Pan-American Congress of Architects in 1968. José María was a 
cousin of Rafael Obregón and, perhaps on account of having the same surname, he 
was known as “Pepe”.208 He was in charge of the design of housing projects and 
closely involved with their construction.  
During his architectural studies at the Catholic University of America (1940s), 
Pablo Valenzuela y Vega ([1920-1954]) met the Obregón cousins and, upon his return 
to Colombia, they decided to run the practice together. Valenzuela acted as the 
manager of the company; he was not usually involved in design and, judging from his 
record at university, he was the least outstanding designer of the three founders. 
After returning to Colombia, Rafael Obregón and Pablo Valenzuela were 
immediately connected with local universities. (Tapia 2010) Obregón taught at two of 
the most prominent of them: the state-owned Universidad Nacional de Colombia for 
more than 25 years, and at the privately founded Universidad de Los Andes. Similarly, 
Valenzuela was at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and the Universidad de los 
Andes.209 Through teaching they disseminated their ideas in academia, and also had 
the opportunity of encountering talented students, some of whom would subsequently 
work with the firm. 
Later, other architects and engineers joined the partnership. Some of them 
started as draughtsmen, or juniors. The professionals linked with the firm include: 
                                                
208 In order to differentiate both Obregón cousins, I follow the practice of the office, using Obregón 
when referring to Rafael, and Pepe, to José María. 
209 Although, according to the information gathered by Germán Téllez in a recent study still 
unpublished about the history of the School of Architecture and Fine Art of Universidad de Los Andes, 
Valenzuela is not listed as a staff member at any time. Téllez comments: “he might have been one of the 
many informal guest tutors”. (Téllez Castañeda 2013) 
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Architect Hernando Tapia Azuero;210 Engineer Alberto Sanz de Santamaria;211 
Architect Edgar Bueno Tafur;212 Architect Manuel Forero Delgadillo;213 Engineer 
Vicente Hernandez Rosano;214 and Architect Rafael Obregón Herrera.215 
Some of these students started as draughtsmen and then gained other 
positions. Such was the case with Hernando Tapia, who joined the firm in his third year 
of studies, and soon became a lead designer and associate architect of the firm. 
However, he was never a partner, whereas there are other cases of draughtsmen who 
evolved within the firm, as is the case of Edgar Bueno. 
According to Tapia, “Valenzuela was the manager, Pepe was in charge of small 
projects, Rafael [Obregón] was the socialite and a good designer”. He continues: 
“Rafael and I developed basic schemes and preliminary plans, from which, later on, 
juniors developed clean blueprints.” (Tapia 2009)  
At the centre of the practice, Rafael Obregón and Hernando Tapia were in 
charge of the project for the Naval College. There were other professionals as junior 
architects who appear in the blueprints as drawing assistants: M. Forero, E. Bueno, C. 
Ricaurte, M. Garcia, Maldonado. (Obregon & Valenzuela - O&V 1954-1961) 
 
· Architects: small firm, young architects 
                                                
210 Hernando Tapia Azuelo (1937-2011), Architect Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Member of 
the Colombian Society of Architects. Founder and ex-rector of Piloto University. Member of the Bolivarian 
Society of Architects (Venezuela). Delegate to the V and VII international congress of UIA. Lecturer at 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and an active member of the Colombian Communist Party. 
211 Alberto Saenz de Santamaria, Civil engineer Bachelor by Cornell University at 1957. Resident 
engineer at Pardo Restrepo & Santamaria and Mopal 1957. Partner of Summa Construction 1958-1959. 
Partner in charge of construction at Silva & Santamaria 1959-1960. Partner in charge of construction at 
Obregón & Valenzuela Co 1960-1969. Partner and manager of Obregón & Valenzuela Ltd Co 1969-1976. 
212 Edgar Bueno Tafur, Architect by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Lecturer at Javeriana 
ad National universities. Lecturer and Dean at Piloto University. Fellow lecturer Universidad Central de 
Quito. Member of the Institute of Architects of Venezuela. Member of the teaching commission and board 
at Colombian Society of Architects. Secretary of the Vision habitat centre. Consultant at Colombian 
institute for the promotion of higher education – ICFES. 
213 Manuel Forero Delgadillo. Architect Universidad Nacional de Colombia. IT technician. 
214 Vicente Hernandez, Civil Engineer by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, with 
specialization in building management at Universidad Javeriana. 
215 Rafael Obregón Herrera (Jr), Architect at Rhode Island School of Design. Master in Urban 
Studies for developing countries at MIT. Obregón Herrera has had a career as an urban planner 
participating in main agencies at the national level and in Bogotá.  
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Exploring the connotations of the studies in the Catholic University of America 
undertaken by the three original partners of O&V, it is necessary to point out their 
studies occurred during wartime. Consequently the conditions were exceptional, not 
only because of the small number of Colombians studying abroad at the time, but also 
because of the conditions of the university in which they were enrolled. 
During the war, US universities had a shortage of personnel. Numbers of both 
professors and students were sharply reduced. In the records of the CUA I found 
minutes of the faculty board containing constant allusions to the continuous reduction 
in members of the academic community. Remarkably, however, they also note the 
increase in foreign students, particularly from Latin America and Europe. (Catholic 
University of America et al. 1942) Reviewing the list of students and staff at the time 
shows that most of them were foreigners. Indeed in 1944 Obregón graduated with five 
other students, only two of whom were American.216  
 
Figure 101. CUA’s newspaper note about Obregon’s involvement in contemporary 
discussions ©CUA 
I found other relevant information about the university and the curriculum of 
architecture. In the history of the CUA it is noticeable that the campus served as a 
military training campus for recruits for at least two years, until 1945. (Catholic 
University of America 1942) The curriculum of architecture, as noted by Jean Louis 
Cohen in his publication, included a course on civil camouflage, following the manuals 
prepared by Pratt University. According to the evaluation panel of the AIA accreditation 
process, design practices of civil camouflage were common in US academic 
programmes. ([Catholic University of America] 1940-1945) Therefore, it is clear that the 
three partners should be familiar with industrial camouflage as part of their architectural 
education. However, I have not found an explicit acknowledgement of that in the 
collected evidence.  
 
                                                
216 The CUA does not allow names on the list to be copied, as a policy to protect the privacy of 
their most renowned alumni. 
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· Links of the partners 
Members of the O&V belonged to and moved within wealthy circles of 
Colombian society. This allowed them to access a number of private and public 
projects by invitation. Obregón was very skilful at this. In one of the interviews with 
Tapia (2010), the latter recalls how “Obregón got most of the projects to the office 
thanks to his own social contacts.”  
Members of the practice also participated in and had continuous exchanges 
with other practices in Latin America. Indeed, according with the firm brochure, 
Obregón was president of the Colombian Society of Architects, and an honorary 
member of the Societies of Architects of Chile and of Venezuela. Pepe was a member 
of the Colombian Society of Architects, and a fellow of the Bolivarian Society of 
Architects.  
From the archives of the Universidad Nacional, it is clear that Obregón 
assumed a prominent role within the studio, along with other professors such as 
Fernando Martínez Sanabria, Guillermo Bermudez and Gabriel Solano. All of these 
have been recognized as conspicuous architects of modernity.217  
 
· O&V experience 
In the appendix there is a complete list of 137 projects designed by O&V. I have 
assembled this inventory from information gathered from various sources. The basic 
list has come from the firm’s portfolio. (Obregon & Valenzuela - O&V [s.d.]) 
Architectural journals such as Proa, Casas y Lotes, Arquitecturas and Architecture 
d’Aujourd’hui provided additional data, complementing the on-going research at 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia initiated by Isabel Llanos Chaparro and Edison 
Henao Carvajal, which in turn has developed final works in the architectural 
program.218 Llanos’ doctoral research is related to the evolution of type of their houses, 
                                                
217 Recent studies of Colombian modernity have made an important advance in recovering and 
analyzing their work, mainly in Bogotá. Cf. collection Punto aparte, a series of dissertations of the master 
in architecture of the Universidad Nacional. 
218 In the fifth year of studies in the Universidad Nacional, one of the specialization areas is a 
research-based studio about modern housing spaces. Some of their final works are by writing and others 
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and Henao’s to the use of tower-platform typology.219 In the table, first is the year or 
years of the project; the name used to identify the project, which in the vast majority 
refers to the owner; the built area, if known; and the location of the project as city, or 
neighbourhood if relevant. 
 
Figure 102. O&V suburbia houses in Bogota: primary experience of the architectural 
practice ©O&V/EM/E 
The largest percentage of their projects were private houses (81%). A 
considerable number of these were individual buildings in outskirts with average area 
of construction of around 400m2, occupying usually less than half of the property. A 
small number of housing projects were designed mainly “for rent”, i.e. houses built by 
their clients to achieve some profit. The number of social clubs and commercial offices 
reaches 12%, and these are concentrated in the 1960s. 
There was a sharp rise in the activity of the firm during the years 1955-1958, 
coinciding with the time of accelerated urbanization that took place during the whole 
decade, including the years of the dictatorship. At the time urban areas were 
expanding and suburban houses – their speciality – were in high demand.  
Most projects, that is 94 of them, were located in Bogotá. A smaller number was 
either in Barranquilla or Cartagena (15 and 16 respectively), which can be explained by 
the social circles in which Obregón’s cousins moved. Most of the names referred to as 
owners/clients are industrialists and politicians. In short, the expertise of O&V was 
mainly in private housing located on the outskirts of consolidated urban areas in 
Bogotá. The height of the practice was immediately after the design of the Naval 
College project. . 
 
Figure 103. Modernist spaces with local adaptations: Hotel Casino Cartagena, 1955 
© CARANGO 
                                                                                                                                          
by design. It derives from the area about Heritage under my coordination, which had previous works on the 
subject. Cf. Estefani Vasquez and Eugenia Marin, 2008 
219 These theses have joined a current trend in the doctoral program at the Universitat Politecnica 
Catalunya about modern architecture in Latin America, which has been quite active in disseminating their 
work in recent years. 
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Furthermore, what is consistent is the modernist image. Their projects had high 
standards and appealed to both the social and economic elite. From its early stages, 
the practice developed a distinctive language in their projects through the regularity 
and clear organization of their spaces; simple geometric volumes; asymmetrical 
compositions; mastery of details and technical innovation with an avant-garde image 
and spatiality. All their projects incorporated the highest modern standards, while 
incorporating reinterpretations of traditional elements. i.e. interior gardens or 
courtyards. The universality of their proposals was presented as corresponding to the 
state of art of modern architecture. From this evidence, I deduce that their devotion 
towards modernity was conclusive for the assignment of such a representative project 
as the Naval College, regardless of their lack of experience in projects in terms of 
infrastructure, or with a similar magnitude. On the contrary, the Naval College boosted 
their activity. 
 
· Other participants 
The accounts of Edgar Bueno and Hernando Tapia tell us about the design 
practice at O&V in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Bueno, ”Obregón put into 
practice what he had learnt while studying abroad. The design process in the office 
used to be a collaborative one”, as Obregón used to organize his studio at the 
university. Tapia remembered how, “It was common to hold preliminary meetings in 
order to define parameters, and the main ideas of the project, and after developing 
some ideas individually, we would have another meeting to integrate a proposal that 
was later split up again, and designed and drawn in detail by different members of the 
team.” This had been a common practice in American firms since the first decades of 
the twentieth century.220  
Tapia claims that “the Naval College was a joint design [by Tapia] with 
Obregón, indeed it was more mine than his”. As a matter of fact, Tapia was the one 
that went to live for three months in 1954 as a cadet in the old Naval College in order to 
learn about the internal practices: 
                                                
220 Collective design practices at SOM have been the subject of a study by (Jung [2011]) 
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I did not know how the Army [sic] works in general, and 
specifically the Navy, which has such an amount of 
particularities. I had not had any relations with vessels, or their 
life.  
And later he adds: 
The only way to understand what the recruits’ and officials’ life 
is like, how they organize, what they learn, what kind of 
exercise and activities they do, was by living there as a cadet. 
We never had a similar project before. So, I lived […] under 
their discipline, […] to do so, you need to have lots of energy, or 
little money. 
But Obregón was also commissioned to visit other Naval Colleges in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Chile. Apparently there were two commissions; the first attempt to travel 
mentioned by Admiral Lemaitre failed, as we will see, and there seems to have been a 
second commission to visit simultaneous projects in other Latin American countries, as 
reported by Admiral Eraso Annexi. ([2011]) 
Tapia (2010) asserts that the project was developed in a short period of time, so 
that, after living there, O&V had two months to present the project. The contact point 
with the Navy was always Obregón; Tapia attended no meetings. His interaction was 
limited to his experience at the former college in the design phase, and he never 
returned to see the project built. What is more, pictures showed to him in the interview 
held in 2010 were his first and only encounter with the Naval College built. 
 
· National cooperation among studios  
Until the late 1960s O&V used to focus on design. At the time it was common to 
cooperate amongst practices. Some of them even shared offices in the same building, 
as a prominent architecture of the time, Germán Samper Gnecco (2011) recalls. This 
facilitated the exchange of ideas and mutual support in design contests.  
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[having offices in the same building] was practical for 
interactions and cooperation among studios, some of which 
were informal, as the project belonged to another firm, but they 
would probably need some support. 
They also interacted closely with engineering firms in order to define the 
feasibility of technical aspects in their projects. The construction of their projects was 
usually delegated to other architectural and engineering practices. The professional 
circle of architects and engineers was very close, as it developed from the 1940s, and 
built on their academic experience. It was also related to well-to-do groups that led the 
new associations, and with an aspirational group of young supporters. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, when working in other cities, it was a common custom 
for Bogotá-based firms to create joint ventures with local architectural or engineering 
practices. In the case of the Naval College these were Alfonso Mejia Navarro and 
Leopoldo “Popo” Angulo Garcia. The former was an engineer who had worked with 
Obregón on other projects on the Caribbean coast; the latter was a member of the 
local elite, whose role in the project remains unclear. In a small, tightly knit 
conservative society such as Cartagena, however, these links would have ensured 
local support. 
In other interviews, there is also a reference to the participation of other firms – 
Pizano Pradilla Caro and Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta – in the design and construction. 
Domenico Parma may also have participated, as he did in the Los Andes hippodrome. 
Tapia mentions that “Germán Samper, as junior architect, participated tangentially in 
the design, as an external architect.” Tapia also mentions engineer Francisco “Pacho” 
Bermudez as a participant in the project. However, when I interviewed Germán 
Samper Gnecco (2011), he did not acknowledge his participation in this project or in 
any other one of O&V. As for Bermudez’s possible participation, Carlos Martínez in 
Proa mentions only Guillermo Bermudez as a design consultant, which accords with 
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information on the cover page of the O&V brochure of the project. This information 
about Bermudez has not been recalled before in any of the studies about his work.221 
As in other projects, O&V delegated the actual construction of the project. The 
firm Pizano, Pradilla Caro built the first phase, of which there were several parts. There 
is also information about the participation in some structural aspects of the engineering 
firm Carlos Hernandez & Cia. Ltda.  
  
Figure 104. Collaborative design at O&V office © O&V 
The cooperation of other firms, as has been pointed out, is contradictory. 
However, it could also be unofficial. This practice was also extended to the execution 
of most projects with the participation of other firms. Samper mentioned in the interview 
how O&V used to work with other practices such as Pizano, Pradilla, Caro; Cuellar, 
Serrano, Gomez; the engineer Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta; Guillermo Bermudez; 
Cuellar Serrano Gomez. In other words, contemporary architectural and engineering 
practices in Bogotá constituted a small circle of support; even if they were competing 
for similar projects, in the background they were cooperating with one another. 
This cooperative practice allowed for the rapid development of projects, as they 
divided up various tasks. It also meant that information was both shared and separated 
out. 
 
· Connections with international studios 
From different interviews I received contradictory information about the possible 
participation of foreign firms in the design and construction of the Naval College. For 
instance, both Admiral Lemaitre (2009) and the architect William (Ceballos 2009a) 
agreed about the participation of “foreign advisors” in the project, without much clarity 
about their role, but acknowledging the importance and magnitude of the project. 
                                                
221 Guillermo Bermudez belongs to the generation of architects that developed from the 1960s 
and 1970s what was known as “Brick architecture’; his legacy has been widely studied. Cf. (Daza et al. 
2009), (Bright Samper 2006), (Weiss Salas 2008) 
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Ceballos affirmed that “the same firm working on the CAN project”. This means, SOM 
would have participated in the project.  
However, I did not find any information in the Bunshaft archives, nor in Louis 
Skidmore’s, or Nathaniel Owings’ about this or any project in Colombia. Remarkably, 
neither was there any information in these archives about the CAN project. Only one 
image of a different project, Gordon Bunshaft worked on – the Bogotá Bank, a private 
building they designed in Bogotá – was found. Unfortunately however, the relevant 
archives of the firm have not yet been consulted.222 This would be a worthwhile step in 
the future. 
 
Figure 105.  Banco Bogotá’s image in SOM archives © AAA 
SOM participation in CAN and Bogotá Bank is not disputed. Historical accounts 
found in Colombia also confirm it. At the time, and amidst the controversy generated 
around the CAN project, the Ministry of Public Works proudly published in their reports 
the participation of this US corporation. ([Colombian government] 1951-1957) 
Subsequently, this participation has been recorded in architectural and engineering 
history.223 These contradictions result quite surprising, even in the most publicized 
projects, as it generates, in turn, more questions about the real extend of the 
involvement and possible collaborations; which will be worth to note, it does not limit to 
SOM. 
 
· Flows of information  
Flows of information have been a relevant element in common in the interviews 
with architects from that time. There is a constant concern in following information and 
trends in different countries. Through various media, Colombian architects continually 
received information from the avant-garde centres. In addition to Colombians studying 
                                                
222 SOM archives are divided into the main branches they have operated. Apparently projects of 
Latin America were managed from the office in Chicago, but this information has not been confirmed. 
223 See (Téllez Castañeda 1977; Niño Murcia 1991; Saldarriaga Roa 1986; Cortes Diaz 2006) 
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abroad, and visiting consultants at the Ministry of Public Works, already mentioned, 
there were other forms of diffusion.  
One of these spaces comprised the universities, where architects taking part in 
these projects worked alongside foreigners. Scholars participating in cooperation 
programmes, and immigrants who came to the country during the Second World War, 
were active members of academia, and their impact still needs to be fully traced. As 
Jorge Arango (1953) has pointed out, “as the architecture schools were not created 
until 1936, the vast majority of the professionals who gave direction to these schools 
were educated abroad”. Without identifying specific names, he mentions how architects 
from France, Italy, England, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain and the United 
States were actively taking part in the dissemination of modern ideas. Probably the 
most prominent ones are: Leopoldo Rother, Vicente Nasi, Bruno Violi, and Fernando 
Martínez Sanabria.  
I also found at the studios of my interviewees complete collections of 
architectural journals. Germán Samper, Hernán Vieco, and Dicken Castro mentioned 
traditional journals such as Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, Architectural Forum, 
Architectural Record, and Progressive Architecture. In addition to these, Obregón & 
Valenzuela journals have very diverse origins: Arts & Architecture, Technique et 
Architecture, The Japan Architect, Detail, Interiors, Kenchiku Bunka.  
 
Figure 106. Study and discussion of foreign publications were a common practice at 
O&V office © O&V 
Tapia (2009) recalls how part of the regular practice was to look at and discuss 
published projects. These publications provided a permanent intake about 
contemporary trends elsewhere. Their intention was to remain in the avant-garde, thus 
assuring their prominent position in the architectural realm. 
 
 
228( Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán(
 
 
6.3. How it was represented  
Despite being the main feature at the exhibition of the National Plan of Public 
Works at the National Museum in 1955, the Naval College faded in the records 
afterwards. The same thing happened with other projects introduced to the community 
through models, drawings and photos. The material presented was intended to have a 
didactic character; massive models were built to represent the network of railways and 
roads. Graphic information was created to introduce new forms and spaces to the 
targeted public.  
According to the available evidence about the exhibition, the material exhibited 
about the Naval College coincided with images reported in Proa, and in the brochure 
recently found in their archives. So, let us explore the images presented in both 
publications. It essentially comprised the model, and interior ad exterior perspectives 
that intended to make the presentation of new spaces more didactical. 
 
· Proa, journal of architecture  
Some of the project’s blueprints have been in the public domain through the 
journal Proa since 1955, in an edition “dedicated to the most relevant aspects of the 
Naval College under construction in Cartagena by the Government of the Military 
Forces”. (Martínez 1955) This means that what is reported in the journal is the original 
project, and does not show the changes that were introduced later.  
Images in the journal Proa show how detailed and complete the proposal was 
in 1955. The journal includes different images of the model, plans and perspectives, 
along with descriptions and comments presumably made by Carlos Martínez.224 It 
shows a diverse set of buildings that are part of the complex by presenting 
corresponding plans and façades. Even if the information in the journal is complete, it 
is still difficult, due to the scale and complexity of the project, to identify specific areas, 
or the level of definition achieved in the design. Martínez insists on the difficulty of the 
                                                
224 Unless otherwise stated, architect Carlos Martínez wrote all content as editor and owner of 
Proa journal. This issue does not mention any collaboration; thus it is highly probable that the descriptions 
and comments are Martínez’s own.  
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programme, from which one can interpret that it exceeded the magnitude of other 
contemporaneous projects. 
 
Figure 107. ENAP chapel, library, theatre and cultural centre in sets: façades, plans, 
perspective © Proa  
The article emphasizes the educative function of the Naval College. It does 
exclude two areas of the project that correspond to the whole zone for midshipmen and 
other petty officers, and the group of houses for officials and the director, without 
mentioning the reason for this omission; this suggests they may not yet have been 
designed. Comments on the military character of the complex are minimal. This 
emphasis on the scholarly function matches the interpretation and interest of the 
designers, and perhaps also of the government.  
As mentioned above, the journal under the direction of Carlos Martínez was a 
firm promoter of modern architecture. This journal has been a valuable historical 
source for the study of this period in Latin America. A case in point is the research of 
the scholar Hugo Mondragón,225 who analyses the work of Carlos Martínez in using 
Proa as a medium to encourage modern architecture in Colombia, and other Latin 
American countries.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this was the only project of the military 
government to receive such a comprehensive report in Proa. During the dictatorship,226 
the journal concentrated on private houses, and private industries, which were subject 
to reference and analysis. It refrained from references to the military government, or to 
the work and projects undertaken by the Ministry of Public Works in this period. Neither 
did it make any reference to conflicts between the dictatorship and the Society of 
Colombian Architects - SCA, or other groups during the regime. There is no 
explanation or comment about this historical gap. However, from these omissions it is 
possible to infer that there was at the very least a certain distance of the editor from the 
                                                
225 Carlos Martínez, Proa’s founder and editor for more than 30 years, was also a prominent 
scholar in Colombia. Further references about this journal and its editor can be found in (Mondragón 
2003), (Mondragón 2010)  
226 Carlos Nino notes how, only after the regime fall, the publication registered the conflict about 
one of the most visible and controversial projects undertaken by the dictatorship, the National 
Administrative Centre. Cf (Niño Murcia 2011) 
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dictatorship. In general terms about the architectural realm, it has been difficult to 
identify a particular and consistent stance towards the regime. It clearly was a tense 
relationship, but the regime took favourable measures for the SCA that are still in force: 
By decree 1782, June 8th, 1954, the Society of Architects is the official Consultative 
Body of the Colombian government for the built environment policies and projects. 
Which means that technically the organism has a voice on state decisions about the 
built environment. 
The introduction of issue number 91 of Proa makes a reference to the process 
undertaken by the regime: 
Amongst the multiple projects that are currently under 
construction in Colombia, [the Naval College] is the most 
beautiful urban composition due to its precision, clarity, and 
order, in addition to the outstanding aesthetic qualities of its 
architecture. (Martínez 1955)  
In his comments, Martínez even supports the continuation of this project, while 
raising the possibility, or even hope, of a change in the government.227 
Sometimes, in our context, changes of leaders imply 
transformations of the most splendid initiatives. Hopefully, this 
magnificent project [the Naval College] will not suffer setbacks 
in its execution. If it were to change, even in a minor aspect, it 
would lose all its unity, its entire accent, and all its aesthetic 
significance. (Martínez 1955) 
Therefore, one can conclude that despite the distance Proa takes from the 
political turmoil surrounding the Rojas government, the Naval College is of sufficient 
merit to break the silence of this journal about state projects. 
 
                                                
227 As explained in Chapter 1, even if the regime was ratified by the National Assembly, there was 
increasing discontent in prominent circles.  
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· Official images of the project  
In turn, the regime acknowledged the existence of this publication. The logbook 
of the Naval College records in 1955 ([ENAP] 1955b):228 
The important journal of urbanism and architecture edited in 
Bogotá, Proa, dedicates its latest issue to the new Naval 
College to be built in Cartagena’s bay. The cover of the journal 
shows the model of this important project, the interior pages 
show all of its aspects through photogravure of the blueprints, 
and perspectives of all the buildings. Mainly the offices, 
dormitories for cadets and students, cultural centre, hospital, 
technical and practical classrooms, workshops, marine training, 
dining rooms, gym, shop, etc.  
What was published by Proa seems to have been what was provided either by 
the Ministry of Public Works, or DIPE, as an official image of the project. This includes 
the image of the model of the complex that was used whenever the Naval College was 
referenced. The black and white image shows the model diagonally, excluding the two 
extremes of Manzanillo Island – that is, the one that has the fortress of Manzanillo and 
the one beyond the sports area showing only roads that seem to continue. The model 
does not provide much information about the relation of the island to its surroundings. 
Indeed, when using a high contrast resource to highlight the constructions, it is difficult 
to distinguish between the terrain and the sea. It shows the entire occupation of the 
island, including some areas where it is not clear whether the image is showing a 
building or a delimitation of an area – i.e. according to the programme, areas that 
correspond mainly to training. 
 
Figure 108. ENAP model became the official image of both the National Plan of 
Public Works and Naval College, 1955 © ENAP 
                                                
228 Current officials of the Navy whom I contacted in order to gain permission to internal archives 
were surprised that the information about blueprints and perspectives had been publicly available since 
1955. This in turn facilitated explaining the relevance of the architectural complex. 
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Unlike projects such as the CAN or other academic centres, no pictures of the 
construction process were made public or disseminated in the architectural history. Not 
until 2000 was an image of the Naval College under construction made public; it is 
published in the book of Germán Samper’s son, Eduardo Samper, and Jorge Ramírez 
(2000). The image corresponds chronologically with the suspension of works between 
1957 and 1959, and was taken by Paul Beer. As already explained, the link to this 
avant-garde photographer can be considered an indicator of how the project was 
regarded.  
Having this lead, I then consulted the collection of the photographer Beer about 
the existence of other pictures. Indeed there are 49 images that are registered as being 
of the Naval College.229 In a basic list of Beer’s material, there is a register of a set of 
photos requested by O&V on August 24th, 1957 in the Naval College (negatives 5221-
5270). It is noticeable that the date is after the overthrow of the dictatorship. This 
means that these images were taken shortly after the construction works had been 
suspended. These images are fundamental to see the stage reached by this time in the 
construction process, and the original features of buildings. They are probably the most 
complete collection of images of modern architecture produced by architectural 
practices of the time, however, they have remained until now in a private collection.230 
 
 
6.4. How it was interpreted 
In terms of the magnitude of the project, as well as its quality as modernist 
architecture, one can consider the Naval College as a high achievement of the Rojas 
regime. It materializes the ambitions and strategies of the military government, as 
much as its inconsistencies. Different interpretations can be read into the project, 
depending on one’s stance and role. In this section the reception of different actors will 
be presented. The account of different interpretations about the project cannot be 
                                                
229 Information from the list of photos of Paul Beer archive 
230 Once again, in the field trip I made in March 2013, I tried to reach permission to at least see 
the images. Unfortunately, no access to this private collection has been possible. 
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comprehensive, but includes the visible groups related to the architectural complex at 
the time.  
 
· Institutionally: Navy 
Consulting the historical archive of the Naval College itself, I found little 
reference to the construction or the project of O&V. Given the hierarchies of the 
institution, it is highly probable that the decisions about the architectural project were 
taken at a command level.231 However, in the logbook of the unit, ([ENAP] 1946-1976) 
every minor event out of the ordinary is recorded. My visits and fieldwork have been 
documented, and a similar practice was common in the 1950s. Notably, the temporary 
residence of the architect Tapia was not recorded, nor was the contact point assigned 
to him at the time. Yet Ceballos (2009a), the field architect in charge of speeding up 
the continuation of the construction, confirmed that such a residency took place. 
In short, all that the logbook of the unit briefly records between 1944 and 1964 
about the architectural project of the Naval College in Manzanillo are the following: 
! Assignation of terrains and beginning of works 
! Annotation about the issue of Proa which features the Naval College project 
! Visit of ministers to the construction field 
! The movement in of the personnel, and the donation of old furniture 
! A tree-planting day 
! Nomenclature of buildings.  
After 1965, the inauguration of other works and new buildings, different from the 
ones in the original project, is also barely recorded. The sparse information about the 
built environment of the Naval College found in the logbook seems to constitute a 
pattern in the official records. This could have various interpretations. On the one hand, 
the architectural project was a top-down decision. And, on the other, the newly built 
environment provided the space to develop the college’s mission, but no more was 
expected from it. 
                                                
231 Historical information from the General Command of the Navy is held by the Naval History 
Academy: a board of retired officials. 
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Figure 109. ENAP still under construction was inhabited by cadets © ENAP 
I assume there may be more records about the construction of the Naval 
College in the archives of the General Command of the Navy. Unfortunately, despite 
my trying on several occasions, the Academia de Historia Naval [Naval History 
Academy] was highly reluctant to provide access to the historical information inquiring 
about the 1950s. New generations of officials were much more collaborative for this 
research, officials from the time expressed more resistance on having an outsider 
looking at their information. 
 
·  Navy officers as users 
My first approach to the Naval College project was through a family picture 
taken in 1972.  
 
Figure 110. Family memories:  surprising modern architecture in a colonial city c. 
1972 © MPSB 
What drew my attention to it was that the picture featured a modern building in 
a city known for its colonial architecture. I found later that the building in the 
background was a regular image in several pictures from former officers. i.e. basically, 
officials from the 1960s and 1970s. However, the building was identifiable as part of 
the Naval College only by people who knew the institution.232 
Traditionally each group of the Naval College has its class picture taken, which 
is published in the cadets’ journal Corredera existing since the 1950s. Since 2008 the 
college has compiled most of its numbers. Remarkably, rather than a sculpture, a 
symbol, or any other monument, most pictures, especially from the first two decades, 
                                                
232 In 2010 a group of descendants of Navy officials created a group on Facebook to collect 
memories of their time living in the naval neighbourhood in Manzanillo. 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/4733028580/?fref=ts accessed on January 24, 2013. This also 
coincides with pictures collected through groups of former cadets; there are others by contingents who 
have been sharing their pictures online more recently. 
Data restriction
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feature identifiable exterior or interior spaces of the architectural complex. The iconic 
building that most frequently appears in the background is the one originally designed 
as dormitories – that is, the elevated pavilion on pilotis that has prominent brise-soleils 
on its facades.  
 
Figure 111. Characteristic brise-soleils of the dormitories © AB 
When the pictures are of the interior, the background features also recognisable 
elements of the new complex: a series of vaults and void bricks as decorative blocks, 
which correspond to social and circulation areas. Some of the spaces in the school 
would not immediately be apparent as part of the new complex. For example, in cases 
where the pictures were taken in areas such as classrooms or dining rooms, it could be 
more difficult to identify these spaces. 
 
Figure 112. Solar calendar at ENAP since the 1970s has been taken as the 
representative building © MPSB 
Yet, it is identifiable that since the mid 1970s, the use of these buildings as 
photographic background disappeared. Indeed, the publication made by the ENAP to 
teach the history of the space in Manzanillo, and highlight the most valuable buildings 
and meaningful memorials does not even mention any building of the O&V original 
project. It only includes the solar calendar building, built on 1970s. ([ENAP] [2008]) 
Most officials have been surprised by the interest of this research on these original 
buildings that are commonly neglected by their users.233 
 
· Framed invisibility in the city 
As has been mentioned, the Navy is part of the history of Cartagena. Its officials 
and recruits are an active part of the daily life of the city. Despite the demonstration 
                                                
233 On every visit I have made, there are new personnel to whom I have had to explain the 
historical value of the original architectural project, about which they only know that was built during Rojas 
regime.  
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organized in the 1950s when the option of moving the Naval College to a different city, 
Barranquilla, was under consideration, reports in the media about the actual 
construction or the project itself are minimal, and limited only to the local newspaper.  
In the historical archive of the city, there is no information about the Naval 
College’s buildings. Even the foundation Fototeca Histórica de Cartagena – a private 
initiative to collect photos from the community that has a significant number of images 
of buildings from different periods of the urban development of the city – had no 
images of the college when consulted in 2009.234 Graphic evidence of the permanent 
presence of the Navy in the city refers either to social events or achievements of the 
force at sea.  
Perhaps it may be worth reiterating that after the exhibition and initial 
publication in Proa, no other image of the building has been included in the scholarly 
literature. The only exception is the image commented on in Samper’s book in 2000. It 
has essentially been overlooked both as urban space and in the architectural realm. 
This can question its initial relevance, or the reception after its construction. Perhaps it 
reflects the relation between the project as designed, and the context in which it is 
immersed.  
 
 
6.5. Unexceptional project 
According to the architect Tapia (2010), the firm did not receive a specific 
parameter, or premise, to develop the project, either from the Navy or from the Ministry 
of Public Works. As designers, their practice was to learn through the direct experience 
of similar projects, and to research projects published in international journals to which 
O&V subscribed. In the case of the Naval College, both designers in charge of the 
project had relevant experience to inform the design. 
                                                
234 After Dorothy Johnson de Espinosa died, the foundation has had a period of instability and 
has reduced the activity that it initiated in 1988. In 2011 the archive of the foundation signed an agreement 
to continue with the Universidad Tecnológica de Cartagena, it thus has remained closed to the public 
consult while a digitalization process is undergoing.  
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In the interview held in 2009, Tapia acknowledged that this project was his 
reason for getting in contact with the institution, as he himself had no previous military 
instruction, nor any understanding about how these kinds of institution work. Tapia 
remembers that in 1954, during his time at the old Naval College, he had direct contact 
with various officials, and by doing so he and his colleagues learnt the particularities of 
the programme. Tapia received the impression that daily life within the academic 
centre was run according to a strict regime, but was not all that different from the 
routine he himself had had as a student at the Universidad Nacional campus in Bogotá. 
An individual with socialist concerns, and not a practitioner of any sport, he recalls how 
demanding the physical activities were, and the importance of hierarchy amongst the 
cadets. Tapia (2010) identifies these two aspects as determining elements for the 
design processes.  
Obregón, as a keen sailor, had a better understanding of the marine space and 
practices. But as Admiral Lemaitre mentions, “it was an ambitious project, therefore, 
the Navy commissioned him [Obregón] to visit different Naval Colleges in the continent. 
I was in Brazil at that time [1954]. Obregón came to see the site there. He planned to 
travel to Argentina and Chile as well, but he became ill, and had to stay longer in my 
house, postponing the journey.” (Lemaitre 2009) Nevertheless, in a second interview 
Lemaitre (2010) opens the possibility of a later field trip to those Naval Colleges as it 
was important to have a point of reference of similar complexes. Indeed, Argentina’s 
Naval College had been built in the previous decade,235 while Chile built its Naval 
College between 1955 and 1957,236 which opens the possibility of some exchanges or 
parallels between designers.237 
 
                                                
235 Some general information about the Argentine Naval College is at 
http://www.escuelanaval.mil.ar/ 
236 Information about the history of the Chilean Naval College can be found in 
http://www.escuelanaval.cl/Escuela/historia.html 
237 It would be interesting to pursue a comparative study amongst different architectures of Naval 
Colleges in Latin America that were built in a similar period of time. However, it would require institutional 
support to enable access to these military bases in each country.  
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· Following the manuals 
If we see the characteristics of the complex, they basically follow the common 
principles of modern architecture. No major differences can be traced from any other 
contemporary project. Indeed, it functions and follows a similar image as most modern 
facilities built in Colombia. The image of some robust and solid military construction 
cannot be found here, nor in other projects of the National Plan of Public Works.238  
 
Figure 113. Modified perception of spaces through shades: cameras and corridors 
view c.1960s © ENAP 
Judging from the case study of a factory proposed in the Wittmann’s manual, 
there are three main factors to be considered: “locality, visibility, vulnerability”. These 
observations are by no means comprehensive, and derive from a simple replication of 
the civil defence guidelines. Conditions of defence have changed after more than 50 
years, but the manual and architectural complex are in essence contemporary.  
The location responds to an analysis of vulnerabilities. As one might expect, the 
location and urban articulation of the Naval College is strategic. The isolation and 
visual control of the bay provide the project with time for preparation. Admiral Ordoñez 
Rubio (2009) mentioned how the military base could rapidly respond to any anomaly in 
the bay with the combination of other facilities. The triangle formed by the Naval Base, 
the Naval College and the Naval social club could cover the internal bay area by cross-
fire from land with less than 0.5 miles from each point.  
It also defined a post of control near, but not adjacent to, two vulnerable areas 
of the city, namely the commercial harbour and the petrochemical assembly station. 
The college has created a tendency towards a more industrial development in the 
surrounding areas, changing the trend that was initiated in the 1940s in El Bosque 
sector, connecting towards the central area of the city by the Avenue “Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla”. 
                                                
238 The scholar David Monteyne has traced the linkage between modern architecture and civil 
defence techniques. Monteyne highlights two factors about specific architectural objects identified as 
public fallout shelters: their operative character in case of action, and how they become normalized as a 
regular habitat. cf (Monteyne 2011) 
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In terms of the internal complex one can also observe certain correspondences 
to principles of defence. The complex does not have any prominent building. The 
maximum height is four storeys in the pavilions. So, given the distance from the other 
side of the bay, the visibility of these buildings is minimal. The island itself is 
identifiable, but does not draw attention to it.  
 
Figure 114. Multiple schemes of circulation, free plan, and fragmentation of 
components: blueprints of cadets dormitories building © Proa 91 
A technical survey would be necessary to verify this but, in principle, a visual 
comparison with the Pratt Institute manual (1942) demonstrates that the Naval College 
follows some of the guidelines for industrial camouflage “to reduce vulnerability”: the 
dispersion of buildings allows not only a scattering of core functions in the layout of the 
complex but also a reduction of damage, or what is called “localized damage”, due to 
the propagation of explosion waves due to the distances between them, the uneven 
volumes, and the liberation of ground floors, which takes the higher force of the wave. 
The proportion on the surface of blocks, which in some cases goes up to 1:9, also 
made them a “less easy target”.  
 
Figure 115. Dispersed and elevated buildings to reduce vulnerability and adapt to 
climatic conditions © O&V 
Unfortunately, I found these manuals at a late stage in my research, and did not 
have the opportunity to talk about them with the architects I interviewed from that time. 
Maybe they did not know them directly. Maybe they would not remember them. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that many of its principles were to some extent adhered to in 
the development of the architectural complex itself. Not surprisingly, PSYOP strategies 
were enforced.  
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6.6. Embodiment of the strategy  
Once again, the number of contradictions in the data and gaps in the 
information coincide with the manner in which this architectural complex does not 
constitute a landmark in the city or within the institution. The latent presence of the 
Naval College, which is remarkably the largest academic campus and military space in 
Cartagena, suits the double game of visibility and invisibility that other projects of the 
National Plan of Public Works accomplished. 
Analyzing spatial forms of power that were surprisingly constructed or planned 
during the regime lead us to identify how these infrastructural projects have framed the 
spatial practice. This Dovey states as an exercise that “can reveal ways in which built 
form marks territory, enables and constrains proxemic relations, frames behaviour 
settings and constructs cognitive maps” (Dovey 2008, 30)  
This project executed by the Colombian practice O&V well illustrates how the 
dictatorship executed infrastructural projects in different regions of the country during 
the Cold War. Their urban impact and their legacy as architectural objects embody the 
complex game of different operations and strategies in the construction of the modern 
built environment. Yet, more remarkably, the Naval College also depicts how conflictive 
are the reception and interpretation of these projects. 
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Part III 
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7. Architecture as political project 
Based on the analysis of the evidence collected, one could argue that the 
architecture developed as part of the National Plan of Public Works was a political 
instrument of the Rojas dictatorship. But then other questions arise, such as: to what 
extent were these state projects a direct materialization of the double-truth, i.e. welfare-
warfare, of the military regime? Further, how permeated was the architecture with the 
strategizing around it, and how did this manipulation shape the design, mediation and 
reception of this architecture?  
The construction of a new nation through the development of the built 
environment constituted one of the main policies of the Rojas government.239 This vast 
legacy has been largely overlooked. However, the multiple factors I have identified in 
connection with these projects not only make possible a crucial documentation 
(valuable in itself on account of the dispersion and complexity of the sources) but also 
begin to allow a review of the responses to them at the time and now. In a fragmented 
society such as that of Colombia, diverse and not necessarily coherent responses are 
entirely possible. 
 
Figure 116. Framed projects, Urban Centre Antonio Nariño (CUAN) © Colombia en 
marcha 
The double-truth game, that is the misleading strategy of offering believable 
information, whilst pursuing alternative objectives – through architectural and 
infrastructural projects deeply needed by communities undergoing a process of 
development – provides a fertile terrain for the generation of different reactions. Far 
more than the quality of the built environment produced during the mid-twentieth 
century, these reactions have conditioned the value attached to the works themselves, 
their social meanings, and the sense of belonging or attachment communities create 
with them: what I call the appropriation of these spaces. 
                                                
239 It has already been discussed in Chapter 3 how the regime embraced a development agenda 
that was not reduced to architecture, and how the construction of national identities in Latin America 
responds to different logics 
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The process of modern urbanization in Latin America did not merely occur 
during the Cold War, but was heavily shaped by that latent conflict. As Kenneth 
Frampton noted recently, “We should tell ourselves once again, […] that as far as Latin 
America is concerned, it was never possible to separate architecture from politics or 
from the rigorous modernizing drive which still makes up the intrinsic substance of its 
spirit.” (del Real et al. 2013) 
Although not all the works built during the post-war were necessarily valuable 
as architectural projects, a better understanding of them and the reasons why they 
have been overlooked, provide a more balanced and critical assessment of them. 
Colombia, like other countries in Latin America, has a considerable built legacy that is 
still in use, although poorly understood and continually under threat, as we will see. 
This architectural infrastructure was meant to be essentially instrumental, but in the 
case of the National Plan of Public Works, the dictatorship claimed to build a new 
sense of nationhood through them. I will therefore explore the reception they have had. 
Such a close intertwining of an international and national political project with the 
propagation of an architectural language creates implications that question not only 
canons of the type and method of projects undertaken, but also how communities have 
related to them. 
 
 
7.1. Architecture as artefact 
The capacity of architecture to shape social and political processes also implies 
a cultural aspect. Once the double-truth of projects of the National Plan of Public 
Works becomes visible, that is, its welfare and warfare agendas, it adds elements to 
the discussion of architecture as artefact.240 The notion of architecture as a cultural 
product leads to the consideration of its multiple representations. In other words, the 
possibility of hidden agendas – as is the case with the state architecture promoted 
                                                
240 The artefact as a cultural product has been a subject in material culture studies, and some of 
them have been related to the Cold War architecture. See (Whitfield 1996), (Colomina et al. 2004), (James 
2006) 
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during the Rojas regime – questions how literally these architectural projects can be 
interpreted, thus indicating the limitations of studies reduced to the programme or 
materiality of the architectural project. 
These architectural and engineering projects as artefacts, more than a neutral 
platform, materialized the ambiguity and contradiction of the Rojas dictatorship. 
Discussions about the multiple purposes, simultaneous dynamics or different outcomes 
enrich the comprehension of architecture as material culture. In this regard, it will be 
necessary to consider not only what a project represents in its most practical terms, but 
also the manipulations that can be deployed through what appear initially to be basic 
facilities. To accept that these infrastructural projects represented both the embracing 
of the novelty of modern life, and simultaneously the dictatorship’s ambiguous political 
project, challenges us to question precisely what they both represented and 
misrepresented, as well as how they have been interpreted. In addressing these 
questions, a deeper understanding of the political potential of architecture will be 
attained through tracing the relationships of the direct and distant context of these 
projects. 
 
Figure 117. Transparency and openness in the new architecture: ENAP Museum © 
Proa  
 
· Beyond contradictions 
Acknowledging the political capacity of the architecture, there is a value in 
recognizing architectural projects as material representation with multiple intentions, 
regardless of how much one would subscribe to its originating ideas. The more 
objectionable they are, the more necessary it is to understand them and their possible 
implications. 
In this sense, one can move forward assuming that camouflage is a deceptive 
representation of an object in its environment. This distorted appearance aims to 
create a “mis-representation” for the observer. Representation has been an important 
aspect of cultural studies and aesthetics. However, it is commonly assumed to be a 
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direct depiction of certain ideas. This thesis argues that such ideas may have multiple 
levels of interpretation, particularly in the case of a deceiving rationale. 
This argument questions, in turn, the idea that architectural objects, as 
artefacts, are a direct representation of reality. As artefacts, they might represent 
simultaneously different ideas, and ideals, which in some cases could imply the use of 
misleading information with some specific agenda that is not necessarily open to all 
levels and elements in relation. 
These are arguments that may be common to other governments in the region. 
The apparent imposition and dominance of military governments, in the light of their 
urgency to create manifestations of their presence, may be a proof of their own 
vulnerability. However, the complexity of the idea of power and the multiplicity of its 
relation in architectural studies brings in more elements to question and decode. 
The dynamic production of space, that is, of the built environment of a society, 
provides the grounds for stability and permanence, which are in a constant recreation 
and tension by agents of power. However, one can argue at this point that the more 
invisible the multiple relations and ideologies the milieu materializes, the more 
vulnerable is the society to internalizing its potential as a conditioner of the social 
collective.  
 
 
7.2. Resisting utopia  
Even if urban planning and the new architecture were part of a utopian project 
of nation-building that received extensive support from the military and foreign 
governments, they were not set against a blank canvas. Rather than being a collective 
project, the National Plan of Public Works was a top-down policy. The community of 
users was the receiver, but they were assumed to be spectators, as Ranciere defined 
it: 
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Being a spectator means being passive. The spectator is 
separated from the capacity of knowing in the same way as he 
is separated from the possibility of acting. (Ranciere 2009) 
However, Latin America has not been entirely passive and submissive adopting 
these ideas. This might have different explanations, but I want to stress three of 
particular interest. Firstly, the National Plan of Public Works was focused on a 
consolidated, if fragmented, community. Architectural and engineering projects were 
placed in the service of social groups already configured. Secondly, it is possible to 
identify a group of intellectuals that led debates within Latin America about changes of 
paradigms and this rush of development breaking with the past. Cases could be 
located in Brazil, Uruguay or México, where José Vasconcelos, among others, 
published a series of essays on subjects ranging from Latin Americanism to aesthetics, 
that were widely disseminated in the Americas. And finally, simultaneously with the 
Allies’ propaganda, the region was receiving as a counter-offensive a considerable 
influx from the Soviet bloc. As Nicola Miller (1999) has stated, the influence of 
communist ideas was addressed in the first instance to intellectuals. Raising voices to 
question the projects being carried out was perhaps a way for these spectators to 
emancipate themselves. 
Emancipation is the process of verification of the equality of 
intelligence. The equality of intelligence is not the equality of all 
manifestations of intelligence. It is the equality of intelligence in 
all its manifestations. It means that there is no gap between two 
forms of intelligence. (Ranciere 2009)  
This case study can exemplify different forms on which such conflictive 
relationship has occurred. Regardless of any effort of the regime to orientate the 
presentation of these state projects, the reception of such an intricate set of strategies 
may well be beyond control. Even if users grasped some understanding of them, the 
rational and emotional connection that these projects could have had was 
unpredictable. As one might expect, there was also a bottom-up process in the 
interpretation of the novel infrastructure. 
In part, the association of these public works with the dictatorship may have 
conditioned the state projects’ interpretation. We have seen how these projects helped 
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in the construction of the political capital of Rojas, but then one questions about how 
the resistance to the dictatorship, led by intellectuals amongst others, may have 
conditioned the reception of its outcomes. This may help to explain the (hardly open) 
opposition to some of the projects recorded in debates in the media and professional 
associations, as was the case with the CAN project.  
 
· Cultural disdain 
Following on different approaches to understand the overlooked legacy, I focus 
now on the user’s community that received this state architecture, which has already 
been identified as exterior and not inert. It is a community that had no connection with, 
and developed no sense of belonging to, the Plan’s state buildings. I bring into 
question whether correspondingly, as the dictatorship was using a soft power to 
introduce a double-truth with the National Plan of Public Works, so did the community 
establish a soft reception of them. A practical subversion of the enforced modernity 
could be the use of the facilities detaching them of any meaning. 
The lack of appreciation is tangible not only through the experience of the city 
where, as in the case of the Naval College, their construction has been ignored by the 
city, but also for the inhabitants of the campus. Such disregard of this architecture is 
also noticeable in more public and recent debates. Obviously, after more than 50 
years, new expectations and needs about these spaces will appear, but the case has 
been enhanced as there is a new trend of interventions in Colombian cities. Perhaps 
some the most visible projects from the 1950s have recently received more support 
from an informed community in their defence. A case in point could be the debate held 
during 2009 about demolishing of the international airport in Bogotá, an indicative 
modernist building associated to Rojas, which has ended up on the authorization of 
demolition of the original air terminal. The current trend indicates a threat even for the 
most prominent examples of modernist architecture. 
 
Figure 118. Former image of El Dorado Bogota’s airport c.1970s © GT 
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One of the first debates about the value of these projects was related to the 
Caja Agraria (Agrarian bank)241 building in Barranquilla, one of the few buildings 
recognized as a prominent example of modern architecture by the traditional canon, 
that has been listed as national heritage since 1995.242 Nevertheless, since 2006, 
academic, popular and legal debates about the architectural value and social 
significance of the building have taken place, trying to reverse the order issued by a 
judge on May 10th 2011. The judge ordered the demolition of the building in response 
to the request – supported by 18,337 signatures – of the local, and regional 
government, Universidad del Atlántico, i.e. a departmental public university,243 the 
regional Society of Architects, and a civic association called “Love for Barranquilla”. 
(Cortissoz Cabrera 2011) 
  
Figure 119. Caja Agraria in Barranquilla, 1953-1961 remarkable example of modern 
architecture © MLR-UNC 
According to Jaime Cortissoz Cabrera, former president of the regional Society 
of Architects and president of the civic association leading the demolition initiative, the 
argument for removing the listed status of the building was that even if the building has 
outstanding aesthetic and historic characteristics as an example of modern 
architecture, it fulfils no other criteria:  
The technical aspect, as most of the brise-soleils on the façade 
were oxidized […]. And social appropriation, as most people 
from Barranquilla do not appreciate, nor recognize this building 
as its cultural heritage. […] this lack of appropriation was 
reaffirmed with a public poll of El Heraldo [local newspaper] on 
March 28th, 2008, which outcome shows that 90% [of the locals] 
support the demolition. Conclusion: turn down the Caja Agraria!  
                                                
241 The project was originally planned on 1955 were the location was defined, and the design was 
given in Bogotá to the Spanish architect Fernando Martínez Sanabria. It was built on 1961-1965. 
242 The Colombian official denomination “National Cultural Asset” will be equivalent in the United 
Kingdom to the “Listed grade I”. 
243 Universidad del Atlantico. 
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Notably Cortissoz, as an informed professional, admits the architectural value of 
the modernist building, but rapidly discards this as a valid argument to preserve the 
construction, on the basis of the unloved condition it has. 
 
Figure 120. Technical detail of Caja Agraria’s brise-soleils: one of its most prominent 
features © MLR-UNC 
In a discussion that addresses more the tension between the national, and the 
regional and local governments, other voices have portrayed the situation. As 
mentioned by Humberto Mendieta, “I know nobody [in Barranquilla] that appreciates 
the Caja Agraria building. It is a landmark in the city, but it does not have any sense of 
belonging attached to it.” (Mendieta 2011) The building has been seen since its 
construction as an imposition to the city from the national government, which in the still 
on-going legal process represents the part concerned with the preservation of the 
building. 
Admittedly, some of these projects have become either obsolete or insufficient, 
and thus plans to transform them have drawn attention to works built in the mid-
twentieth century, which in turn have incited debates about the value these projects 
have for the communities involved, included the “informed community”. The results in 
most cases have not favoured these modern architectural buildings.  
 
· Silence: repression or resistance? 
Historically, the regime’s National Plan of Public Works has sunk into oblivion. 
Individual projects related to it have remained in use as they still comprise an important 
percentage of the infrastructure available. The process of visible invisibility has 
continued over time. These projects are in the better cases disregarded.244 Here we 
come to the initial point of this research. The established canon of studies has informed 
not only the education of connoisseurs-to-be, but has also, by extension, shaped public 
opinion, which has already received a considerable charge on its own shoulders.  
                                                
244 The scholar trend on the identification of valuable objects in terms of their architecture, has an 
urgent pedagogical demand, if there is an interest on preserving them. 
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Undoubtedly, the experience of the dictatorship’s excesses permeated the 
negative connotations of the political upheaval, and its products, including its 
architecture. That may be inevitable, and is to some extent understandable. Yet the 
question is what sense, if any, is there either in continuing to replicate what has been 
said already, or in leaving unexplored gaps, which have been identified. 
After identifying the scope of the Plan, and its pervasiveness, established 
arguments minimizing its importance or complexity lose their credibility. The silence 
about these works deserves a better comprehension. According to this logic, I am 
revisiting what it is possible to identify as a common point on the exclusion of these 
architectural projects from the canon of studies. This can be extrapolated and better 
understood as the paradox of the spectator. This is the non-passive reception. There 
are as many possible explanations as there are historians, but here I explore some 
alternatives. 
At first sight this silence – that is, the exclusion or denial – could be forced by 
the imposition of the regime, or by a lack of resources proper to the bewildering 
strategies in control. No doubt daring to challenge the official version of the state, trying 
to find data from the local and immediate resources – that one can imagine were even 
more enclosed at that time – proved at least for this research to be restrictive, biased, 
and ultimately insufficient. However, it is necessary to make an explicit point: the 
information does exist. Even if it responds to the already explained strategies of 
fragmentation, distortion, incompleteness and so on: the fact is that official records still 
exist. 
Evidently the inscription into postmodern influences as mentioned by Felipe 
Hernandez (2002) have played a role. Dismissing outcomes due to its aesthetic 
identification with a current of thought has reinforced the silence in the Colombian 
canon of architectural history written in the 1980s and 1990s. But then the justification 
for what has happened in the last nearly 20 years remains unresolved. 
Hence, alternative explanations are worthy of consideration. One of these is 
that silence has been a voluntary response as a form of resistance –"in other words, an 
emancipatory form against the imposition of projects by the dictatorship. Despite the 
validity of such expression, the result has proved highly obstructive at least in two 
aspects. On the one hand, we have seen how even the informed community 
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disengages from these modernist projects. On the other, there is the almost total lack 
of accurate survey and analysis of what was built in the mid-twentieth century. The 
silence has thus nurtured the lack of understanding and valuation of modernist 
projects. 
Fortunately, emerging scholarship is addressing this gap. As Kenneth Frampton 
noted recently, “Latin America is a continent [sic] whose time has indisputably arrived 
after half a century of provincial amnesia and neglect.” (del Real et al. 2013) 
 
 
7.3. Conflictive identity 
In the publication of the first anniversary of the regime, the DIPE excludes 
information about capital cities, instead introducing information about middle-sized 
cities and dispersed towns, whilst affirming: 
Certainly, never in the history of the country, a renewing 
movement, a government, a new hope, have produced such 
unanimity, and a wider participation of all Colombians. This 
popular initiative, and for the people, is a demonstration that the 
country is standing up, and perhaps for the first time, it could be 
said the state exists, not only as a bureaucratic organization 
[…], but as the one with the meaning given by the prominent 
German thinker: “State is ‘being in form’ of a popular unity 
guided and portrayed by power”.245 (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 16) 
Territorial presence was idealized as a form of the state. It was necessary 
intervention to ensure the control upheavals of violence in rural areas. And it was 
immediately associated with the achievements in the pacification of the most 
                                                
245 It is not clear to which German thinker it refers. Yet, it shows awareness of international 
trends. 
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problematic zones. The active presence of the state in regions such as the coffee-
growing area, or the eastern plains facilitated that appreciation. 
Paradoxically, the state gained an almost invisible presence in different regions 
of the country through a modern infrastructure. Communities have been immersed in it; 
yet the built environment has been the support stratum without creating meaning or 
any attachment to. Public buildings have largely been identified, and used as facilities 
provided by the state. Perhaps it is that identification with the state, and in particular 
with the Rojas regime, that contributes to the contradiction. In other words, this 
stigmatization can be associated with the political resistance generated by this 
dictatorship.  
 
Figure 121. Press clipping about a new project for a bus Service Centre (i.e. bus 
terminal) 1954 © El Tiempo  
The regime was clearly identified with the provision of social services of modern 
life, but at the same time it was highly repressive and corrupt. (Lasso Vega 2005) The 
result was an immediate bitter-sweet reference to the state, which may have reflected 
on the difficult relations established with the newly built environment. The rejection of 
the dictatorship may well be translated into a reluctance to accept whatever that 
government represented, including its architecture. Nevertheless, this would not 
entirely explain the situation, as democratic and totalitarian regimes alike have 
developed modernist projects in Latin America, as elsewhere, over more than 40 
years. It would be reductionist to focus only on the geopolitical response, excluding 
cultural interpretations of the phenomena. 
Therefore, neither will the connection of the territory be a defining element to 
encourage a sense of belonging, nor will the rejection of the state be persuasive 
enough to deconstruct a national identity. At this point, then, it will be necessary to 
explore alternative aspects to understand how state-sponsored projects of the mid-
twentieth century have resonated, and what have shaped their interpretations; in other 
words, how architectural objects have a dynamic role in the fluidity implied in the 
construction of national identity. 
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· Creation vs. imposition 
The construction of a new national identity was conclusive of the incursion into 
modernity – at least in the political discourse. The case of the Colombian National Plan 
of Public Works can be taken as an indicator of how being immersed in a given reality 
does not necessarily parallel the development of a sense of belonging and social 
appropriation. The regime claimed that state-sponsored projects were the result of the 
ambition of communities. It was a state interpellation of “the desire of the people”; 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954a, 3) however, the historical 
records make visible how these projects were a request of the dictatorship: 
On February the 11th, the directorate of information and 
propaganda of the state sent to [all] mayors of the country a 
circular asking those towns that had not started any 
[infrastructural] work spontaneously, to begin the construction of 
any of general utility. That circular quotes: the directorate of 
information and propaganda of the state clearly reiterates that 
the government is not demanding from you or the population 
excessive expenses […] the project should be called “June 
13th”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 
17) 
Nevertheless, in the same text, the dictatorship emphatically discouraged any 
demand of financial support from citizens: “wrongly, such a gracious date [i.e. June 
13th] could become a reason for economic sacrifices or new taxations”.  
Infrastructural projects were also the logical support for the industrial 
development of the nation, even if not all the projects seem to have a direct 
connection. A case in point would be Rojas’ speech in Barranquilla, which highlighted 
projects in the region such as a hydroelectric power station in the Sierra Nevada area, 
the road between Barranquilla and Santa Marta, housing in Barranquilla, the extension 
of the aqueduct, a hospital, and works to dredge the Bocas de Ceniza delta. Rojas 
described these as “[a]mongst the priority projects in order to improve the industrial 
and general development of this region”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas 
Pinilla) 1953b, 159)  
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Along with the social conflict, and the struggles of the rural communities, new 
projects were highlighted but these did not constitute a priority for the common 
audience. It is significant, however, that the 1940s to the 1960s represented the only 
period when there was a weekly section relating to new developments in the built 
environment in several newspapers and periodical magazines – i.e. every Tuesday in 
El Tiempo, or every Thursday in El Espectador.  
According to records in the media, these projects were not perceived by 
communities as fundamental to the development of nationhood, but as an answer to a 
greatly desired modernization and industrial growth, and indeed, as the collateral effect 
of internal migration from rural areas.246 However, Téllez asserts: “many of those 
‘public works’ were far less important to communities”, arguing that “[these projects] 
were simply appearing as they really were. […] They were random and improvised.” 
[emphasis in the original text] (Téllez Castañeda 2013) 
 
Figure 122. MOP reports using popular icons to resemble mass support for National 
Plan of Public Works © Un pais que trabaja 
The provision of welfare services and the restrictions of a military regime were 
intertwined. The authoritarian modernization pervaded the urbanization process, and 
pretended to define what may constitute a cultural reference. Even if the dictatorship 
claimed to have popular support, it was eroded by the excesses of force, and lack of 
consistency between actions and discourse. Rojas creation of a national identity was 
conceived as a top-down process, with wider concerns than the local and direct 
relation of those who were to experience the new spaces. 
Identity, as a social construction, has an intrinsic flux. It emerges from 
relationships, and shared beliefs: it is not a unidirectional or fixed product. (Anderson 
2004) Therefore, pretending that an unclear National Plan of Public Works would be 
passively received by the local population – the users of these projects – ensured a 
failed rhetoric about the creation of national symbols; which, as a result, are 
disregarded as can be drawn both, by the architectural history, and by the current 
                                                
246 This topic has been discussed by (Saldarriaga Roa 1984) 
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neglect of this legacy. Imposition of a pretended element of identity drives to resistance 
towards it. 
Within cultural studies of the region, Jens Andermann has suggested “the idea 
that the image, in Latin America, historically constitutes a contested site, one at which 
figurations of identity and alterity are constantly reproduced as well as re-assembled 
and re-signified”. (Andermann et al. 2005) This in part derives from Derrida’s proposal 
that identities emerge from exclusion and difference. (Curtin et al. 2007) The question 
therefore is to what extent the imposition of an “identity” may have created an “alterity” 
towards modernity.  
 
· Unfamiliar spaces 
The repercussions of the state architecture promoted by the dictatorship are 
difficult to define precisely. In the first instance, as has been commonly reported in the 
few scholarly references to the Plan’s projects, they were not understood, either at the 
urban or architectural levels. However they clearly shaped the urban development. As 
mentioned by José Salazar  
During this period [1950s] the interventions “without plan” are of 
great magnitude, and produced significant changes in the city. 
Some examples of public initiative are the ones that have 
defined the future development of the city, defining growth and 
occupation trends on the territory, vitality, activity areas, among 
others, as well as a common language in the architectural 
forms. (Salazar Ferro 2007) 
Although urban studies have been relevant in the construction of the collective 
character, the literature has persistently presented a superficial and fragmented 
interpretation of projects developed all around the country.  
Projects of the National Plan of Public Works were, initially, alien objects in their 
communities. Neither did its users understand the rapid adoption of new forms of 
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space.247 In the interview held with Captain Gustavo Ramírez García (2009),248 who 
was a recruit of the first group trained in 1961 at the Naval College, he genuinely 
recalls one aspect that marked his memories of the first years in Manzanillo in his late 
teens: “initially we thought that the buildings were designed to ‘sink’ into the terrain”. In 
other words, they expected the free plan of the ground floor that was composed only by 
structural pillars to be part of the foundation of the building, which with time and weight 
of the upper volume would penetrate the terrain, leaving the first floor as access level. 
The buildings to which he was referring were the dormitory pavilions. Which indeed 
initially had some structural problems as their foundations failed and the building went 
down in the ground some centimetres. (Ceballos 2009b) 
Two features contribute to this reading: first, the contemporary unfamiliarity with 
the prism’s elevation on pilotis that related not only to the formal composition common 
in the modern language, but also to prevent the expansive wave of explosions as part 
of the war tactics we have seen; and secondly, the technique used to raise the level of 
the island’s terrain through a traditional system of consolidating the soil by digging 
wooden pilotis, a technological innovation that raised curiosity not only among users 
but also in the construction industry. (Roa 2007) 
 
Figure 123. Image of the elevated pavilions at ENAP: users confronted with novel 
forms ©Corredera 
At a time of latent international tension and national struggle, projects of the 
National Plan of Public Works were presented individually, the public information about 
them always being fragmentary, ambivalent, and sudden. The saturation of information 
about individual projects with repetitive and partial data made it difficult to fully 
understand the new objects. In addition, after more than 50 years – and with the lack of 
information – it is difficult to identify which projects were exclusively the initiatives of the 
national government249 and, more importantly, how they related to various local, 
regional, or foreign networks.  
                                                
247 There is a distance from the image published in magazines and the practical understanding of 
the space or new living standards. 
248 I interviewed Captain Ramirez Garcia about his memories of his first years a recruit at the 
ENAP in 2009, at the ENAP, Cartagena (Ramírez García 2009)  
249 As opposed to foreign or local governments, or other organizations or individuals. 
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Two main aspects of consideration should be highlighted here. The strategic 
operation of the built environment not only introduced new forms that convey 
simultaneously the modernization of new living standards, and the protection sought in 
war-time, but the built environment was also highly shaped by the dictatorship’s 
manipulation of the information to frame its ambitious infrastructural projects. 
Propaganda was more easily assimilated than new spatial practices. 
My contention in this respect is that the poor level of understanding and 
awareness, combined with the saturation of information around projects of the National 
Plan of Public Works, contributed to the lack of identification they originally generated. 
It was not only an issue of the difficulty of relating to the new. Clearly, resistance to the 
new language joined with the manipulation of information to make it even more difficult 
to interpret what was not only unfamiliar but intended to be unknown. The built 
environment was instrumental in a double-truth strategy, of which only part of the 
whole agenda was public knowledge. 
 
· Normalized but ignored 
Users of the new infrastructure were conceived of and remained as external 
actors. These projects were meant to be used by the population: they were not isolated 
posts of control or dummies.250 Given the precariousness of the country, urbanization 
was a double opportunity to secure the territory whilst providing modern facilities. 
Indeed, the National Plan of Public Works addressed, at least in theory, popular 
aspirations and necessities. People had access to them in their everyday lives. They 
defined urban patterns, and consolidated new areas. Some of them have constituted 
local landmarks, even if they only allow a limited visual connection. By the 1970s 
modern projects had become unexceptional in the urban landscape as they constitute 
nearly 70% of urban areas. (Aprile Gniset 1991)  
The regime incentivized the construction of projects resembling this modernity – 
for instance, it gave higher subsidies for the use of materials such as concrete. Building 
                                                
250 Dummies practice occurred mainly in European cities during the Second World War. See 
(Cohen 2011)  
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projects were developed faster, helping rapid urban growth. Most urban areas were 
extended and developed after the 1950s. They become, therefore, the common image 
of the city. A building with formal abstraction, innovative techniques, concrete as a 
preferred material, and innovative functions became ordinary in the landscape. In 
consequence, these infrastructural projects were normalized in the everyday 
experience of intermediate and large cities.  
Recently, an architectural historian specializing in Brazilian modern 
architecture, Fernando Luiz Lara (2008) has claimed that, in contrast to the usual 
reception of modern architecture, in Brazil it has become highly popular and accepted 
as an image of progress. However, from the Colombian perspective, I would argue that 
there is a difference between being normalized, and developing a sense of belonging 
and identification with the built environment. In other words, just because a community 
is immersed in a specific context it does not necessarily mean that it is significant for 
the community. Other areas and architectures have created more tangible bonds. 
The function as modern conveniences, and nothing else, has been the reason 
to relate to these architectural projects; they are part of new living standards that have 
been internalized. Yet the materiality of these buildings has been ignored if not 
disregarded. The places do not belong to users; they have no control over, nor 
appreciation of them. The experience of the space of these public buildings is subject 
to institutional guidance. Therefore, public facilities become an overlooked container of 
urban life. 
It would be worth mentioning that rare exceptions make even more notorious 
the lack of appreciation of most of the projects. One might presume that infrastructure 
in general terms would not be a particular source of a sense of belonging. But it would 
be necessary to return to the distinction between different types of buildings of the 
National Plan of Public Works. On the one hand, buildings that explicitly represent the 
state are usually conceived as urban and social landmarks. As the scholar Caroline 
Humphreys (1973) has pointed out, infrastructural buildings aim to represent values 
and ideologies in power – in this case, the creation of the new nation. On the other 
hand are modern facilities that might adjust more to characterless commodities, which 
Tracing(the(Cold(War(in(Colombian(architecture:(a(disregarded(legacy((
María(del(Pilar(Sánchez=Beltrán( 259(
 
 
in this case will be related to the development ambition. Curiously enough, prominent 
exceptions are two remarkable facilities. One is the Universidad Industrial de 
Santander,251 which was the biggest academic campus in the north-east region of the 
country. The other is Medellín’s airport Olaya Herrera, which received acceptance and 
constitutes a key reference point of the city. (Londoño Marin et al. 1957) 
 
Figure 124. Modern spaces carrying a positive social meaning such as Olaya 
Herrera Airport, Medellin © Alejandro Agudelo 
The point to highlight here is that, regardless of the function, the appreciation 
and sense of belonging by the community towards these buildings did not respond to 
the expectations and discourse of the dictatorship. Most of them were used, and 
integrated in the daily life of urban areas, but have been ignored as architectural 
objects. No other value than that of modern service was attached to these state 
projects.  
 
· Refused as national representation 
The complexity of the period makes it necessary to consider alternative 
features. I recall here two political aspects we have seen, that may well have some 
impact on the reception of these projects. Both fluctuations in the discourse of a regime 
trying to remain in power and the political instability from the end of the second year in 
power (1955), that led to a rapid change of power returning to the traditional structures 
in 1957, may have played a part in the response towards these projects. But this was a 
common phenomenon of the Cold War in the region.  
The emerging scholar Luis Castañeda (2013) argues that in Latin America the 
deployment of “developmentalism” in the 1950s rapidly changed to internationalism 
from the 1960s onwards. Conversely, Andrea Giunta (2005), referring to Argentinian 
evolution in art, noted a synchronicity in discourses: “the internationalist project [was] 
complementary to the project of nation-building”. Giunta emphasizes how the ideal of 
                                                
251 The general plan of this campus was created before the Rojas regime, but during that 
government most of their buildings were constructed. 
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internationalism assured not only the condition of modernity but also the ambition to be 
on a level with centres of reference, namely Europe and the United States – to which I 
concur, adding that this interest in foreign countries was also related to shared 
aspirations and fears, as mentioned by Rojas, when addressing a circle of engineers 
and architects, and presenting his idea about the construction of a new state “beautiful 
and modern, similar to great American or European cities”. (Archivo Presidencia (1953-
1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1953b, 244) 
The message about modernity received by the community along with these 
projects was directly related mainly with the United States, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom. In Colombia, magazines such as Cromos played an important role in 
disseminating the modern living standards of these countries, as a driving paradigm. 
As noted by Valerie Fraser (2000), “in some ways the modern was synonymous with 
the foreign”.  
The state strategy played in multiple dimensions: firstly, an interest in 
constructing significance as a fellow country of others in the Western Hemisphere, 
which was related to the aspirational image as a modern country; secondly, 
consolidating the sisterhood of Latin American countries, whilst aspiring to a new 
nation. And, finally, there was the urgency of creating a difference from what at the 
time was identified as negative: communism. These dimensions thus emphasized the 
exterior identification of Colombia as a modern non-communist Latin American country, 
and indeed situated it in a prominent position for multinational organizations of the 
period, as discussed previously. Nevertheless, the internal work of social cohesion was 
a task left behind. An extended history of inequality and social fragmentation made this 
a difficult enterprise. 
Inconsistently, the emphasis on this alien origin had simultaneously both a positive and 
a negative connotation. Namely, what was positive was the possibility of paralleling 
with leading centres of the world. Simultaneously, it carried a negative side as the 
European and the United States’ innovations preserved the nuance of an imported, if 
not imposed, image, in which the local character was not easily perceived. Notably, in 
1959 the editorial article of the issue of Art in America dedicated to Latin American art 
contended that “the lack of differences, the extraordinary coincidence in style and 
viewpoint” between art from North and South America, was taken as a “proof of the 
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strength of the bonds that unite the Americas”. ("Special issue on Latin American art. 
Editorial"  1959) 
Modern architectural projects of this period responded to an international 
image, and new standards. The reality is that spaces may have had a different 
language but some of them retained a traditional organization, or even building 
techniques. Despite how different they may have appeared, they were not entirely 
alien. These projects created adaptations to the local conditions, making even more 
efficient available resources, as we have seen with the Naval College.  
One could remark therefore that this internationalism implied two ironies that 
have been discussed in previous studies. (Silvia Arango 1996, 1989) At one level, in 
the search for what in the modern postulates was identified as “universal image”, the 
singularities of the national were diluted if not omitted. At another level, the label of 
“foreign” created more resistance, as it reinforced the alien origin.  
Yet these premises could be considered near-sighted, oversimplifying the 
dismissal of these state projects, which in some cases had reached the level of 
rejection, as we have seen. Other architectures that have been considered proper to 
the national identity have also a foreign origin. For example, just to mention the two 
most prominent ones: the traditional centres of major cities have either the Spanish 
urban and architectural tradition, or the “Republican” image, which corresponds to the 
adaptation of alternative references such as neoclassical architecture. Therefore, 
invalidating this argument makes it evident that these explanations tend to overlook 
relevant historical facts. 
 
Figure 125. Universal and local spaces in the interior of ENAP: modern construction 
adapted to the context © ENAP 
In an effort to rescue the validity of internationalism as a premise in building 
modern nations in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, Giunta (2005) has 
argued that national identity was constructed not in the otherness, but in the 
indifference towards a global modern world. Controversially, Brillembourg (2004) 
acknowledges that local, or national, projects did not aim to create a particular 
expression, but that in different ways this architecture adopted features in order to 
adapt to the context, in particular to the climatic conditions of the tropics. Trying to 
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respond to the question of how “Colombian” was architecture developed as part of the 
National Plan of Public Works, I concur with the view that in the case of its architectural 
projects there is no evidence that a nationalist image was ever pursued. No specific 
guidelines for these projects were in rule. Yet adaptations and innovations respond to 
the available resources, and to the international modern image. 
 
 
7.4. Mediating architecture  
The circumstances in which the new architecture was introduced, through a 
hasty run of small and dispersed projects, conditioned the user’s approaches to these 
spaces: the mediation of this architecture shaped its integration and assimilation. The 
regime highly mediated the infrastructural and architectural projects of the National 
Plan of Public Works. Not only were they used as a political tool by the military 
government, but also the influx of other forces and generators of opinion, such as the 
media, and the informed community, obscured the interpretation and more natural 
assimilation of the works.  
Regarding the mediation of architecture, Adrian Forty (2012a) has pointed out 
how it has a capacity to transform the relation of the observer or user with an object, 
acting as filter that frames the interpretation of the space. Thus, questions arise as to 
the extent of the dictatorship’s control over the process of both creation and 
representation. One can assert that the way in which National Plan of Public Works’ 
projects were presented, exhibited, but also polemicized, shaped the public reception 
of them. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, regardless of the continuous flow of 
information, there was a lack of knowledge about these projects. The mediation did not 
intend a better comprehension or relation of users with the new spaces. They were just 
part of the political game. Propaganda spread in the media about these projects was 
addressed to the determination of accomplishing new living standards and 
development. Addressing a crowd in a small town, Pacho, Cundinamarca, Rojas 
affirmed: “The budget of the Ministry of Public Works and the ICT will provide for the 
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construction of hygienic and modern buildings for workers and middle class groups”. 
(Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1955)  
The assimilation of these projects was framed from the time of their conception, 
construction and experience. The particular mode in which state buildings were 
understood, or not, was conditioned with the ambition of achieving the modernity of the 
most developed countries. 
 
Figure 126. Hybrid and everyday architecture: alternative response to modernity: 
hall inside the pavilions ENAP © MPSB 
However, involving local communities was rarely considered. As mentioned in 
the case of the Naval College, some studios of local professionals participated at some 
stages of the project, but that was all. There is no reference in the archives about 
concerns to involve communities in defining the projects they would receive. Users 
were conceived and addressed as observers, even better as external observers – in 
other words, as spectators. In this respect, Ranciere (2009) argues: 
Being a spectator means looking at a spectacle. And looking is 
a bad thing, for two reasons. Firstly looking is put as the 
opposite of knowing. It means being in front of an appearance 
without knowing the conditions of production of that appearance 
or the reality which is behind it. Secondly, looking is put as the 
opposite of acting […] without any power of intervention. 
I have discussed the extent to which this architecture has been passively 
received. At this point, my stress is on the presentation of the architectural object as 
the embodiment of the political project; but part of the contradiction one may find 
concerns the relative freedom with which architects created their projects. One could 
therefore claim that, more than the object itself, it was the mediation of architectural 
projects that was politicized. 
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· Soft counter-offensive  
The subversion towards power is to be expected, as Certeau (1984) has 
argued. In this case, it takes different scopes, one of which is the non-passive 
response towards the mediation itself. In consonance with the use of – until then – non-
conventional means, puzzled reactions are unsurprising. Understanding how the 
reception operated by different actors evolved through history requires the observation 
of two-way strategies and practices of power.  
We have analysed some of the reactions from the immediate community of 
users, which indeed can be surprising enough. Other interpretations can be read not 
only from what is in the archives and literature, but from what is absent. Which proves 
my point about how the illustrated community has interpreted the regime’s 
infrastructure, and how their informed opinion has created an impact on the reception 
of this infrastructure. In other words, how what has been ignored or forgotten has also 
shaped the interpretation of the phenomena. Hence, I will take the notion of 
emancipation suggested by Ranciere (2010) – after assuming the active role of the 
spectator – that in turn, benefits form the idea of “counter-memory”, where through 
interpretation of the given reality, it becomes transformed, and lastly reconfigured.  
Authors such as Andrea Giunta (2005) have claimed that cultural exchanges, 
as instruments of mutual persuasion, were uneven in their impact and reception, taking 
into account that in Latin America exhibitions about US works took a prominent place, 
whereas those from the region were relegated to marginal spaces. 252  
And it is here that foreign tensions of the Cold War became entangled. 
Interestingly, foreign references about the development of modern architecture in 
Colombia coincide with the more apprehensive international relationships of the 
regime.253 The economic and politic report of [1955] states: 
Internal threats to political stability were apparent in several 
countries due primarily to the unpopularity of governments with 
                                                
252 Alexander Gonzalez (2011) presents an extended document about exhibitions in the 
construction of Pan-American ideal. 
253 Interest of Colombian can be traced from it registers in different journal and magazines a t the: 
Forum issue of November 1946. 
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important groups within their countries, economic difficulties, or 
a combination of the two. The dissatisfaction of important 
elements was obvious in Argentina, Colombia, Cuba and 
Guatemala. (Novak et al. 1998) 
Remarkably, there is a temporal correspondence in late 1955 with the distance 
between the Rojas and US governments, the reduction of programmes of technical 
cooperation of foreign agencies, and the noticeable absence of references to 
Colombian architecture in international records of the time, which it would be worth 
noting were commissioned by the MoMA, as part of the cultural exchanges. Earlier 
reports about architecture, as the one from Giedion argues, Colombia as much as 
Finland, Brazil, Venezuela were: “centres of new vitality.”  
Countries which have been slumbering in their own lethargy or 
under oppression begin to awake and to become active 
participants in an evolution which is encompassing the entire 
world. (Giedion 1958)  
Apparently, the architecture emerging in Colombia as a reference of 
modernism, but later this disappears. It thus vanishes from the most disseminated 
literature. It would be nonsense to deny the importance of achievements of other 
countries such as Brazil and México, but the point addressed here is the reduced 
visibility of other prominent examples such as the case of “notably Colombia, 
Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay”, which are identified by Hitchcock as “architecturally 
active”. (Hitchcock 1954a) 
Tracing documents of the US cooperation and cultural exchanges at the 
Rockefeller Archive Centre (RAC), I found that when exploring the region gathering 
information for the exhibition, and publication at the MoMA, they had local contacts in 
each country. They were meant to be a knowledgeable source about the latest 
developments in terms of architecture. In this sense, Molina (2012) reports the 
existence of a list of contacts in Latin America that Sert sent to Hitchcock, which is in 
the collection at the Smithsonian and might or might not coincide with the report 
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prepared at the MoMA as a briefing for the delegation of the survey, mentioned by Del 
Real.254 I have not consulted them. 
Nevertheless, in the Nelson Rockefeller collection for the Inter American 
system, I found a report relating to the MoMA project in Latin America, which indicates 
that the architect Dicken Castro acted as Colombia’s contact point for the MoMA. 
(Hitchcock 1955-1957) In retrospect, Castro himself was a surprise, his internal 
position in the country at the time being not particularly relevant,255 but his presence 
may be explained as he was a former student at the Oregon-Eugene University, which 
probably gave him key international contacts. Castro’s correspondence with Hitchcock 
remains in the collection of the latter in the Smithsonian archives.  
In the interview I had with Dicken Castro, (2011) he did not remember any 
contact with the MoMA in the 1950s nor any selection or participation in that project. 
Admittedly, after more than 50 years a sudden request to remember that long ago was 
a difficult task. So the information about what Castro recommended as a “prominent 
example” of the Colombian development is still to be discovered from the written 
documents. 
 
Figure 127. Few architectural projects selected as representative of Colombian 
modernity between 1945-1955 © HITCHCOCK 
According to the MoMA press release of November 23rd, 1955, (Art] 1955) in a 
preliminary survey 10 countries were visited – México, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panamá, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina. I have not found 
much information about the visit architectural historian Henry-Russell Hitchcock (1903-
1987) made with photographer Rosalie Thorn (Rollie) McKenna (1918-2003) to Bogotá 
and Medellín.  
There is a gap between Hitchcock’s initial appraisals in 1954 when he noted “of 
course I was already aware that Mexico, Brazil, and after them Colombia and 
                                                
254 In (del Real 2012) there is a reference of "Data on Personalities in Latin American Countries 
Prepared for the Use of Henry-Russell Hitchcock and R. Thorne McKenna," n/d, unpaginated. CE, II.1. 
69(1) 3/5. MoMA Archives, NY. 
255 Dicken Castro (1922) is an architect with a prolific career in graphic design. Received the life 
and legacy award of the Ministry of Culture in 2012 
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Venezuela have the best stuff” (Hitchcock 1954b) and what was published in the 
survey on Latin American architecture 1945-1955, (Hitchcock 1955) in which Colombia 
is misrepresented with bizarre and minimal reference to projects that are clearly not 
relevant or outstanding objects by any means. In the text there is no visible explanation 
for this dramatic change. Perhaps the emerging architecture found did not meet 
expectations, but the examples shown in this research are clearly more valuable than 
the pieces to which the country was reduced. Further exploration on the rationale of 
this gap might shed some light on the agency of the reaction to the international 
political perception – and friendliness – in cultural exchange activities, as opinion-
makers. So far, quality does not necessarily equate with international recognition. 
 
Figure 128. Most Colombian modern architecture has fallen outside records despite 
its architectural values, Cali Countryside Club, 1955  © CARANGO  
 
· Memory shaping 
According with soft power strategies, the fugacity of the information, access, 
and the simultaneity of different undergoing projects made it difficult to retain data. It 
helped in restraining the capacity of retention, and helped to expedite neglect. Which in 
turn corresponds with Adrian Forty’s idea that “forgetting is the decay of imprint”. (Forty 
et al. 2001) I argue therefore, that the strategies of the dictatorship with regard to the 
meditation of projects of the National Plan of Public Works were oriented to shape 
processes of remembering and forgetting. 
The saturation of highly mediated information, and multiplicity of projects that 
were filling the political discourse and the media, did not allow their fixation in people’s 
memory. The dynamic flow of information implied a short retention of it. The 
urbanization process and the rapid growth of the cities were part of daily life during the 
mid-twentieth century.  
 
Figure 129. A highly mediated dictatorship shaped the representation of it and its 
products © DIPE 
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Architecture and engineering were at the very centre of the modernization, but it fell 
short of representing a national ideal. The National Plan of Public Works did indeed 
build all around the country, and contributed to the physical and practical cohesion of 
the nation. But it did not represent the image of the nation. It would not be possible to 
cite a specific building as representative of Colombia, neither for ordinary people nor 
for intellectuals.256 The Plan did not construct a national identity as the dictatorship was 
claiming.  
Fittingly, the DIPE highlighted: “Some newspapers reported ‘Colombia feels 
again like a fatherland’. The fatherland has been re-conquered, and the state has 
finally come into existence.” (Archivo Presidencia (1953-1957: Rojas Pinilla) 1954d, 7) 
Before the 1950s, the state presence was almost non-existent in some regions and 
indeed the establishment of these infrastructural projects made the institutions and 
services provided by the state more visible. But then, here one should trace a 
difference between what can be conceived as fatherland and nation; terms that were 
interchangeable in Rojas’ discourse when referring to the country. Although the 
emphasis of the government’s policy was the renewal of the idea of nation what was 
received from the population was the existence of a fatherland. The cultural studies’ 
scholar Mirela-Luminata Murgescu (2002) highlights the importance of the difference 
between these two terms:  
The construction of identities implies necessarily the activation 
of concepts and affects towards this territory, […] as Fatherland 
or Motherland. This territory can overlap with the state where 
the respective community lives, but may also include regions 
belonging to other states, or be completely outside the 
respective state. 
And Murgescu (2002) goes on to emphasize: “the nation is a community of 
people who feel united through the same customs or through a certain way of thinking 
and who have the sentiment that they form a group different to others”. In accord with 
                                                
256 In the case of Brazil o México the government programs embrace a specific image as 
representative of their nationhood, and it has remained as reference of their identity. 
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this, Diane Curtin has pointed out that in Latin America,257 “geographic place no longer 
provides a strong sense of cultural identity, and conflating national and cultural 
identities becomes particularly problematic”. (Curtin et al. 2007) That social mind-frame 
as nation remained only in the regime’s discourse, but did not transcend to the 
population.  
The mediation of the built environment helped therefore to construct a territorial 
awareness of the extended and diverse Colombia. In a decidedly established tradition 
to focus only on the capital city, having a plan that appealed to emphasize in a national 
territory is allegedly a positive turn. Yet the mediation of the built projects making an 
emphasis in the territory minimised the local and immediate impact of the buildings. 
Drawing on the strategy of the Rojas regime, individual buildings were meant to be 
overlooked.  
 
 
7.5. Required emancipation 
Unravelling the complexity of Latin American modernism and nation-building in 
modern times, Jorge Larrain (1996) has pointed out how Latin American modernity is 
not entirely imposed, nor mutely adopted, but has a hybrid character, which brings us 
back to Garcia Canclini. This also implies a two-way process of negotiating and dealing 
with what has been explicit and what has remained untold. 
 
Figure 130. Revision of common interpretations: alternative view of the ENAP 
dormitories 2010 © MPSB 
The interpretation of the modern process in Latin America derives basically 
from the tension between modernity and modernization.258 It essentially addresses the 
                                                
257 This geographer takes as case study Ecuador, but points out similar characteristics in the 
Latin American region that shares a common colonial history under the Spanish rule.  
258 In Latin America it has been an extended space of debate, and has copious literature. The 
debate range having prominent names not only of cultural studies, but from cultural disciplines, such as 
literature. Such is the case of Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes, amongst others. 
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complexity and multiplicity of the phenomena – in particular the incongruence between 
the rhetorical discourse and practice. This leads to questions about the ambivalence of 
the modern project, and the reception of it, as a simulacrum – what Octavio Paz has 
identified as “pseudo-modernity”, as seen in Chapter 1. 
The infrastructural legacy of the Rojas dictatorship has been a case of both top-
down and bottom-up processes. Ranciere exhorts thus it deserves urgent attention: 
It calls for spectators who are active as interpreters, who try to 
invent their own translation in order to appropriate the story for 
themselves and make their own story out of it. An emancipated 
community is in fact a community of storytellers and translators. 
(Ranciere 2009) 
The architecture of the mid-twentieth century in Colombia is a “surviving 
witness” of a complex and contradictory period that still has to be entirely discovered. 
This architecture still constitutes an important part of Colombian cities, and the 
emerging scholarship has a role to play in the activation of the absence; rational inquiry 
about what happened at that time and its materialization will constitute our 
emancipation. 
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8. Conclusion: Double-truth practices 
To date, the state architecture built during Rojas Pinilla’s dictatorship has been 
largely overlooked; this thesis has identified it and provided an interpretation of what 
happened. My research has enquired into the rationale behind the transformation of 
the built environment during the regime, and its consequences in architectural history 
and culture. It has investigated the strategies in use in the context of the Cold War, 
tracing relations based on the representation of pre-eminent projects, and questioning 
the historical interpretation given to them. 
Drawn from the historical evidence, the conclusion of this investigation is that 
the political mediation and instrumentalization of architecture have conditioned not only 
the creation and materialization of the built environment, but also its reception and 
interpretation. Colombian state architecture created during the mid-twentieth century 
responded to what Caillois (1984) identified as a double-truth strategy, that has deeply 
shaped not only the architecture itself, but also the way it has been treated in 
architectural history and contemporary debates about heritage.  
This research has addressed the architecture as a materialization of the political 
project of a modern state in Latin America that, in responding to the complex dynamics 
during the Cold War. During this period two important trends simultaneously shaped 
the development of the region. One that has been widely recognized related to the 
implementation of social services and facilities of the modern life. And the second one, 
that operated in a less visible manner, that is, the concern with the defence of the 
hemisphere. By increasing awareness about the strategies in use within the mediation 
of these state projects, this thesis has set out to foster the acknowledgement of what 
was deliberately created in order to be forgotten. In doing so, this research challenges 
common assumptions about the lack of value of modern Colombian architecture from 
this period, and ultimately calls for a re-evaluation of these projects, which, as Henry-
Russell Hitchcock (1954c) initially suggested, deserve better consideration.  
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8.1. Neglected (but still present) history 
This research has combined international sources and a methodological 
approach with specific historical knowledge about Colombia. It has been mainly driven 
by questions that emerged from the lack of available information in the current 
historiography; a lack which contradicted the popular reference in the most distant 
regions that attributes part of the existing infrastructure to the dictatorship. Over the 
course of my research, it became apparent that the archival information that I 
uncovered was likely to remain contradictory and incomplete. The official records this 
research took as its primary source were highly cryptic, deliberately muddled, and yet 
sensitive; but they were necessarily the initial point from which to reconstruct a history 
of a neglected period. This realization required that I rethink the strategy by which I 
was approaching my subject. If I wanted to understand these architectural projects in 
relation to each other, then I needed to better understand the general context in which 
they were built and to analyse the rationale for the programme, the National Plan of 
Public Works, of which they were part. And that frame of reference necessarily was 
neither restricted to national archives, nor to the four years of the regime. Awareness 
about the national and international context has made more comprehensible the 
paradoxes of this space production. 
While recognizing the important contribution made by the current 
historiography, there is still little information about what happened at the turning point 
of the development of the built environment in Colombia. Therefore the proposed 
challenge was to reconcile the inconsistency between scholarship and the built 
environment. My academic experience and my own political position made me very 
sceptical. I assumed a distance from the regime, and positioned myself as an outsider, 
as I did not have direct experience of the dictatorship, but only of its built legacy. 
This research has made a concerted effort to find sources of information about 
an obscure period. This was an enterprise that required meticulous scrutiny of the 
available historical data, joining many of the dots and filling in the gaps in the cultural 
and political history relating to Colombian architecture. The information was 
contradictory and ambivalent, which meant that often before fully trusting it, I attempted 
to cross-reference it against other sources. Despite considerable effort, it was not 
always possible to verify the data; in those cases where it was not possible, I have tried 
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to highlight the contradiction or gap in the hopes that some future studies may be able 
to shed light on the matter. 
Themes such as the Cold War strategies emerged from the data collected, 
becoming a suitable resource to make sense of the historical registers and voids. The 
most difficult aspect of this research was trying to identify the guiding logic behind what 
has continued to be a confusingly ill-defined Plan of infrastructure: the almost 
excessive amount of (misleading) public information about the Plan stands in stark 
contrast to the scarcity of internal records. A breakthrough moment occurred when I 
realized that, rather than some of these areas of confusion simply being the result of 
poor documentation, they may actually reveal the logic of the Rojas government: that 
is, the Rojas government may well have been engaged upon a campaign of deliberate 
obfuscation and manipulation – in other words, camouflage and soft power, masking 
the full extent of their building activities.  
A recurring question has been: why would a dictatorship engage in such a 
manipulatory strategy? This thesis has presented different possible interpretations 
given the sensitive geographical, social and political conditions of Colombia at the time, 
and the particularities of a populist regime. I would summarize them in three main 
intersecting explanations for the paradoxes of such a double-truth enterprise. First, by 
specifically addressing vulnerable social sectors, the National Plan of Public Works 
aimed to control the rural conflicts that were then translated by migration to the 
suburban areas. This ensured not only the efficient provision of materials, and funding 
through international cooperation, but also rapid construction through standardised 
processes that eased the incorporation into new living standards of the modern world. 
It thereby controlled urban expansion. Secondly, such infrastructure also ensured a 
state presence in vulnerable sectors and regions that until then were mostly 
unexplored, i.e. rural areas with precedents of violence, which were more responsive to 
the expansive communist discourses that were rapidly being disseminated. The 
considerable number of civic buildings, thus, not only allowed some of them to act as a 
smoke screen in the construction of purely defence installations, but also occupied 
strategic sites to support the democratic discourse with buildings that provided modern 
services and support networks, of either shelter or mobility, as is the case of the 
network of airports. That is, it ensured territorial awareness. Thirdly, the military regime 
permanently tried to reduce the ever-growing political resistance and legitimize its 
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government by gaining favouritism from popular sectors through the creation of social 
services and facilities. In the creation of Rojas’ political capital, the benevolence of 
services provided was a more effective proposition than was strategic control of the 
population. 
The use of alternative sources of evidence has been a challenging endeavour, 
but it has proved fruitful to address the sensitivity of the information and the context. 
The material gathered from official sources mainly in Colombia and the United States 
has offered the opportunity of a more complete understanding of architectural objects 
that have to date remained disregarded in architectural culture.  
Based on the conceptualization of space and power, the thesis has provided an 
enquiry into the discourses and strategies of the time. I have investigated the creation, 
representation, and interpretation of modernist projects in Colombia, on different 
scales: national (network of airports), regional (Boyacá), urban (Bogotá), and 
architectural (ENAP). This multiscalar approach allowed me also to question the space 
produced by the state in the mid-twentieth century, and how it has been experienced 
and registered. 
Approaching such a sensitive subject as a dictatorship proved to be more 
difficult than initially imagined. I had to be extremely cautious about still active 
animosities against or in favour of the regime, and had to be particularly careful to 
emphasize that this research is a critical assessment of the infrastructural plan, and 
neither a blind celebration of, nor an attempt to annihilate, the regime and its politics 
and built projects. This thesis does not advocate for totalitarian regimes; it is a call for, 
and contribution to, the informed analysis of the produced space.  
 
8.2. Learning from a disregarded construction  
The Naval College reflects what occurred on a larger scale with the National 
Plan of Public Works. Even though the modernization of the country did not begin with 
Rojas, the regime’s explicit interest in projecting a modern image boosted the 
consolidation of modernist architecture through standardization of processes, the 
structuring of suburban and rural areas, the use of industrialized materials, the 
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language of abstraction, pure forms, and updated functions. Modern architecture was 
built in Colombia through numerous ordinary and small projects disseminated in new 
territories. These facilities enabled and represented improved living standards at a time 
that appeared to warrant state presence and control. But then, as has been shown, 
they became highly stigmatized, and neglected in architectural culture.  
The evidence suggests that the regime’s transformation of the built environment 
was deliberately meant to be discrete. Not only were the facilities low-profile 
constructions, but also the state information about the projects was also misleading, or 
fragmented. The way in which information was manipulated is consistent with known 
soft power tactics. (Nye 2004) Publically, however, the representation of these projects 
was highly mediated, and thus they were portrayed as urgent and necessary projects 
of development. There was no mention made of national security or international 
defence aspects, which we now know were part of the complete picture.  
Although I found no explicit advice or guidelines about industrial camouflage 
specifically for those building in Latin America or Colombia, from the data collected 
about the Rojas National Plan of Public Works it seemed likely that camouflage had 
been deployed at some level. Historically, Colombia has been keener to observe and 
take as a reference what happens in the United States and Europe than in the rest of 
Latin America. In terms of the materialization itself, the physical characteristics of 
infrastructural projects co-relate to mostly US manuals of industrial camouflage, 
(Wittmann et al. 1942) showing similar patterns in terms of the location, image, and 
forms. And even if there was no explicit manual on camouflage for Latin American 
architects, this was not necessary for the diffusion of these principles, given that most 
architects operating in Colombia were educated in America or Europe or worked with 
consultants who had been. I have explained in the thesis how this operated both on the 
urban and architectural levels.259 The relevant point about camouflage and soft power 
strategies, however, is that they distort buildings or make them resemble something 
different from, or simpler than, what they really are, and this was a pattern I found 
repeated over and over again in the products of the National Plan of Public Works. 
                                                
259 It may be worth mentioning that there are more keys to decoding these buildings, which I have 
not included in the thesis, for security reasons, and to honour the non-disclosure agreements signed in 
order to gain access to reserved material relevant for this research.  
Data restriction
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Indeed, it is hard not to conclude that these state projects were intended to be 
overlooked. The proliferation of non-iconic projects was suitable in order to avoid 
resistance with buildings that projected an image of openness, to embed posts of 
territorial control through numerous small-scale buildings, and later to build political 
capital upon addressing the most troubled sectors. The regime sought to consolidate 
its control both through the welfare provision of social services and the warfare system 
of defence construction, the latter perhaps much more possible given the military 
regime. Development programmes provided an appropriate scenario for the 
experimentation and accomplishment of multiple agendas. Invisibility thus suited the 
regime’s ends. 
Colombia subscribed to the US idea: “development equals security”. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Colombia received cooperation from Germany, the 
United Kingdom and France, but after the Second World War the United States 
became the main foreign influence in Latin America and in particular in Colombia. It 
was an open door to the US backyard within the larger frame of the mutual security act. 
In the early years of the Cold War, the influence of the United States and multilateral 
organisms was strengthened. The cooperation took different forms, but it mainly 
involved know-how, resources, and qualified labour. To date, that influence has not 
been fully comprehended, particularly not in relation to the built environment.  
This cultural analysis of the interaction between architecture and power 
questions the mediation of architecture through the strategies in use during the Cold 
War. It draws on Lefebvre’s idea of the simultaneous and dialectical construction of the 
society and the built environment; a conditioner and product; a medium and 
representation; production and interpretation. (1991) As a result, I found that the 
rationale behind the huge transformation of the built environment was 
misrepresentation. This architecture was a political instrument that responded to the 
double-truth idea. (Caillois et al. 1984) That is to say, the National Plan of Public Works 
simultaneously promoted welfare, providing modern facilities, and warfare, creating a 
state presence and posts of national and international control. State architecture 
embodied tactics and strategies creating a deliberate self-effacement of thousands of 
infrastructural projects: as functional, non-iconic objects, they were meant to seem 
everyday and non-threatening, non-political and non-ideological. Certainly, the majority 
of them were completely opposite to the grandiose expressions of state power that we 
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see at the time in other Latin American countries, the example par excellence being 
Brasilia.  
It has been my contention that these strategies shaped the public reception and 
interpretation of the architecture, and has since had both cultural and material 
consequences. A lack of understanding about these facilities and their association with 
the regime has continued until now, and from this has emerged a conflictive relation 
with these buildings. Despite the fact that, as has been demonstrated, these 
infrastructural projects were not necessarily innocent, they provided facilities that have 
become part of the habitus, being therefore normalized and overlooked. 
This self-effacement has been reinforced by the canon of architectural history, 
which has ignored and disregarded potentially valuable projects of modernist 
architecture. More notoriously still, it has omitted projects that were initially identified as 
architecturally valuable, as is the case of the Naval College. The neglect of state 
architecture of the 1950s in turn has made even more operative the set-up of framed 
memories about these projects. I found that silence as resistance to the architectural 
history had counter-productive results. Silence about these projects does not mean 
forgetting, on the contrary it reinforce the resistance to them. It has led to the 
jeopardizing of modernism as language that also produced objects worthy of 
reconsideration.  
What remains unknown? What has been untold in this history? Both what has 
become known through this thesis, and what still remains unknown, suggest that this 
topic may well prove to be a fruitful terrain for academic research for years to come. At 
the very least, this research has demonstrated that the dictatorship’s architectural and 
infrastructural projects were significant, singly and as a totality, and should no longer 
be excluded from architectural history.  
 
8.3. Discussing the created invisibility 
My thesis contributes to architectural culture by providing an understanding of 
the production of the built environment within complex dynamics and, in so doing, it 
raises significant questions about what has been included in or excluded from the 
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history of modern Colombian architecture. The context of the Cold War offers a 
different perspective about a turning point in the urbanization process, and the 
adoption of a modern image; that is to say, it identifies the years of the Rojas 
dictatorship as crucial to this process, in contrast with what has been either said in the 
past or left unspoken. Fundamentally, it problematizes the mediation and 
instrumentalization of architecture that, despite being an overlooked and unloved 
legacy, is still valuable and representative of a global historical and cultural 
phenomenon. 
Perhaps the most palpable contribution of this research is revealing original and 
unknown material, and its interpretation. It has built a foundation of data and identified 
relevant sources of information, most of which have recently become more accessible 
as restrictions on them have been eased. In the first place, this thesis has contributed 
to filling a gap in national history, calling attention to the possible value of state 
architectural projects of the 1950s, and contesting the established canon about 
Colombian modern architecture. But the thesis’ analysis provides further outcomes. 
Acknowledging that the dictatorship was a difficult political period, this research 
nonetheless supports the idea that it marked a decisive change in the development of 
the built environment. However, the absurdities and excesses of the regime 
overshadowed the historical impact on the space production. State projects of the time 
have not to date been documented or explained. They have remained overlooked, and 
in some cases downplayed, being associated simply with their use as facilities – and 
still highly politicized. The study of them as architectural objects, i.e. their architectural 
qualities and their historical significance, has been neglected, even though the task has 
become more urgent in recent years as some projects of that time are in jeopardy.  A 
critical understanding of them constitutes an opportunity for an informed and balanced 
assessment of their cultural significance and architectural value. 
Situating modern Colombian architecture in an international context not only 
provides a new understanding of the architectural and urban development, but also 
contributes to its visibility as part of a wider strategy, that could potentially be traced in 
other countries. This thesis can be allied with the growing critical interest in alternative 
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modernities,260 that is, modernism that does not necessarily develop the same way that 
it did in Europe and the United States or, indeed, in other Latin American countries. 
This differentiated form of modernism was the outcome of the dialectics between the 
politics and architecture of Latin America in the 1950s. The enthusiastic construction of 
newly built environments and societies presents a valuable case study that is different 
to the most well-known references, finding spaces where it was conversant with what 
had occurred in a global context.  
This contribution to architectural and cultural history sheds light on an obscure 
period in Colombian history and provides an interpretation of the phenomenon by 
tracing relations of projects so far ignored. Considering political, economic, and social 
aspects that conditioned the built environment, I have traced the relationships with the 
politics and strategies of the time. Indeed, this is the first explicit study of architectural 
projects related to the Cold War in Latin America. The evidence found suggests that 
multiple agendas were being materialized in architectural or urban objects, which in 
turn raise awareness about the multiple representations, or even mis-representations, 
that may be conveyed by architecture. 
Analysis of the architecture as political instrument questions to what extent such 
connotations act against the value and significance of the architectural object. This can 
be considered an ethical, or even a psychological, concern, but mostly it is a cultural 
issue. My contention here is that neglecting the existence of the multiple agendas 
conveyed by architecture results in the built environment being affected more 
negatively. 
 
8.4. Following steps  
The growing interest in discovering and analyzing other architectures in Latin 
America during the time I have been working on this research has been stimulating, as 
it tells of the importance of and need for this research. Emerging discussions and 
                                                
260 The scholar debate about alternative, differential or multiple modernities is a necessary 
reference in relation to Latin America in order to discuss the non-monolithic phenomenon. C.f. (Rabaté 
2013), (García Canclini et al. 2005), (Eisenstadt 2002), (Gaonkar 2001), (Rabaté 1996). 
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thought-provoking scholarly studies have been opportunities to air different rationales 
for why the built environment in this region during the mid-twentieth century was 
shaped as it was.  
However, this research is only a first step in laying the foundation for future 
work. The more we know about the subject, the more valuable areas of enquiry 
appear. For instance, two immediate themes are already apparent. First, there is a 
pressing need to investigate the specific details of the involvement of US agencies and 
companies in Colombia. This requires more archival material from different sources, 
but potentially the study of projects developed by SOM and MoMA in Colombia will be 
highly illustrative for reaching a deeper understanding of the extent and nature of 
technical and cultural cooperation. Secondly, in studies about camouflage, the role of 
the observer has been overlooked and this is something that could be fruitfully 
addressed in future work. An analysis of how this external position has been 
maintained over time, affecting the interpretation and reception of architecture, would 
provide more elements for discussing material culture. 
The paper presented at the annual conference of the Society of Architectural 
Historians in 2012 brought the opportunity to find some parallels with other countries in 
South America, especially Paraguay, Cuba, and Venezuela, that will be worth 
exploring. The Colombian scenario of vulnerability and rapid change during the Cold 
War was similar to theirs. A comparative study addressing the specificity of each 
country would necessarily require collaborative and interdisciplinary research. Two 
main areas of enquiry could be identified here: on the one hand, foreign interactions 
with other governments; and, on the other, the more informal and immediate outcomes 
of migratory patterns. 
Meanwhile it is widely recognized that the dominant political agenda in Latin 
America during the Cold War was an open resistance to the communist influence. The 
relation and impact of US foreign policies and cooperation exchanges were presented 
as support for the development of the region. Nevertheless, the United States was not 
the only government actively involved in the region. For instance, it would be worth to 
enquire the involvement on the built environment production and cultural projects of the 
emerging socialist movements in the region that were supported by the former Soviet 
Union, and other governments, trying to counter-balance the US influence. (Wiarda et 
al. 2007) Therefore, a comparative analysis of other international relations and foreign 
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interactions could potentially provide a more complete understanding of the highly 
supported trends of development of the built environment in Latin America. 
And perhaps of a wider interest, there is another topic that can be approached 
making use of the advances reached here. Numerous immigrants, mainly Europeans, 
arrived in Latin America during the two World Wars and the early years of the Cold 
War.261 From a rapid survey it is clear that they played a key role in both the 
educational system and practice of architecture in their receiving countries. In the light 
of network theories, this could be another area of enquiry as a phenomenon of currents 
of thought and flows of information.  
These questions are also relevant in the continuation of a cultural analysis of 
the Colombian case. The relationships with other governments and the crucial role 
played by migrants – in particular German, Italian, and Spanish immigrants – will shed 
light on the exchanges that significantly shaped modern development in the country. 
The opportunity to pursue this research in a more global context has shown the 
relevance of understanding Colombian architecture not as an isolated case, but as part 
of a wider phenomenon. It is my intention to continue working on tracing the 
architectural history of these international connections.  
 
8.5. Rethinking the modern legacy 
Admittedly, the study of the Colombian Naval College and the National Plan of 
Public Works is necessarily specific, but through these projects I have discussed a 
wider scenario about the exterior factors, actions, and processes that intervene in the 
production of space. For all its specific insights, my study is relevant more broadly, in 
that it demonstrates how architecture can be mediated by multiple agendas and 
suggests that, in the Cold War, these multiple agendas were often embedded in 
modern forms. Those multiple ambitions, and expressions were widely disseminated 
                                                
261 The Colombian record for the Committee for International Coordination of National Research 
in Demography (Asociacion Colombiana para el estudio de la poblacion -ACEP 1974) reports that 
according to data of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) – now OIM – 
between 1952 and 1974, 7,904 Europeans migrated to Colombia, most of them professional and 
technicians with their families. 
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given the implementation of similar politics of development and modernization at a time 
of greater expansion of multinational interactions. 
Cultural and historical impacts (negative and positive) of the instrumentalization 
of the built environment – which has been commonly represented as the ultimate 
embodiment of novelty and abstraction – should be understood and critically 
discussed. Architectural culture needs to learn from them, from their complexity and, by 
doing so, to draw a distinction between the rejection of the political period that 
produced it and the denigration of any potential value or historical and social interest of 
the architectural object itself. Systematic biases weaken architectural history. 
Cold War realities and representations in development programs, at least in 
Latin America, are a double-edged sword, as that mediation ends up distorting the 
results. Awareness about the consequences of high mediation in turn questions 
simplistic interpretations of the architectural object as artefact, where there is no 
consideration of the multiplicity it can embody, or even its mis-representation. 
This research has addressed architecture as a material representation of 
power, including the hidden practices and nature of that power. This 
instrumentalization is not necessarily explicit; thus it conveys multiple meanings, which 
have cultural implications on the conflictive relation that people develop with the 
artefact. This presents a difficulty for the interpretation of cultural meaning, the 
construction of identity, valuation as worth, and the construction of a sense of 
belonging. Yet the reality is that Colombia is not an isolated case. Questioning aspects 
of the production of its built environment under Rojas allows us to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the differentiated modernist architecture of the mid-twentieth 
century. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. ENAP general plan: prized state project during the regime, published 
in 1955 © Proa 91 
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Figure 2. Naval College designed by Obregon & Valenzuela, 1955-1961: 
representative project of modern architecture promoted by the state © ENAP 
 
 
Figure 3. Colombia seen by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs: a fragment 
of the country, and dramatic geographical conditions © RAC 
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Figure 4.  Archival material of the Rojas presidency 1953-1957 without 
preservation © AGN 
 
 
Figure 5. Naval College Location in Cartagena © IGAC (modified) 
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1. Setting the context 
 
Figure 6. Common images of the mid-twentieth century: inauguration Luis 
Angel Arango Library, 1958 © BLAA 
 
 
Figure 7. Prominent figures who took part on Pan-American cultural 
exchanges organized by the ICA © RAC 
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Figure 8. Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"], 
February 22, 1946 © NARA  
 
Figure 9. Latin America as a backyard: “Civilization, the last chance” by 
Herblock, originally published in 1939 ©LOC/Herblock Foundation 
 
 
Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"], 
February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey 
Papers.
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Country Period Years in power 
Argentina 1943 -46 3 
Venezuela 1952 - 58 6 
Colombia 1953 - 57 4 
Paraguay 1954 - 93 39 
Bolivia 1964 - 82 18 
Brazil 1964 - 85 21 
Peru 1968 - 80 12 
Ecuador 1972 - 79 7 
Uruguay 1973 - 85 12 
Chile 1973 - 90 17 
Argentina 1976 - 83 7 
Surinam 1980 - 87 7 
Figure 10. Dictatorships in Latin America during the Cold War. © MPSB based 
on Bethell  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Colombian territory in the world © World Geographic Maps 
(modified) 
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Figure 12. Traditional urban areas, cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants by 
1930s © Mapsof.net (modified)  
 
Figure 13. Rojas’ speech on taking power speech, June 13th, 1953 © El Tiempo 
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Figure 14. Image of public manifestations of support for the regime alongside 
undergoing “works of progress”, 1953 © DIPE 
 
Figure 15. National broadcasting of presidential speeches ensuring wider 
audiences with the use of modern media © BLAA 
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Urban population AAGR AAGR AAGR AAGR 
City 1938  1951  1964 1973 
Bogota  3.44   5.52   7.48   4.72  
Medellin  3.43   6.84   5.24   3.93  
Barranquilla  0.85   5.25   4.08   3.27  
Cali -1.85   7.00   7.62   4.13  
Manizales  0.59   2.99   4.44   0.35  
Cartagena -0.85   2.10   6.16   2.88  
Ibague  0.87   3.71   3.97   2.74  
Pereira  1.80   3.07   5.47   1.70  
Cucuta  1.51   3.99   4.81   5.27  
Bucaramanga  1.52   5.84   6.03   2.88  
Pasto  1.41   3.85   2.58   3.04  
Neiva  1.35   3.02   4.53   3.38  
Santa Marta  0.72   2.76   6.28   2.35  
Popayan -0.58   3.12   4.21   2.01  
Tunja  0.60   2.36   7.35   1.59  
Total main cities  1.43   3.36   6.16   3.86  
Figure 16. Synthesis of Colombian census data 1930s – 1970s (Average 
Annual Growth Rate). Based on DANE 
 
Figure 17. Urban extension Cali 1961: almost duplicated area in a decade © 
OSSO 
 
Data restriction
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Figure 18. Map of distribution of projects in coffee-growing area © UNC 
(modified) 
  
Figure 19. List by region (Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America) of capital 
cities of countries taking part in the program, ICA telegram, 1961 © NARA 
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Figure 20. Scheme of the US cooperation system intertwined with security 
concerns © MPSB 
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Figure 21. Workshop at Inter-American Housing Centre, part of the cultural and 
technical exchanges © RAC 
 
 
Figure 22. Press article encouraging modernization to resemble the United 
States © Cromos 
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Figure 23. Le Corbusier pilot plan for Bogota: mainly focused on the traditional 
centre, preservation of rivers, and road network © FLC-ADAGP 
 
 
Figure 24. Colombian main cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants) in 1973 © 
Mapsof.net (modified)  
  
Data restriction
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2. Misrepresentation of the political agenda 
 
Figure 25. Accelerated construction of architectural and engineering projects: 
Chapel Gimnasio Moderno School © Orduz 
 
Figure 26. UNESCO mobile public library, gaining public support through 
developing social programmes during the construction of the local library 
©RAC 
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Figure 27. Front page: manual of psychological operations © University of 
Illinois 
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Figure 28. Front page: the Art of Camouflage © BL 
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Figure 29. Camouflage, Basic Principles: cover © NARA 
 
 
Figure 30. The government showcased the achievements on infrastructure 
through the media, exhibitions, official reports © DIPE 
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Figure 31. Front page: Camouflage manual of Pratt Institute © TATE 
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Figure 32. Diagram synthesizing key aspects for existing buildings and new 
structures: health and aesthetics along with security © Industrial Camouflage 
Manual  
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Figure 33. Architectural students were trained through camouflage design 
problems © Industrial Camouflage Manual 
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Figure 34. Management of shadows in order to conceal existing or new 
buildings © Industrial Camouflage Manual  
 
Figure 35. Fragmentation of the built space, different material and form to 
reduce visibility © Industrial Camouflage Manual  
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Figure 36.  “Interim Secret” clearance to SOM for projects of Defense 
department and the Atomic commission ©LOC  
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Figure 37. Letter Skidmore’s apology for absence from Princeton University 
meeting in 1952 for being in the South and “Ninety percent of our work now 
is defense work” © LOC 
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Figure 38. CIAM Strategic bombing © ETH Courtesy: Stephen Graham 
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3. The National Plan of Public Works 
 
Figure 39. Infrastructural projects equated development, international airport in 
Cali © Proa  
 
Figure 40. Map of location of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 
1950s, growing number of urban centres in Andean and Caribbean regions 
© Mapsoft.net (modified) 
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Figure 41.  Members of the Currie Mission in Colombia 1949-1953 © The 
Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years 
 
Figure 42. Railways and road network map seeking connectivity across the 
country, but still concentrated in the Andean region © MOP 
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Figure 43. Image of voluminous reports of Ministry of Public Works 1953-1958, 
focused on technical innovations on road and railroad networks  © MOP 
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Figure 44. Table figures by type of projects reported as inaugurated in 1954 
©MPSB based on data MOP 
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Antioquia 5 2 17 11 1 3 3 3 1 5 1 13 8 3 0 0 0 0 76
Atlantico 5 0 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 24
Bolivar 4 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 5 1 2 0 0 29
Boyaca 8 0 22 5 0 4 2 1 0 4 0 9 6 1 1 0 0 0 63
Caldas 3 2 9 0 2 3 2 3 0 0 1 3 3 4 0 2 0 0 37
Cauca 3 0 10 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 22
Cordoba 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 12
Cundinamarca 6 0 24 10 2 6 0 1 0 0 0 11 13 1 0 0 1 1 76
Choco 3 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 11
Huila 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8
Magdalena 0 2 8 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 4 1 0 0 0 25
Narino 1 1 12 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 26
Norte)Santander 2 1 8 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 23
Santander 9 1 6 3 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 6 7 0 1 0 0 44
Tolima 6 1 13 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 5 8 6 0 0 0 0 46
Valle 3 2 17 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 32
San)Andres nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Caqueta nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Meta nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Amazonas nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Arauca nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Guajira nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Vaupes nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Vichada nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Total 61 12 176 50 10 27 11 9 2 13 9 67 56 36 6 5 3 1 554
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Figure 45. Map of distribution of projects by department in 1954 ©MPSB based 
on MOP data 
 
Figure 46. Press clippings emphasizing technical innovations in projects under 
construction © El Espectador 
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Figure 47. SOM’s drawing and model for CAO project: these images were 
widely used to report the project © MOP 
 
Figure 48. Sert and Wiener plan for Bogota, 1952, concentrating the urban 
operation to the historical centre of the city and it immediate surroundings © 
LCB  
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Figure 49. Press clipping about CAOS (i.e. Chaos), discussions in favour of and 
against the project © El Tiempo 
 
 
Figure 50. Ministry of Public Works staff members: notably an important 
number of members were military officials © MOP 
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Figure 51. Inauguration ceremony of the National Plan of Public Works 
exhibition at the National Museum ©DIPE 
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Figure 52. Rojas regime publication entitled: “Policy of Public Works”, 1955 © 
MOP 
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Figure 53. Extensive construction of railroads or roads in order to connect 
different regions © Colombia en Marcha 
 
 
Figure 54. People attended exhibition of National Plan of Public Works: didactic 
explanation through models and perspectives ©DIPE 
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Figure 55.  “Rojas designed the international airport” press clipping, 1953 © El 
Tiempo 
 
Figure 56. Rojas Pinilla in a speech with prominent social and political figures of 
the country, 1953 © Discursos del General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1953 
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Figure 57. Projects in different regions were under construction for extended 
periods: Universidad Tecnológica Pereira © Carlos Drews 
 
 
Figure 58. Featuring and expansion of the construction industry: inauguration of 
the Exhibitions Centre in Bogota, Corferias. © BLAA 
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4. A national project 
 
Figure 59. Political capital built by Rojas, 1953 © El Tiempo 
 
Figure 60. Regional location of facilities in Boyacá, 1954: ensured state 
presence in most of the area © Ochoa Planning Map (modified) 
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Figure 61. Axis from Bogota's centre to El Dorado airport: expedite mobilization 
© MB 
 
 
 
Figure 62. Payments to individuals in administrative files of Ministry of Public 
Works ©AGN 
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Figure 63. Advertisement of US firms and innovative materials used in 
Colombia, Military hospital Bogotá ©Architectural Forum 
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Figure 64. Experts visit, reported in the media: Paul Lester, Le Corbusier, 
Josep-Lluis Sert © El Tiempo,  
 
 
Figure 65. Pablo Tobon Uribe Hospital under construction on the outskirts of 
Medellin © Gabriel Carvajal 
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Figure 66. Civil airports development was a War department programme, and 
this map shows the priorities in the Caribbean zone © NARA 
 
Figure 67.  Blueprint of a Colombian airport: the journal compared it with 
contemporary international developments © ESCALA 
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Figure 68. Image of Latin America routes reconfigured: Colombia as a hub, and 
intercontinental flights via the United States © DIPE 
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Figure 69. Bogota military projects under construction in 1950s, shaped urban 
extension © LCB 
 
Figure 70. The CIA internal report on Socialism in Latin America illustrates how 
nationalism was seen by the US agency. ©CIA/FOIA 
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5. The Naval College  
 
Figure 71. Modern architectural complex © ENAP 
 
 
 
Figure 72. Saturated space at the old naval college (1935) in the outskirts of the 
historical centre, which image resembles colonial features © Corredera 
magazine 
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Figure 73. Along with pointing out the critical condition of urban growth, this 
issue highlights the architectural qualities of the ENAP project in Cartagena 
© Proa 
 
Figure 74. ENAP classrooms: the complex’s educational role seems prominent, 
2008 © MPSB 
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Figure 75. Location of ENAP in Caribbean Sea © World Geographic (modified) 
  
Figure 76. Cartagena’s representative images: Colonial fortress and historic 
centre 2008 © Juan Marulanda/ MPSB 
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Figure 77. Aerial picture before urban development, 1954 © IGAC 
 
 
Figure 78. Mass support for the ENAP to remain in Cartagena ©FHC 
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Figure 79. Location of sixteenth-century fortresses in Cartagena’s bay © IGAC 
(modified)  
Figure 80. Navy sites in Cartagena in 1974: keeping the same locations of the 
colonial fortresses  © IGAC (modified) 
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Figure 81. O&V label of Naval College blueprints showing different years, and 
people involved © AB 
 
 
 
 
Figure 82. Different covers using the same image© ENAP / Corredera 
Magazine / Proa  
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Figure 83. Picture of the original model featuring the proposal of later additions 
(the initial project in white) c. 1970 © ENAP 
 
  
Figure 84. Image O&V Brochure for ENAP project: perspectives without 
reference to the military character of the complex ©ENAP 
Tracing!the!Cold!War!in!Colombian!architecture:!a!disregarded!legacy!!
María!del!Pilar!Sánchez=Beltrán!
335!
 
 
  
Figure 85. Construction blueprints of the cadets’ dining room © ENAP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 86. Annotation in the ENAP logbook about denomination of buildings © 
ENAP 
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Figure 87. Spread sheet of the programme, areas, phases, and values © AB 
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Figure 88. Aerial view of first ENAP buildings proves the difficulty of identifying 
the conformation of buildings © ENAP 
 
Figure 89. Naval College work sketches looking for solutions of the programme, 
O&V © AB 
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Figure 90. Naval College first version of the urban plan: note the change on the 
morphology of the terrain, and a complete different layout, O&V, 1955-1961 
© AB 
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Figure 91. Naval College, approved general plan O&V, 1955-1961 © AB 
Figure 92. Buildings interconnected: transition on interior and exterior spaces 
©MPSB 
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Figure 93. Volume of the dormitories in the 1960s, and 2010: preserving main 
features but the free ground floor © Corredera magazine / MPSB 
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Figure 94. Officials’ assembly in front of the class rooms © ENAP  
 
Figure 95. Dining room elevations © Proa 91 
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Figure 96. Gym perspective © Proa 91 
 
 
 
 
Figure 97. Aerial image of the first group of buildings illustrating the diverse 
formal solutions adopted © Corredera 38 
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Figure 98. ENAP in 1959, during the period construction works were 
suspended © SAMPER/BEER 
  
Figure 99. Geometric composition: detail of celosias bricks to enclose spaces 
allowing illumination and ventilation © ENAP 
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Figure 100. Logbook of the ENAP, rare notes about construction ©ENAP 
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6. Tracing connections 
 
Figure 101. CUA’s newspaper note about Obregon’s involvement in 
contemporary discussions ©CUA 
 
Figure 102. O&V suburbia houses in Bogota: primary experience of the 
architectural practice ©O&V/EM/E 
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Figure 103. Modernist spaces with local adaptations: Hotel Casino Cartagena, 
1955 © CARANGO 
 
 
Figure 104.  Collaborative design at O&V office © O&V 
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Figure 105. Picture of Banco de Bogota in SOM News Archives © AAA 
 
Figure 106. Study and discussion of foreign publications were a common 
practice at O&V office © O&V 
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Figure 107. ENAP chapel, library and cultural centre were presented in sets: 
façades and plans. © Proa  
 
 
Figure 108. ENAP model became the official image of both the National Plan of 
Public Works and Naval College, 1955 © ENAP 
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Figure 109. ENAP still under construction was inhabited by cadets © ENAP 
 
 
Figure 110. Family memories:  surprising modern architecture in a colonial city c. 
1972 © MPSB 
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Figure 111. Characteristic brise-soleils of the dormitories © AB 
 
 
Figure 112. Solar calendar at ENAP since the 1970s has been taken as the 
representative building © Maria del Pilar Sanchez Beltran 
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Figure 113.  Modified perception of spaces through shades: cameras and 
corridors view c.1960s © ENAP 
 
 
 
Figure 114. Multiple schemes of circulation, free plan, and fragmentation of 
components: blueprints of cadets dormitories building © Proa 91 
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Figure 115. Dispersed and elevated buildings to reduce vulnerability and adapt 
to climatic conditions © O&V  
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7. Architecture as political project 
 
Figure 116. Framed projects, Urban Centre Antonio Nariño (CUAN) © Colombia 
en marcha 
354! Tracing!the!Cold!War!in!Colombian!architecture:!a!disregarded!legacy!!
María!del!Pilar!Sánchez=Beltrán!
 
 
 
Figure 117. Transparency and openness in the new architecture: ENAP Museum 
© Proa  
 
Figure 118. Former image of El Dorado Bogota’s airport c.1970s © GT 
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Figure 119. Caja Agraria in Barranquilla, 1953-1961 remarkable example of 
modern architecture © MLR-UNC 
 
Figure 120. Technical detail of Caja Agraria’s brise-soleils: one of its most 
prominent features © MLR-UNC 
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Figure 121. Press clipping about a new project for a bus Service Centre (i.e. bus 
terminal) 1954 © El Tiempo  
  
Figure 122. MOP reports using popular icons to resemble mass support for 
National Plan of Public Works © Un pais que trabaja 
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Figure 123. Image of the elevated pavilions at ENAP: users confronted with 
novel forms ©Corredera 
 
 
Figure 124. Modern spaces carrying a positive social meaning such as Olaya 
Herrera Airport, Medellin © Alejandro Agudelo 
 
 
Figure 125. Universal and local spaces in the interior of ENAP: modern 
construction adapted to the context © ENAP 
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Figure 126. Hybrid and everyday architecture: alternative response to modernity: 
hall inside the pavilions ENAP © MPSB 
 
 
Figure 127. Few architectural projects selected as representative of Colombian 
modernity between 1945-1955: Bogota country club © HITCHCOCK 
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Figure 128. Most Colombian modern architecture has fall outside records despite 
its architectural values, Cali Countryside Club, 1955  © CARANGO  
  
Figure 129. Media coverage helped the dictatorship to shape the representation 
of it and its products © DIPE 
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Figure 130. Revision of common interpretations: alternative view of the ENAP 
dormitories 2010 © MPSB 
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2. List O&V projects 
 
Year Name Function Area City 
1946 Muña Club  social   Sibaté, Muña 
lake 
1949 House Jesus Maria Montoya  house   Bogotá 
1949 Jose Maria Obregon House  house   Bogotá 
1949 House Lucia E de Obregón  house   Bogotá, 
Usaquén 
1949 House Eduardo Child  house   Bogotá, 
Usaquén 
1950 Building to let  house   Barranquilla 
1950 House Adolfo Támara  house   Barranquilla 
1950 House Mario Santodomingo  house   Barranquilla 
1950 House Samuel Martelo  house   Barranquilla 
1950 House to Raffle  house   Barranquilla, 
Pradomar 
1950 House Josefina de Salazar house   Bogotá 
1950 House Roberto Herrera  house   Bogotá 
1950 House William Goad by Post  house   ND 
1951 House Alfonso Mejía Navarro house   Barranquilla 
1951 house to raffle    house   Barranquilla, 
Pradomar 
1951 Building of flats house   Bogotá 
1951 House Álvaro López  house   Bogotá 
1951 House Ilse de Boy  house   Bogotá 
1951 House Manuel Arias Restrepo  house   Bogotá 
1951 Country club with Jorge Arango social   Bogotá 
1951 House Joaquín Villegas  house   Cota  
1951 Muña club  social   Guatavita, 
Tominé Lake 
1952 Building to let and radio theatre  house   Bogotá 
1952 House Carmen A de Umaña  house   Bogotá 
1952 House Heinz Kessler  house   Bogotá 
1952 House Inés y Ana Rodríguez F  house   Bogotá 
1953 House Maria E de Byngton  house 240 Bogotá 
1953 House Roberto Barreto house 274 Bogotá 
1953 House Beatriz Salazar de R house 299 Bogotá 
1953 House Hernando Valdiri  house 418 Bogotá 
1953 House Raul Castro house 586 Bogotá 
1953 House Arcadio Plazas house 327.46 Bogotá 
1953 House Augusto Mechán house   Bogotá 
1953 House Bernardo G Herrera  house   Bogotá 
1953 House Ernesto Martelo  house   Bogotá 
1953 House G Aldana & Obreval house   Bogotá 
1953 House Gabriel Hernández  house   Bogotá 
1953 house in Bogota owner?  house   Bogotá, Bella 
Suiza 
1953 House in Bogota owner?  house   Bogotá, Chico 
1953 House in Bogota  house   Bogotá, 
Usaquén  
1954 Warehouses owner?  industry   Barranquilla 
1954 House Mario Santodomingo house 488.35 Barranquilla 2? 
1954 House Daniel Ovando  house 168 Bogotá 
1954 House Margarita de Gutiérrez house 235 Bogotá 
1954 House Jacqueline de Aparicio house 269 Bogotá 
1954 House Josefina de Reyes house 270 Bogotá 
1954 House Nora O de Arias – house 290 Bogotá 
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1954 House Beatriz Salazar de R house 296 Bogotá 
1954 House Rafael Obregon G  house 301 Bogotá 
1954 House Teresa de Umaña  house 316 Bogotá 
1954 House José Maria Calderon house 348 Bogotá 
1954 House Hernando Murillo  house 463 Bogotá 
1954 House Edmundo Merchán  house 585 Bogotá 
1954 House to raffle Savings Bank house 149.73 Bogotá 
1954 House Jorge Pardo house 222.67 Bogotá 
1954 House Emiliano Posada  house 283.73 Bogotá 
1954 House Juan Buraglia  house 545.14 Bogotá 
1954 Colombian Industrial Bank BIC  house   Bogotá 
1954 Bocagrande Hospital hospital   Cartagena 
1954 Social club  social   Pereira 
1955 House G Bermúdez & R Obregón house 241 Bogotá 
1955 House Álvaro Bernal  house 285 Bogotá 
1955 House Enrique Aparicio house 295 Bogotá 
1955 House José Bravo Lazcano house 298 Bogotá 
1955 House Alberto Marin  house 306 Bogotá 
1955 House Fabio Jaramillo house 318 Bogotá 
1955 House Manuel Pardo Umaña  house 488 Bogotá 
1955 Mortgage central bank employees 
dwelling  
house   Bogotá 
1955 House Rafael Obregón house 341 Bogotá 2? 
1955 William Villa Uribe house  house 435 Bogotá, Chico 
1955 House in Bogota owner?  house   Bogotá, 
Usaquén 
1955 House Bogota, Usaquén house 450 Bogotá, 
Usaquén 
1955 Naval College of Cartagena institutional   Cartagena 
1956 House Inés de Hernández house 179 Bogotá 
1956 House Bernardo Matín house 215 Bogotá 
1956 House Maria Teresa de Pardo  house 282 Bogotá 
1956 House Bernabé Pineda  house 286 Bogotá 
1956 House Benjamín Gutierrez house 326 Bogotá 
1956 House Roberto Wills house 358 Bogotá 
1956 House Jorge Restrepo house 396 Bogotá 
1956 House Andrés Restrepo house 738 Bogotá 
1956 Guillermo Eraso Anexxi House  house 418 Cartagena 
1956 Mortgage Central Bank Houses BCH  house   Cartagena 
1956 House Evaristo Obregón house 543 Medellín 
1957 House Lucia de Obregón house 347 Bogotá 
1957 House Fanny S de Restrepo house 396 Bogotá 
1957 House Pedro Muñoz house 458 Bogotá 
1957 House Carlos Corredor Pardo  house 577 Bogotá 
1957 House Andrés Restrepo  house 606 Bogotá 
1957 House Eduardo Shaio  house 836 Bogotá 
1957 House Rafael Obregon  house 361.43 Bogotá, Chico 
3? 
1957 Jose Vicente Mogollon House  house 410 Cartagena 
1957 Social Assistance of Bolivar institutional   Cartagena 
1957 Social Club Cartagena  Social   Cartagena 
1957 Country club social   Ibagué 
1958 Sanatorium for the mentally ill with 
Ricaurte Carrizosa & Prieto 
hospital   Barranquilla 
1958 House Miguel López  house 400 Bogotá 
1958 House David Puyana  house 508 Bogotá 
1958 House Alejandro Tovar  house 548 Bogotá 
1958 French and Italian Bank  financial   Bogotá 
1958 Emilia Moreno house house   Bogotá, Lago 
1958 House Adalberto Gallardo  house 630 San Andrés 
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1959 (Julio?) Mario Santodomingo  house   Barranquilla, 
Pradomar 3? 
1959 House Julio de Mier Riaño house 252 Bogotá 
1959 House Eduardo Moreno house 470 Bogotá 
1959 House Alfredo Miani house 537 Bogotá 
1959 House Emilia Moreno [same as 
Eduardo Moreno] 
house 483.41 Bogotá 
1959 The national insurance building with 
Pizano Pradilla Caro 
commercial   Bogotá 
1959 Mexico theatre  theatre   Bogotá 
1959 Olympic Villa sports   Cartagena 
1959 American Casino Hotel hotel   Cartagena, 
Bocagrande, 
1959 Eduardo Gaviria House  house   Cartagena, 
Castillogrande 
1959 Periquitos island house  house   Cartagena, 
Rosario Islands 
1959 House Germán Fernández  house 766 San Andrés 
1960 Cervico Shop  commercial   Bogotá 
1960 Pardo Restrepo Santamaria building commercial   Bogotá? 
1960 Caja Agraria warehouse industry   ND 
1961 second place in national contest for 
Agrarian bank building  
financial   Barranquilla 
1961 Marymount School  educational   Bogotá 
1961 Building of flats  house   Bogotá 
1961 Alfonso Mejia Navarro house  house   Cartagena, 
Castillogrande 
1962 Colombian insurance company 
building  
commercial   Bogotá 2? 
1962 Styron plant Bechtel corporation Dow 
chemical 
industry   Cartagena 
1963 Eduardo Angel house  house   Cartagena, 
Castillogrande 
1964 House owner?  house   Bogotá 
1966 Building of flats  house   Bogotá 
1968 Nemqueteba building commercial   Bogotá 
1969 Hernán Echevarría house  house   Cartagena, 
Castillogrande 
1969 Cafe at soda plant house   ND 
1973 Colinsa houses house   ND 
1956/1
957  
Bogota Bank financial   Cartagena 
1963/1
965  
Bavaria Buildings Bachue and 
Bochica at International centre 
commercial   Bogotá 
ND  Mrs Naranjo de Mejia House house   Barranquilla  
ND  Marco Tulio Amaris house  house   Barranquilla, 
Pradomar 
ND  Miguel Correa House  house   Barranquilla, 
Pradomar 
ND  Alvaro Lopez house  house   Bogotá 
 
 
· Synthesis 
total!
137!
111!housing! 81%! 392.52! barranquilla>!15!
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1940s!
>15!
6!commercial! 4%! !! Bogotá>!94!
1950s>!
105!
6!social! 4%! !! Cartagena>!16!
1960s>!
12!
3!industry! 2%! !! Others>8!
1970s>!
1!
3!finance! 2%! !! ND>4!
ND>!4! 2!institutional! 1%! !! !!
!! 2!hospitals! 1%! !! !!
1953=
1957>71!
1!hotel! 1%! !! !!
!! 1!sports! 1%! !! !!
!! 1!theatre! 1%! !! !!
!! 1!education! 1%! !! !!
!! !! 100%! !! !!
!! Before!1955!mostly!suburbia!houses!! !! !! !!
!! After!1955!more!diverse,!still!strong!
private!housing!
!! !! !!
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3. Substantial quotes in Spanish 
Th 
Ch- 
Sec 
Text File pdf 
pg 
Book 
pg 
1.4 Colombia reclamaba eso: un Gobierno que afirmara las 
bases de la nacionalidad, y que se proyectara hacia lo lejos 
en la historia. Personero  de  los  deseos  más  auténticos 
de  Bolívar  y  decidido  a  llevar hasta el final su labor de 
reintegración colombiana, este Gobierno ha iniciado su vida 
en medio de la espontánea alegría de los colombianos. Por 
ello, de movimiento militar, el del 13 de junio, se convirtió en 
movimiento nacional. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953. ELT 
 43 
1.4 Consolidado gloriosamente, con el amparo de la Divina 
Providencia, el movimiento cristiano nacionalista del 13 de 
junio, me dirijo a vosotros con gratitud y con afecto en 
nombre de la Patria, invocando la protección de Dios y la 
excelsitud de nuestros próceres, hoy 20 de julio, aniversario 
de nuestra Independencia. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953. ELT 
 111 
1.4 El conservatismo, que es mayoría en esta corporación, 
tiene en sus programas y en sus tradiciones normas 
fecundas para llevar a término una racional y patriótica 
reforma de aquellos aspectos que las exigencias de la vida 
moderna soliciten con imperio; en las doctrinas de la Iglesia 
Católica tiene el manantial inagotable de la verdad, que no 
perece; en el pensamiento de Bolívar, fanal que no se 
extingue en el señalamiento de sus derroteros ideológicos; 
y habrán de ser ellos lo que lleven a vuestra inteligencia la 
luz que necesita para encontrar las formulas que garanticen 
en fecunda armonía las exigencias del orden con los 
atributos de la libertad, lema de nuestro escudo, y las 
demandas de la justicia en el orden social y económica con 
los imperativos del progreso en todo linaje de actividades. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
13 14 
1.4 Palabras de Su Excelencia, pronunciadas el 17 de junio de 
1955, en el atrio del Voto Nacional, para consagrar a 
Colombia al Corazón de Jesús. 
Sagrado Corazón de Jesús: 
En este día, destinado a honrar el misterio de vuestro amor 
hacia los hombres, como Presidente de Colombia y en 
nombre de su católico pueblo vengo a renovaros la 
consagración oficial de la República y a reconocer que sois 
Señor y dueño de los individuos y de las familias, fuente 
primera de la autoridad y fin último al que deben ir dirigidas 
nuestras acciones y palabras. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1955 
 220 
1.4 Bolívar, Genio Continental: Ambiciosa empresa suya de 
crear una Sociedad de las Naciones de América para 
asegurar la unidad moral e intelectual del Continente. Esta 
concepción grandiosa tuvo inevitables resistencia en ciertos 
caudillos insulares, quienes pretendían que el propósito de 
establecer un Tribunal de Justicia para las cuestiones 
americanas era una imitación sutil y peligrosa del Consejo 
Anfictiónico de la antigua Grecia. Realizado el sueño de 
Bolívar, no hubiéramos tenido que llevar nuestros litigios a 
otros Continentes, donde no se comprenden nuestros 
problemas étnicos, geográficos y políticos. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
56  
1.4 Mostrar objetivamente a todos los que quieran ver dentro y 
fuera de nuestras frontera la nueva realidad colombiana, a 
través las muchas cosas pequeñas, medianas y grandes 
que se han sucedido entre nosotros y por todas las cuales 
asoma el alma popular, desenvolviéndose como un largo 
rollo para enseñarnos su verdadera cara de grandeza, sus 
esperanzas, sus virtudes y sus arrestos impetuosos de 
pueblo altivo y soberano, es el objetivo de esta publicación. 
En riguroso orden cronológico aparecen nuestros relatos 
gráficos reflejando los aspectos más sencillos pero 
Colombia en 
Marcha 
3  
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trascendentales de la formidable evolución espiritual y 
material sufrida por Colombia en un año de gobierno de las 
Fuerzas Armadas. 
1.4 “Paz, Justicia, Libertad”. Bajo este lema que abrió para 
Colombia horizontes de claridad y de esperanza, se inició el 
nuevo ciclo histórico de la vida de una nación que sentía 
temblar los cimientos de su estructura, asentada, 
paradójicamente, sobre el inconmovible granito de los 
Andes. Tres palabras de insigne alcurnia, reemplazaron los 
alaridos de las Euménides sueltas. 
Hoy, limando asperezas, restañando heridas y deshaciendo 
entuertos, el Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas 
reconstruye, con un sentido de humanitarismo cristiano, la 
ruinas morales y materiales de un país que estuvo en 
guerra consigo mismo u con los más elementales principios 
de la civilización 
Colombia en 
marcha 
17  
1.4 Un gobierno de todos y para todos 
Al presentar mi saludo a las clases trabajadoras en el día 
escogido para celebrar mundialmente la Fiesta del Trabajo, 
quiero que se analice serenamente la obra social del 
Gobierno y se diga si en el funcionamiento del binomio 
Pueblo-Fuerzas Armadas, las autoridades en general, y los 
militares en particular, no hemos cumplido fielmente hasta 
hoy los compromisos adquiridos desde el 13 de Junio, 
demostrando que el Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas ha 
sido, es y continuará siendo "un Gobierno del pueblo, para 
el pueblo y por el pueblo". 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1955 
 137 
1.4 Como un día los pueblos del Mediterráneo, los pueblos del 
Caribe tienen un destino común en el cual nuestra posición 
geográfica nos señala como fiel de balanza en el progreso y 
armonía de América. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
45 67 
1.4 Homenaje de la Sociedad Bolivariana de Colombia 
Palabras del señor Presidente, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, en la 
comida ofrecida por la Sociedad Bolivariana de Colombia, 
en honor del mismo, de su esposa Doña Carola y su hija 
María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Díaz, el 24 de Julio de 
1956. 
Colombia siempre responde afirmativamente en sus 
compromisos internacionales y especialmente, en estos 
compromisos del continente americano, responde con 
palabras y responde con hechos; al defender fuera de estas 
fronteras continentales, los principios de solidaridad 
mundial y respeto, por la civilización cristiana y por los 
principios de la verdadera democracia, Colombia, con los 
Estados Unidos, fueron las únicas repúblicas, que enviaron 
tropas a luchar en Corea; 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1956 
 349-
350 
 
1.4 Envío un saludo emocionado en estos históricos instantes a 
las valientes tropas colombianas que luchan en Corea al 
lado de las Naciones Unidas 
Colombia en 
Marcha 
5  
1.4 Los derechos de la mujer: Capítulo al que ya nada puede 
agregarse en la controversia de la ideas es el derecho para 
la mujer de elegir y ser elegida. Colombia –país 
esencialmente católico- no puede continuar negando a 
quienes forman el alma de sus hogares ese sagrado 
derecho, emanación de la misma personalidad y presea de 
la civilización cristiana. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
19 149 
1.4 Solidaridad americana 
En un mundo siempre conturbado por el espectro de la 
guerra, América demuestra con hechos que es el 
Continente de las soluciones pacíficas y de la esperanza. 
La solidaridad americana, felizmente expresada en el 
arreglo colombo-peruano, es hoy más necesaria que nunca, 
ante los inmensos peligros que amenazan a la civilización 
cristiana con el tumultuoso avance del comunismo. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
 173 
1.4 El Gobierno seguirá impulsando el plan de obras públicas 6 Meses de 57  
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que se adelanta con la colaboración del Banco 
Internacional; el ferrocarril del río Magdalena, la Siderúrgica 
Nacional de Paz de Río, las centrales hidroeléctricas, la 
nueva refinería de petróleos, las viviendas para empleados 
y obreros. 
Gobierno 
1.4 Un sol de Paz, Justicia y Libertad alumbra para todos los 
colombianos en este nuevo amanecer, superada la etapa 
de barbarie que nos desprestigió ante el mundo civilizado; 
unidos en fraternal abrazo podremos realizar ya las grandes 
y nobles tareas que nos guarda el destino; nadie nos 
detendrá en este camino de patrióticas aspiraciones, 
porque las espadas que nos legaron los forjadores de 
nuestra nacionalidad, dignificadas aún más por la razón que 
da el derecho, vencerán cuanto se oponga a la benéfica 
unión del pueblo y de las Fuerzas Armadas, y nos sacarán 
triunfantes en la nueva batalla que estamos librando por la 
salvación de Colombia. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
163 190 
1.4 La inauguración de cerca de dos millares de obras en los 
burgos colombianos es una confirmación más de que algo 
ha cambiado en el país. Ahora no hay campo a engaños. El 
pueblo entero tiene ante sí las realizaciones nacidas de la 
buena voluntad y de la inteligencia del Presidente Rojas 
Pinilla. Las palabras dichas no bastarán para convencer a 
las gentes independientes sobre beneficio alguno, si los 
éxitos no tuvieran realidad. El régimen presenta un saldo 
que el país puede apreciar. A la voluntad organizadora de 
la vida colombiana, a la política seguida, a las ideas 
conductoras de este Gobierno bolivariano, nacionalista y 
católico, se unen las realizaciones materiales. Ya no hay 
solamente promesas. Ya existe la manera de hacer un 
balance. El pueblo lo está haciendo, y su júbilo y su 
participación son una carta de crédito y el más codiciado y 
valioso testimonio de eficacia y honestidad. 
Un país que 
trabaja 
5  
1.4 A los ciudadanos de Barranquilla feb 04, 1956. 
Me es grato sobre manera, hablar desde este sitio tan 
propicio a las nobles evocaciones, desde aquí contemplo, la 
magnífica avenida que pregona los ambiciosos proyectos 
urbanísticos de Barranquilla, […] en el propósito de 
alcanzar el destino que nos corresponde como pueblo libre 
y digno de una venturosa prosperidad. 
Oyendo al señor Gobernador del departamento, al señor 
alcalde de la ciudad, y comprobando el unánime apoyo que 
las masas obreras y campesinas, le han dado a su 
representante, se comprende como carecen de lisonja y 
como son ciertas sus palabras, cuando hablan del férvido 
respaldo, que el pueblo del Caribe da al gobierno de las 
Fuerzas Armadas.  
El país no puede gravitar exclusivamente, sobre una 
cualquiera de sus comarcas, su progreso tiene que ser 
uniforme, equilibrado y metódico, el gobierno atiende por 
igual las necesidades, que este concepto impone en la 
tarea administrativa por esto Barranquilla con las obras que 
se adelantan, Santa Marta con su nuevo puerto y el 
terminal del Ferrocarril del Atlántico, Cartagena con su 
refinería, su dique seco y otras grandes obras navales, y 
Montería el más grande imperio agrícola y ganadero del 
país que el gobierno apoya y fomenta, constituyen el 
magnífico cuadrilátero económico y demográfico, sobre el 
cual descansará por muchísimos años, el venturoso 
porvenir del Norte Colombiano. 
Discursos 
1956 ELT 
 46 
1.5 Colombia y Venezuela tienen una misión conjunta como 
adalides del panamericanismo. Por encima de todo, 
tenemos que preservar la solidaridad y defensa del 
hemisferio, haciendo del nuestro el continente de la libertad 
contra la amenaza mundial del comunismo. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
45  
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1.5 Frente anticomunista 
El mundo acaba de asistir con angustia al avance victorioso 
del comunismo en la Indochina francesa. Sin la 
colaboración de la China Roja y de la Rusia Soviética, este 
problema se hubiera resuelto satisfactoriamente hace 
varios años. Todo lo que abandonen las naciones libres en 
Asia, caerá en la órbita de Moscú. Ni Corea ni Indochina 
son problemas locales del Continente milenario, sino 
problemas mundiales. Lo que olvidan los comunistas es 
que la batalla de Asia se puede convertir en la guerra de los 
Continentes. América no puede ser indiferente al colosal 
conflicto del mundo moderno. 
ELT  173 
70 
1.5 Solidaridad Americana  
Discurso para condecorar a los negociadores colombianos 
del caso Haya de la Torre, 13 de mayo de 1954. 
En un mundo siempre conturbado por el espectro de la 
guerra, América demuestra con hechos que es el 
Continente de las soluciones pacíficas y de la esperanza. 
La solidaridad americana, felizmente expresada en el 
arreglo colombo-peruano, es hoy más necesaria que nunca, 
ante los inmensos peligros que amenazan a la civilización 
cristiana con el tumultuoso avance del comunismo. 
ELT  172 
1.5 Alocución al país con motivo del primer aniversario del 
Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas.13 de junio de 1954. 
BIENHECHORAS CONSECUENCIAS 
la impiedad y el comunismo internacional 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
 228 
1.5 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Discurso pronunciado al 
instalar la ANAC.. 27 de julio de 1954. Frente a la 
revolución internacional 
… La hora actual es la del combate definitivo entre el 
cristianismo y el comunismo. Nosotros en América 
ocupamos una posición de grave responsabilidad, por 
nuestra formación espiritual, por nuestro destino histórico y 
por nuestros compromisos con la Republicas amigas. Por 
otra parte, hemos tenido que sufrir en varias ocasiones los 
impactos de siniestros atentaos de típica inspiración 
marxista. Se impone, pues, que vosotros adoptéis ahora 
una fórmula para declarar contrarias a la Constitución las 
colectividades políticas que, como el comunismo, obedecen 
consignas de países que persiguen la destrucción de 
Colombia. 
… Una sociedad que no cuida de su base fundamental, que 
es el pueblo, está no solo injustamente edificada, sino 
expuesta a los peores peligros. El comunismo ha 
prosperado en el mundo, porque la civilización occidental 
olvidó que el sustento era el cristianismo y concluyó 
abrazándose locamente al materialismo capitalista. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
 387 
148-
155 
1.6 Camilo José Cela: Lucharía Colombia en defensa de 
Europa si la Naciones Unidas así se lo pidiese? 
RP: Colombia estaría dispuesta a luchar en los campos de 
Europa en defensa de los principios de la civilización 
cristiana contra la invasión del comunismo ateo y bárbaro. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
28 27 
3.1 EL SENTIDO DEL MOVIMIENTO Discurso pronunciado por 
el excelentísimo señor presidente, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla el 
4 de julio, ante la manifestación obrera 
NI DEMAGOGIA NI CÁLCULOS MALSANOS: Inmodificable 
será mi decisión de calmar las angustias del obrero y del 
campesino, y responder con obras a los anhelos de paz, 
efectiva protección y justicia social. 
53a  72 
3.1 Departamento por departamento, obras inauguradas el 13 
de Junio de 1954. 
Un país que 
trabaja 
12-
281 
21-
330 
3.1 Aún el más escéptico de los colombianos dejaría de ser 
sincero si no reconociera que el país entra al año de 1955 
bajo los signos más favorables que haya tenido en mucho 
tiempo. Paz, economía sólida, estabilidad de los negocios 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
8 17 
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existentes, estímulo para nuevos negocios, incremento 
considerable en todo orden de producción, amplias y 
favorables ofertas de crédito en el exterior y sobre todo una 
fe decidida y valerosa en nuestro propio esfuerzo y en las 
posibilidades del país. 
3.2 Resumen de las obras que se inauguran hoy, 13 de junio 
de 1954: Total 1.422 
Un país que 
trabaja 
279 332 
3.2 El 13 de junio no es una simple transformación política, sino 
una revolución moral que le devolvió a la Nación su 
alterada fisonomía y la encauzo de nuevo en el rumbo 
histórico que había perdido. Esta fecha no marca una 
ruptura de la legalidad, sino un regreso al espíritu mismo de 
la ley, por eso la opinión, sin distingos de clases o partidos, 
reconoce que la presencia de la Fuerzas Armadas en el 
Poder significa la inmediata restauración de los derechos 
públicos y privados, en toda su plenitud y eficacia. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
60  
3.2 A partir del 13 de Junio, fecha estelar para los buenos hijos 
de la patria que son los más y los mejores, para la república 
amaneció un nuevo día. El país encontró nuevamente su 
tradicional derrotero republicano y democrático, y con 
entusiasmo y convicción sin precedentes, va afirmando los 
pilares esenciales de la nacionalidad a través de un 
repertorio de empresas de colosales proyecciones 
históricas, que bajo el estratégico comando de las Fuerzas 
Armadas por medio de su más preclaro exponente, el 
Excelentísimo Señor Presidente, Teniente General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla, aceleradamente se están plasmando en 
realidades tangibles.  
Colombia en 
Marcha 
3  
4.1 Homenaje de la Sociedad Bolivariana de Colombia 
Y en segundo lugar, tenía que pensar en La Paz, en la 
unidad nacional; esa unidad nacional, que todos los países 
del mundo buscan, porque en ella se funda la seguridad de 
la soberanía y de la libertad de un pueblo. Los colombianos 
y todos los suramericanos, para hablar solamente de este 
continente, somos, pudiéramos decir ciertamente, 
nacionalistas, puede que en algunas ocasiones lo 
exageremos, pero todos tenemos que comprender que en 
esa exageración, con ideas nacionalistas, es la que 
mantiene la unidad del pueblo, es la que mantiene la unidad 
de América y es la que garantiza la solidaridad. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1956 
 346 
3.2 La radio debe agregar a sus programas comerciales, 
programas culturales, para que las gentes de todas las 
clases sociales puedan recibir beneficios espirituales de 
ese admirable medio informativo. Así mismo, el cine, el 
teatro y la prensa deben ensanchar los conocimientos del 
pueblo. En el afán de hacer fácil para todas las fuentes del 
saber, el Gobierno está adelantando los estudios, 
prospectaciones y contratos indispensables para introducir 
en el país la televisión. Si en otros países, hasta el 
presente, este formidable medio de transmisión sólo se ha 
empleado para la propaganda comercial, nosotros lo 
dedicaremos preferentemente a los fines de cultura. 
Periódicos fuente conocimiento 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
126 171 
3.2 Piedrahita – construcción del CAN: Pero Bogotá es una 
ciudad desorganizada, incómoda y fea en el concierto de 
las ciudades suramericanas y no hay lógica alguna para 
seguir atándola a situaciones que pretenden ser 
tradicionales y no valen como tradición. En la ciudad es 
necesario seleccionar, preservar y dignificar lo que tiene 
valor histórico, sentimental o arquitectónico, para dejar que 
el resto de la ciudad se abra paso, capte el progreso y se 
ponga a tono con la evolución de los tiempos. 
Ministerio de 
Obras 
Públicas 
11 37 
3.2 Y finalmente muchas personas que no conocen el proyecto 
del Centro Administrativo ni el Plan Piloto de los urbanistas 
extranjeros, han defendido ésta para atacar el primero y 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
23 44 
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ahora no van a poder conciliar sus razonamiento ni explicar 
su encendido fervor histórico, muy loable por cierto y que yo 
comparto con sinceridad, cuando sepan que el Plan Piloto 
proyectaba derribar varias edificaciones históricas, entre 
ellas el Palacio de la Carrera, para levantar unas moles que 
irían a presentar una oprobiosa desproporción en ese 
ambiente y que sólo encuadraría dentro de la gigantesca 
sombra de Manhattan, en la ciudad de New York. 
3.3 Y en tercer lugar, porque en este año se reincorporará a las 
actividades oficiales la ingeniería nacional. Esta 
reincorporación se hará a base de capacidad profesional, 
de responsabilidad exigida y de escrupulosa honestidad en 
la relaciones con el Ministerio de Obras Pública 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
9 18 
3.4 Inauguración obras primer año  
El 13 de Junio significa el regreso de la República a sus 
mejores tradiciones y creencias, el cuidado por todas las 
regiones colombiana, la ayuda económica a los campesino, 
el respeto y la tutela sobre bienes y vidas de todos los 
habitantes, la defensa de la fe tradicional, atención militar a 
nuestras fronteras nacionales, la inviolabilidad de la 
soberanía, el trabajo para todos, la igualdad de los hijos 
todos de la patria ante la ley y las autoridades. Por eso, 
esta fiesta aniversaria es una fiesta de todos los 
colombianos. 
Un país que 
trabaja 
8 18 
3.5 “No son ofrecimientos demagógicos ni cálculos malsanos 
los que me llevan a seguir en contacto permanente con el 
pueblo con el cual he permanecido en fraternal unión 
durante mi vida militar y a través de los soldados que llegan 
de los campos, y de las ciudades a los cuarteles, y que son 
el símbolo perfecto de las masas trabajadoras. Orgulloso 
recuerdo en estos momentos que el dinero necesario para 
terminar mi carrera de Ingeniero Civil lo gané en los 
Estados Unidos, trabajando materialmente, como cualquier 
obrero, en la fábrica Ford, ocho horas diarias, con el mismo 
fatigante esfuerzo que hacéis vosotros en el trabajo diario. 
Al estrechar mi mano podéis sentir aún las asperezas que 
dejaron en ella las máquinas y herramientas del taller. 
Inmodificable será mi decisión de calmar las angustias del 
obrero y del campesino, y responder con obras a los 
anhelos de paz, efectiva protección y justicia social 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
44 43 
3.5 Cualquier demagogia en estos aspectos seria controlada en 
forma inmediata para evitarle mayores  necesidades y 
angustias a la clase media, al campesino y al obrero. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
 403 
3.6 La misión principal de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Poder ha 
sido devolver la paz a la Nación; la tarea que ahora sigue 
es crear la concordia y restablecer el imperio de la 
Constitución y de la ley. Al abrir esta palestra republicana el 
Gobierno aspira a que sus debates estén inspirados en la 
severidad del raciocinio, que se oigan en calma todas las 
opiniones, que se discutan tranquilamente los principios, 
para que de la exposición de las ideas contrapuestas 
salgan triunfantes la razón y la verdad. Aspiro a que los 
partidos olviden sus odios tradicionales, a que cesen las 
recriminaciones y a que nadie vuelva a remover el dolor de 
lo pasado. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
8 144 
3.6 Con la ayuda de la Divina Providencia, cuya protección en 
ninguna circunstancia dejaré de implorar, os aseguro, para 
tranquilidad de la República y garantía de la libertad dentro 
del orden, que cada día será más firme y significativo el 
binomio nacional del pueblo y de las Fuerzas Armadas. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
199 213 
3.6 Progreso General y Uniforme. Para mí, como Presidente de 
todos los colombianos tengo como un axioma que el 
progreso de la Nación debe ser total y armónico. Mi 
corazón de Mandatario se siente orgulloso de esta empresa 
gigante (Siderúrgica Paz de Río) que tanto representa en el 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
86 208 
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oriente colombiano, pero con la misma satisfacción y 
entusiasmo estoy tomando iguales medidas para la 
realización, en el Occidente de una obra paralela a Paz de 
Río por su magnitud y significado, con la cual, al desarrollar 
integralmente la hoya del valle del Caula, se beneficia a los 
Departamento del Cauca, Valle, Caldas y Antioquia, y se 
produce la alimentación necesaria para impulsar hasta el 
máximo la industrialización de zonas tanto del Oriente como 
del Occidente.  
4.1 COMPROMISO INTERNACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD 
Homenaje al Secretario de Estado de USA, 8 de octubre de 
1954. IMPORTANCIA DE LA COOPERACION.  
... por medio de organismos interamericanos que tienen 
funciones y poderes claramente definidos, que por mayoría 
de votos toma sus decisiones para coordinar los esfuerzos 
del Hemisferio encaminados a repeler cualquier clase de 
agresiones o de amenazas de agresión, así como a 
resolver todos los conflictos y todas las situaciones que 
pongan en peligro la soberanía, la independencia, la 
integridad territorial o la inviolabilidad de las fronteras de 
cualquier país americano… 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1954 
76  
4.1 Entrevista con Visión, corresponsal Guillermo Payán -
Colombia Respira 
Cuál es la idea central de su gobierno en materia de política 
internacional? 
RP Colombia respetará los tratados internacionales 
suscritos y tratará de estrechar sus vínculos con el país que 
actualmente rige los destinos del mundo occidental, 
Estados Unidos, y con las naciones hermanas, de la 
América. 
   
4.1 Colombia y Chile  
Palabras de agradecimiento del señor presidente al recibir 
la medalla militar del ejército de Chile, 3 de diciembre 1953 
El Deber de América: Los pueblos de América tienen el 
deber de unirse… a través de sus ejércitos… y porque 
están llamados a un destino común, como son comunes 
sus gestas libertadoras y sus magistrales empresas. 
6 meses 251  
4.1 Acción Popular. La enseñanza campesina 
Discurso pronunciado en la Caja de Crédito Agrario, el 23 
de julio 
… para que nuestros núcleos rurales que constituyen no 
sólo la inmensa mayoría de los pobladores colombianos, 
sino la porción más necesitada de la ayuda común,  más 
dignos, por sus prendas y sacrificios, del apoyo del Estado, 
reciban en su plenitud los dones de la educación. 
6 meses de 
gobierno 
  
4.1 Discurso del Señor Presidente Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, ante 
la manifestación popular de Cartagena, el 11 de noviembre 
1953 
Renacimiento colectivo 
desde el robustecimiento de una política social que mejore 
las condiciones de vida de nuestros trabajadores urbanos y 
rurales, y evite el peligro de la lucha de clases, hasta la 
multiplicación de las viviendas como fórmula eficaz de 
fortalecer el núcleo familiar y darles a los grupos menos 
favorecidos un claro sentido de su dignidad de hombres y 
de ciudadanos; desde la adopción de planes racionales en 
las obras públicas, hasta la defensa de nuestros productos 
agrícolas, sin olvidar reformas fundamentales que depuren 
la justicia, combatan la impunidad y aseguren el 
escrupuloso manejo de los fondos del Estado. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
 531-
532 
4.1 EQUIDAD PARA ZONAS RURALES 
Discurso pronunciado en la Plaza de Bolívar de Bogotá 
ante la manifestación cívica de ganaderos y agricultores, el 
31 de agosto –1953 
…Cuanto hagamos en materia de ayuda financiera y 
6 meses de 
gobierno 
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técnica por la agricultura y la ganadería, transformará a ese 
hombre, por la acción de la equidad, en el mejor y más 
adecuado instrumento de producción y de trabajo. Nada 
podemos recoger de los esclavos y mucho podemos 
esperar de los hombres libres. 
 En términos globales podría decirse que el Movimiento 
Moderno en Colombia, ahora identificado como arquitectura 
oficial del “establecimiento” siguió in recorrido similar al que 
tuvo en otras partes del mundo: lejos del purismo 
esencialista de los años 40, fue derivando en un formalismo 
gratuito que si bien produjo en ocasiones ejemplos 
estéticamente elaborados, mostraba ya signos evidentes de 
agotamiento conceptual. Se empezaron a sentir entonces 
los ataques dirigidos a los distintos flancos. 
Arango 1989  235 
4.1 La Patria, que no es únicamente un retazo de tierra 
delimitado por fronteras convenidas y pactadas a través de 
los siglos, sino que comprende, esencialmente, a toda una 
porción humana ligada por los lazos invisibles de sus 
creencias, de su idiosincrasia, de sus tradiciones y de sus 
creación, se exterioriza generalmente en las obras 
ornamentales y arquitectónicas que plasmaron sus 
emociones y tendencias. 
Colombia en 
marcha 
115  
4.1 Amamos el pasado y lo respetamos con toda la fuerza de 
nuestra alma, pero no podemos vivir como se vivía en el 
pasado. 
Ministerio de 
Obras 
Públicas 
11 37 
4.1 El crédito para la vivienda de interés social, debe ser tan 
bajo como lo resistan las instituciones de ahorro y las 
entidades prestatarias y la ayuda asignada por el Gobierno 
debe aplicarse a la creación de facilidades comunales y a 
cubrir los saldos en rojo que produce la vivienda 
campesina. En el campo, sigue siendo mi  creencia 
inmodificable, está la fuerza y la permanencia de este país. 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
8 16 
4.1 Discurso pronunciado por el Señor Presidente Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla, ante la gran manifestación popular de Pasto, 
el 17 de octubre 1953 
El transporte aéreo es una de las más importantes 
necesidades para el intercambio comercial y mejor 
vinculación y conocimiento entre los habitantes de dos 
diferentes Departamentos.  Con un territorio tan extenso y 
de topografía tan diversa como el colombiano, que requiere 
ingentes sumas del Presupuesto para la conservación, 
ampliación y construcción de las vías terrestres, el medio 
más económico y efectivo para resolver el trascendental 
problema de los transportes, es un plan ambicioso de 
aeropuertos que cubra todo el territorio y, según sus 
categorías, vaya formando y enlazando convenientemente 
las líneas municipales con las departamentales y éstas con 
las nacionales, para incorporar las más importantes al 
tráfico aéreo internacional. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
 440-
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4.1 Desde las reliquias prehistóricas hasta nuestros días, 
Colombia presenta a los ojos de los entendidos una rica 
variedad de motivos de todo orden que sucesivas 
generaciones fueron dejando como testimonio de su 
existencia y como prolongación de sus concepciones sobre 
la religión, sobre la vida, sobre todos los problemas del ser 
humano. 
Colombia en 
marcha 
115  
4.1 Entre todas las capitales suramericanas y de 
Centroamérica, Bogotá es la que posee mayor posibilidad 
de ensanche económico y racional. En la inmensa y 
extraordinariamente bella Sabana de Bogotá, podría vivir 
holgadamente la población total de Colombia. En cambio, 
hoy tenemos una ciudad que con solo 650 mil habitantes, 
tiene una longitud que se acerca a 16 kilómetros y en 
muchos puntos su anchura no pasa de 2 ½ kilómetros. 
Quien sostenga que una ciudad lineal de etas proporciones 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
22 43 
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es el ideal urbanístico, puede estar tratando de hacer un 
mal chiste, pero está solamente demostrando una 
ignorancia culposa en estas material de simple y elemental 
observación 
4.1 Descripción General del Proyecto (El Dorado): La 
construcción del aeropuerto se ha proyectado en dos 
etapas, con dos pistas paralelas, de 3.800 metros y 3.600 
de largo, respectivamente, provistas de sus calles de rodaje 
y áreas de estacionamiento de aeronaves. Los edificios 
para pasajeros, carga, mantenimiento, hangares y demás 
facilidades para atender el tráfico aéreo, están localizadas 
entre las dos pistas. En la actualidad el Gobierno de las 
Fuerzas Armadas está llevando a cabo la construcción de 
la primera etapa, que contempla una pista de aterrizaje de 
3.800 metros de longitud por 300 de años, con una faja 
pavimentada de 60 metros de ancho. Paralela a la pista de 
aterrizaje se ha proyectado una pista de carreteo de 30 
metros de ancho y 3.800 metros de longitud. Se han 
proyectado también las áreas de parqueo de las aeronaves 
y los edificios para pasajeros, carga, movimiento, hangares 
para atender las necesidades presente y las que se 
presentarán en un futuro próximo. 
Ministerio de 
Obras 
Públicas 
18 68 
4.1 El entonces Director del Departamento Nacional de 
Aeronáutica Civil, Teniente Coronel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, 
hizo un estudio comparativo de los dos proyectos y 
presentó un informe al Ministro de Guerra, que concluye 
así, después de analizar el aspecto técnico, el margen de 
seguridad de dicho terreno sobre las inundaciones, la 
posibilidad y facilidad de los drenajes, la geología del suelo 
y del subsuelo, la adquisición de terrenos, el costo de 
construcción, las vías de acceso a la capital, la facilidad 
para una comunicación directa con Bogotá sin utilizar la 
vías existentes, etc. “por las consideraciones anteriores, el 
Departamento de Aeronáutica Civil conceptúa que el 
aeropuerto nacional de Bogotá debe construirse en los 
terrenos escogidos sobre la margen izquierda del río 
Bogotá en el triángulo Fontibón-Engativá-Puente Grande. 
Este concepto que contempla fuera del aspecto técnico, los 
intereses presente y futuro de nuestra capital, podrá ser 
sostenido por el Gobierno desde todo puto de vista y 
defendido fácilmente desde todos sus aspectos” 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
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4.2 A los desafiantes rascacielos u obras suntuosas, este 
Gobierno prefiere la multiplicación de la pequeña y mediana 
propiedad, los servicios públicos indispensables para los 
novecientos pueblos y aldeas del país, y los beneficios de 
la asistencia social para los necesitados de los campos y 
ciudades. 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
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4.2 Nuestro movimiento nacional está en la obligación de 
levantar una juventud robusta y ambiciosa de grandes 
destinos, capaz de emprender una tarea de proyecciones 
históricas. 
Colombia en 
marcha 
175  
4.2 Será merecedor de todo apoyo y estímulo por parte del 
Estado el capital que prospecta, crea y ejecuta empresas 
productivas, que arriesga ahorros que son fruto del mismo 
trabajo; que compromete la técnica de los expertos y la 
habilidad y consagración de los obreros, para producir 
bienes esenciales, y que al pagar salarios adecuados, 
contribuye positivamente a la tarea de elevar el nivel de 
vida de las clases menos favorecidas. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
16 19 
4.3 “La multiplicidad de aeropuertos desarrollará 
convenientemente la aviación de turismo, que constituye la 
base fundamental de la defensa nacional”.  
No son muchos los países que, como Colombia, puedan 
ofrecer al viajero tantísimas y tan bellas oportunidades. 
Desde las heladas cumbres de El Ruíz y de la Sierra 
Colombia en 
marcha 
90  
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Nevada, hasta las ardientes vegas del Magdalena y las 
calcinantes llanuras del Tolima nuestra geografía, como un 
mapa-mundi en miniatura, encierra entre dos océanos y un 
rio-mar (el Amazonas) perspectivas y paisajes 
imponderables. 
También brinda nuestra tierra a la curiosidad de etnólogos, 
paleontólogos, historiadores y hombre de ciencia en 
general, un rio venero de tradiciones y monumentos. N este 
crisol de razas y de costumbres, apreciarán quienes nos 
visiten los fermentos vitales y en gestación de un pueblo en 
trance de alumbramiento. 
4.4 La nación colombiana avanza aceleradamente hacia un 
futuro mejor. Los moldes de lo que teníamos hace unos 
pocos años, ya aparecen pequeños e insuficientes y la 
solución de los problemas tal como veníamos 
contemplándola nos parece hoy anacrónica y a veces 
ilógica y absurda. 
Hay que entrar, pues, con un criterio más amplio, más 
lógico, más técnico y más moderno, a estudiar la nación 
colombiana de hoy, con sus problemas de expansión, de 
desarrollo industrial, de crecimiento demográfico y de 
mejoramiento en el estándar de vida que se traduce en 
aumento de producción, porque la gente consume cada vez 
más y cada vez mejor, lo cual a veces exige un 
mejoramiento radicar en los transportes. La civilización 
actual es función de los transportes en último análisis. 
Una Política 
de Obras 
Públicas 
 25 
1.6 A cerca de España: “Creo que el problema común que más 
nos pueda afectar es la defensa contra el comunismo, que 
amenaza los valores de la civilización cristiana, y, de un 
modo especial, los de la hispanidad”. Entrevista con Camilo 
José Cela, Julio 27, 1958 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953? 
28 27 
4.1 PROGRESO PARA TODOS: Propósito de esta 
Administración es realizar una ambiciosa obra de progreso, 
con el fin de desarrollar hasta el máximo los recursos 
naturales del país, de aprovechar las condiciones 
económicas que se presenten y de llenar todo espacio de 
vida vacío.  
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
57  
7.3 Seguramente, nunca en la historia del país, un movimiento 
renovador, un gobierno, una esperanza nueva, habían 
producido un consentimiento tan unánime y una 
participación tan completa de todos los colombianos. Esta 
iniciativa aldeana y para las aldeas es una demostración de 
que el país entero está en pie y tal vez –por primera vez- 
puede decirse que exista en él el Estado, no ya concebido 
como mera organización burocrática, estrictos cuadros 
administrativos que suministres estadísticas, certificados y 
expidan resoluciones, sino con el significado que al vocablo 
daba el pensador Alemán: “Estado es el ‘estar en forma’ de 
una unidad popular dirigida y plasmada desde el poder”. 
Un país que 
trabaja 
7 16 
7.3 Esa compenetración que no ha sido obra del azar sino que 
tiene sus raíces naturales en la aplicación sincera de las 
promesas oficiales, en el grado superlativo como el 
Teniente general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ha sabido 
interpretar y solucionar los clamores reivindicativos de su 
pueblo. 
Colombia en 
Marcha 
3  
7.3 Con fecha 11 de febrero, la Dirección de Información y 
Propaganda del Estado envió a los alcaldes del país una 
circular en la cual se pidió a los de aquellos poblados que 
no habían iniciado obra alguna espontáneamente, la 
construcción de alguna de utilidad general. La circular de 
esta oficina dice: “La Dirección de Información y 
Propaganda del Estado repite con entera claridad que el 
Gobierno no exige de usted y de esa población gastos 
excesivos, ni siquiera abundantes, mucho menos 
superiores a las posibilidades del municipio; la obra, que se 
Un país que 
trabaja 
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llamará ’13 de Junio’… debe hacerse consultando las 
posibilidades del tesoro municipal, sin exigir a la ciudadanía 
ninguna cuota o contribución extraordinaria (subrayado en 
el original) con ese fin. Mal podría convertirse una fecha tan 
amable para los colombianos, como del 13 de Junio, en un 
motivo de sacrificios económicos o de nuevos impuestos. 
Esa fue la participación de la “DIPE”. Consistió en dar forma 
a una mística que, como siempre, es nacida de los 
sentimientos y deseos profundos de las gentes, no de 
ninguna presión estatal o política, porque de esta manera, 
cuantas obras se deseara inaugurar no tendrían valor 
alguno, y no pasarían a ser armazones materiales de 
asfalto, cemento o piedra, sin interioridad ni sentido alguno, 
y que bien podrían llevarse a cabo al impuso de las meras 
necesidades materiales, cuando el pueblo o aldea se viera 
precisado a construirlos. Un noventa y cinco por ciento de 
los poblados de Colombia está adelantando su obra, 
construyendo, en el ámbito nacional, el monumento –calle, 
hospital, carretera, puesto de salud, casa municipal, “casa 
campesina”, puente- que simbolice el sentido del 13 de 
Junio: eficacia y realismo, sentido constructivo y amable 
dentro de la energía necesaria en la actualidad política de 
este país, como en la de todos los del mundo 
7.3 Barranquilla, que es el primer puerto fluvial y marítimo del 
país y la llave maestra de nuestra economía, necesita 
conservar su merecida fama de ciudad industrial, 
mejorando modernamente sus instalaciones u actuales 
medios de producción fabril. Cuando esté terminada la 
reorganización y seguridad de su Aduana, el Gobierno 
creará, como necesidad de inaplazable urgencia, una zona 
franca que asegure su mayor desarrollo e incremente otras 
industrias. 
El río Magdalena es y seguirá siendo la gran arteria de 
nuestro progreso, y para el mantenimiento adecuado de 
este medio maravilloso de transporte, el Gobierno no 
olvidará lo que significan en la economía nacional sus 
propios problemas y los de sus moradores. 
Dentro de los planes de inmediata realización para 
incrementar el desarrollo industrial y general de este 
Departamento, están la gran hidroeléctrica de la Sierra 
Nevada y la construcción de la Carretera a Santa Marta. 
Con relación a Barranquilla, conviene destacar el interés del 
Gobierno a través del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, para 
resolverle el problema de sus viviendas, especialmente el 
de la zona negra, que se hace palpable en una inversión 
total en terrenos y construcciones de once millones de 
pesos. Además, acaba de expedirse el decreto que autoriza 
al Alcalde de Barranquilla para contratar un empréstito de 
$4.500.000 con destino a la ampliación del acueducto. 
6 Meses de 
Gobierno 
159  
7.3 La idea de darle a la capital de la República una bella y 
moderna calzada, como la tienen las grandes capitales 
americanas y europeas, es conveniente para su 
embellecimiento e importancia, pero la manera como fue 
realizada le quitó su bondad y la hizo ingrata. ¿Cómo 
pueden justificarse las horas extras que se pagaron en su 
construcción, con el único objeto de inaugurar un trayecto 
sin finalidades comerciales o turísticas, y que ni siquiera 
beneficia a los propietarios de zona, que las tienen que 
pagar con el impuesto de valorización? ¿Por qué no se 
adelantó con planos y presupuestos aprobados, y a un 
ritmo de trabajo correspondiente a su ninguna urgencia, 
construyendo primero las vías laterales, para que quienes 
pagan la valorización puedan beneficiarse de su dinero? 
Discursos 
Rojas Pinilla 
1953 
 244 
7.4 Unas palabras dichas por el Presidente Rojas Pinilla en la 
noche del 13 de junio de 1953 lograron plasmar ese 
movimiento, encauzar estos sentimientos para una larga 
Un país que 
trabaja 
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labor histórica, dar a las gentes sensación de que la tierra 
que pisa es suya y de que vivir no es motivo para que otra 
gente las persiga para arrebatarles la vida. Algún periódico 
decía, uno o dos días después del 13 de Junio: “Colombia 
sabe otra vez a patria”. La patria ha sido reconquistada, y el 
Estado ha comenzado a tener existencia. 
 
